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Abstract 
The record failure of development aid, massive corruption, escalating poverty rates, 
resource-related conflicts, systematic exclusion, and general disenfranchisement 
across the East African Community (EAC) puzzle many development experts, as 
they do concerned citizens. Instead of espousing inclusive citizen participation, cyclic 
rounds of national leaders have governed EAC countries using retrograde 
ideologies, depictive of restrictive leadership interests. Underlying these interests is 
usually a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on 
hapless masses. In the process, the leaders methodically personify state institutions 
and systems, rendering them acquiescent to their desires. Over time, destitute 
citizens also submit to the status quo, yielding a cadre of “acquiesced citizens”.  
With respect to the above, the three objectives of this study were to analyse how 
personified leadership styles influence governance and development policies in East 
Africa; to assess the degree of citizen involvement in public governance, and how 
this influences development in East Africa; and to develop criteria for citizen-driven 
development policies that transcend personified governance in East Africa. 
The findings of this thesis will enable citizens, academia, development practitioners 
and other stakeholders to unconditionally determine or guide national governance 
and development agenda. Most importantly, this study has unravelled a new 
approach for analysing national leadership, in a manner that can potentially enable a 
country to identify leaders who can champion effective principles of good 
governance and simultaneously achieve sustainable development. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction  
The term ‘East Africa’ previously referred to colonial territories within the British East 
Africa Protectorate and German East Africa. The term specifically referred to the 
three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Together with Rwanda and 
Burundi, these three countries now collectively form the East African Community 
(EAC). Although the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD, 2019) scheme of 
geographic regions currently lists 22 territories that make up Eastern Africa, in this 
study the term ‘East Africa’ explicitly denotes the five countries that form the EAC 
because of their related history, geography, economies, culture and geopolitics. 
Although co-located within the same geographic region the political, social and 
economic dynamics among East African countries are different. The quality and 
characteristics of governance that shape economic development in the region also 
differ remarkably across the countries. One common thread throughout the region is 
calamities: both natural and man-made. Whereas different countries have developed 
compelling coping mechanisms to address natural disasters, an even bigger human 
motivated challenge looms large – the proliferation of autocratic, repressive and 
unaccountable systems. National citizens and scholars alike have struggled over the 
years to decipher the irony and the tragedy of politically inspired corruption without 
much success. The over-simplifications of the root causes of corruption in East 
Africa are often misleading and flawed. State sanctioned corruption, one of the most 
sophisticated human rights violations in the region promotes injustice, favouritism 
and marginalization of citizens. 
The fact that the region’s political leadership and corruption are intricately interwoven 
calls for a distinctive investigations approach, different from what has already been 
attempted, to understand the underlying dynamics and suggest evidence based 
solutions to deal with the challenge. Accordingly, this study seeks to explore the role 
of national leaders in determining governance and development outcomes in the 
East African region. By all intents, my research does not exhaust discussions on the 
entire continuum pertaining to leadership actions in East Africa. Essentially, I 
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approach the topic from the perspective of contributing to the knowledge gap in 
public policy and its implications for inclusive citizen participation in national 
governance and development. I discuss the ramifications entailed in this topic in the 
problem statement in subsequent paragraphs. 
1.2 Problem statement 
The African Development Bank (ADB) (2017:5) posited that, with an average annual 
GDP growth rate of 5.4 percent, East Africa is developing faster than any other 
regions in sub-Saharan Africa are. Similarly, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2017:2) argued that the EAC has an overall 
combined GDP of US$ 154.9 billion. In addition, Penev and Marušić (2014:38) 
reported that the total inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the region 
increased by 78 percent from $3.8 billion in 2013. Likewise, UNCTAD (2015:34) 
asserted that the FDI to the EAC almost doubled to $6.8 billion in 2015. In 2011, the 
region received $8.3 billion in total aid disbursements, up from $7.9 billion in 2010, 
which represents 18 percent of the total aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa (Teshager 
Alemu & Abebe Alebachew, 2018:50). The region’s main economic activity, 
agricultural trade, increased from $2 billion in 2005 to $7.5 billion in 2008, with the 
entire region (excepting Kenya) exporting more agricultural products than it imported 
(Society for International Development SID, 2012:4). Remarkably, East Africa 
discovered more deposits of hydrocarbons in the two years prior to 2013 than was 
found in any other place in the world (Deloitte & Touché, 2013:11). Uganda 
discovered onshore oil reserves worth $84 billion (Imaka & Musisi, 2013). In the 
same period, Kenya discovered coal worth $40 billion (Obiri, 2014:19). Later, Kenya 
discovered oil that could earn $1.2 billion annually (Otieno, 2018). Meanwhile, 
Tanzania discovered offshore gas worth $27.5 billion during the same period 
(Kibendela, 2013:5). According to the East African Community ‘Vision 2050,’ about 
80 percent (EAC Vision 2050, 2015: 25) of the East African population, that now 
stands at 150 million (EAC Vision 2050, 2015:17) are young. Despite the vast market 
and human resource potential that the population presents; the significant resource 
endowments and development-aid inflows during the last six decades, the East 
African region has failed to translate these potentials into sustainable economic 
growth and development. 
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In absolute terms, 53 million East Africans (38 percent of the regional population) 
lived below the poverty line in 2010 (SID, 2012:5). I argue that poor governance 
attributably drive these ineffective policies. Omwenga (2013:5) posits that EAC 
countries have not improved significantly over time in six World Bank governance 
indicators, which comprise “voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption.” Furthermore, Transparency International (2013:5) conducted a 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) survey on all five EAC countries that corroborated 
the above findings. The CPI survey revealed that, with the exception of Rwanda that 
ranked a decent 49 out of 177 countries, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Burundi 
ranked dismally, at 111, 136, 140 and 157 out of 177 countries, respectively 
(Transparency International, 2013:5). In addition, The East African (2012) has 
revealed that $1.33 billion has been lost in the EAC through corruption over the past 
decade. At the head is Uganda, which lost at least $680 million over the ten-year 
period, followed by Tanzania, which lost $333 million. Rwanda lost $158 million and 
Kenya lost $112 million, while Burundi lost $49 million (The East African, 2012).  
Although East African countries profess to drive their respective national 
development policies, based on sound governance principles, there is a pertinent 
lack of objectivity in policymaking processes. Instead of espousing inclusive citizen 
participation, cyclic rounds of leaders advance regressive policies and ideologies 
that only serve self-centred executive interests. Underlying these interests is usually 
a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on hapless 
masses. The egocentric system allows incumbent leaders to misuse public 
resources to restrain any contenders or to reward their supporters in order to 
preserve their regimes. The most politically attractive reward is appointing cronies, 
many of whom are unqualified, to crucial policymaking institutions. This narcissistic 
action hinders objectivity and impartiality, and consequently mismanagement 
pervades society, weakening it severely. 
Over time, national institutions assume the personified attributes of incumbent 
leaders, rather than espouse democratic national interests. The erosion of 
democratic principles paves the way for massive corruption and donor aid leakages. 
These results in wealth disparities between the ruling class and the masses, which 
lead to the emergence of “acquiesced citizens” – a hypothetical phrase I coined to 
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define citizens who reluctantly subordinate to repressive and coercive regimes. 
Recognising an opportunity to profiteer, some donors exploit this weakness under 
the pretext of ‘assistance’ to ensnare oblivious nations in a cyclical aid trap. For 
instance, a study on trade between the United States of America (USA) with 
emerging markets found that, for every dollar spent on trade, $53 accrued in exports 
to the USA (Jackson, 2012). I argue that this trade imbalance subsists at the 
detriment of the donors’ trading partners. Astonishingly, some African countries 
believe it is opportune to cash in on donors and manage dependence, exaggerate 
despondency, and manipulate aid to obtain resources (Ilorah, 2013:25). Accordingly, 
the poor stay destitute because of this systemic dysfunction while, repressive 
regimes cleave to power at the expense of citizens. 
The following examples shed more light on the above arguments. From the mid-
1980s to the late 1990s, the West labelled a new cadre of African leaders as the 
‘new generation’ or ‘new breed’ of African leaders. This term suggested that these 
leaders governed differently from their counterparts on the continent (Maliti, 2012). 
The administration of US President Bill Clinton used the term often to describe 
America’s newest allies in Africa (Maliti, 2012). Two Presidents in the EAC, Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, were listed among the seven 
new breed of African leaders (Oloka-Onyango, 2004:29). At first, several nations and 
international actors esteemed and appreciated the ‘new breed’ of leaders, yet with 
the passage of time, the so-called ‘new breed’ started behaving like their 
predecessors (Botha, 2012:39). Additionally, the longer these leaders entrenched 
themselves in power, the more inclined they were to pilfer national resources and 
inhibit culpability; hence, advancing contentious governance. Moreover, the turmoil 
and strife that propelled the ‘new breed’ of leaders to power continued to define and 
formed part of their governance strategy. Eyster (2014:28) asserted that corruption 
and poor governance remained perhaps the largest and most daunting issues 
impeding East African development. According to Eyster corruption was so 
widespread and severe that it derailed other initiatives and hindered growth. 
Aside from Rwanda which performed relatively well in fighting corruption, 
experts rated other EAC members quite low. Eyster maintained that, clearly, 
corruption was a large issue in these states, and the GDP per capita reflected 
the strain that corruption placed on a country. For instance, Burundi, with one of the 
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highest corruption rates in the world, also had one of the lowest per capita 
GDP rates (Eyster, 2014:28). 
The underlying causes for the record failure of development aid, massive corruption, 
escalating poverty rates, resource-related conflicts, systematic exclusion and general 
disenfranchisement across the EAC region poses a significant knowledge gap that 
this study investigates further. Similarly, we can trace the inability of many East 
African countries to harness their huge natural resources endowments to improve 
the living conditions of their citizens to the complex interplay between personified 
leadership, governance and development, which is poorly understood.  Therefore, 
the latter necessitates this study to contribute to the knowledge gap. 
Accordingly, this study examines the extent to which personified leadership affects 
governance and development in East Africa. I develop theoretical models on 
personified leadership and compare these to empirical literature highlighting how 
national leadership influences governance and development outcomes. Because of 
the complications associated with personification as described above, I delve deep 
into the background of selected national leaders to unravel the root cause of 
personified inclination. I then investigate the adaptations and responses that citizens 
have developed under personified leadership. Learning more about the relationship 
between personified leadership and governance and development, should help 
citizens participate more democratically in national discourses leading to better 
governance and development.  
1.3 Research questions 
i). Why do incumbent national leaders in East Africa assume personified, 
rather than citizen-driven, development policies? 
ii). How does personified leadership style influence governance and 
development policies in East Africa? 
iii). How can East African citizens influence national governance and 
development policies under personified leaders? 
1.4 Research objectives 
This research 
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i). Analysed how personified leadership styles influenced the directions of 
governance and development policies in East Africa; 
ii). Assessed the degree of citizen involvement in public governance and 
how this influences development in East Africa; 
iii). Developed best-practice criteria for citizen-driven development policies 
that transcend personified governance in East Africa. 
1.5 Importance of the study 
Existing literature is vague on how personification affects development policy and 
governance. There are also no universally accepted definitions of the terms ‘policy’ 
and ‘governance’. The researcher maintains that in the process of researching on 
the subject of ‘personification’, this study unravelled innate factors that motivated 
individual policy and governance actions. Consequently, this study provides a basis 
for leaders, citizens and other relevant stakeholders to find common solutions that 
advance sustainable development policy and governance strategies. In addition, the 
researcher has highlighted how personification results in the creation of acquiesced 
citizens. This study also provided new operational definitions that explicitly hinged on 
theoretical logic substantiating the subject of personification. Accordingly, the 
discussions of key terms preserved the unambiguous testability of hypothesis and 
theory. Thus, whereas the study identified gaps in the current research, it also 
compellingly ascertained the extent to which empirical evidence supports the theory 
of personification. 
1.6 Research methodology 
This study generally undertook applied research to understand the phenomenon of 
personified leadership in order to solve specific, practical questions pertaining to 
governance and development policy in the EAC. From the viewpoint of objectives, I 
classified this research as broadly correlational and explanatory. This research was 
correlational to the extent that it attempted to establish the existence of a relationship 
between personified leadership, and governance and development outcomes. The 
explanatory component of this research attempted to clarify why and how there is a 
relationship between personified leadership, governance and development.  
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With respect to methodological rigour, I identified a broad collection of relevant 
studies, both published and unpublished on the subject of personified leadership. 
The extensive compendium of literature I consulted ensured that the resultant 
conclusions and recommendations stemmed from a comprehensive knowledge 
base. I then summarised, analysed, and synthesised the assembled literature to 
determine the extent to which specific research areas revealed interpretable themes 
or patterns. I determined that each of the research questions demanded a slightly 
different analytical focus in order to investigate the net impact of personified 
leadership on governance and development outcomes. Accordingly, I applied two 
research tools – meta-analytical and content analysis protocols to address the 
objectives, selection criteria, search strategy, and methods of the study. Before I 
discuss the research tools, I have discussed the stages undertaken during the 
research process to collect, synthesise, and interpret the information. 
i). Defining the study focus 
This thesis focused on the extent to which personified national leadership 
determined governance and development outcomes. In this context, my research 
focused on themes I believed define core challenges across the EAC, which 
included deliberately sanctioned inequalities, inability to foster sustainability of 
development projects and lack of well-governed democratic societies. To hone in on 
the research focus, I formulated study questions that guided the development of 
empirical and theoretical viewpoints. I envisioned that the latter would enable East 
African citizens and other stakeholders to address behavioural issues associated 
with personified leadership dispensation. Accordingly, I categorised the questions as 
“what, how and why” to gain an understanding of the effect, effectiveness and 
characteristics of development policies and governance in the EAC. I then traced 
cardinal influences on governance and development to the ‘personified’ decisions 
and actions of national leaders, with my primary focus being persons who hold or 
have held the office of ‘President.’ I also delved deep into behavioural psychology to 
comprehend the cognitive development of persons who eventually become leaders 
with personified inclinations. In terms of geographic coverage, I defined the target 
populations as the citizens of Kenya and Rwanda that formed the case studies. This 
is because Kenya has been the most relatively stable and economically vibrant 
country in the region. Rwanda, on the other hand has faced several cycles of turmoil 
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since its colonial legacy, but has demonstrated remarkable resilience over the years.   
To lend credence to the validity of my research results, I characterised the 
accessible population to include information derived from researchable primary 
databases and publications on the subjects. 
ii). Determining eligibility of studies 
In determining eligibility of literature studies for consideration, I used inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to set the boundaries for the systematic review after setting the 
research question. The above criteria were fundamental to collecting a rigorous and 
defensible set of data for the literature review. The inclusion criteria delineated the 
boundaries of this study by focusing on the type of qualitative and quantitative data 
to include in the study. Essentially, the inclusion criteria defined the key features of 
the target population that I used to answer the research questions. On the other 
hand, the exclusion criteria defined the parameters for the elimination of literature 
that did not conform to the methodological rigour of relevance and logic. Having set 
the boundaries of research, I excluded literature that would curtail the success of the 
study or increase the risk for an undesirable outcome. I also included information 
that was contextually relevant to the themes of this study. 
Both criteria enabled me to identify eligible literature based on language style, type 
of publication, peer review, study design, sample size, context of source material, 
period, data collection method, and the acceptability or non-acceptability of grey 
literature. Based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, I arrived at reasonable 
conclusions regarding the research impact on the external validity of the results. 
Accordingly, end-users can generalize the results of this thesis to understand 
personified national governance and development across other societal settings, 
populations, leadership motivations, and times. 
iii). Literature search of databases 
I conducted online research of databases using the Boolean search technique (Aliyu, 
2017:216) through which I created a structured search "criteria." While reviewing the 
references of article’s and sifting through abstracts, published ‘full-length’ papers, 
and unpublished material. The Boolean search enabled me to refine my searches 
using key words and modifiers. For instance, inserting the word “AND” between 
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terms ‘instructed’ the database to find both terms in the same record; while inserting 
the word “OR” meant that I wanted the database to find either of the terms, and 
inserting the word “NOT” meant I excluded records with a particular term. Because 
this technique is electronic, I rapidly sifted through databases without compromising 
the quality of the resultant material. 
iv). Data sources 
I accessed libraries in Uganda that are located at the United States Embassy, The 
British Council, and local universities. Other sources accessed included the World 
Bank, African Development Bank, Government of Uganda archives, and the National 
Public Library. I also consulted online libraries including Wiley-Blackwell, Wiley 
Online, SAGE, African Electronic Journals, JSTOR, Researchgate and other open-
access or subscription-based University libraries. 
v). Collection and abstraction of data  
I extracted data from primary studies using electronic and paper data sheets. The 
data extraction sheets served as visual representations of the thesis review 
questions, as well as the critical appraisal of studies included in the meta-analysis. 
The electronic information I stored in folders on the computer, served as a historical 
record of the processes leading to the conclusions that I reached throughout the 
review process, and as a repository of data. In conjunction with the data sheets, the 
repository of information clearly highlighted the name of the study, study design, 
name of the author, year published, setting and number of participants. I also 
designed parameters to capture the effect, effectiveness, and quality of governance 
and development systems in the EAC. 
 Meta-analytical approach 
Under this approach, I developed research protocols that subscribed to a high quality 
meta-analytical design. In particular, these protocols identified the extent of data that 
correlated personified leadership to governance and development outcomes. I then 
developed hypothesis to fill in the gaps and tested my theories against a relatively 
rigorous body of homogenous literature. Through the meta-analytical approach, I 
applied a rigorous quantitative and qualitative (re)analysis of literature to reveal the 
biases, strengths, and weaknesses of existing studies. 
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Specifically, using the meta-synthesis technique, I integrated, evaluated and 
interpreted the findings of multiple qualitative research studies. I combined such 
studies to identify their common core elements and themes. On one hand, through 
research integration this thesis estimated the magnitude of the effect size for the 
population in referenced studies. Conversely, the research integration permitted the 
generalization of the meta-analytic findings to other similar contexts. Ultimately, 
using the meta-synthesis technique, I analysed and synthesised important 
components of every researchable material in a process that transformed unique 
results into new knowledge and insights. During the interpretation of the research 
findings, I combined and triangulated the results of various studies to detect 
statistically significant phenomena in personified dispensations. 
In order to aid the process of combining data from various literature studies, I drew 
on other statistical approaches to compliment the ‘random effects model’ that I felt 
suited this particular meta-analytical study. Using the random effects model, I 
conducted a two-stage sampling approach to zero-in on the literature subjects of 
interest in the EAC. This was appropriate because by the time of this study, some of 
the subjects of interest, for example national leaders, had long vacated their 
leadership positions. Leaders whose governance styles are discernible in real time 
are currently holding these offices. Accordingly, in the first stage, I selected studies 
from a sample of literature articles that I deemed were outcomes of rigorous 
scientifically acceptable research. Where feasible, I assembled literature from non-
researched sources in order to accommodate alternative perspectives. I construed 
the first stage to be outcome dependent on personified leadership inclination that I 
treated as a continuous outcome variable in this study. In the second stage, I 
developed criteria where I selected a sub-sample of countries to form case studies 
that are generalizable to other East African countries covered in this study. 
 Content analysis 
Using content analysis, I quantified and analysed the presence, meanings and 
relationships of specific words and concepts, and then made inferences about the 
messages within the texts, writer(s), audience, culture, and time of occurrence. 
Drawing on primary techniques of content analysis, namely, relational and 
conceptual analysis approaches, I enhanced the depth of my inquiry and synthesis 
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of the literature as explained in ensuing narratives. Using relational analysis, I 
examined the relationships between concepts in specific texts. On the other hand, I 
applied conceptual analysis to establish the existence and frequency of concepts 
most often represented by words or phrases in a text. The content analysis tool was 
particularly significant in aiding the analysis of attitudinal and behavioural 
characteristics and impacts of national leaders. The latter entailed the systematic 
analysis of the complex interplay of factors that define the relationships between 
leaders and citizens in personified dispensations. In this respect, the content 
analysis tool facilitated the accurate interpretation of literature pertaining to the 
psychological or emotional state of persons or groups in personified dispensations.  
From the extensive body of literature, I deductively coded texts into manageable 
content categories. The systematic coding of sources by selective reduction enabled 
this study to reduce texts to categories consisting of a word, sets of words and 
phrases. Subsequently, I focused on, and counted the number codes for specific 
words or patterns that were responsive to the research questions. For instance, in 
analysing the effects of personified disposition on society, I used content analysis to 
quantify and analyse the meanings and relationships of concepts, then made 
deductions about the messages within the texts. Essentially, by using content 
analysis, I triangulated data using thematic analysis to identify themes or major ideas 
in documents; undertook computerised indexing of text documents; and described 
features of the text in quantitative terms.  
Where I needed to enhance the application of the above protocols, I used online 
software, for example ‘Text Analyser’ (Adamovic, 2009), to analyse the frequencies 
and distribution of words or phrases. Fundamentally, computer analysis provided me 
a functional alternative to the phrase based coded analysis discussed in the 
preceding paragraph. Through the online software, I gained diverse insights from 
structured and unstructured literature. In this respect, I used algorithms to classify 
phrases from huge volumes of texts that would naturally be daunting for manual 
analysis. Not only did computer analysis improve the consistency of my research, it 
saved valuable costs and time, and mitigated human bias in my evaluations. 
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 Data analysis and interpretation 
In the data analysis process, I used domain analysis to identify domains in literature 
sources, while taxonomic analysis aided my appreciation of the relationships among 
domains. Likewise, through componential analysis, I comprehended the differences 
among subcomponents of domains; and using theme analysis, I appreciated how all 
the relationships link to the subject of study. To enhance my interpretation of 
information, I focused on matters of scholarship, theoretical problems, controversies 
and key findings in literature.  
The phenomenological approach to qualitative methodology, allowed this study to 
draw inferences on individuals' subjective experiences and interpretations of the 
world. This approach was particularly important in analysing the intrinsic factors that 
galvanised people to assume personified inclinations. The qualitative methodology 
was instrumental in synthesising information about how people think, feel and act, 
and what they know. From the information I collected on different national leaders, I 
triangulated, contrasted and validated the data to ascertain if it yielded similar or 
conflicting results. Likewise, using the historical approach to qualitative methodology, 
I traced and discussed personified leadership from the advent of national 
independence in the 1960’s to the current social, cultural, economic and political 
affairs in East Africa. In addition, using this approach I reflected on the historical 
context of this study, and formulated possible solutions to cyclical challenges 
associated with personified governance and development. I then explored the 
genesis of personification in East Africa’s political domain, investigated the historical 
roles EAC citizens have played in encouraging or mitigating personified 
dispensations, and identified the likely directions for future research on the subject.  
Basically, from the methodical interpretation process, I identified and conceptualized 
significant considerations  from complex findings by answering questions on the 
research findings. In this respect, I developed inferences by comparing my findings 
with information garnered from related literature and previous research. In order to 
draw logical and scientific conclusions from my qualitative data, it was essential to 
quantify the data. Accordingly, I subjected my findings to quantitative analysis in 
order to numerically represent and manipulate qualitative deductions for purposes of 
describing and explaining the phenomena in the observations. By coding data as 
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explained in section 1.7.2 of this study, I identified emerging patterns that I quantified 
to determine the size of the effect in subject analyses. In order to ensure the integrity 
of this approach, I organised data in categories that related to particular areas of 
interest, for example, influences of national leaders on governance and development 
in East Africa in the post-independence era. Through coding, I constructed a 
category system that allowed systematic categorization of all the assembled data. By 
coding information, filtered, highlighted, and focused the salient features of the 
qualitative data record where I generated categories, themes, and concepts, as well 
as grasped meaning, and built theory. 
From the above processes, I was able to develop subjective conclusions and 
recommendations from this study that are scientifically grounded and generalizable 
to other contexts. 
 Ethical considerations 
In drawing ethical protocols for this study, I contemplated whether the research 
questions I designed were worth examining, and if the literature review methodology 
were an effective way of answering the questions. Similarly, I deemed it ethical to 
consider how this research can best expound on the work that other scholars have 
accomplished on the subject. Accordingly, I conducted the research cognizant that 
my use of processed and (re)packaged data is subject to intellectual property rules 
and where necessary, the consent of the authors/owners of literature. Whereas I 
take full responsibility for the originality of my work, in my citations and references I 
acknowledge the efforts and contributions of other writers. Furthermore, I 
engendered core values such as honesty, respect, and fairness, in my discussions of 
the study subject’s limitations as well as social and emotional statuses. I 
endeavoured to maintain the integrity of the arguments and thought-lines of the 
original authors quoted in this study without compromising my own subjective 
reasoning. I avoided perceptions of victimisation and maintained confidentiality 
where explicitly required by the authors. Overall, I applied the principles of utility, 
feasibility, propriety, accountability, and accuracy to all processes of the study. 
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1.7 Limitations of the study 
i). Third-party reporting and restrictive environments in some countries 
limited accurate data collection on the values, power relations and 
individual actions of leaders. 
ii). The overtly subjective sampling procedure applied in the study 
decreased the representativeness of the sampled material relative to 
the geographic area of coverage.  
iii). To avoid being rigidly prescriptive, I restricted the definition of 
“personified” to the context of national governance and development. 
iv). Because of the secrecy surrounding leaders and citizen behaviours, 
some research outcomes were attributional or approximate due to the 
limited resources or capabilities to observe behaviours. 
v). A study of longitudinal effects, such as the length of time that I required 
to research the problem exhaustively, for example leadership evolution 
and transformation, was objectively infeasible. 
vi). Even though East Africa has 22 countries, this study is limited to the 
five counties within the EAC, namely: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi, while the case studies are limited to two 
countries, that is, Kenya and Rwanda. 
vii). The analysis of personified leadership will be limited to an assessment 
of its links with governance and development. 
1.8 Clarification of terms 
i). ‘Personify’ means the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique 
personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.” 
ii). ‘Policy’ means the “lines of argument rationalising government 
decision, typically intended to influence and determine a course of 
action.” 
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iii). ‘Governance’ is the conscious exercise of conferred (or inferred) 
authority, whether individual or collective to lead, control and steer 
directions and decisions of society and institutions. 
iv). Development implies “a desirable and positive economic, political, 
social and cultural initiative aimed at transforming a situation.” 
v). ‘Acquiesced citizens’ is a term coined to describe national citizens who, 
as a result of devious exclusion and de-legitimisation, reluctantly 
accept to be governed under repressive and coercive regimes 
vi). ‘Impersonation’ means ‘an act of pretending to be another person for 
the purpose of entertainment or fraud (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016).” 
1.9 Conclusion of Chapter One 
Chapter One highlighted the paradox pointing to the fact that although the EAC was 
the fastest growing region in sub-Saharan Africa with significant resource 
endowments, economic growth and development had not yielded concomitant 
results. A significant number of the population still lived on less than $1 a day, a 
figure below the poverty line of $1.25 a day. The region also faced extreme levels of 
corruption, with the exception of Rwanda, which attempted to espouse good 
governance ideals. Similarly, the record failure of development aid and the existence 
of massive corruption, escalating poverty rates, resource-related conflicts, 
systematic exclusion and general disenfranchisement across the region still puzzled 
many development experts. 
In the above respect, this thesis linked governance and development challenges to 
individual actions/inactions of national leaders. The researcher argued that, over 
time, national institutions assumed the personified attributes of incumbent leaders, 
rather than pursuit of democratic national interests. Subsequently, a disenfranchised 
and disempowered population, subsisting under personified regimes, resulted in the 
emergence of “acquiesced citizens” – a hypothetical phrase I used to define citizens 
who reluctantly subjected themselves to repressive and coercive regimes. 
Accordingly, in subsequent discussions, this theoretical and empirical study on the 
subject of personification unravelled and offered solutions to the problem of poor 
policies in the EAC. Using a case study of Rwanda and Kenya, this study developed 
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suggestions to emancipate acquiesced citizens to foster their democratic 
participation in national governance, and development. 
Chapter One also outlined the methodology I used to solve the problem of 
personified leadership dispensation. Particularly, I outlined the rigorous criteria 
undertaken to prove the hypothesis of this study. The methodology entailed a 
complex mix of approaches that outlined how I collected and analysed the 
appropriate data. In this respect, I applied universally recognized analytical methods 
to test and validate the theory of personification. With respect to interpretation, I 
organised data extracted from literature review that I refined for better analysis. 
In the subsequent chapters, I endeavoured to ground this study in literature by 
developing definitions, arguments and an analytical framework regarding the theory 
of personification. This grounding was beneficial in aiding the identification of the key 
elements of this study that I discussed, as well as the relationship of these elements 
to one another, especially for the chapter on empirical analysis. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL/EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I developed definitions, arguments, as well as analytical and 
conceptual frameworks pertaining to the theory of personification. I highlighted that 
this theory fosters an understanding on how cognitive development, social 
interactions and ecological factors shape an individual’s behavioural inclination, 
which in turn determines the individual’s leadership trajectory. Likewise, I argue that 
this theory enabled readers to comprehend how a personified disposition in national 
leaders (or citizens) affects their ability to implement egalitarian governance and 
development programmes. From this theory, I then derived a testable proposition on 
personified behavioural disposition in national leaders. Subsequently, I analysed 
literature to determine the effects of leadership actions on including citizens in 
national governance and development. I then concluded by ascertaining the role of 
citizens’ in mitigating or catalysing the emergence of personified national systems.  
Ultimately, I rationalised that the theory of personification enables citizens and other 
stakeholders to understand their leaders better, to the extent that they could 
participate more productively in national governance and development. Accordingly, 
Chapter Two started with a detailed analysis on the theory of personification to set a 
foundation for subsequent discussions. In succeeding paragraphs, I correlated the 
theory of personification with personality psychology, development philosophy, and 
finally, the concept of leadership. I deliberately elected these themes because this 
study theorised that personality traits determine leader development over time. 
Similarly, I reasoned that the predictive power of personality psychology also 
correlates with national development. This chapter ended with a brief conclusion on 
the discussions and provided a synoptic indication of the ensuing literature. 
2.2 Theoretical and empirical dimensions of the theory of personification  
Despite the significance of the theory of personification, there is limited or no 
reference in social research literature to how personified systems relate to national 
governance and development. While a few researchers have made credible attempts 
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to discuss personality concepts and personalised leadership, none of them explained 
the subject of personified leadership within the context of this study. However, this 
study hypothesised that personality, a component of the theory of personification 
denotes the manner in which individual’s reason, comprehend and respond relative 
to the external domain. Conversely, personified policies that are antecedent to 
personalised systems constitute the primary impediment to positive governance and 
development outcomes. However, the above hypotheses required a correlation with 
the concept of leadership to comprehensively exemplify the theory of personification. 
In the process of assembling relevant literature on personified leadership, I observed 
that scholars frequently encountered a broad, and at times, very perplexing corpus of 
literature that exemplifies the complexities in analysing national leadership. By the 
time of this research, no theory had yet captured holistic national leadership 
dynamics to the extent that it is empirically relatable to this study. It is even more 
frustrating to interested parties like citizens and other stakeholders that existing 
attempts to explain leadership theories are largely marginal, disparate and 
contradictory. This study therefore established an analytical and theoretical 
framework to discuss issues pertaining to how personified leadership relates with 
governance and development in order to plug the gaps in literature.  
In subsequent paragraphs, I presented an overview of the proposed theory of 
personification. I then explored key concepts that constitute building blocks of this 
theory. The process entailed conceptualising why incumbent national leaders in East 
Africa assume personified, rather than citizen-driven, development policies; how 
personified leaders influence governance and development policies in East Africa, 
and the extent to which East African citizens influence national governance and 
development policies under personified leaders. Furthermore, the study drew on the 
operational definitions of the key terms including: personify, policy, governance, 
development, acquiesced citizens, leadership and impersonation in section 1.8, to 
build up arguments in the analytical and conceptual framework. In Chapter Three, I 
utilised philosophical concepts of governance and development to strengthen my 
discussions in Chapter Four on the empirical conducts of personification. 
Fundamentally, Chapters Three and Four link the theories covered in this study to 
practical experiences using Kenya and Rwanda as case studies. 
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There have been several studies that have examined the complex interplay between 
national leadership, governance and development. However, the impact of 
personified leadership on the above factors in the EAC, or anywhere else, is not well 
developed or is completely lacking in the literature. Therefore, this thesis proposes a 
conceptual framework to fill this gap. In this respect, I developed inferences, 
conclusions and recommendations based on the conceptualization and a review of 
literature regarding four theoretical fields namely: leadership, personality psychology, 
governance and development to address the knowledge gap. I included personality 
psychology because it brings to the fore the intrinsic factors that motivate the actions 
of leaders and their follower alike. In this context, I proposed a multidisciplinary 
conceptual framework that highlights the occurrence and dynamics entailed in 
personified leadership, governance and development.  
The framework I proposed hinges on three main concepts: 
a) The first concept is that leadership is a phenomenon that stems from 
perspectives a leader develops at childhood formative stages that external 
influences later reinforce in life. Eventually, these influences define whether 
the relationship a leaders has with followers are collaborative, passive or 
conflicting. In this context, leaders enjoy a mutually commutative influencing 
relationship with their followers. Essentially, both leaders and their followers 
both wield legitimate and illegitimate positional powers. Thus, whereas the 
leader’s authority to act is based on a constitution, a decree or brute force, 
egalitarian or selfish interests drive the motivations behind either action. In 
other words, leaders may choose to include or exclude citizens in participating 
in national discourses; however, the leader retains the final verdict over the 
decision-making process. I maintain that insight or advice from experts or 
institutions usually back an incumbent leader’s decisions. Once egocentrism 
perpetually blocks the leader’s discretionary vision, the phenomenon this 
study labels “personified leadership” kicks in. Once personification sets in, the 
leader systematically takes over decision-making processes in all national 
institutions. Over time, these institutions start echoing the essential character 
of the leader. Conversely, this study theorizes that depending on their 
interests, citizens have a role in perpetuating or mitigating personified 
leadership. In due course, citizens become acquiesced to personified 
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leadership dispensations which ‘overpowers’ the citizens using coercive 
means, including disenfranchisement. The ultimate catalytic effect of 
personified leadership is poor national governance that ultimately 
compromises state institutions and diminishes development outcomes. 
b) The second concept is the subject of national governance within the context 
of personification. In most articulations, the terms “government” and 
“governance” are alternately used to signify the exercise of authority in any 
designated domain, for instance, an institution or state. As signified above, the 
conceptualization of the term ‘governance’ is deemed too confusing, a factor 
that has reduced the term to a buzzword in various circles. In order to 
enhance its unrestricted applicability to wide-ranging parameters, the prefix 
“good” is attached to “governance”, to read ‘good governance.’ This also has 
now become a contestable mantra alluding to good conduct of governmental 
and bureaucratic processes. The above discussions highlight the knowledge 
gap in conceptualizing the term ‘governance.’ In this respect, I have reviewed 
the different aspects of the theory of governance in order to unravel empirical 
support for the term in the literature. Furthermore, this study attempts to 
provide a functional definition of the word ‘governance’ as the conscious 
exercise of conferred (or inferred) authority, whether individual or collective to 
lead, control and steer directions and decisions of society and institutions. The 
underlying factor in this definition is the hypothesis that governance assumes 
multiple ‘structural and procedural’ dimensions depending on the objectives 
and actions of the person(s) in control.  
Unfortunately, literature often ignores the motivating factor behind leaders 
who determine governance outcomes. Whereas available literature on 
governance competently illustrates particular modes of governance, there is 
still a significant gap in the demonstration of the longitudinal impact of 
personified leadership on various modes of governance. Accordingly, this 
thesis provides a conceptual framework to analyse and conceptualise the 
inherent dynamics in countries struggling to establish democratic systems but 
is challenged by the personified mode of governance. Furthermore, this study 
opens up avenues for new research by concurrently analysing the paradoxical 
21 
 
impacts of personified governance in light of its positive and negative impacts 
on national development. This conceptual framework provides a contextual 
perspective when analysing empirical dimensions of personified governance 
later in this study. Contemporary debates on alternative modes of governance 
underscore the ineptitude of nations to develop objective policies largely due 
to loss of institutional independence. This study recognizes this gap, and the 
need to address the vulnerability of governance institutions that the 
researcher attributes to personified leadership. To this end, this framework 
provides a means to understand the complex labyrinth of interactions between 
national governance institutions, non-state actors and citizens, all of whom 
contribute to governance. Thus, it is apparent that the principal component in 
any governance system is the reciprocal unencumbered respect in the 
relationships among actors. Unfortunately, we note the absence of mutual 
respect in many governance frameworks in East Africa resulting in conflict 
between the actors involved.  
Therefore, this theoretical framework on governance identifies a good-practice 
relationship between national leaders and governance institutions, whose 
conceptualization will go unnoticed without this study. Ultimately, this thesis 
develops a framework of governance for policy analysis, based on the 
accessible literature, which can be beneficial in advancing national 
development. In trying to develop a pragmatic testable hypothesis of 
governance, I encountered a complex interplay of factors that shed more light 
on why certain critics feel ‘governance’ is a fluid concept. 
c) The third concept is the subject of national development within the context of 
personification. This conceptual analysis traces the major concepts of 
development in order to build the theoretical framework of personified 
development. The methodology I have applied in this study covers literature 
review, data analysis and synthetization of data categories to deduce similar 
meanings and themes that will result in the creation of independent concepts 
on the subject of development. This study conceptualizes that national 
governance has causal effect on national development. By theoretical 
deduction, I argue that national leaders have a direct influence on governance 
and development outcomes. Despite its significance, there is limited or no 
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literature linking a leaders’ cognitive development process to national 
development outcomes. Kaufmann (noted in Grindle, 2007:4), corroborates 
my argument in asserting that “the link between governance and development 
is more than correlational, rather, it is causal since good governance makes 
development possible.” I postulate that the use of the term ‘good governance’ 
in relation to development means that in the minimum, some singular or 
several actions need to be wholesome and appropriate for development to 
occur. I attribute the assurance of these ‘good’ actions to national leaders who 
hold the final verdict in national decision-making. In yet another complex 
interplay of concepts, this study investigates the intrinsic factors that inspire 
national leadership action(s) on development through governance as a 
transitional conduit. However, a critical review of the diverse literature on 
development reveals lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework for 
understanding the intricacies of personified development.  
Accordingly, this study synthesises the interdisciplinary literature on national 
development theories and empirical works, and then uses conceptual analysis 
to tease-out patterns and similarities within the literature. Subsequently, I 
applied conceptual labels in order to interpret the data and derive arguments, 
conclusions and recommendations. In this respect, I reviewed competing 
theories of development in order to comprehend various development 
processes with the aim of motivating discussions on diverse development 
challenges. I began by reviewing structural change theories and then 
transition to classical development theories in order to juxtapose their 
arguments on resource management economic investments and institutional 
frameworks with the theory of personification. I rationalized why the theory of 
personification provides a more comprehensive outlook of development over 
and above the structural and classical theories. I then embarked on exploring 
international relations theories to comprehend how nation states behave and 
interact in an international setting. Because of its key role in international 
relations, I successively reviewed political theories in order horn in on how 
individuals are organised politically across different configurations of power. 
Whereas both international relations and political theories furnished me with a 
wealth of information on how actors behaved on unique local and international 
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settings, the theories came short in describing personification within the same 
contextual settings.  
Subsequent to the above, I analysed policy theories in the quest to 
understand how actors make, influence or are influenced by ‘courses of 
action.’ I provided a rational synopsis of policy theories in terms of its 
complexity and diversity in light of its enabling potential for implementation or 
mitigating role. Despite the limitations, the reviewed theories face at 
conceptualization, each analysis offered me commendable insights into policy 
implementation processes. From the foregoing, I offer an assessment of the 
benefits, costs, and risks of these theories. I also explored the implications of 
these frameworks on governance and development. The theories were also 
instrumental in highlighting the extent of leadership influence on policy 
institutions and on the other hand, modelling citizen amenability to policy 
decisions, and the overall impacts of those decisions. I then embarked on 
analysing demographic theories that integrate several theoretical concepts 
into a dynamic framework. My analysis spanned across local and international 
socio-economic and political forces that influence three cardinal demographic 
processes namely: fertility, mortality, and migration. I hoped to conceptualise 
the extent to which demographic theories have predictive value on the 
processes that shape national development in developing countries. However 
like other previous theories, the analysis of demographic theories was equally 
fraught with shortcomings; for instance, there is no conceptual rationalization 
on how fertility results in a demographic transition. Conversely, the theory of 
personification attempted to re-interpret and conceptualise various 
demographic concepts in order to address the gaps presented by 
shortcomings in theories. 
As is evident from the above discussions, the analysed theories and literature 
pose more questions than answers. In this regard, the theory of 
personification offers alternative conceptualization to address the gap in 
literature unravelled in the review. Thus, the main building blocks of the 
conceptual framework on ‘personification’ are actors, their stakes and the 
relative power they exert to pursue these interests, as well as the institutions 
and systems in which these actors operate. The specific building blocks 
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consist of governance frameworks, development contexts, government 
institutions, national leaders, citizens and the international community. 
 Unravelling the epitome of personification 
The Free Dictionary online (2016) defined ‘epitome’ as a representative or perfect 
example of a class or type. Likewise, The Cambridge Dictionary online (2016) 
defined the epitome of something as the “typical or highest example of a stated 
quality, as shown by a particular person or thing.” The Urban Dictionary (2016) 
provided the most contextually relevant definition of ‘epitome’ as being a perfect 
example of a certain quality someone, or something that "personifies" this said 
quality. Accordingly, this section delineated distinctive subjects, on the subject of 
personification, to illustrate the ‘perfect example’ of certain leadership qualities. In so 
doing, this study tried to understand how we could measure and perhaps project 
specific leadership behaviour. The researcher also explained what behaviours are 
associated with personified leadership. Halpin (1956:172) argued that if we 
concentrate on analysing how leaders behave under different situations, we would 
substantially enrich our understanding of leadership phenomena. Halpin maintained 
that it is not easy to accomplish this shift in viewpoint, because many beliefs that 
were not in accord with behavioural facts encumbered our ways of thinking about 
"leadership.” In addition, Halpin posited that the term ‘leadership’ evoked strong 
personal views that were sentimental, and this further complicated the dilemma 
associated with the concept. According to Halpin, to be a leader is "good" and 
therefore it is good to lead, so he argued that everyone should visualise himself or 
herself as a leader. In this respect, Halpin argued that, instead of applying scientific 
rigour, most people tended to verbalise leadership largely as a catchphrase. Halpin 
(1956:172) underscored the point that the ambiguity of our definitions of the term 
‘leadership’ limited our use of this term to ‘a rallying cry.’ In consonance with Halpin’s 
views, I attempt to unravel and expound on the ‘value-laden’ concept of personified 
leadership. This section ultimately guides the reader to conceptualise more 
absorbingly, the aggregate impact of personified leadership on critical national pillars 
of governance and development.  
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 Meaning of personification 
The Free Dictionary offered two contextually relevant definitions of the verb 
‘personify’. The general English or Thesaurus version of the Free Dictionary defined 
‘personify’ as: “1) to think of or represent (an inanimate object or abstraction); as 
having personality or the qualities, thoughts, or movements of a living being; 2) to 
represent (an object or abstraction) by a human figure, 3) to represent (an abstract 
quality or idea), and 4) to be the embodiment or perfect example of.” The legal 
dictionary defined the verb ‘personify’ as “to ascribe personal qualities to be the 
embodiment, characterize, copy, embody, embrace, humanize, incarnate, manifest, 
orationem attribuere, symbolize, treat as human, and typify.” Conversely, the 
Encyclopædia Britannica defined ‘personify’ as a “transitive verb that means 1) to 
conceive of or represent as a person, or as having human qualities or powers: 
impute personality to; and 2) to be the embodiment or personification of; incarnate.” 
I used a content analysis program that coded the above definitions for specific words 
and configurations that were responsive to the focus of my inquiry. As a result, I 
identified occurrences of words that were contextually relevant to the subject of 
personification. The program revealed that each of the verbs represent and personify 
appeared four times. The program also revealed that each of the explicatory words 
qualities, human and embodiment appeared thrice. Similarly, the words personality, 
object, incarnate, having and abstraction appeared twice. Because of their 
inapplicability, in the above analysis this study did not consider the usage and 
frequency of indefinite articles that introduced new concepts into a discourse; 
conjunctions that connected words, phrases or sentences together; and prepositions 
that described connections linking portions of a sentence. 
Accordingly, this study defined ‘personify’ as “an abstract attributable to a unique 
personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.” Therefore, in this study, the 
term ‘personification’ means the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique 
personal or human characteristic, especially national leadership.” 
 Transformative stimuli of personified disposition 
Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:228), in discussing personification, illustrated that 
the contemporaneous experiences [of phenomena like personification] are not 
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absolutely tangible (i.e., they are not colours, tastes and so on), but are rather 
abstract attributes (e.g., personality types). Moreover, sometimes personality types 
in ‘sequence-personality synaesthesia’ suggested that the simultaneous experiences 
in social descriptions fit in relational domains. Thus, Amin, Olu-Lafe, Claessen, 
Sobczak-Edmans, Ward, Williams and Sagiv; and Simner and Holenstein (as noted 
by Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229) argued that “these experiences reflected 
individual characteristics (gender, personality, physical appearance, cognitive 
abilities, occupation, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, inclinations) besides 
‘social interactions’ between inducers (e.g., emotive and behavioural responses to 
other units).” As Smilek, Malcolmson, Carriere, Eller, Kwan and Reynolds (noted in 
Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229) observed, we can group social and affective 
qualities ascribed in sequence-personality synaesthesia into four distinct types: 
“physical (gender, physical appearance), personal (cognitive abilities, occupation, 
personality, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, and inclinations), relation 
(emotive and behavioural responses to other units) and social role (occupation, 
familial and non-familial relationships).” 
I pointed out that the above literature corroborated the theoretical argument of this 
study that mental states, moods and attitudes precipitated specific behavioural 
responses in personalities. This study argued that by inference, mental states, 
moods and attitudes characterised the personalities of individual national leaders, 
and hence their governance styles. In essence, behavioural stimuli in national 
leaders directly influenced the ultimate course of their social, political and economic 
interests and inclinations. Accordingly, in order to understand the primary actions 
and ideological inclinations of national leaders, one must first analyse their 
behavioural dispositions. Hence, through behavioural analysis experts could 
decipher personality traits that drive national policies and governance styles. 
Underwood offered an in-depth discussion on “the psychology of personality.” 
According to Underwood (2002:109), unlike in personality theories, “experts 
universally recognized that varying degrees of situational factors influenced 
individual behaviours and actions.” Underwood maintained that, “whereas the issue 
of personality formation fell more clearly within the purview of psychology than of 
social psychology, some of the factors in personality formation had implications for 
belief and attitude formation.” As higher order constructs, beliefs are antecedent to 
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attitudes. While attitudes often emanated from beliefs, (some attitudes have non-
cognitive bases), Underwood (2002:105) argued that, “opinions, or factors that an 
individual embraced to be factual, denoted an individual’s subjective convictions 
regarding certain features of the self or the real world.” Therefore, the conceivable 
elements of beliefs are indefinite in scope. For instance, the mental picture that one 
contemplated usually related an object with certain properties and therefore, this 
entailed cognition. Underwood maintained that, “on the other hand, attitudes 
epitomized a psychological inclination or predilection expressed by individuals who 
reviewed objects or entities in terms of their liking or disfavour. Thus, attitudes 
denoted affective mind-sets that exposed emotions or sentiments ascribed to 
occurrences (people, things, places, ideas, etc.).” 
I argue that the above literature accentuated the argument set out in preceding 
paragraphs that “beliefs, values and attitudes” are critical factors that promoted 
social and economic development. Underwood’s (2002:110) argument on situational 
factors that influenced individual behaviours and actions linked the behavioural 
actions of persons to their intrinsic beliefs, values and attitudes. This concept is 
significant for understanding how environmental constructs influenced the cognitive 
development that a national leader subsequently transforms into governance 
practices. This study maintains that the conceptualisation of the self in relationship to 
‘others’ or the ‘world’ determined how an individual leader could possibly perceive 
national development policies or governance styles. I contend that this literature 
underscored that beliefs and attitudes that national leaders held, acted as models 
that portrayed their self-interests and inclinations. 
Whereas Underwood (2002) dwelt on situational behavioural stimuli in the realm of 
social psychology, Martínez and Oishi (2006) specifically highlighted the point that 
both genetic and environmental factors shaped personality. Martínez and Oishi 
(2006:2) asserted that cultural influences are among the most important of the 
genetic and environmental factors. Conversely, Bouchard (2004) amplified the 
significant influence of genetic factors on individual psychology. Bouchard 
downplayed “shared environmental influences as often, but not always, of less 
importance than genetic factors, and often decreased to near zero after 
adolescence.” I argue that the above juxtapositions highlighted the inherent 
complexities entailed in the analysis of personality psychology. However, the 
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common theme in the discussions is the critical depiction of genetic and 
environmental factors as behavioural stimuli. The latter enriched the theoretical 
argument of this study by highlighting the fact that, in addition to the other stimuli 
already discussed, genetic heritability played an equally significant role in shaping 
psychological traits, and in essence, perceptible leadership disposition. Within the 
context of this thesis, I posit that issues of genetic heritability potentially rationalised 
correlations between ethnicity in familial heredity and a national leader’s governance 
style or actual inclination towards personification. Equally of interest to this study was 
the way in which cultural influences that environmental factors precipitated 
determined the trajectories of a national leader’s governance style. The foregoing 
was especially significant in East Africa, the geographic focus of this study, where 
cultural influences played a critical role in shaping societal livelihoods and 
configurations. 
In addition, the proponents who bolstered arguments that social and cultural 
dimension constituted an important personality influence emphasised the cultural 
role played by society in shaping the governance style of a national leader. Thus, in 
the context of cultural psychology, the view held by Martínez and Oishi’s (2006:6) 
“endorsed relativist and constructivist notions of personality, and tended to favour 
emic (i.e., indigenous) over imposed-etic (i.e. imported) methodology for theory and 
instrument development” [in the analysis of culture]. Similarly, Markus and Kitayama; 
and Miller (noted in Martínez and Oishi, 2006:6) theorised that, “wherever one 
developed and expressed ‘personality,’ it could not be separated from the broad 
social and cultural context of the affective, motivational and cognitive capacities that 
shaped our approaches to assessing and reacting to the environment.”  
Congruently, Maccoby (2000:10) argued that, “high heritability of a [genetic] trait 
does not imply that it is not also subject to the influence of environmental factors, or 
that it cannot change by alterations in environmental conditions.” According to 
Maccoby (2000:16), behaviour geneticists believed that environmental factors that 
affected distinct children in a family differently arose from the fact that some children 
are more genetically susceptible to environmental influences than others are. 
Furthermore, societies set different standards for people at various phases of their 
lives, and there are requirements that loom large, especially in childhood. 
Accordingly, Maccoby (2000:2) posited that “not all socialization occurs in childhood; 
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instead, socialization and re-socialization occur when adults enter into new life roles. 
For instance, people socialized into the customs and standards of an occupational 
culture when they took up an entry-level job.”  
Equally, Triandis and Suh (2002:139) highlighted the significance of socialisation in 
relation to culture. In their analysis, Triandis and Suh “identified dimensions of 
socialisation that were related to cultural syndromes, such as the emphasis on child 
independence found in individualist cultures and the emphasis on dependence found 
in collectivist cultures.” I argue that the above emphases were particularly significant 
to this study, especially in defining how environmental factors, culture and 
socialisation patterns shaped the extent of a leader’s dependence on national 
support systems. According to Palus (2009:5), dependent leadership cultures 
assumed that “only people in positions of authority were responsible for leadership.” 
The foregoing assumption emphasised the “top-down influence, and convergence of 
decision-making powers to limited senior positions.” Likewise, Palus assumed that 
seniority and rank acted as significant cues of eminence. To Palus, all the above 
assumptions were therefore a “conservative approach to change.” On the other 
hand, Palus (2009:6) argued that independent leadership cultures assumed that 
“leadership styles stem from different persons based on their knowledge and 
expertise. This assumption encourages decentralized decision-making, a compelling 
need for personal accountability and proficiency on individual dependence.” To this 
end, Rohner (noted in Triandis & Suh, 2002:135) emphasised the strong, consistent 
links between socialisation practices and personality in the shaping of leaders. I 
argue in affirmation that the correlation between socialisation practices and individual 
attributes played a key role in shaping the behavioural inclinations of national 
leaders. I deduced from Palus’ (2009) explanation that a mode of socialisation that 
promoted a dependent leadership style likely developed into personified disposition, 
since it coalesced around the individual. However, Palus’ model also had 
commendable ‘safety valves’ that allowed for personal accountability and broad 
decision-making practices, which are aspects that potentially mitigate the 
proliferation of personification. 
In the realm of development psychology, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:232) 
asserted that “personification in synesthetic adults represented an excessive 
manifestation of the human tendency to perceive reality using the self as a model. 
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This in turn derived from younger children’s animistic thought, used as an 
undeveloped filter through which they learn about the social world. Thus, synesthetic 
personification could represent a residual expression of childhood animism, an early 
stage in social cognitive development.” Piaget (noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 
2013:232) studied animistic thought in children and hypothesised that “the excessive 
animistic mode of thinking (including personification) served as a mechanism for 
constructing reality with the self as a model.” Piaget observed, “this is in line with 
contemporary accounts of the way in which we construct social reality.” I found 
significance in the arguments highlighting the human predisposition to comprehend 
reality based on “the self as a model.” The latter was crucial for understanding why 
leaders with personified inclinations use themselves as a paradigm of national 
development. Likewise, in corroborating Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv, I argue that 
excessive animist thinking influenced leaders with personified inclinations to the 
extent that they became insensitive to the development needs of their constituents. 
Accordingly, this egocentric behaviour permeated governance and development 
institutions, usually with adverse impacts.  
I contend that the above literature highlighted how national leaders’ perceptions of 
themselves structured their view of reality. The assertions by Sobczak-Edmans and 
Sagiv’s (2013:232) reinforced my arguments that personified inclinations emanated 
from early stages of social cognitive development, and ultimately defines one’s 
definitive behavioural disposition. The fact that personification is possibly a residual 
expression of childhood animism revealed the reason why some national leaders 
perceived their ideas as infallible “models” of national practice. The above literature 
provided a scientific basis to theorise that the degree of childhood animism by which 
individuals formed perceptions of social reality inspired their personification of 
national development and governance policies. This study further argues that the 
‘external environment’ may be the foremost important influence on the intrinsic 
degree of childhood animism. Consequently, understanding childhood animism will 
help experts to forecast the possible trajectory of a national leader’s development 
policy actions and governance styles. 
In close context with “… perceiving the self as a model” cited in the preceding 
literature, Wilson, Near and Miller (1996:285) argued that “Machiavellianism as a 
strategy of social conduct involved manipulating others for personal gain, often 
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against the other's self-interest.” Wilson et al. (1996) maintained that “everyone is 
capable of manipulative behaviour to some degree, but some are more willing and 
more able than others are.” Conversely, Dawkins and Krebs (cited in Wilson et al., 
1996:286) observed that, “natural selection favours individuals who successfully 
manipulated the behaviour of other individuals, whether or not it was advantageous 
to the manipulated individuals.” Dawkins and Krebs upheld that humans frequently 
restricted pro-social behaviours to their own community, while overtly taking 
advantage of other groups. To Dawkins and Krebs, leaders who were accountable 
for actions directed at other individuals exhibited Machiavellian traits. The latter is 
close to the “spirit of Machiavelli himself, who combined his manipulative political 
ways with genuine loyalty toward his own city.” Likewise, Barber (noted in Wilson et 
al., 1996:293) tested the hypothesis of genetic relatedness in Machiavellianism. 
Barber administered a modified ‘Mach test’ to particular groupings of people, such as 
"family members", "friends," etcetera. Barber established that, on average, subjects 
expressed a lesser predisposition of Machiavellianism toward family relations and 
support system than they did to the broader society. I contend that the concept of 
manipulative Machiavellian behavioural disposition could be important for 
understanding national leaders’ governance styles. 
As hypothesised in the above literature, I assert that we could use Machiavellian 
behaviours to rationalise the political and socio-economic actions of national leaders. 
The fact that Machiavellianism utterly described individual conduct toward other 
groups validated the assumptions of this study. It compellingly highlighted that 
personified systems promoted egocentrism in leaders and favouritism towards 
persons sympathetic to incumbent regimes. Of equal significance, Wilson et al. 
(1996:285) argued that, “we can make specific predictions about the propensity to 
manipulate others as a function of their in-group versus out-group status.” Wilson et 
al. (1996) maintained that, “we can develop specific hypotheses to predict the effects 
of genetic relatedness, age, gender and situational factors on the adaptedness of 
Machiavellianism.” Based on the foregoing, I deduced that basing on behavioural 
factors; we could predict the direction of development and governance in personified 
systems. However, in divergence with the theory of personification, Wilson et al. 
(1996) asserted that, “the psychological literature on Machiavellianism lacks a solid 
theoretical framework to guide empirical research.” I observe that although this factor 
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limited the empirical applicability of the Machiavellian concept, we could still use the 
concept to understand personification from a psychological perspective.  
2.3 Correlating theory of personification and personality psychology  
In this segment, I analysed the theory of personification, based on ontological, 
epistemological and theoretical perspectives. Drawing on ontological perspective(s), 
I analysed assumptions, beliefs and a collection of human values that, together, 
formed this study’s view of the ‘existence’ and ‘reality’ of personified systems. 
Likewise, the ontological perspective guided my arguments on how personified 
entities operated within a specific socio-geographic hierarchy in terms of intrinsic 
comparability. Similarly, I applied epistemological perspective(s) to explain this 
study's ontological perspective(s) of how the reality of personification related to other 
theoretical constructs analysed. The epistemological perspective focused my 
rationalisation of the necessary and sufficient conditions for personification in my 
research, the credibility of my information sources, the suitability of the literature 
structure, and the boundaries of my research on the subject of personification. To 
synthesise my arguments in this section, I applied an overarching theoretical 
perspective that articulated a single conceptual position on the subject. The latter 
hinged on a robust analytical argument, which complemented the ontological and 
epistemological positions adduced in this study. To begin with, in subsequent 
paragraphs I examined three major theoretical perspectives in personality 
psychology, that is, humanism, psychoanalysis and behaviourism.  
 Humanistic theories of personality and personification 
According to Bland and DeRobertis (2017:1), the “humanistic perspective on 
personality emphasises the individualised qualities of optimal well-being and the use 
of creative potential to benefit others.” Bland and DeRobertis (2017:1) maintained 
that, “humanistic perspectives entail the relational conditions that promote those 
qualities as the outcomes of healthy development. The humanistic perspective 
serves as an alternative to mechanistic and/or reductionist explanations of 
personality based on isolated, static elements of observable behaviour (e.g., traits) 
or self-concept.” Of particular significance, Polkinghorne (noted in Bland & 
DeRobertis, 2017:7) posited that the pressure to conform to social ideals yielded 
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self-concepts that distorted and concealed elements of people’s actual personalities, 
thereby transforming them into social misrepresentations of their true personae. 
Bland and DeRobertis (2017:17) crowned their argument by asserting that rather 
than conceptualising personality as a fixed structure, set of traits, or self-concept, the 
humanistic perspective holistically/systemically portrayed the person qua self as 
continually evolving and as uniquely situated in socio-cultural and eco-psycho-
spiritual contexts. 
Drawing on the above discussions, I noted that under personified dispensations, 
individuals can actually “use their creative potential to benefit others” as Bland and 
DeRobertis particularly explained. However, this also infers the responsibility for 
personal actions squarely rests in the hands of the beholder since they exercise the 
will to act. In spite of this, I noted that humanistic theorists did not patently explain 
the inherent factors that determined an individual’s behavioural tendency, as 
articulated in detail by the theory of personification. In this regard, this study went 
beyond humanistic theories to leverage traditions of anthromorphism and ‘childhood 
animism’ as discussed by Piaget (noted in Kallery & Psillos, 2004:291). I triangulated 
the latter with insights by Hopwood, Donnellan, Blonigen, Krueger, McGue, Iacono 
and Burt (2011:12) that highlighted the utility of an integrative and age-targeted 
approach for understanding genetic and environmental contributions to personality 
development during the transition to adulthood. Consequently, I inferred that actions 
executed by the “self,” including leadership, consciously revealed a person’s 
behavioural susceptibility towards personification. Therefore, when a person 
assumed a leadership position, I argue that the individual is accountable for their 
‘conscious’ actions. These actions include taking responsibility for the outcomes of 
governance and development. However, the latter deviated from Rogers’ argument 
(noted in Pescitelli, 1996:4) that made a distinction between the ‘self’ as observed 
compared to real experiential causes of maladaptive behaviour. I observed that 
Pescitelli’s argument seems to exonerate individuals’ from taking responsibility for 
personal actions. On the contrary, the theory of personification holds leaders 
accountable for their conscious and premeditated actions. 
Equally, another proponent of humanistic theory, Abraham Maslow, categorised the 
need for self-actualisation as the growth of an individual toward attaining the 
fulfilment of his or her highest needs (Maslow, 1943:383). According to  Plotnik and 
34 
 
Kouyoumdjian (2013:443), Maslow believed that although very few individuals 
reached the level of self-actualisation, everyone had a self-actualising tendency. 
Plotnik and Kouyoumdjian maintained that in Maslow’s assertion, this tendency 
motivated us to become the best kind of person we are capable of being. Likewise, 
Kritsonis (noted in Francis & Kritsonis, 2006:2) posited that Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs theory underscored the fact that “an individual’s wants orchestrated in a 
hierarchy from the lower-level physiological needs to the higher-level needs for self-
actualization.” Maslow maintained that the “physiological needs are the highest 
priority because until they are reasonably satisfied, other higher-level needs will not 
emerge to motivate behaviour” (Francis & Kritsonis, 2006:2). To rationalise that self-
actualising people are healthy, Maslow came up with his own account of healthy 
personalities as a deviation to psychodynamic theories that are grounded in clinical 
case studies. Maslow (noted in Neher, 1991:4) examined “exceptional historical 
figures, such as Abraham Lincoln and Eleanor Roosevelt, as well as some of his 
own contemporaries whom he thought had exceptionally good mental health.” From 
the afore-mentioned study, Maslow illustrated various individualities that self-
actualising individuals shared, including biological needs, physiological needs, safety 
needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem, cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, 
self-actualisation and transcendence needs (Maslow, noted in Huitt, 2007). 
Therefore, within the context of this study, I deduced that Maslow’s perspective 
connoted that a national leader’s highest motive would be self-actualisation and, 
ultimately, transcendence. This argument aligned well with the theory of 
personification that considers that the need to fulfil egoistic potentials drives actions 
of some national leaders.  
In addition, the theory of personification rationalises that human motives go beyond 
Maslow’s constructs of ‘self-actualisation’ to depict extreme behavioural inclinations. 
For instance, Maslow’s theory posited that “self-actualizing people tend to focus on 
problems outside themselves; have a clear sense of what is true and what is false.” 
However, the theory of personification argues that personified leadership inclinations 
tend to be egocentric, distrustful, and insensitive to democratic exigencies. 
Furthermore, whereas Maslow’s ultimate human motive is transcendence, which 
entailed helping others to achieve self-actualisation, this study contends that, to the 
contrary, personified leadership frequently suppresses the masses and practises 
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social exclusion to the detriment of sound national governance and development. 
Likewise, Maslow’s theory did not explicitly explain how external factors, such as the 
environment or socio-cultural dynamics, influenced the trajectory of individual 
actions. Yet in East Africa, the environment and socio-cultural dynamics are key 
determinants of effective governance and development. In this respect, the theory of 
personification addresses the latter by recognising that external factors influenced 
the degree of a leader’s decision-making, and hence, subsequent actions. 
This segment now examines the works of another humanistic proponent, George 
Kelly. Kelly thought that the mental structures that we use to interpret and predict 
events are personal constructs (Paszkowska-Rogacz & Kabzinska, 2012:409). 
Kelly’s theory contended that, “it is not important whether an event that is conceived 
by an individual actually exists or not; what matters are the basic facts that the 
individual perceives as real” (Paszkowska-Rogacz & Kabzinska, 2012:409). In 
addition, Kelly (noted in Heffner, 2014) posited that “when we interact with our 
environment and within ourselves, this manner of interacting is our personality.” Kelly 
(noted in Paszkowska-Rogacz & Kabzinska, 2012:409) propounded a Personal 
Construct Theory that hinged on the ‘fundamental postulate,’ which avers a person’s 
psychological processes are “channelized by the ways in which they anticipate 
events.” To this end, Kelly’s theory emphasised “the individual’s very personal and 
subjective experience of any event, which was merely data until they created their 
own way of understanding it” (Melanie, 2006:38). 
My deductions agreed with Kelly’s assertion that “… we [humans] acted in a manner 
congruent with how we interpreted past events to shape our expectations of the 
world.” While I agreed with Kelly’s assertion, I construed that it was not a sufficient 
parameter to define personification. Similarly, I agree with Boeree’s observation, 
which asserted that “… Kelly believes that ‘to understand behaviour one needs to 
understand how the person construes reality more than what that reality truly is’ ” 
(Boeree, 2006:21). However, I observed that this concept, too, was not sufficient to 
define personification exhaustively. In both instances, the assumption by Kelly that 
individuals had cognitive interpretative abilities connoted an idealistic level of 
intelligence that allowed individuals to make factual assessments. In reality, not all 
individuals have cognitive abilities to learn from their experiences. For example, if 
scheming national leaders used the level of interpretative abilities posited by Kelly, 
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they would avoid undemocratic attempts to entrench themselves in power. This is 
because the process of ousting undemocratic Presidents, who fail to relinquish 
power, is usually very costly to the citizenry. Interestingly, the theory of 
personification acknowledges the limitation of functional intelligence. The theory 
recognises that many leaders seem to follow consistently failed contextual 
undemocratic precedents in their attempts to personify national systems. 
 Psychodynamic theories of personality and personification 
In this section, I analysed the relationship between the theory of personification and 
leading psychodynamic theories. Although psychodynamic theories have evolved 
over time, they have not varied much from original theories.  
According to Westen (1998:3), although not unanimous, most psychodynamic 
theorists largely observed five critical propositions. Westen argued that much of 
mental life, including thoughts, feelings and motives, is unconscious. The latter 
connotes that an individual, like a leader in the context of this study, can manifest 
behaviour or develops distinctive attributes that are incomprehensible to them. 
Westen maintained that individuals could have conflicting feelings that motivated 
them differently and often resulted in compromise toward the same person or 
situation because their mental processes, including affective and motivational 
processes, operated in parallel. Furthermore, Westen contended that stable 
personality patterns began to form in childhood, at a time when experiences play an 
important role in defining how personalities developed to influence subsequent social 
relationships. Additionally, Westen posited that a person’s mental representations of 
their own personality, other individuals, and inherent relationships guided 
interactions with others. To Westen, personality development involved not only 
learning to regulate sexual and aggressive feelings, but also moving from an 
immature, socially dependent state to a mature, interdependent one.  
In order to understand confluences or divergences between personification and 
psychodynamic theories, I distilled information from the above introductory summary 
from which I extracted a contextually relatable theme with strong internal logic. One 
emergent theme was the fact that human beings are social animals that thrive on 
complex relationships, motivated or inhibited by their conscience. Bearing the latter 
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in mind, I selected and analysed psychodynamic theories in subsequent paragraphs 
to analyse on how childhood development processes influence an individual’s 
personality. Specifically, I examined psychodynamic influences on mental inclination, 
feelings and relationships with respect to leadership. I deemed that the above 
concepts were important for effective contextualisation of personification in this 
section. Accordingly, I examined how famous proponents of psychodynamic theory 
of personality, such as Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler and Erik Erikson, 
articulated/overlooked concepts related to personification. 
Sigmund Freud (1923:5) studied the psychosexual evolution of human beings, from 
which he developed the Structural Model, “which described the three parts of an 
individual's personality [id, ego and superego].” Freud (1923:5) argued that a person 
is born with id, the pleasure-seeker portion of our personality. He believed that the id 
in new-borns is crucial because it motivates individuals to satiate their intrinsic 
needs. According to Freud (noted in Lapsley & Stey, 2011:1), the id is “insensitive to 
other experiences and is purely concerned about its exclusive gratification.” The 
direct influence of the external world modifies the ‘id’ resulting in the ‘ego’, according 
to Freud. Consequently, the ego of a healthy person is the strongest part of their 
personality. It is the ‘executive’ of the personality in the sense that it regulates 
libidinal drive energies so that satisfaction accords with the demands of reality. It is 
the centre of reason, reality testing, and common sense, and has at its command a 
range of defensive stratagems that can deflect, repress, or transform the expression 
of unrealistic or forbidden drive energies.” Freud maintained that, “the superego is a 
further differentiation within the ego, which represents its ‘ideal’ state. The superego 
emerges because of the oedipal drama, where the child takes on the authority and 
magnificence of parental figures through introjections or identification.” Freud (noted 
in Lapsley & Stey, 2011:1) also asserted that, “whereas the id operated in pursuit of 
pleasure, and whereas the reality principle governed the ego, the superego bids the 
psychic apparatus to pursue idealistic goals and perfection. It is the source of moral 
censorship and of conscience.”  
I found Freud’s assertions on self-satisfaction significant for gaining a better 
understanding of how behavioural factors potentially determined a leader’s ego, and 
ultimately their personality. Correspondingly, Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors and 
Preston (2010:16) also embraced Sigmund Freud’s arguments when they posited 
38 
 
that the interaction in a leader’s personality of the “id, ego and superego” and their 
“control of the pleasure and reality principles”, fundamentally defined the manner in 
which leaders behaved or made decisions. While I agree with the political 
psychology theories, that individual’s displayed unique or mixed personality 
attributes, motivation and behaviour, I aver that other external factors equally 
influenced the leadership style. For instance, persons subordinating to the 
personified leader also endorsed continuation, as is evident in Uganda, Rwanda and 
now Burundi, where the privileged political cronies openly advocate for perpetual 
incumbency of the Presidents. Accordingly, I posit that consistency and mutual 
agreement between the leader and subjects is vital to achieve effective democratic 
governance. Furthermore, I noted that whereas Freud’s constructs conveyed 
masculine nuances, it conspicuously ignored feminine concepts. Although the latter 
poses a conceptual challenge in assessing demographic impacts of leadership in a 
given polity, the theory of personification ably addresses this gap. Similarly, Freud’s 
masculine concepts may also promote chauvinist ideology in personified systems, 
leading to the exclusion and ultimate marginalisation of women. 
Another leading psychodynamic theorist, Alfred Adler, provided some deep insights 
into the dynamics of personality.  
Adler (noted in Morgan, 2010:56) underscored the point that two factors frequently 
influence every single aspect of human relations: “the inferiority complex and the 
striving for social feeling.” According to Adler (noted in Morgan, 2010:57), ‘Individual 
Psychology’ connoted the manner in which individuals and nations craved power, 
largely driven by profound feelings of inferiority. Similarly, Adler maintained that, 
“Individual Psychology could bring together for good all the intrinsic latent forces in 
groups, just as it has done in individuals.” Adler (noted in Morgan, 2010:60) asserted 
that the relative occurrence of the inferiority complex is the most crucial singular 
factor in determining the way in which personality developed. This inferiority complex 
turned into a deep-seated impetus among persons of all ages, to execute their 
actions in a manner that evolves to the goal of superiority.”  
I noted that Adler’s emphasis on inferiority ignored the instinctively conditioned, 
nurturing role of caregivers, for example the mother. Similarly, Adler disregarded the 
extension of the parental nurturing role, ceteris paribus, through the lives of children, 
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which I theorise, empowers the child to think and reason positively. Conversely, I 
argue that cognitive development, a pivotal that shapes the eventual leadership 
behavioural disposition, commenced at birth and continued throughout adulthood. I 
base my argument on the theory-driven approach of development psychology taken 
by Watts, Cockcroft and Duncan (2009). According to Watts et al. (2009:265), a child 
is engrossed in a symbiotic relationship with the mother, lacking a fundamental 
sense of separation from her. From the foregoing assertion, I argue that only an 
intelligent being, like all normal human beings, could discern an immediate maternal 
connection at birth. Watts et al. (2009:265) corroborated this in their assertion that 
developing the rudimentary sense between the self and the mother, between internal 
and external forms of stimulus, clearly proved central to the infant’s psychological 
development and formation of their ego. Contrary to Adler’s theory that hinged on an 
“inferiority complex” per se, it is apparent from the foregoing that every formative 
stage in a person’s life is important in determining the person’s subsequent 
behavioural inclinations, including leadership trajectories. Interestingly, at the ego 
formative stage, an infant becomes fascinated with the image of the self (Watts et 
al., 2009:280). I also argue that an infant’s fascination with self-image, if not well 
channelled, could eventually translate into an egoistic, personified leadership 
inclination later in life. Thus, the ego formative stage is critical to leadership 
development. 
Another leading psychodynamic theorist, Erik Erikson, unravelled complexities 
pertaining to societal influences on childhood development (Morgan, 2010:138).  
According to Erikson, “the stages of psychosocial development involved challenges 
that a person must overcome to be successful in the later stages. In his great 
classic, Erikson delineated a sequence of eight distinct phases of psychosocial ego 
development, generally known as ‘the eight stages of man’ (Morgan, 2010:143). 
Erikson postulated that the phases were a ‘universal phenomenon’ that arose from 
epigenetic materialization of a ‘ground plan’ of personality that was conveyed 
genetically. At the first stage he called ‘infancy’, Erikson juxtaposed ‘trust’ and 
‘mistrust’ with the notion that ‘hope’ is the emergent psychosocial strength gained by 
the individual. Erikson believed that the feeling of ‘trust’ is a fundamental cornerstone 
of a robust personality (Morgan, 2010:147). At one and a half years, the child 
transitioned to the “autonomy versus shame and doubt” phase where they learned 
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‘will power’ as a personality skill (Morgan, 2010:148). During the stage of the four to 
five year old child, the resolution of conflict versus guilt produces in the child a deep 
sense of purpose or, if negatively resolved, the loss of direction and purpose towards 
the future. Erikson explained that, “initiative added to autonomy the quality of 
undertaking, planning, and ‘attacking’ - a task for the sake of being on the move, 
where previously self-will, more often than not, inspired acts of defiance or, at any 
rate, protested independence” (Morgan, 2010:149). The ‘school age’ period, 
between six and eleven, covered the years that Erikson referred to as the “latency 
period.” Here, tension that Erikson termed ‘industry versus inferiority’ appeared, 
creating a crisis that evoked a sense of ‘competency’ (Morgan, 2010:150). The next 
stage that nestled in between childhood and adulthood is a pivotal period in the 
development of the individual ‘ego’. Finally, adolescence is a period in one’s 
development where ‘ego identity’ and ‘role confusion’ encountered the resultant 
psychosocial complexity of ‘fidelity’” (Morgan, 2010:151). 
Furthermore, Erikson posited that “by virtue of an entrenched ego identity 
exemplified by ‘fidelity or loyalty’ to oneself and one’s social milieu, the individual 
was now ready for intimacy.” To Erikson, “this ‘intimacy’ expressed the disposition to 
commit to effective relationships and partnerships. The latter required one to develop 
moral capability to take on such commitments, despite the fact that it necessitated 
considerable concessions.” Erikson posited that this is the phase associated with 
courtship, marriage, and early family life (Morgan, 2010:153). On this note, Morgan 
(2010:154) argued that “subsequently, an individual in the ‘middle years’ of their lives 
potentially became actively creative or stifled into degeneration. Morgan maintained 
that people in their mid-years who took up and cultivated generativity engendered a 
feeling of ‘care’ that improved the quality of life for the next generation. Conversely, 
individuals who lacked generativity never operated as constructive members of 
society. They only lived to gratify their desires, and lacked relational skills. Lastly, 
Erikson (noted in Morgan, 2010:155) argued that, “ego integrity in late adulthood 
created a pleasurable positive personality, whereas people who rued at the 
unproductivity of their earlier years yielded to depression.” 
I found relevance in Erikson’s assertion that, in general, resolving challenges 
pertaining to the stages of life relative to one’s age potentially prepared an individual 
for effective leadership. In essence, Erikson reasoned that those who were younger 
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and had not mastered all of those stages of growth would not be good leaders. The 
reference to ‘stages of growth’ in the foregoing sentence brought to mind the concept 
of ‘personality,’ which is a key factor in leadership development. According to 
Erikson (noted in Wiggins, 2003:111), “the enthusiasm to progress toward, be 
cognizant of, and relate with a growing social network leads individuals to develop a 
personality that aligns with preordained steps in human organisms.” In the foregoing 
context, I noted the linkage between personality and social interaction that are 
crucial ingredients of leadership style. To this extent, the theory of personification 
identified with Erikson’s theory that leadership is about relatedness. Likewise, the 
theory of personification draws significant inspiration from Maslow’s (1987) rendering 
of “great self-esteem.” I argue that leaders with good self-esteem were dependable 
and focused, when interacting with the society they led. This stability is attributable, 
in Erikson’s concept, to sound socio-emotional development in children and 
teenagers, continuing to adulthood. In agreement with Erikson’s theory, Fletcher 
(2012:14) argued that, “whereas leaders who have an avoidant manner of relating 
regard themselves positively, they have an exceptionally negative opinion of others.” 
Similarly, Fletcher argued that “… leaders who had a fearsome manner of relating 
with others have a negative perception of themselves and others.” In congruence 
with Fletcher’s observations, Erikson asserted that “common impressions of good 
and evil gave directions to men; these impressions assumed definitive specificity in 
every person’s ego development” (Erikson, 1994:17). I contend that the terms ‘good 
and evil’ and ‘ego development’ are contextually pertinent in analysing and 
understanding the theory of personification. Leaders demonstrating excessive 
egoistic tendencies usually disregarded democratic principles of governance in 
preference for personified rule. I also posit that citizens often perceived the atrocious 
and exclusionist policies pursued by personified regimes as ‘evil’. Conversely, 
leaders with ‘common images of good’ would develop a balanced ego that enables 
them to govern democratically. 
On the contrary, Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development came short in 
addressing certain critical aspects that the theory of personification embraces. For 
instance, Erikson assumed [linear] “stages of psychosocial progression where 
individuals had to surmount hurdles in order to succeed later in life.” However, I 
wondered what could transpire when a child missed a stage of growth, for example, 
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through voluntary/involuntary separation, catastrophic events, and the like. I noted 
that Erikson does not compellingly articulate transitions between stages of 
psychosocial development. Does Erikson insinuate “failure” if a child fails to 
surmount any stage of development? Unequivocally, I point out that Erikson 
disregards the innovativeness, resilience and versatility of human beings to cope, 
adapt and recover in the face of shocks. 
 Behaviourist theory of personality and personification 
Behaviourists believed that humans (and animals) are motivated primarily to receive 
rewards and to avoid punishments (Young, 1936:332, 333). The foregoing concept 
worked on the notion that “if behaviour is not reinforced, it will not continue.” 
Similarly, behaviourists argued that environments controlled human development by 
means of hereditary tradition and habit equipment (Watson, 1913:7). Of the many 
concepts adduced by behaviourists, I found the above assertions significant for 
understanding the theory of personification within the context of personality 
influences. In subsequent paragraphs, I examined works on behaviourism by leading 
theorists. 
Pavlov (noted in Wolpe & Plaud, 1997:969) attracted substantial interest to the 
examination of issues pertaining to the comprehension of personality. Wolpe and 
Plaud contended that, to Pavlov, “Individual nervous systems varied in their levels of 
excitation or inhibition. In addition, he proposed that combinations of these two 
factors, which varied along physiological dimensions, determined various personality 
types.” Similarly, Wolpe and Plaud (1997:970) asserted that “in the paradigm 
stemming from Pavlovian personality genres, genetic encoding prompted people to 
respond distinctively to environmental stimuli.” Therefore, this study argues that if we 
can develop leadership behaviour in others, then it is possible to shape the character 
or personality of a subject in the process. In other words, we can condition leaders to 
adapt to a certain desired pattern using distinctive stimuli. Accordingly, I found 
Pavlov’s work on classical conditioning particularly important to the extent that it 
enhances our understanding of how humans perceive themselves, their behaviour 
and learning processes. I also found relevance in Pavlov’s experiments that reflected 
on how the environment can influence the individual.  
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In consonance with Pavlov’s theory, the theory of personification hypothesises that a 
leader’s behavioural inclination can be clearly discerned through the embodiment of 
their ‘true self’, as is perceptible from the unpretentious responses to stimuli that 
Pavlov’s animal subjects exhibited. However, the theory of personification 
acknowledges the primacy of the human being above all animals. This singular 
factor enables human minds to feign calculated responses to stimuli to elicit selfish 
gains. Because of this human ability to pretend, assessing the legitimacy of devious 
leaders with personified inclinations can be a daunting task for citizens. Similarly, 
while I agree with Pavlov that genetic factors play an important role in shaping 
personality, I contend that these do not constitute a compelling factor in formulating 
personification. To the contrary, the theory of personification recognises the 
operation of external factors, such as environment and parental influences, on 
human development. Additionally, the theory of personification contests the 
conclusion drawn from Pavlovian experiments by behaviourists to the effect that a 
leader’s primary concerns are for people and production. The reason for this 
deviance is that, under personified systems, leaders are insensitive to citizens’ 
demands and, rather than stimulating production for the national benefit, prefer to 
manipulate systems to feed their egocentric aspirations. 
Skinner (2011:8) is by far one of the most influential spokespersons of all time for 
uncompromising behaviourism. Skinner believed that the world could solve its major 
problems if only we improved our understanding of human behaviour. Instead of 
focusing on the sequence of actions before a ‘response’ occurs, as with Pavlov's 
conditioned reflexes, Skinner established that our reactions to the ‘response’ greatly 
influenced its ensuing occurrence rate. Skinner (2011:44) dubbed ‘operant 
conditioning’ as reflecting “the process through which a person comes to deal 
effectively with a new environment.” A ‘behaving’ person directs ‘operant behaviour’, 
which we attribute to an act of will (Skinner, 2011:54). To Skinner, free will is an 
illusion and human action ensues from consequences of repetitive action. “Where 
consequences are bad, there is a high likelihood that people will not repeat the 
action; conversely, there is a high probability of repeating the actions that led to a 
good consequence”, an act that Skinner called the ‘contingencies of reinforcement’ 
(Skinner, 2011:43). Of particular relevance to this study is Skinner’s assertion that a 
degree of prediction [of human behaviour] is possible. The latter works on the 
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principle that what people have often done, they are likely to do again; they follow 
custom because it is customary to follow them, and they exhibit habits. Furthermore, 
Skinner argued that “the human mind converts the environment into experience; and 
action into ideas, purposes and will. The thinking person transforms into a thinking 
mind; consequently, the self or personality replaces the person.” Likewise, Skinner 
maintained that, “the self or personality is at best a repertoire of behaviour imparted 
by an organized set of contingencies” (Skinner, 2011:164). 
This study agreed with Skinner’s assertion that the environment influenced human 
beings, and that the human mind translated the environment into experiences, 
actions, ideas, purposes and will. Consequently, the self or personality replaces the 
thinking mind in an individual, which essentially this study perceives as defining the 
character or behavioural inclination of a leader. However, I disagree with Skinner’s 
assertion regarding the principles of reinforcement, which suggests that an individual 
will most probably repeat actions that had earlier led to good consequences. In terms 
of leadership, the latter implies that a leader, through repetitive acts, can perfect 
“effective” leadership behaviour. In Skinner’s experiments, he provided food rewards 
to enhance the good repetitive actions of his study subjects, pigeons. I argue that in 
human terms, the good repetitive actions of leaders should be part of their natural 
obligation to the citizens, rather than expectancy for reward. To the contrary, the 
reward system, if not well managed, could easily sublime into an institutionalised 
demand for incentives, which ultimately breeds personified systems. Additionally, 
under Skinner’s theory, if a leader learns something, and if positively reinforced 
through inducement, this will result in repetitive actions. I found this argument to be 
precarious, especially if what the leader had learnt was detrimental to national 
development. The latter signified that unstructured behavioural reinforcement could 
easily precipitate personified systems. Similarly, the fact that Skinner used animal 
subjects in controlled experiments to personify human behaviour connoted that, in 
practice, leaders should control individuals in a specific manner to elicit certain 
results. I argue that this concept is very characteristic of personified leadership 
behaviour, where leaders seek to control acquiesced citizens under their authority to 
feed egoistic desires. 
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2.4 Correlating theory of personification and development philosophy 
In Section 2.4, I briefly explored literature in the fields of development studies, 
international relations, political studies, policy studies, demography, economics and 
philosophical studies. This analysis provided an ordered assessment of the 
relationship that this thesis has with the body of literature. 
 Development theories 
In the field of development studies, two development theories are significant within 
the classification of ‘linear stage’ theory. First, Rostow (1959:1) generalised a set of 
stages of growth, which he designated as the traditional society; the preconditions 
for take-off; the drive to maturity; and the age of high mass consumption. Rostow 
maintained that, beyond the age of high mass consumption, lie the problems which 
were beginning to arise in a few societies, and which may arise generally when 
diminishing relative marginal utility sets in for real income itself. Of Rostow’s five 
stages, this study concurs that the ‘traditional stage’ depicts the livelihoods of about 
70 percent of the EAC’s largely peasant population. However, personified policies 
usually thwart efforts to transition from subsistence levels through growth in trade, 
infrastructure, savings and investments. Yet, Rostow’s development theory does not 
illustrate this factor adequately. Similarly, Rostow (noted in Parr, 2001:4) argued that 
the “take-off to sustained growth stage is the most critical, the most difficult to attain, 
and economic growth becomes the normal condition during this phase.” This stage, 
according to Rostow, (noted in Parr, 2001:4) “required increased capital investments, 
emergence of a leading industrial sector and a functional institutional structure that 
buttresses the leading sector.” However, I argue that leaders under personified 
systems often squander national resources on unstructured investments, which 
usually fail, to the detriment of the nation. Equally, I argue that Rostow’s assertion 
that an institutional framework should support the leading sector is not practical 
under personified systems, which endeavour to structure institutions around the 
personality of the leader. I also point out that whereas Rostow’s stages of growth 
follow a linear pattern, in reality, policy processes do not follow a predictable pattern 
structured along well-defined steps. The latter poses challenges in correlating the 
theory of personification to Rostow’s theories. 
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Secondly, the Harrod-Domar growth model linked the pursuit of high aggregate 
output performances to a number of specifically identifiable macro conditions 
(Vaitsos, 2003:21). Vaitsos (2003:21) maintained that these can be reduced to four 
main policy fronts that are conducive to high growth: high savings/investments rates; 
high capital productivity; high rate of technical progress; and low population growth 
rate. Likewise, the Harrod-Domar model illustrated the fact that every economy must 
save a proportion of its national income to replace depreciated capital goods 
(Todaro, 1977:52). However, this study posits that savings alone, as described in the 
model, cannot spur development. The level of savings also depends on the integrity 
of the persons who govern the process, a factor that is lacking in personified 
systems. Equally, I point out that the Harrod-Domar model focuses overtly on 
investments and does not explain national governance on economic growth, a factor 
addressed by the theory of personification. Another important limitation of the 
Harrod-Domar model, within the context of this study, is that it advocates ‘that every 
economy must save a proportion of its national income.’ This assertion assumes that 
policymaking institutions are functional and synchronised in given economies, a 
factor that I argue is absent in personified systems. To the contrary, policymaking 
organs in personified systems depend on the whims and caprices of egocentric 
national leaders who use such institutions as mechanisms to reward loyal subjects, 
thus eroding their objectivity. 
 Structural change theories 
Goulet (2003:121) asserted that “structural change deals with the progressive 
process by means of which the economic, industrial and institutional structure of an 
underdeveloped economy transforms over time. This allows new industries to 
supplant traditional agriculture as the engine of economic growth.” Goulet (2003:116) 
maintained that “two notable representative examples of the structural-change 
approach are the two-sector surplus labour theoretical model of W. Arthur Lewis, and 
the patterns of development empirical analysis of Chenery and Syrquin.” Similarly, 
Todaro (1977:188) analysed the Lewis model and concluded that a developing 
economy consists of two sectors. According to Todaro, these sectors are the 
traditional, overpopulated rural subsistence sector characterized by zero marginal 
labour productivity, and a modern high-productivity urbanized industrial sector [that 
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gradually draws] labour from the subsistence sector. In the model, Todaro observed 
that “the extent of industrial investment and capital accumulation in the modern 
sector determines the speed with which expansion occurs.” He maintained that 
“modern-sector profits, that exceed wages, made such investment possible provided 
capitalists reinvested their entire profits.” However, I point out that Lewis assumes 
absolute capital investments in an economy, but ignores capital flight, a limitation 
that is characteristic of poor governance and weak monetary institutional policies in 
personified systems. Likewise, I posit that national leaders in personified systems 
siphon large sums of money from central reserves. The leaders stash the cash away 
in foreign accounts or offshore investments that do not necessarily contribute to the 
growth of their country’s economy. In addition, Lewis assumed an idealistic condition 
in which surplus labour transitions smoothly from the subsistence to urbanised 
industrial sector. However, I argue that personified systems thrive on marginalisation 
and exclusion policies to maintain a large disenfranchised and powerless population, 
who serve the egoistic interests of the incumbent regime. The above argument 
possibly explains why the agricultural and urban informal sectors are the most 
marginalised in personified economies. 
In the other structural change theory, Chenery;  Chenery and Srinivasan, and 
Chenery and Syrquin (noted in Jeníček, 2016:98) examined analyses done on 
countries with disparate levels of per capita income. The studies identified various 
idiosyncratic features pertaining to the process of development. According to 
Chenery et al. (noted in Jeníček, 2016), “these include the shift from agricultural to 
industrial production; the steady accumulation of physical and human capital; the 
change in consumer demands from emphasis on food and basic necessities to 
desires for manufactured goods and services.” Chenery et al. (noted in Jeníček, 
2016) maintained that “the features also include growth of cities and urban industries 
as people migrate from farms and small towns, and the decline in family size and 
overall population growth as children lose their economic value, and parents 
substitute child quality for quantity.” However, I contend that this model implies rural–
urban migration, and insinuates moral decadence of parents who are uncommitted to 
ethical family values – aspects that are characteristic of a poor governance system. 
Besides, the East African region that I focus on in this thesis is predominantly an 
agrarian community. Hence, I aver that labour surpluses are largely seasonal since 
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the region still depends on rain-fed agriculture. Drawing ‘excess’ labour from farms 
during off-seasons may only feed personified systems that are averse to investing in 
the agricultural sector, and ultimately distorts food productivity. Moreover, demand 
for agricultural products in the region has outstripped the supply, making the industry 
profitable. Rather than promote migration to the cities, there is need therefore to 
maximise the profitability of rural land resources. 
 Classical economic theories 
Classical economists theorised that the combination of private capital and property, 
the free operation or the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, and human labour formed the 
basis of economic growth (Engel, 2010:2). Economists recognise Adam Smith, the 
foremost exponent of ‘free market’ principles, as the architect of classical economics. 
On his views of man, Adam Smith (noted in Hayek, 2005:117) stated that “in spite of 
the ‘narrowness of his comprehension,’ a unique person, who uses his own 
knowledge for his own purposes, assumed a position to serve men and their needs, 
or used men and their skills.” I find contextual relevance in Smith’s assertion that a 
process of socialisation, whether self-interested or benevolent, constitutes all our 
feelings. I argue that the notion of benevolent socialisation is essential for 
deconstructing personified systems as it provides a basis for consensual dialogue. At 
the same time, Smith harmonised his social comprehension of the ‘self’ with a 
profound respect that every significant ‘self’ is distinct and is capable of making 
objective choices. For Smith (noted in Fleischacker, 2017), “social pressures inspired 
and guided ethical self-transformation; in spite of this, the individual carries out their 
own self-transformation in the end.” 
Regarding the above, I argue that social pressures are necessary to precipitate 
ethical transformation in order to translate personified systems into participatory 
democracies. However, contrary to the theory of personification, two paradoxical 
factors are immediately pertinent from Smith’s arguments. First, Smith advocated for 
a free enterprise economy under a capitalist system, which in my view erroneously 
assumed that human beings will not exploit each other. On the contrary, I argue that 
personified systems take advantage of capitalist structures to amass wealth by 
exploiting disenfranchised workers. The helpless workers have no option but to 
acquiesce in the face of the powerful and sometimes monopolistic capitalists. 
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Second, Smith limited the responsibilities of governments because he considered it 
crucial that for the development of virtue, people should have plenty of room to act 
and shape their feelings, on their own (Fleischacker, 2017). However, this study 
recognises the pivotal role that government plays in advancing the national 
governance and development agenda. Similarly, I argue that Smith’s advocacy for 
limited government functionality sets the foundation for personified systems that 
exploit policy gaps to serve self-interests. Interestingly, Smith also noted that self-
interest is a powerful, but not the only motive, in human behaviour (Coase, 1976:1). 
To me this indicates a hint of personification in Smith’s argument. Conversely, Coase 
(1976:28) maintained that “where benevolence motivated a politician, they will be 
inclined to give preferentiality to their family, friends, and party members, all of whom 
are usually inhabitants of their region or country of origin. However, when self-
interest motivated politicians, it is perceptible that the results were less satisfactory.” 
I observed that whereas Coase differed from Smith on the subject of self-interest, he 
agreed with the theory of personification that such dispensations yield poor results, 
In contrast, neoclassical economists laid greater emphasis on methodological 
individualism (Lowenberg, 1990:623)., According to Vanberg (1994:1), the latter 
meant that “whatever phenomena we sought to explain at the social aggregate level, 
ought to demonstrate how it stems out of the actions and interactions of distinct 
individuals.” Vanberg posited that these individuals, “whether separately or jointly, 
pursued their interests as they wished, based on their comprehension of the world 
around them.” Similarly, on the subject of ‘individuals,’ Buchanan (1987:244) 
asserted that, “the ‘individual’ is designed as an ‘agent’ with the distinguished 
capacity to evaluate, make choices and act.” Accordingly, Lowenberg (1990:621) 
posited that “anything the individual valued is a legitimate source of utility that is 
revealed by their behaviour [in which they rationalize choices].” Lowenberg 
maintained that “in the least, we assumed that in the economic theory of human 
behaviour, perceptible self-interest, for instance social status, motivated an individual 
to make choices.” I found the above arguments particularly relevant to the extent that 
it demonstrated how actions and interactions of individual human beings 
consequently resulted in human behaviour that is identifiable with self-interest. In 
tandem, Lowenberg argued that [neoclassical] assumptions “disregard the quest for 
egoistically conceived economic interests, nor do they ascribe any malicious or 
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selfish motives to a unique agent.” On this note, I point out that this indemnification 
does not suffice under personified systems. Instead, I argue that selfishly motivated 
economic concerns are the cornerstone of personified regimes. On this note, I 
contend that the argument by neoclassical economists that ‘human behaviour is 
identifiable with self-interest’ is pertinent for rationalising how personified leadership 
inclinations typify the theory of personification. 
Conversely, neoclassical economists argued that competitive forces, operating 
through factor substitution and variations in relative prices, leaned towards facilitating 
full employment and exploiting the growth potential of the economy (Salvadori & 
Panico, 2006:xiii). However, Keynes, a leading neoclassical economist, asserted that 
capitalist economies would not always tend to a balance between supply and 
demand equilibrium that produces full employment (Keynes; Love, noted in Engel, 
2010:5). Love (noted in Engel, 2010:5) argued that the latter is due, in Keynes’ 
reasoning, to a lack of demand in the economy, which requires government to boost 
demand to achieve full employment. Hence, the Keynesian ‘revolution’ heralded 
theoretical reform in economic analysis and governmental policies (Meade, noted in 
Engel, 2010:5). In the above respect, I point out that the assumption by neoclassical 
economists’ that leaders, for instance, act rationally ignores ‘selfish’ aspects of 
human behaviour. Likewise, I posit that over emphasis on capital accumulation as a 
solution to underdevelopment motivates crude amassing of wealth by leaders in 
personified systems, at the expense of the citizens. Rather than focus on capital 
accumulation alone, efforts should also focus on equitable national income 
distribution and institutional reforms that are responsive to citizen’s needs. 
 International relations theories 
In international relations theories, Morgenthau (noted in Keaney, 2006:3) 
systematised six principles of realism: first, he asserted that “the state is the central 
actor on the world stage”. Second, Morgenthau stated that the natural state of 
international politics is anarchic. Morgenthau maintained that all states seek to have 
the greatest amount of power that they possibly can. Likewise, Morgenthau asserted 
that the intrinsic natures of human actors who control the states determine state 
behaviour. In addition, Morgenthau argued that, in pursuit of security or power, 
states conduct politics and adopt policies according to a rational framework. Finally, 
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Morgenthau contended that, “force or the ability and willingness to use force at will, 
is an integral part of statehood.” I agree with Morgenthau that the deep-seated 
disposition of human actors who govern states actually determine the character and 
performance of the state. This is especially true under personified disposition where 
leaders aim at entrenching their persona into state institutions until the systems start 
reflecting the leader’s essential character. Similarly, I find significance in 
Morgenthau’s contention that “states display an assertive power-seeking disposition 
that stems from the fact that human nature is deficient.” The latter corroborates my 
hypothesis that aggressive power-seeking behaviour is characteristic of personified 
systems. Drawing on Morgenthau’s theory, this forceful behaviour would drive 
leaders, and ultimately nations, to always seek power and domination over others. 
Conversely, Slaughter (1995:720) argued that, “institutionalists perceive the 
international system as anarchical, while states are self-interested actors who seek 
to survive by increasing their material conditions.” Similarly, Slaughter (1995:726) 
maintained that “states are the primary actors in the international system, and that 
states are engaged in the pursuit of power, however the presence of institutions 
modifies the organizing principle of anarchy.” I observe that like realists, 
institutionalists perceive the state as being in ‘anarchy’. Although institutionalists 
have identified self-interest at state level, this study argues that self-interest - a 
primary factor in driving behaviour, is surrogate to personification. Similarly, Andrew 
Moravcsik’s liberalist theory (noted in Slaughter, 1995:728) commenced “with 
individuals and groups operating in both domestic and transnational civil society.” 
According to Moravcsik, “these are the primary actors in the international system. 
State behaviour is in turn determined not by the international balance of power, 
whether or not mediated by institutions, but by the relationship between these social 
actors and the governments representing their interests, in varying degrees of 
completeness.” Moravcsik maintained that “State preferences are derivative of 
individual and groups preferences, but depend crucially on which individuals and 
groups are represented.” I observe that the liberalist theory applicably recognise the 
centrality of individual behaviour in society. They correctly argue that individuals and 
groups have an inundating influence on state structures. In consonance, I hasten to 
add that personified agendas drive individual interests, which in turn, influence 
societal systems and ultimately the state. This contention is important in scientifically 
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linking individual actions to larger events that affect the governance and 
development in any given state. 
On the other hand, constructivism as a social theory dealt with underlying 
conceptions of how the social and political worlds interact.  Constructivists argued 
that men and women made everything involved in the social world. The fact that it is 
made by [humans] makes it intelligible to them (Jackson & Sørensen, 2006:165). 
Jackson and Sørensen maintained that “constructivists perceive the social world as 
that of human consciousness.” To Jackson & Sørensen, this cognizance “consisted 
of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and discourses, of 
signs, signals and understandings among human beings, especially groups of 
human beings, such as states and nations.” Additionally, Jackson and Sørensen 
(2006:165) contended that “the social world is an intersubjective domain: it is 
meaningful to people who made it and live in it, and who understand it precisely 
because they made it and they are at home in it.” Likewise, Checkel (1998:326) 
considered two pertinent constructivist assumptions. Checkel argued that, “the first 
supposes that material structures beyond certain biological necessities derived 
meaning only by the social context of their interpretation. The second dealt with the 
basic nature of human agents and state behaviour in broad structural environments 
where rule-governed action, norms and logics of appropriateness prevail.” Zacher 
(noted in Checkel, 1998:329) also affirmed that “customs that regimes follow act as a 
check on state behaviour; they are an explanatory variable that interposes between 
fundamental power diffusions and outcomes.” Beyond the constructivist perspective, 
I argue that personification of systems negates societal norms that constrain errant 
political behaviour, and instead concentrates self-centred power on a leader. In 
addition, I posit that societal customs also actuate individual behavioural 
progression, occasionally leading to personified tendencies. However, I point out that 
constructivists need to clarify from their perspective how personified human 
behaviours form, as well as how leaders’ personalities and interests are shaped. 
These critical factors define personified behavioural disposition and therefore play an 
important role in shaping national and international relations. 
In contrast to the above, Wendt (1987:336) mooted two alternative theories to the 
‘agentic’ theorising. According to Wendt (1987:332), “neorealism and world-system 
theories compellingly affect contemporary discourses on ‘International Relations’.” 
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Wendt (1987:339) maintained that neorealists define international system structures 
in terms of observable attribute of their member states, and as a result, assert that 
those structures usually limit the options available to pre-existing state actors. In 
addition, Wendt (1987:339) asserted that neorealists believe that “human agents and 
social structures are theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities.” 
Regarding the foregoing, I argue that leaders with personified inclinations can 
potentially exploit neorealists’ institutional structures with the result that national 
systems eventually begin to reflect the desires of the more powerful egoistic actors. 
Similarly, I posit that the diminution of institutional objectivity, coupled with 
concentration of power around a leader, sets the stage for the transition to 
personified governance style. On the other hand, Wendt (1987:335) argued that, 
“world-system theorists define international system structures in terms of the 
fundamental organizing principles of the capitalist world economy, which underlie 
and constitute states.” Wendt underscored the point that “world-system theorists 
understand that ‘state actors’ are generated by ‘structures’ according to structuralist 
provisions.” This study opines that agentic and structural theories show a contrast 
between societal and individual interests – a factor characteristic of self-interest and 
identity formation. I point out that the latter constitutes important factors that shape a 
leader’s behavioural inclination. However, I argue that agentic and structural theories 
do not explicitly explain how personified policies impact on state relations, which is a 
gap that the theory of personification addresses. 
 Political theories 
In the field of political theories, Dryzek, Honig and Phillips (2011:11) posited that “the 
classic liberalism deem that individuals are essentially impassioned by self-interest.” 
Furthermore, “individual motivation is the best judge of  what this interest requires”. 
Likewise, Dryzek et al. (2011:12) argued that liberalism perceives the material 
aspects of interest as best realised through exchange in a market economy that 
benefits all. They maintained that “in the liberalism model, politics reconciles and 
aggregates individual interests by intervening when interests do not coalesce for 
mutual benefit.” To Goodin (2009:70), the latter “takes place under a supposedly 
neutral set of constitutional rules.” Goodin maintained that, “given that powerful 
individuals organized politically into minorities or majorities can turn public power to 
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their private benefit, checks across different centres of power are necessary, and 
constitutional rights are required to protect individuals against government and 
against one another.” However, a foremost classical liberalist, John Stuart Mill (noted 
in Boire, 2002:255), “refuted concepts that individual actions naturally affect society 
or that acts that harm individuals are also injurious to society. Mill clarified his 
departure on two levels. First, Mill acknowledged that the ‘self-regarding’ conduct of 
an individual hinders them from performing some public duty or identifiable harm to 
people. Secondly, to Mill that so called ‘self-regarding’ conduct is not invincible to 
societal control or discipline.” 
I agree with classical liberalists that ‘powerful individuals’ can essentially personify 
public power to feed their self-interests. However, liberalists do not disambiguate at 
what point a person has an ‘interest’ or transitions to the hyphenated compound term 
‘self-interest’. Additionally, I argue that for ‘individuals to be the best judge of their 
interests’ requires them, in the first place, to know that ‘interest’. On the subject of 
‘self-interest’ – a variant for egotism, I contend that self-interest actually motivates 
personified behaviours in national leaders. It drives a national leader to perceive 
state institutions as an extension of their persona. Yet for conflict resolution, 
liberalism largely relies on politics to resolve divergent individual interests, but is 
silent on the role of traditional structures. The model also assumes that 
constitutionalism prevails in any given polity. However, I argue that under personified 
systems, crucial government pillars such as the judiciary and legislature are 
frequently compromised, resulting in constitutional quandary. This is where I agree 
with Mill’s opinion that “society or the state can legitimately limit a person’s actions 
when it has considerable negative consequences for other persons.” 
In contrast, Marxists have scorned liberalism’s individualistic ontology, pointing 
instead to the centrality of social classes in political conflict (Goodin, 2009:71). 
Goodin maintained that the Marxist theory draws on philosophies of Karl Marx, who 
together with Friedrich Engels inspired the intellectual tenets of Marxism. According 
to Carnoy (2014:46), Marx believed that “the basis of social structure and human 
consciousness emanate from the material conditions of society. The form of the state 
therefore, emerges from production not from the general development of the human 
mind or from the collectives of men’s wills.” Carnoy maintained that in Marx’ view, 
“society shapes the state while the dominant mode of production and relations 
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inherent in that mode, in turn, shape society”. Marx (noted in Carnoy, 2014:47) 
theorised that “the state is the political expression of, and an essential means of 
‘bourgeoisies’ class dominance in a capitalist society.” Equally, Marxists saw the 
market as a generator of oppression and inequality, rather than a mechanism to 
meet individual interests (Dryzek et al., 2011:12). However, I point out that in 
Marxian theory, the bourgeoisies have particular control over labour that inexorably 
extends their power to control state institutions. I argue that the latter would 
inevitably lead to an authoritarian regime that sets the premise for personified reign, 
since the model encourages coercive dominance and capitalist exploitation. I also 
argue that non-elites could occasionally escape the ‘gravity’ of Marxian class 
ideology to edge their way to the top of the manufacturing class, and even the state. 
Similarly, the property-less masses, that in Marxian theory serve as labour reserves, 
when mobilised can transform into a formidable force of ‘machinery’ to wrest control 
of the state. 
Regarding political liberalism, Cappelen and Tungodden (2004:1) contended, “the 
discipline of liberal egalitarian theory of justice is a composite combination of the 
values of equality, freedom and personal responsibility.” There is significant 
convergence in debates around equality, with socialists preoccupied with questions 
of individual responsibility. Conversely, liberals present equality rather than liberty as 
the “sovereign virtue” (Dworkin, noted in Dryzek et al., 2011). Dworkin argued that 
the two strands combine to make liberal egalitarianism almost the only [enduring] 
tradition of egalitarianism. According to Dall’Agnol (2006:4), Dworkin [the foremost 
proponent of liberal egalitarianism] perceived equality to be the driving force of 
liberalism. Dall’Agnol maintained that “subjecting individual rights to the concept of 
equal respect and concern obligate that the political theory Dworkin advances be 
named ‘liberal egalitarianism’” (Dall’Agnol, 2006:4). To Dworkin, equality is the 
foundation of individual rights and social welfare (Dall’Agnol, 2006:5). Thus, Dworkin 
shows that the fundamental idea of ‘equality’ shapes the notion of welfare, which is 
the ultimate end of political actions in utilitarianism. Accordingly, liberal egalitarians 
advocated for the choice of a particular public policy that would increase the 
conditions of life for the whole community, rather than a policy that will improve only 
the conditions of a small group (Dall’Agnol, 2006:6). I agree with the liberal 
egalitarians to the extent that they view “equality” as significant for determining 
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courses of welfare and political actions. I also concur that equality curtails the 
impetus for personified systems to discriminate along “civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights to which all human beings are entitled.” However, I posit 
that whereas liberal egalitarians hold ‘equality’ above ‘individual rights,’ the theory of 
personification puts them both on a par. This is because under personified systems, 
national leaders use social exclusions and marginalisation to disempower citizens, in 
direct violation of their inalienable rights. In addition, I contend that the liberal 
egalitarian preference for policies that affect whole communities rather than 
minorities is insensitive to the needs of vulnerable populations, for instance people 
with disabilities (PWDs), orphans, and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). Such 
skewed policy frameworks offer opportunities to some leaders to introduce 
personified systems. 
On the other hand, Etzioni (1993:1) argued that the communitarian philosophy 
emphasises the importance of community in the functioning of political life, in the 
analysis and evaluation of political institutions, and in understanding human identity 
and well-being. Accordingly, Spring, Aharoni, Summy and Elliot (2010:94) argued 
that the term “communitarianism” described the notion that human beings can 
flourish only within the context of a community. Furthermore, [communitarians] 
argued that the following three features characterised communities: shared goals, 
and relationships that are not merely instrumental, and a sense of identity (Spring et 
al., 2010:94). For communitarians, a network of social relationships subsumed 
individual [identity], never the social isolates that liberalism assumed. [Individuals 
also] have obligations to the community, not just to the political arrangements that 
facilitate their own interests (Dryzek et al., 2011:15). Likewise, Bell (2016:2) 
contended that “communitarians deemed that principles of justice originated from 
particular forms of life and traditions of specific societies, and thus can vary from one 
context to another.” Regarding the conception of the ‘self’ (an important factor in the 
theory of personification), Bell (2016:19) maintained that communitarians believed 
individuals have a vital interest in leading decent communal lives. The latter has the 
political implication that there is a need to sustain and promote the communal 
attachments that are crucial to our sense of well-being. Conversely, I argue that the 
‘self’’ is surrogate to the cognitive formation of our personalities. Contrary to the 
communitarian assertion, I posit that an individual first looks inward into their intrinsic 
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potential before looking outward to the surrounding community. However, the 
community can effectively influence the behavioural inclination of an individual, 
including the national leader. In the same vein, communitarians suggest that 
individual liberties are subservient to societal norms.  
In addition, I contend that society is an aggregation of several individuals, bound 
together by common values and objectives. Thus, society should reflect the essential 
liberties ensconced in its ‘composite’ group of individuals. Furthermore, citizens 
should have the liberty to draw leaders from among the several individuals to ensure 
the effective guidance of society. I also aver that there is need to mitigate the 
possible ascendency of a leader with personified inclinations or even the 
entrenchment of acquiesced ethnicities that exhibit genocidal leanings. Accordingly, 
communities should advocate for democratic constitutional checks and balances to 
protect citizens against individual, societal and government excesses. 
To understand the theory of personification further, I examined political philosophies 
by Aristotle, a leading traditional thinker and classical democratic theorist. Aristotle 
(noted in Miller, 2017:8) distinguished several types of rule, based on the nature of 
the soul of the ruler and of the subject. “First, Aristotle reflected on despotic rule, 
which the master-slave relationship exemplifies. Aristotle believed that under this 
form of rule, natural slaves who lacked a deliberative faculty needed direction by a 
natural master.” Next, Aristotle considered paternal and marital rule, which he also 
viewed as defensible: “he argued that by nature, males are more capable leaders 
than females, unless the male is constituted in some way contrary to nature.” 
Likewise, “the ‘elder’ and the ‘perfect’ are by nature more capable of leadership than 
the ‘younger’ and ‘imperfect.’” In what Aristotle understood as an ‘aristocratic’ 
constitution (literally, the rule of the aristoi, i.e., best persons) Aristotle (noted in 
Miller, 2017:8) contended that, “the correct conception of justice required the 
assignment of political rights to those with virtue, property and freedom who make a 
full contribution to the political community.” Additionally, Aristotle (noted in 
Cunningham, 2002:7) characterised “the proper rule of the many, ‘polity’ and termed 
its deviation - democracy.” I find the foregoing account discriminatory and 
marginalistic, as it suggests stratification of individuals and society along clear 
occupations. I argue that this kind of discrimination is characteristic of personified 
systems in which leaders marginalise or even exclude certain categories of citizens 
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to satisfy their political excesses. The stratification of society may quickly transform 
into the enforcement of segregative caste systems that are breeding grounds for 
personified dispensations. Of particular interest in Aristotle’s model is the ceding of 
sovereignty by the masses to an individual, rather than ‘rule of the many’. This 
potentially results in egocentrism and dictatorship, which precipitates fertile ground 
for personified systems. 
Conversely, Dunleavy (2009:13) posited that the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy’ are 
compound elements that formed liberal democracy. However, Hawkesworth and 
Kogan (1992:196) argued that the ‘liberal’ and the ‘democratic’ elements in liberal 
democracy may be in tension where citizen majorities come to favour policies that 
curtail political and civil rights. Hawkesworth and Kogan maintained that more often, 
the two elements support each other; each of which is an essential component of 
liberal democracy. Conversely, Dunleavy (2009:13) defined liberal democracy as “a 
political system where the term ‘democracy’ implies organizing regular ‘free and fair’ 
elections to determine the establishment of governments; and constitution of the 
legislature, where political groups and parties freely compete, and systems efficiently 
assure majority rule.” Moreover, the “‘liberal’ part ensures law and constitutional 
safeguards protect basic civil liberties, while an independent judiciary and legal 
system impartially enforce legal enactments and rules” (Dunleavy, 2009:13). I 
contend that although Dunleavy’s model was cognisant of civil liberties, it ignored the 
reality of inequalities in societal structures that arose from income disparities, 
poverty, greed and corruption. Similarly, liberal democracy seems a little fragile for 
political conditions prevailing in some developing countries that require military 
solutions to restore peaceful coexistence.  
Additionally, Hawkesworth and Kogan cited shortcomings in the liberal democracy 
model that had significant implications for the theory of personification. Hawkesworth 
and Kogan (1992:196) contended that some authoritarian governments’ permitted 
substantial civil freedoms, while some liberal democracies had adopted restrictions 
on press freedom and civil rights, or had abused the positions of minorities. I argue 
that this inverse incongruity on the espousal of liberties by different political 
dispensations is correspondingly a similar paradox in personified systems. 
Alternatively, classic pluralism, as defined in David Held’s Models of Democracy 
(noted in Eisenberg, 1995:9), is a theory about interest group competition and 
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distribution of power within a state. However, Young (noted in Eisenberg, 1995:58) 
averred contrarily, that one source of power is found in institutions that is not 
captured by the distribution paradigm. Young stated that conceptualising power in 
distributive terms meant the implicit or explicit conception of power as a kind of 
faculty possessed by individual agents in greater or lesser amounts. In addition, 
Cunningham (2002:73) argued that classic pluralists focused on conflict among 
‘interest groups’ in society. Their main concern was how to maintain consistent 
democratic stability and peace in conflict-ridden societies. Cunningham maintained 
that “leaders played a crucial role to guarantee the special interests of their 
constituents, and at the same time also negotiated to maintain peace.”  
This study noted that the classic pluralist model provided avenues for functional 
conflict resolution mechanisms that are responsive to societal interests, and may 
therefore be applicable in personified systems. Equally, political groups under the 
model are autonomous and can make independent political decisions, which I 
construe to constitute a good check on excesses under personified systems. 
However, the classic pluralism model does not consider societal class disparities, 
which is a challenge that the theory of personification addresses. Furthermore, the 
theory does not consider some developing countries that have never experienced 
‘genuine’ multiparty politics in a pluralistic system. In such a volatile situation, 
devious leaders with personified inclinations could easily manipulate citizens for their 
own selfish gains. To an extent, this study differs with Young’s notion about the 
distributive paradigm, a model that can be leveraged to share national resources 
equally among citizens. Instead, under the theory of personification, I argue that 
Classic Pluralists do not take into account the need for ‘domination’, which is a 
trademark character of personified leadership.   
Similarly, David Held (noted in Dijk, 1996:45) defined participatory democracy as a 
blend of ‘representative’ and ‘direct democracy’. The model aimed to develop a 
mode of citizenship that Jean Jacques Rousseau (noted in Dijk, 1996:45) maintained 
would primarily be via collective discussion and education. This study argues that 
leaders play a crucial role in advancing participatory processes and fostering 
reciprocity. Thus, the model becomes ineffectual when personified inclinations 
compromise the altruism of leaders. On the other hand, the protective democracy 
model advocated for popular control of government as a means of protecting 
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individual liberty (Hudson, 2006:5), as well as from infringements upon individual 
liberty by other citizens (Browne, 2006:46). Other political philosophers and leading 
proponents of protective democracy, Jeremy Bentham and James Stuart Mill, also 
gave useful insights into functioning of government. Bentham and Mill (noted in 
Hudson, 2006:5) favoured “democratic government as the best means to secure a 
liberal society.” Unlike Marxism, which recognises class differences and inequality in 
society, the protective democracy model ignored these nascent factors. However, I 
posit that inequality and subjective apportionment of classes in society are 
characteristic of personified dispensations. In this instance, undemocratic personified 
governments will not guarantee societal liberties since they overtly value personal, 
rather than national honour. 
Lastly, Bohman (1997:321) contended that “proponents of deliberative democracy 
defended a complex ideal of an association whose common life is governed by the 
public deliberation of its members.” Bohman maintained that “deliberation was 
democratic, to the extent that it rested on a process of reaching reasoned agreement 
among free and equal citizens.” Likewise, Chambers (2003:308) defined deliberative 
democracy as “a normative theory that suggested ways in which we could enhance 
democracy and criticize institutions that did not live up to normative standards.” 
Chambers maintained that “deliberative democracy was a more just and democratic 
way to deal with pluralism.” Thus, in Chambers perspective, deliberative democracy 
focused on views anchored in conceptions of accountability and discussion. I argue 
that in order to mitigate personified excesses, the theory of personification could 
benefit from the morality, accountability and consensus inherent in the deliberative 
democracy model. However, I have questions about the constancy of key theoretical 
constructs associated with deliberative democracy, including practical applicability of 
equality, and rationality and reason in developing economies like those in East 
Africa. For instance, how does one ensure rational, practical reasoning outside the 
leader’s own thinking under personified dispensation? Similarly, the fact that 
deliberative democracy champions criticism, rationality and discussion raises 
questions on the inclusiveness of the model in the predominantly semi-literate areas 
of East Africa. Apparently, the model seems to favour enlightened political actors 
over the illiterate electorate. Therefore, I argue that the deliberative democracy 
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model, although seemingly flexible, still has loopholes that personified leaders can 
exploit. 
 Policy studies theories 
Rose (noted in Osman, 2002:38) argued that “policymaking is best conveyed by 
describing it as a process, rather than as a single, once-for-all act”. This process 
involved negotiation, bargaining and accommodation of many different interests, 
which eventually gave it a political flavour. Conversely, Osman (2002:38) argued that 
“public policymaking not only involved the public bodies or public officials as policy 
actors; rather, private or non-official groups also played a very active role in 
policymaking.” Osman maintained that “this public private interaction constituted the 
structure of the political system within which policy actors influenced the policy 
process.” Similarly, Osman (2002:39) asserted that “policymaking entailed 
approaches like political system model, rational model, incremental model, mixed 
scanning model, group theory, elite theory and pluralist theory.” To the foregoing, 
Knill and Tosun (2008:4) added “institutional and process conceptual models.” Of 
these approaches, Easton’s (1957:383-384) ‘political system model’ is the most 
contextually pertinent to the theory of personification, as I discuss below. 
Easton (noted in Osman, 2002:39) explained that the process of policymaking as a 
‘political system’ in developing countries responds to the demands arising from its 
environment. Easton maintained that “the ‘political system’ comprised of identifiable 
and interrelated institutions and activities that made authoritative decisions (or 
allocations of values) that were binding on society.” In addition, Easton rationalised 
that “the environment provided inputs to the decision process/political system in the 
form of demands and supports that translate into outputs or policies.” However, I 
observe that the absence of external influences in the environment can yield ‘open’ 
or ‘closed’ political systems. Furthermore, I posit that in the EAC, socio-political 
systems are volatile, unstable and can have unpredictable subsystems – a factor 
that Easton’s model did not articulate well. Concerning the latter, I aver that erratic 
political environments are potential triggers for personified dispensations. This is 
because leaders are prone to yield to their political environment in a manner that 
strongly shapes their actions. Furthermore, leaders give meaning to the political 
situation, whether prejudiced or rational, to generate and/or shape situations for their 
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own interests. Consequently, personified leadership and institutions begin to control 
national agendas in a manner that devalues the concerns and representation of less 
powerful groups.  
On the other hand, Shepsle and Bonchek (noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:5) posited 
that, “the rational model of decision-making, first developed in the field of economic 
analysis formulated guidance on how to secure optimal policy decisions.” 
Accordingly, Shepsle and Bonchek stated that “a decision is rational if no other 
alternative is better than the decision maker’s preference.” I note that this model 
aptly enables policy practitioners to make informed, evidence-based decisions, thus 
avoiding subjectivity and the inequitable judgments frequently associated with 
personified systems. However, I posit that in practice, the need to balance political 
and emotional complexities frequently obscures rational decision-making by leaders. 
For instance, what happens in a situation where leaders need to make instant 
complex and intellectually important decisions? This becomes a daunting task under 
personified systems where intuitional decision-making centres on the leader. Over 
time, this egocentric tendency results in inward-looking policies that reflect the 
intrinsic aspirations of the leader. While I agree that the rational decision-making 
model inspires leaders to make better decisions, I contend that the rational decisions 
depend on whether the national leader religiously follows the rational decision-maker 
model, a factor that is lacking in personified systems. 
Correspondingly, incrementalism emerged in response to the rational model. 
According to Quinn (noted in Rajagopalan & Rasheed, 1995:292), “a strong central 
vision supports the logical and proactive process of policymaking in the ‘logical 
incrementalism model.’” In the model, Quinn argued that “top management formally 
blended formal-analytical, behavioural and power-political techniques. The objective 
was to establish cohesion and systematic movement toward broadly defined ends, 
which are constantly refined as new information appears.” Quinn described the 
integrated model as ‘logical incrementalism’. However, Lindblom and Wildavsky 
(noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:7) posited that “instead, the [incremental] model 
necessitates synchronized selection of goals and policies.” According to Knill and 
Tosun (2008:7), the latter relates to “its foundation on ‘bounded rationality’, i.e. an 
alternative concept to rational choice that takes into account the limitations of 
knowledge and cognitive capacities of decision makers.” On this note, Anderson 
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(2014:129) asserted that “incremental decisions involved limited changes or 
additions to existing policies.” Anderson maintained that “because decision-makers 
operated under conditions of uncertainty about the future consequences of their 
actions, incremental decisions reduced the risks and costs of uncertainty.” However, 
I argue that the lack of contextual knowledge in the complex EAC policy environment 
renders this model ineffective. Instead, it can easily result in disjointed policies and 
even marginalisation of the disadvantaged. Lustick and Forester (noted in 
Woodhouse & Collingridge, 1993) corroborated my argument in their assertion that 
[experts contended that incrementalism tends to] “favour organized elites over the 
poor and disorganized, because weaker actors were not able to protect values that 
stronger actors chose to discount.” Similarly, I argue that leaders in personified 
systems tend to build an elitist cadre of supporters around themselves. in this 
respect, leaders and associated elites under personified regimes also exploit the 
hapless, disempowered masses to meet their egocentric needs. Logsdon (noted in 
Woodhouse & Collingridge, 1993) lent credence to my argument in his argument. 
Logsdon observed that, “in general, incrementalism inadequately accounted for 
crucial factors that the bargaining process does not effectively represent, e.g., the 
future.” I argue that lack of representation is characteristic of personified systems 
that do not accommodate competing views from parties outside the core system. 
Amitai Etzioni (1967:389) asserted that “the mixed scanning model combined 
rationalistic decision-making, with incremental decisions in a ‘scanning’ operation 
that entailed search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information as well as 
drawing of conclusions, all elements in the service of decision-making.” Etzioni 
maintained that “mixed scanning also contained a strategy for the allocation of 
resources among the levels of decision-making and for evaluation, leading to 
changes in the proportion of higher versus lower levels of scanning based on 
changes in the situation.” According to Walt (noted in Sutton, 1999), “the mixed 
scanning model straddled between rational and incrementalist models.” The model 
divided decisions into macro (fundamental) and micro (small) classifications that 
compelled the policymaker to identify possible policy options for further examination 
(Sutton, 1999). I posit that the analytical sequencing of this model renders it 
impractical in the EAC political setting, since the region is deficient of strong 
analytical skills and political will necessary for its application. Specifically, I argue 
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that inexpert policymakers will find it hard to differentiate between fundamental and 
routine policy decisions, especially under personified regimes. I base my argument 
on the fact that leaders with personified inclination will endeavour to transfer liability 
for their undemocratic actions on to other innocent citizens. Accordingly, I posit that 
policymakers should sensitise and involve citizens in the processes of policy 
formulation so that all voices are heard.  
Conversely, the group theory hypothesised that “policies are the result of an 
equilibrium reached through struggles shaped by the relative strength of interest 
groups” (Truman & Latham, noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:7). In the theory, “groups 
are discernible by income, size, density, recruitment, organizational aspects, 
[coherence], sanctioning mechanisms and aspects of leadership” (Newton & Van 
Deth, 2010). Newton and van Deth maintained that, “variations in the relative 
strength of the interest groups may trigger policy changes.” I note that group theory 
presupposes that policymakers are constantly responding to group pressures; 
however, I argue that groups can potentially make flawed judgments. Additionally, I 
posit that groups can coalesce around ethnic identities, for instance in Rwanda, 
resulting in segregation rather than cohesion, a factor that compromises democracy 
and promotes personification. Mills (noted in Knill & Tosun, 2008:8) argued that the 
view that “governing elites determine policymaking” is also linked to group theory.  
I point out that the elite model claims the electorate does not have information about 
public policies and that elites shape public opinion on policy questions. The fact that 
this model focuses on elites brings to the fore class struggles and inward-looking 
strategies that concentrate power on elites at the expense of democratic rights. I 
contend that the latter precipitates the emergence of personified systems, since 
political leaders will perceive themselves as the ultimate ‘possessors’ of knowledge, 
and not the uninformed citizens. Similarly, I contend that the elite model ignores the 
oversight role of traditional African structures and advocacy roles that civil society 
organizations play in shaping courses of public policy. I also argue that because 
elites form the smallest percentage of the population, they are bound to ‘collude’ to 
suppress or reign in the masses in order to sustain their egocentric interests. 
Meanwhile, Immergut (2011:75) averred that “the pluralist theory focuses on freedom 
of individuals from arbitrary government authority.” In the theory that contrasts to the 
65 
 
liberal model, “individuals benefit from the socialization provided by the groups in 
which they participate.” Immergut maintained that “group bargaining was based on 
competition amongst interest groups to attract members and to influence 
governmental decision-making.” To Immergut (2011:75), “the ideal political process 
depended on whether individuals had the freedom to form groups – that in turn were 
free to lobby government. Accordingly, the latter brings forth patterns of public policy 
that are normatively acceptable, as long as the political system is open, competitive 
and bound by the ‘rules of the game’.”  In a sense, Immergut maintained that “pluralist 
democracy is based on the ideal of a political market coming to equilibrium with 
interest groups playing an important intermediary role.” However, I argue that 
pluralists ignored the fact that individuals who form groups also have personal 
interests that can actually influence the thinking of larger groups. In addition, in weak 
or prejudiced personified governments, powerful groups serving personified 
leadership interests could subvert national policy processes to suit their regressive 
ideologies. Similarly, I point out that under pluralism, the representation of interest 
groups in political decision-making processes is imbalanced because personified 
interests, especially those backed by state power, have more formidable interests 
than those of ordinary citizens do. 
One of the first attempts to construct a typology of social policies was the formulation 
of the residual-institutional model by Wilensky and Lebeaux in (noted in Hall & 
Midgley, 2004:25). This model divided social policies into two categories. Wilensky 
and Lebeaux posited that the first category, the residual model, consists of social 
policies that are limited and meagre. The residual model supplements the family, 
voluntary sector and the market [initiatives] when these institutions are unable to 
meet social needs. Wilensky and Lebeaux maintained that the second type, the 
institutional model, consisted of social policies that played a frontline role in society 
and promoted universal coverage and extensive social service provision. 
Conversely, March and Olsen (noted in Peters, 2000:2) “developed the ‘normative 
approach’ – a major development for institutional analysis.” March and Olsen argued 
that “one can best comprehend political behaviour through ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
that individuals acquired through their institutional memberships.” I point out that this 
institutional theory is very pertinent for this study, since I hypothesise that good 
institutions are critical for advancing sustainable national governance and 
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development. Equally, March and Olsen (noted in Peters, 2000:2) maintained that 
“people functioning within institutions are motivated by normative standards rather 
than their desire to maximize individual utilities.” In March and Olsen’s perspective, 
“these standards of behaviour emanated from involvement with institutions that were 
major social repositories of values.” I argue that in all institutional models, decision-
making structures play a pivotal role. However, I posit that powerful individuals who 
exert significant political influence manage these institutional structures. For 
instance, an executive leader in a personified system may exploit the parliamentary 
majority to entrench egocentric policies, to the exclusion of democratic citizen rights. 
Conversely, Caramani (2014:339) argued that “the ‘process model’ assumed that 
policymaking transpired in the bedrocks of diverse constraints, an infinite cycle of 
decisions and varied policy processes. Therefore, it is convenient to conceive 
policymaking as a ‘process model’, otherwise known as a ‘policy cycle.’” Caramani 
maintained that “the cycle models the policy process as a series of political activities, 
consisting of agenda setting, formulation, adoption, implementation and evaluation.” 
On the other hand, Ball (noted in Nudzor, 2009:91) posited that “the model depicted 
policy as a dynamic process that related to the interaction of actors on issues 
pertaining to policy formulation, articulation, dissemination and interpretation.” Thus, 
“the comprehension of the policy process should emphasize both the diverse ways in 
which policy is examined, and the ‘social agency of the policy process.’” Ball 
maintained that “the conception explicated the point that there were real struggles, 
disputes, conflicts and adjustments in the policy process, and that these took place 
in the pre-established terrain.” However, Knill and Tosun (2008:9) posited that “in 
reality different political actors and institutions may be involved in diverse processes 
at the same time.” I opine that individuals or groups pursuing their own material 
interests can influence these singular or composite stages of the process model. As 
compared to Karl Marx’s theory of capital accumulation, powerful individuals or 
groups with personified inclinations can manipulate the policy process to their own 
advantage and detriment of the helpless citizenry. 
 Demographic theories 
In the field of demography, Hirschman’s (1981:562) two models demonstrated how 
demography linked to [socio-economic] development. According to Hirschman, the 
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first model, “labelled ‘population planning’ stressed the relevance of demographic 
theory and knowledge toward a few selected goals, the chief one being the reduction 
of fertility. In the model, development-planning aimed to bring some degree of control 
to the elements that played important roles in development.” Coale and Hoover 
(noted in Hirschman, 1981:562) affirmed the latter in their assertion that “there was 
growing awareness that rapid population growth may have a dilatory effect upon 
socioeconomic development.” However, I note that there is little empirical evidence 
to prove that rapid population growth and high fertility are hindrances to economic 
progress, as is also implied by Malthus in ‘theory of population growth’. Moreover, I 
posit that the subjectivity of population control may embolden leaders to decimate 
marginalised persons or communities. In Hirschman’s second model, I noted that the 
ultimate practicality of demographic scholarship tarries in empirical population 
research that assesses development along contrasting socio-economic dimensions. 
To Hirschman, the model facilitated “development plans” to apply “empirical 
research” on population and socio-economic resources. However, I argue that non-
statistical studies, for instance ethnography, can also be empirical and yet are 
beneficial in their own right. Furthermore, some statistical studies can also be non-
experimental, for instance, survey research, and still be valid in analysing socio-
economic conditions. 
On the other hand, Malthus, in his Malthusian population theory (Malthus, 1888:194) 
in classical economics and demography implied the “dependence of population 
growth on the material conditions of the economy.” Malthus argued that “human 
biological capacity to reproduce [potentially] surpasses the physical capacity to 
produce.” In this context, the supply of food is inadequate to complement rising 
demand. In Malthus’ view, “the perfection of a human society free of coercive 
restraints was utopian, because the threat of population growth would always be 
present.” In discussing Malthus’ theory, Currais (2000:77) posited that “when 
population size was small, the standard of living would be high, and population would 
grow as a natural result of passion between the sexes. Conversely, without 
constraint, population would rise geometrically, but food production would only rise 
arithmetically.” Because of this natural law of imbalance, Malthus (noted in Elwell, 
2005:11) asserted, that “inequality was built into the very structure of human 
societies, and it was simply not feasible to create a technological or enlightened 
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society in which resources were fairly and equitably distributed to all.” However, I 
argue that, unlike Malthus’s moral restraints, but in consonance with his elite self-
interest, personified actions of egocentric leaders also cause inequality. I posit that a 
great faction of Malthus’ observations on coerciveness and imbalance in society is 
surrogate to the tenets of personified governance. Thus, in order to entrench 
themselves, some leaders manipulate society and even exterminate their own 
destitute citizens. 
On the other hand, Marxian demographic transition model considered children a 
necessity for survival; and an investment/production good. The Marxian view (noted 
in Brezis & Young, 2016:16) suggested that “the proletarianisation of the workforce 
resulted in a fertility increase, since the working masses attempted to accumulate the 
one factor of production they controlled – labour power.” To Marx (noted in Brezis & 
Young, 2016:16), “man controls nature and is therefore able to control nature 
consciously and make his own history.” Marx maintained that “this ability allows man 
to produce beyond subsistence and guarantees that he will not succumb to the 
dilemma that Malthus described.” Likewise, Marx argued that “children are a 
necessity for survival”; they were a production good.  Similarly, Marx (noted in Brezis 
& Young, 2016:17) argued that “since the modes of production defined the decisions 
about fertility, family structures should be distinct, and so should the social classes 
like the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.” Regarding the bourgeoisie, Marx maintained 
that “children are a means for maintaining the family business and the bourgeois 
family based on capital, and private gain.” Similarly, “the bourgeois sees his wife as 
an instrument of production.” Accordingly, I note that in Marx's capitalist model, the 
emergent capitalist classes thrive on private ownership of the means of production, 
and exploit the classes who own only their labour power. This kind of power 
imbalance disadvantageously pits one class of citizens against the other. In the 
context of this study, Marx’s theory accurately portrays the struggle between political 
elites, egocentric leaders and the masses over control and allocation of scarce 
national resources. I argue that the egocentric view that Marx attributes to the 
proletariat exemplifies the actions of personified leaders. Also, Marx’ fallacious 
concept that ‘man controls nature to make history’ could squarely play into the hands 
of personified leaders who are motivated by the desire to ‘control’ their environment. 
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 The philosophical domain 
In the philosophical domain, Soumitra (2007:4) posited that the development of 
human civilisation had witnessed specific advances in the spiritual and material 
realms. Soumitra maintained that a society [comprised] of individual human beings, 
whose nature in turn influenced their social conditions and social behaviour. Equally, 
social conditions and socio-economic structure also influenced individual 
psychology. The higher thought processes of an evolved person could influence the 
collective attitudes of the society and pave the way for a new social system 
(Soumitra, 2007:4). The primary human attribute is his desire for liberation, which 
inspires him to move forward on the path of self-realisation. Soumitra maintained that 
human beings want liberation in the physical, mental and spiritual realms, which any 
social system must support. The social system plays a vital role in the reorientation 
of the human mind, while social freedom means political and economic freedom 
(Soumitra, 2007:5). This study opines that, encapsulated in Soumitra’s discourses, is 
the intrinsic desire for freedom from injustice, exploitation and class domination that 
every human being nurtures, which this study theorises as being attainable through 
democratic leadership. 
Additionally, Samuels (noted in Soumitra, 2007:5) stressed three facets of 
economics: first, he says the objective of economics is to provide positive knowledge 
and insight into the economy. It is concerned with providing information, description 
and interpretation of the nature of economy, Second, economics is social control, 
one of the modes through which modern societies formulate a social construction of 
reality with regard to economy. Economics, then, has both explanation and 
rationalisation, and thus its ideology has come to serve some of the purposes 
formerly provided by religion. The content and nuances of economic theory function 
to control the formation of issues and policies. The third facet of economics is its 
function as psychic balm; that is, it provides us with a sense of order and sets our 
mind at rest (Samuels, noted Soumitra, 2007:5). As discussed by Samuels, 
economic theory provides a basis to define problems, rationalise approaches, and 
find solutions to society’s challenges. Accordingly, I argue that development 
practitioners can use the economics discipline to improve programme delivery. 
Although it refers to individuals constructing a social reality, the theory does not 
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highlight the significance of individual behaviour in the economy. In essence, I argue 
that the theory does not highlight how the cognitive development of an individual, 
who later assumes a leadership position in a given economy, will play out.  
Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) contended that written philosophical principles of 
leadership go back as far as the dawn of civilisation, which shaped its leaders – as 
much as leaders shaped them. Bass and Stogdill maintained that “the Egyptian 
hieroglyphics for leadership (seshemet), leader (seshemu) and the follower (shemsu) 
were being written 5,000 years ago.” Lichtheim (noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990:4) 
highlighted the fact that in 2300 B.C., in the Instruction of Ptahhotep, three qualities 
were attributed to the Pharaoh. “Authoritative utterness is in thy mouth, perception is 
in thy heart, and thy tongue is the shrine of justice”. Bass and Stogdill (1990:4) also 
contend that “the Chinese classics, written as early as the sixth century B.C., are 
filled with hortatory advice to the country's leaders about their responsibilities to the 
people.” Likewise, “Confucius urged leaders to set a moral example” (Bass & Bass, 
2009:4). He also “urged leaders to manipulate rewards and punishments to teach 
what was right and good” (Wren, 2013:50). Wren (2013:50) maintained that “Taoism 
emphasized the need for the leader to work himself out of his job by making the 
people believe that successes were due to their efforts.” Similarly, Argyris (noted in 
Bass & Stogdill, 1990) narrated how Lao-tzu declared that “leaders must participate 
in and share ownership of developments.” Roman and Greek authors, such as 
Caesar, Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch, wrote extensively on the subject of leadership 
and administration. For instance, in his Parallel Lives of around 100 C.E., Plutarch 
(noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990) endeavoured to show the moral similarities between 
50 Greek and Roman leaders: for each Greek leader there was a Roman 
counterpart. Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) maintained that “the heroes in Homer’s Iliad 
exemplified Greek concepts of leadership, for instance, Ajax symbolized inspirational 
leadership, law, and order.” Furthermore, Bass and Stogdill contended that “other 
qualities that the Greeks admired and thought were needed (and sometimes 
wanting) in heroic leaders were justice and judgment (Agamemnon), wisdom and 
counsel (Nestor), shrewdness and cunning (Odysseus), and valour and activism 
(Achilles).” However, Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) also argued that “contemporary 
society did not regard shrewdness and cunning as highly as they once were.” 
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The above literature has enabled this study to ground the concept of personified 
leadership in Greek, Roman, Egyptian, and Chinese philosophies. Whereas these 
societies looked up to leaders for moral guidance and inspiration, some of the 
leaders exhibited authoritarian tendencies that augur well with the theory of 
personification. Also of significance, the literature cited above corroborates this 
study’s theoretical line of argument that subjects sometimes influence leadership 
action. The Greeks even went as far as to define certain attributes that were 
admirable, for example, inspirational leadership. I posit that egocentric leaders can 
take advantage of such societal perceptions and manipulate these to their benefit. In 
other words, instead of living naturally, the leader “acts out” a leadership profile to 
appease society. The fact that this notion is grounded in philosophy will be important 
in rationalising the discussions in subsequent paragraphs.  
2.5 Correlating theory of personification and the concept of leadership 
Leaders are important to the extent that they affect (national) policy processes that 
shape the governance and development of nations. Leaders have the capacity, and 
often resources, to persuade followers or subjects to perform their aspirations. 
Galbraith (noted in Fuqua, Payne & Cangemi, 1998:3) posited that “a powerful 
leader will be judged by how effectively they persuaded their subordinates to accept 
solutions to problems that led to organizational goals.” McClelland (noted in Fuqua et 
al., 1998:4) claimed that “the positive or socialized face of power emphasizes a 
concern for group goals.” McClelland maintained that “the positive or socialized face 
of power finds the goals that move people; helps the group to formulate the goals, 
takes the initiative in providing members of the group the means to achieve the 
goals, and gives group members a sense of support, strength, and competence 
needed to work hard toward achieving goals.” McMurry (noted in Fuqua et al., 
1998:4) asserted that “leaders who can persuade persons are capable of influencing 
their audiences both emotionally and rationally.” Likewise, McMurry noted that 
leaders “analysed their audience in terms of relevant needs, desires and values after 
which they focused on a connection with their audience on common ground before 
moving into areas of resistance.”  
Both theories discussed above highlight the power of leaders to persuade their 
followers. I construe that the leaders’ ‘persuasion’ connotes liberty on decision 
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making, rather than acquiescence, of the subjects. However, leaders who practise 
personified governance use coercion rather than persuasion. This study 
hypothesises that under personified dispensations, the affected national systems 
and institutions frequently assume the character of the leader. It is therefore 
important to study a unique leader in order to anticipate or rationalise leadership 
actions or even direction of national policies under the subject leader. Accordingly, 
this section defines and discusses the concept of leadership within the context of this 
study. In the second segment of this section, I explore how leadership philosophy 
defines national leader’s actions, behaviours and our thoughts. This analysis will 
enable the reader to understand how philosophical concepts of leadership evolved 
from the dawn of civilisation, to date. In part, three of this section, the researcher 
analyses the concept of traditional leadership, based on history, traditions and 
customs. The study also expounds on how newer forms of leadership have 
overtaken traditional forms of leadership. In the final part of this chapter, the study 
examines the abilities and attributes of leaders in terms of traits, behaviour, 
management and inclinations. 
 Delineation of the term “leadership” 
In discussing leadership, Bass and Stogdill (1990:3) averred that “leaders as 
prophets, priests, chiefs and kings served as symbols, representatives, and models 
for their people in the Old and New Testaments, in the Upanishads, in Greek and 
Latin classics and in the Icelandic sagas.” In the Iliad, higher, transcendental goals 
were emphasised (Book x, line 201, noted in Bass & Stogdill, 1990), while the 
Odyssey advised leaders to maintain their social distance (Book III, line 297, noted in 
Bass & Stogdill, 1990). The subject of leadership was not limited to the classics of 
Western literature. It was of as much interest to Asoka and Confucius as it was to 
Plato and Aristotle (Bass & Stogdill, 1990). Similarly, Paige (noted in Bass & Stogdill, 
1990:3) argued that “all societies have created myths to provide plausible and 
acceptable explanations for the dominance of their leaders and the submission of 
their subordinates.” Paige maintained that “from its infancy, the study of history has 
been the study of leaders – what they did and why they did it.” However, Bass and 
Stogdill (1990:3) argued that “in modern psychohistory, there is still a search for 
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generalizations about leadership, built on the in-depth analysis of the development, 
motivation and competencies of world leaders, living and dead.” 
Winston and Patterson provided a contextually pertinent integrative definition of 
leadership. According to Winston and Patterson (2006:7), “a leader is one or more 
people who select, equip, train and influence one or more follower(s); who have 
diverse gifts, abilities and skills and focus the follower(s) to the organization’s 
mission and objectives. To Winston and Patterson, leaders caused the follower(s) to 
“both willingly and enthusiastically expend spiritual, emotional and physical energy in 
a concerted coordinated effort to achieve the organizational mission and objectives.” 
This study finds relevance in Winston and Patterson’s (2006) assertion that “the 
leader recognizes the diversity of the follower(s) and achieves unity of common 
values and directions without destroying the uniqueness of the person.” In this 
respect, this study points out that, contrary to the personified leadership inclination, 
this definition highlights the positivity in altruistic behaviour of leaders and their 
benevolence towards followers.  
Conversely, I highlight some other definitions of leadership that focus on actions 
rallying constituents towards a common goal. According to Stogdill (noted in Silva, 
2016:2), “leadership is the process (act) of influencing the activities of an organized 
group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement.” Similarly, Hemphill 
and Coons (1957:7) “defined leadership as the behaviour of an individual when he is 
directing the activities of a group toward a shared goal.” Likewise, Tannenbaum, 
Weschler and Massarik (noted in Kirimi, 2007:167) “defined leadership as 
interpersonal influence, exercised in a situation, and directed, through the 
communication process, toward the attainment of a specified goal or goals.” 
Conversely, Antonakis, Schriesheim, Donovan, Gopalakrishna-Pillai, Pellegrini, and 
Rossomme (noted in Alves, Manz & Butterfield, 2005:21) considered “leadership to 
be purpose driven, resulting in change based on values, ideals, vision, symbols and 
emotional exchanges.” In my analysis, I established that the common theme in the 
above definitions is leadership actions that ‘influence’ or ‘direct’ activities towards the 
attainment of common goals. These connote the conscious actions of leaders 
towards subjects. Of interest to this study, Weber (noted in Alves et al., 2005:20), 
stated that “leadership rests in three possible sources ‘ideal-types’ of authority: 
charismatic authority, reflected personal characteristics; traditional authority, referred 
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to compliance with norms and forms of conduct; and legal authority, which resulted 
from functional ‘duty of office.” I analysed the above definitions and established that 
the common theme points to how leaders harness their organisational, visionary and 
convening potential to attain some tangible outcomes. This highlights the inherent 
powers that leaders have to influence their subjects. It is also important to recognise 
the interplay of words like “authority, directive, and influence” in describing the 
liberties that a leader has at their disposal. I argue that a leader exercising 
personified dispensation is able to manipulate all these attributes to their benefits. 
I also deconstructed the term ‘leadership’ into three constituents: the leader, the led, 
and inherent relations between leader and led. Therefore, I defined leadership as 
being characterised by the extent to which an individual influences, serves or 
supports other persons to achieve mutually agreeable objectives. In my definition, a 
leader should be a role model who inspires ‘subjects’ towards attaining a common 
objective. The leader should empathise with, sympathise with, and encourage 
followers. Above all, a leader should exemplify sacrifice, devotion and submission to 
their calling in a virtuous manner.  
 Traditional leadership 
Traditional leadership connotes authority and legitimacy based on history, traditions 
and customs. According to Max Weber (noted in Manuh & Sutherland-Addy, 
2014:183), traditional leadership rested on an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority 
under them. Weber maintained that the legitimacy of a ruler’s authority rests in 
traditional norms. Thus according to Weber, the “traditional leadership style 
subsisted on the conviction that bestowment of power on the leader kept with the 
traditions of the past.” In close context, Manuh and Sutherland-Addy (2014:183) 
argued that we could find the most obvious examples of traditional leadership among 
ethnic communities and groups. Traditional leadership loosely correlates with 
hereditary systems of power and privilege, as reflected for example in the survival of 
dynastic rule in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nepal and Kuwait. Manuh and Sutherland-
Addy posited that in these absolute monarchies, the monarch claims, even if seldom 
exercised, a monopoly of political power. It is apparent that traditional leadership is 
not uniquely African, but global. For instance, the UK, Canada, Spain, the 
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Netherlands and Denmark have their authority and legitimacy based on traditions, 
history, customs and status (Manuh & Sutherland-Addy, 2014:184). I argue that the 
fact that traditional leadership spans the globe is an exemplar to the East African 
region to draw contextual inspiration from such areas. This is because the above 
leadership examples consider factors that can check personified governance, for 
example, how to muster legitimate authority, power, and privileges. It is also 
beneficial to study hereditary systems of powers and privileges since personified 
dispensations thrive on this model of governance.  
In his work “On the subject of kings and queens …” Williams (2003:59) gave a 
contextually pertinent account of traditional leadership from an African perspective. 
Williams used the term “traditional” to denote indigenous forms of African cultural 
group identity and nation-state governance that predated substantial European 
colonial influence, that is, predating the 18th and early 20th century. To accentuate his 
argument, Williams expounded on Godfrey Tangwa’s philosophical analysis 
regarding “the important role of democratic processes in traditional governance.” 
Tangwa (noted in Williams, 2003:61) argued that “traditional African leadership and 
authority systems were a harmonious marriage between autocratic dictatorship and 
popular democracy.” Tangwa maintained that specific formal practices (which vary 
between cultures) positioned the citizenry to authorise, critique and sanction the 
ascension of their ruler, his/her continued reign, and the selection and ascension of 
his/her successor. According to Tangwa, while autocratic leadership subsisted, the 
traditional systems allowed subjects to determine the succession and ascension of 
their rulers. To an extent, this veiled democracy in African traditional societies 
mitigated the potential transition of leadership from autocracy to personification. Of 
particular significance, Aletum (noted in Williams, 2003:61) corroborated the latter in 
his assertion that “checks and balances imposed by citizens in the transition and 
maintenance of leadership upheld democracy in traditional institutions.” 
African scholars such as Ayittey (2006) and Turner (both noted in Shero, 2014) have 
suggested that “[African] leader’s fail because traditional checks and balances are no 
longer present to restrain executive power and ambition.” Ayittey in (noted in Shero, 
2014) maintained that “literature suggests that African elders served as a bridge 
between the ruler and the populace; they represented the needs and wishes of the 
people to the ruler and gave credibility to a ruler’s pronouncements to the people.” 
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Correspondingly, Patterson and Winston (2016:157) asserted that “most recently, 
[experts] have attempted to solve African leadership problems in African ways in the 
area of hybridity or hybrid governing systems.” In consonance with the latter, Shero 
(2014) “defined hybridity as a governing structure that deliberately combined 
elements of Western governance with elements of traditional governance (tribal 
kings, chiefs and councils).” In line with the foregoing, this study posits that the Bible 
offers one of the most well established examples of hierarchical traditional leadership 
hinged on moral, ethical and righteous values. Banks and Ledbetter (noted in Shero, 
2014) corroborate my view in their assertion that, “Christian leadership draws upon 
the texts of the Christian Bible as a source for understanding good leadership and for 
multiple models of that leadership.” Throughout the Old and New Testaments, we 
note elders as leaders frequently functioning “to balance the authority of singular 
leaders and to bring consensus and wisdom to policies and decisions affecting the 
community” (Campbell, noted in Shero, 2014). 
With respect to the above, I argue that the theory of personification can draw 
inspiration from the concept of checks and balances in African and Biblical traditions. 
The traditions often have inbuilt safety mechanisms that involve elders or a council of 
advisors who are representative of the subjects. Furthermore, I agree with the above 
scholars that the amalgamation of African traditional systems of checks and 
balances with modern Western governance systems would create effective, hybrid 
democracies. This will curb egocentric behaviour by contemporary leaders, thereby 
curtailing the possibility of transitioning to personified dispensations. In essence, 
traditional systems still have a critical role to play in stabilising modern democracies. 
In light of the above, in subsequent paragraphs this study reviewed literature on key 
traditional models of leadership covering trait, behavioural and situational theories 
that provide the clearest basis for comparison with the subject of this thesis – the 
theory of personification. 
2.5.2.1 Trait theory 
The scientific modelling of the trait theory perhaps began with Galton (noted in 
Zaccaro, Kemp & Bader, 2004:102), who examined the correlated status of leaders 
and geniuses across generations. Galton defined extraordinary intelligence as a key 
leader attribute and argued that leaders inherited, and did not develop, their 
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qualities. Galton also proposed eugenics, which relied on selective mating to 
produce individuals with the best combination of leadership qualities. Terman (noted 
in Zaccaro et al., 2004:102) examined the qualities that differentiated leaders from 
non-leaders in schoolchildren to produce the first empirical study of leadership. 
Terman reported attributes such as verbal fluency, intelligence, low emotionality, 
daring, congeniality, goodness, and liveliness as characterising youthful leaders. On 
the other hand, Antonakis, Cianciolo and Sternberg (2004:103) posited that “the term 
‘trait’ is a source of considerable ambiguity and confusion in the literature. The term 
sometimes and variously refers to personality, temperaments, dispositions and 
abilities, as well as to any enduring qualities of the individual, including physical and 
demographic attributes.” According to Allport (noted in Zaccaro et al., 2004:103), 
“…‘a trait’ is a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli 
functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) 
forms of adaptive and expressive behaviour.” Allport’s viewpoint emphasised the 
idea that ‘traits’ signified unwavering or consistent patterns of behaviour that are 
relatively invulnerable to situational contingencies. 
In the study of human personality, Kanodia and Sacher (2016:124) averred that trait 
theory identified and measured the degree of personality traits; very often recurring 
patterns of thoughts and behaviour of any human, like anxiousness, shyness, 
pessimist thought, optimist thought, openness to new things that exist from individual 
to individual. Similarly, Kanodia and Sacher (2016:125) maintained that most trait 
theorists contended that the same sets of traits actually make up all our 
personalities, and the basic difference for uniqueness is the degree to which an 
individual expressed their trait. Hence, the presence or absence of any trait actually 
does not accurately reflect a person’s uniqueness. Regarding leadership, Kanodia 
and Sacher (2016:128) argued that the trait model focused on the characteristics of 
many leaders, both successful and unsuccessful, and helped to predict leadership 
effectiveness. To achieve the latter, we can compare the resulting lists of [subject] 
traits with those of potential leaders to assess their likelihood of attaining success or 
failure. Kanodia and Sacher maintained that successful leaders categorically have 
different interests, abilities and personality traits that are significantly different from 
those of the less effective or unsuccessful leaders.  
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I argue that these leadership traits are innate and instinctive qualities that an 
individual either has or does not have. I find it significant that trait theory links 
personality, leadership and interest. It is also noteworthy that, like this study, trait 
theory attempts to understand or predict leadership effectiveness. However, while 
this study agrees with trait theory that personality traits or behavioural characteristics 
are inherent in the family and passed on genetically, I argue that influences on the 
leadership style are traceable to the childhood formative stages. Otherwise, if 
progenies acquired leadership skills genetically, then children who share parents 
would ultimately exhibit similar leadership qualities, yet we know that this is not true. 
Regarding the limitations of trait theory, scholars initially focused on associations 
between personality traits and perceptions of leadership (Lord, DeVader & Alliger, 
noted in Judge & Bono, 2004:901). Scholars never focused on traits associated with 
leadership emergence and effectiveness (Judge & Bono, 2004:901). I digress from 
Judge and Bono’s assertion, principally because we cannot unvaryingly correlate 
any singular or multidimensional traits with leadership emergence per se. However, I 
concur that the use of personality traits to predict the actual effectiveness of leaders 
is ideal, although it is still relatively confounding. Furthermore, Derue, Nahrgang, 
Wellman and Humphrey (2011:13) argued that leader behaviours are more proximal 
to the act of leadership than are traits, and thus, are more predictive of leadership 
effectiveness. Derue et al. (2011:19) maintained that although traits reflect 
behavioural tendencies in people, the situation can affect the manifestation of those 
traits into behaviours. I note that trait leadership theory is silent on situational 
influence on leaders. In the theory of personification, I argue that cultural and 
environmental circumstances are critical in shaping leadership behaviours. The 
theory of personification explains why proponents of trait theory observe that “leader 
behaviours are more proximal to the act of leadership than are traits.” This is 
because the theory of personification argues that actions of leaders directly relate to 
their behaviours rather than characteristics. I also contend that whereas trait theory 
seems to focus on singular traits at a time, in the theory of personification, leaders 
can exhibit multiple traits or personalities outcomes in a non-linear manner, which 
reflects in their actions and, ultimately, governance effectiveness.  
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2.5.2.2 Behavioural theory 
Overall dissatisfaction with the trait theory led to a new theory of leadership in the 
1950s and 1960s that focused more on the actual “behaviour” of the leader (Hudson, 
2014:3). Hudson maintained that “the behaviour theory focused more on what a 
leader did rather than what a person was.” Likewise, Hudson asserted that “the three 
leadership styles that emerged from this new belief were the Autocratic, Democratic 
and Laissez-Faire styles of leadership.” According to Hudson, [experts] originally 
thought that “a person’s personality led them to fall into an either/or behavioural 
pattern, but today mastering all of these behaviours and applying the appropriate 
behaviour to the appropriate situation is thought to be a better approach. (Hudson, 
2014:3)” On the other hand, Cherry (noted in Thye, 2010:6) posited that “behavioural 
theory of leadership [suggested] that great leaders ‘are made, not born’.” From 
another perspective, Thye (2010:6) explained that, “on the subject of ‘behaviourism’, 
the behavioural leadership theory focused more on the actions of leaders than on 
mental qualities or internal states. Accordingly, people can learn to become leaders 
through teaching and observation.” 
However, I note that behaviourism overtly relies on observable mannerisms and 
ignores invisible factors, such as an individual’s perceptions and intrinsic inclinations, 
in explaining behaviour. Conversely, in the theory of personification, I argue that 
mental configurations like the degree of childhood animism; coupled with external 
influences, shape the person’s ultimate perceptions and inclinations, thus defining 
the empirical behaviour of a leader. Infants are born into this sudden maze of diverse 
activities, to which they have to acclimatise. At this stage, an individual’s 
surroundings, together with the methods by which caregivers nurture infants, will 
significantly influence a person’s cognitive progression. As infants transition into 
children, they develop certain intrinsic desires that behaviourism does not consider. 
Certain things start appealing to the children about the world around them. They 
substitute material gaps with fantasy and illusions of “what would be.” As children 
progress to adulthood, they develop images of what they want to be, sometimes 
based on perceived “hero figures,” real or imagined. Through these stages, the 
individual learns how to ‘act out’ a specific role in order to fit within society, or even to 
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acquire a benefit only accessible to the ‘play-acting’. These intangible actions limit 
the effectiveness of behaviourism to adequately measure leadership behaviour. 
2.5.2.3 Situational theory 
Hershey and Blanchard (noted in Graeff, 1983:285) “developed ‘the life cycle theory 
of leadership’, which they later renamed the ‘situational leadership theory’.” Similarly, 
in Hershey and Blanchard’s (noted in Graeff, 1983:285) “situational theory of 
leadership, the primary situational determinant of the leader’s behaviour is the task-
relevant maturity that consists of job maturity and psychological maturity.” Hershey 
and Blanchard maintained that “Job maturity reflects the capacity or ability of the 
individual to perform the job. It related to the level of education and experience that 
the individual had acquired. Psychological maturity on the other hand reflected the 
motivational state of the person via the individual’s level of self-esteem and 
confidence.” Hershey and Blanchard argued that “this dimension relates with an 
achievement orientation, and a willingness and ability to accept responsibility.” 
According to McCleskey (2014:118), “situational leadership theory construed a 
leaders’ behaviour to be either task or people focused.” McCleskey deemed that the 
latter supports the theory’s “recognition as a behavioural approach to leadership.” To 
Glynn and DeJordy; Bass; and Yukl (all noted in McCleskey, 2014:118), “the theory 
portrayed that effective leadership is contingent on follower maturity. They 
maintained that this fits with other contingency-based leadership theories including 
Fiedler’s contingency theory, path-goal theory, leadership substitute’s theory and 
Vroom’s normative contingency model.” McCleskey (2014:118) argued that “both 
conceptualizations of situational leadership theory agreed that task-oriented and 
relation-oriented behaviours were dependent, rather than mutually exclusive.” 
However, I highlight that situational leadership theory explicitly focuses on leadership 
style and behavioural actions, in effect neglecting an important category of factors – 
the intrinsic causative factors of leadership outcomes. In contrast, the theory of 
personification addresses the full continuum of a leader’s development by linking 
subsequent leadership action factors along the individual’s growth trajectory. For 
instance, the psychological aspect of situational theory looks at an individual’s level 
of self-esteem and confidence – factors I consider ‘superficial’. However, the theory 
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of personification goes beyond superficiality to focus on intrinsic cognitive and 
emotional factors that influence the leader’s perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘people’. 
 Contemporary theories of leadership 
According to Hudson (2014:2), a contemporary definition contended that “leadership 
is a dynamic relationship (based on mutual influence and common purpose) between 
leaders and collaborators which leads both parties to higher levels of motivation and 
moral development as they evoke real change.” Hudson argued that “when we break 
this definition down, there are three key principles that become apparent namely: 
relationship – the connection between people, the mutual sharing of something and 
collaborators working together.” Hudson (2014:2) maintained that we can re-word 
this contemporary definition of leadership to simply state that “when collaborators 
work together to achieve real change, they influence the leader.” On the other hand, 
Taylor and Rosenbach (2006:4) posited that “a contemporary leader must be able to 
do the following four key things: appreciate and nurture talent even if it means hiring 
smarter or more talented people; focus on what is important without losing sight of 
the main goals; build trust and develop a close tie between leaders and followers.” 
However, I argue that in practical terms, leaders frequently try to portray themselves 
as “intellectually smart” and may snub the idea of hiring someone smarter than they 
are. This is especially true in personified regimes that exalt the leader as the 
repository of ‘wisdom’ and custodian of ‘knowledge.’ Elevating any person other than 
the leader could be catastrophic, and even fatal, under personified dispensations. 
Similarly, I contend that personified dispensations dishonour the idea that 
contemporary leaders build close relationships with their followers. This is because 
leaders under personified dispensations usually prefer to practise nepotism, 
cronyism, and favouritism to reward loyalists instead of collaborating with, or building 
relationships with followers. In my consideration, this explains why personified 
leadership is often unrealistic in their outlook of leadership roles. 
Accordingly, in subsequent paragraphs this study examined contemporary theories 
of leadership to contextualise the theory of personification. The researcher hopes the 
outcome of this discourse addresses gaps in contemporary leadership and generally 
improves approaches to governance. The researcher also hopes to demonstrate that 
leaders are born with characteristics that vary with external influences. To rationalise 
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the above concept, the next section analyses key contemporary theories including 
transactional, transformational, contingency, participative and full range models. 
2.5.3.1 Transactional Leadership 
According to Burns (noted in Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996:2), “the 
transactional leader initiates contact with subordinates in an effort to exchange 
something of value, such as rewards for performance, mutual support or bilateral 
disclosure.” In contrast, Bass (noted in Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996:2) 
posited that “the transactional leader operates within the existing system or culture, 
prefers risk avoidance, pays attention to time constraints and efficiency, and 
generally prefers process over substance in order to maintain control.” Bass 
maintained that “the skilful transactional leader is likely to be effective in stable, 
predictable environments where charting activity against prior performance is the 
most successful strategy.” According to Lowe, Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam 
(1996:2), “the transactional leader clarifies tasks with the ‘right way’ to do things in 
such a manner that maintains dependence on the leader for preferred solutions to 
challenges.” 
With respect to the above arguments, I posit that contrary to the personified leader, 
the transactional leader is inferably sensitive to the feelings of subordinates to the 
extent that they recognise and reward performance. I construe this to connote that 
perceptiveness enables the transactional leader to operate effectively and efficiently 
within the existing system or culture prevalent in any jurisdiction. Judge and Bono 
(2004:901) accentuated the researcher’s line of reasoning in their argument on 
“leadership emergence and effectiveness.” On the other hand, Burns (1978, noted in 
Lowe et al., 1996:2) argued that “the transactional leader focuses on the proper 
exchange of resources.” Similarly, Kuhnert and Lewis (noted in Judge & Piccolo, 
2004:755) contended that “the transactional leader gives followers something they 
want in exchange for something the leader wants.” However, I posit that the point of 
departure between the theory of personification and transactional leadership 
theorists is that in the latter, subordinates depend on the leader for preferred 
solutions. Hypothetically, this line of reasoning buttresses personified leadership that 
views the leader as the epitome of solutions. This perhaps explains why both 
transactional and personified leaders engage in ‘conditional relationships.’ 
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Accordingly, Avolio, Bass and Jung (1999:441, 444) described these conditional 
relationships as “individualized consideration and contingent reward ….” In this 
context, I argue that this kind of relationship thrives on pretentious exchange rather 
than on the responsibility and accountability of the leader. 
According to Judge and Piccolo (2004:755), “transactional leadership theory has 
undergone several revisions, with the most recent version having three dimensions 
namely: contingent reward, management by exception (active), and management by 
exception (passive).” Judge and Piccolo maintained that, “contingent reward is the 
extent to which the leader sets up constructive transactions or exchanges with 
followers. Thus, the leader clarified expectations and established the rewards for 
meeting these expectations.” In general, Judge and Piccolo argued that 
“management by exception is the degree to which the leader takes corrective action 
based on results of leader–follower transactions.” As noted by Howell and Avolio (in 
Judge & Piccolo, 2004:755-6), “the difference between management by exception 
(active) and management by exception (passive) lies in  the timing of the leader’s 
intervention.” Howell and Avolio maintained that “active leaders monitor follower 
behaviour, anticipate problems and take corrective actions before the behaviour 
creates serious difficulties.” On the other hand, Howell and Avolio argued that 
“passive leaders are more reactive than proactive in responding to behavioural 
problems.” However, Avolio et al. (1999:443) argued that “on average, there is 
evidence that active and passive management-by-exception do not correlate or to 
some extent correlate negatively.”  
From the above discussions, I argue that revisions in transactional leadership 
extricate the theory from the pitfalls associated with personified leadership. Unlike 
the theory of personification, transactional leadership recognises that “the leader 
defines expectations and sets rewards for meeting these expectations.” Furthermore, 
the revisions portend that transactional leaders anticipate challenges and resolve 
them before they escalate into “perilous complications.” I perceive these revisions as 
constituting a radical shift from the original conceptualisation articulated by Burns 
and subsequent theorists on the subject. Similarly, I argue that Judge and Piccolo’s 
model did not view the concept of leadership from the root causes of behavioural 
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patterns. However, this study links such leadership behaviour to formative stages of 
childhood development and later influences in the life of a leader.  
2.5.3.2 Transformational Leadership 
Burns (noted in Goertzen, 2012:83) revolutionised views of leadership among 
scholars and practitioners. According to Burns, “transforming leadership occurs 
when one or more persons engage others in a manner that enables leaders and 
followers to raise each other to higher levels of motivation and morality.” Burns 
maintained that although initially starting out separate (and perhaps even unrelated), 
the purposes of both leaders and followers become fused. Essentially, leaders 
played a major role in shaping the relationship with followers. Burns believed that 
leaders are commonly more skilful in evaluating followers’ motives, anticipating their 
responses to an initiative and estimating their power bases, than the reverse. Burns 
asserted that transforming leaders are “guided by near-universal ethical principles of 
justice such as equality of human rights and respect of individual dignity.” This study 
argues that the attainment of what Burns calls the “near-universal ethical principles 
of justice” is a daunting endeavour for leaders with personified inclinations. This is 
because in personified dispensations, egocentric rather than ethical principles guide 
national leaders. Similarly, the term “universal ethics” under the theory of 
transforming leadership may have dissimilar meanings to different people. The 
subjectivity in definitions may ultimately impede the realisation of universal ethical 
principles of justice. Therefore, contrary to Burn’s arguments, this study posits that a 
leader may not be able to demonstrate morality under some contexts, a factor that 
will affect their ability to uphold human rights and respect individual dignity. Then 
there is the issue of ‘motivation’ that Burns references. Again, leaders under 
personified dispensations are motivated by egoistic desires that may not necessarily 
align with the needs of other citizens. 
Additionally, Goertzen (2012:85) contended that “transforming leadership has an 
elevating effect on both the leader and the led because it raises the level of human 
conduct and interaction. In the end, the process of transforming leadership is a moral 
process because leaders engaged with followers based on shared motives, values 
and goals.” Goertzen maintained that “the concept of transforming leadership is 
rooted in conflict, which is often compelling because it galvanizes and motivates 
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people.” Equally, Goertzen (2012:84) argued that “leaders do not shun conflict; they 
embrace it by shaping and mediating conflict.” Goertzen maintained that leaders are 
able to discern signs of dissatisfaction among followers and take the initiative to 
make connections with followers. Likewise, Goertzen also posited that “the power in 
transforming leadership comes by recognizing the varying needs and motives of 
potential followers and elevating them to transcend personal self-interests.”  
Goertzen theorises that leaders connect with, and are empathetic to, their followers 
beyond self-interests. However, I argue that Goertzen does not explain how 
unethical leaders interact with their followers. Furthermore, Goertzen’s theory is 
silent on the impact of personified leadership practices on subjects. Moreover, this 
study asserts that the introduction of “conflict” into personified dispensations, as 
posited by Goertzen, may not galvanise and motivate people. Rather, the intrinsic 
persona or character of a national leader shapes their “transformation” to go beyond 
personal self-interests. Equally, followers of the leader also have a role in fostering 
or hindering his transformation.  
Tizazu (2013:16) mooted further criticism of “transformational theory that treats 
leadership more as a personality trait or predisposition than a behaviour that one 
learns.” In this regard, this study places Tizazu’s depiction of transformational theory 
alongside the theory of personification where they agree that leadership is more of a 
personality trait than educable behaviour. The latter is an interesting concept since 
this study argues that actions of leaders have roots in their childhood formative 
stages, as well as other subsequent influences on their lives that shape their traits. 
Therefore, I argue that the morality that Goertzen (2012) associates with 
transformational leadership does not suffice in the realm of personified dispensation. 
2.5.3.3 Contingency theory 
Fred Edward Fiedler (noted in Levine & Hogg, 2009:152), the leading proponent of 
contingency theory of leadership, emphasised the point that “leadership 
effectiveness depends on two factors: the leader’s task or relations motivations and 
aspects of the situation. Fiedler’s model underscored that effectiveness of leadership 
is dependent (contingent) on matching its leadership style to right situations. 
Because situational control is critical to leadership efficacy, Fiedler broke this factor 
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down into three major components.” First, Fiedler asserted that “leader-member-
relations referred to the degree of mutual trust, respect and confidence between the 
leader and the subordinates.” Similarly, Fiedler (noted in Chokchainarong, 2006:2) 
argued that “a leader is able to perform his task effectively if the ‘situation’ in the 
group, which consists of the ‘leader-member relationship, task structure, and position 
power’, matches his leadership style.” Therefore, in order to ensure leader 
effectiveness, the leader had to first determine and match his leadership style and 
group ‘situation’. Fiedler maintained that “tasks that are more structured (‘high’ task 
structure) tended to give more control to the leader, whereas unstructured and 
unclear tasks (‘low’ task structure) reduced the leader’s control and influence.” 
Equally, Fiedler contended that “the leader position power referred to the power 
inherent in the leader’s position.” In essence, “a leader holds strong position power if 
he has the authority to hire and fire, or to promote and demote his subordinates in 
rank and pay. However, a leader without authority to do the above things has weak 
position power.” 
However, I note that the contingency theory assumes that the leader always enjoys a 
supportive environment from their followers. In other words, absolute focus is on the 
leader’s actions and not the followers’ reactions. However, this is not the case in 
reality since personification breeds discontent and apathy among the citizens. This 
discord may affect the degree of support that a leader has. Likewise, under 
personified systems, an egotistic leader who does not respect or trust their followers 
may not welcome any criticism, whether constructive or not. Instead, personified 
institutional structures usually centre on the leader, hence contingency theory’s 
assumption of “high” or “low” structure may not apply, especially under absolute 
dictatorships. On the other hand, I note that contingency theory provides plausible 
checks and balances on the leader’s influence and control. This is rather paradoxical 
under the theory of personification, where the leader would rather advance 
unstructured policies that prop up their regime than support democratic aspirations. 
2.5.3.4 Participative leadership theory 
Wilson, George, Wellins and Byham in (noted in Choi, 2007:247) “categorized 
‘participative and high involvement’ leadership styles by the extent to which the 
leader encourages participation.” Similarly, Chemers (noted in Choi, 2007:247) 
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argued that “the level of group participation defines democratic leadership.” In the 
same manner, Bass in (noted in Choi, 2007:247) contended that “participation is a 
fundamental characteristic of democratic leadership.” Regarding the latter, Choi 
(2007:258) argued that “the characteristics of democratic leadership such as vision, 
symbolism, and participation also contribute to the development of public 
administration and democratic governance.” In the above regard, I point out that the 
links between citizen participation, governance and leadership are fundamental 
factors in understanding the theory of personification. Still on the subject, Box, King 
and Stivers (noted in Choi, 2007:258) argued that “public officials might encourage 
citizen participation in enhancing democratic governance, because ‘we are’ 
government.” Equally, Lamb (noted in Amanchukwu, Stanley & Ololube, 2015:8) 
posited that “a participative leader, rather than making all the decisions, seeks to 
involve other people, thus improving commitment and increasing collaboration, which 
leads to better quality decisions.” I note that the emphasis of the above scholars is 
on the universal participation of citizens. This is important to the theory of 
personification as it diminishes the possibility for leaders to manipulate citizens for 
selfish reasons. 
According to Murdock (2014), “in participative leadership the leader turns to the team 
for input, ideas and observations instead of making all decision on their own. 
Although the leader reserved the ultimate decision making task, they understood that 
the team possibly had skills and ideas that could benefit the decision making 
process.” Murdock explained that participative leadership involved the entire team 
and the leader worked closely with team members, focusing on building relationships 
and rapport. On the other side of this leadership style, Murdock argued that “you 
have the autocratic leadership style in which the leader tends to be more issue-
focused and makes most decisions without input from the team.” According to 
Ejimabo (2015:10), “the participative or democratic style is more inclusive of the 
group.” Ejimabo maintained that “this leadership style allowed, empowered, 
motivated, and encouraged members of the group to express their ideas, and be 
involved in the decision making process of the organisation.” Conversely, 
“participative leaders encouraged the participation of group members but maintained 
the final verdict over the decision-making process” (Khan, Qureshi, Ismail, Rauf, Latif 
& Tahir, 2015:89). 
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I note that participative leadership theory enables the leader to draw on input from 
parties other than themselves. Participation results in citizen involvement and 
ownership of national governance processes. However, unlike under participative 
leadership, genuine citizen involvement may not be possible in personified systems 
since leaders are egocentric and not altruistic. Participation in national governance is 
a farce under personified systems, since leaders are not willing to share power or 
even the “national cake.” Likewise, it may not always be possible to accommodate or 
address all ideas tabled under participative systems. The sheer volume of 
information generated under this system is enormous due to the broad participation 
of persons. Because of the need for consensus, participative systems may bring 
forth a leader who assumes ‘egocentric’ control of dialogue processes under the 
pretext of increasing efficiency. In order to save time or even exert dominance, the 
emergent leader can personify decision-making processes to suit narrow personal 
and group interests. I contend that the latter aligns well with the assertion by Khan et 
al. (2015) that the participative leader has the final say in-group decision-making. 
Leaders in personified systems may exploit this weakness to their advantages. 
2.5.3.5 Full-range theory of leadership 
According to Bass (noted in Stewart, 2006:13), “four qualities described by Burns, 
Bass, Avolio and Leithwood as ‘full range of leadership model’ are essential for 
leaders. The qualities are individualised consideration, intellectual stimulation, 
inspirational motivation, and Charismatic Leadership, or Idealized Influence.” 
Furthermore, Avolio and Bass (noted in Paraschiv, 2013:254) argued that “the ‘full 
range leadership theory’ comprised of three typologies of leadership behaviour 
(transformational, transactional, non-transactional laissez faire) represented by nine 
distinct factors. Five of the factors were transformational (inspirational motivation - 
charisma, idealized influence attributed, idealized influence behaviour, intellectual 
stimulation, individualized consideration), three transactional and one laissez faire.” 
Bass (noted in Salter, Harris & McCormack, 2014:1) suggested that “if 
transformational leadership could be based on one’s background characteristics, 
values, ethics, or traits, then these traits were universal to mankind.” Of contextual 
significance to this study are findings by Bass (noted in Salter et al., 2014:5) that 
“leaders with a strong moral identity would more likely emphasize moral values in 
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making decisions and communication with their subordinates, which may be linked to 
the transformational facets of inspirational motivation and idealized influence.” I 
concur that values, ethics and traits are crucial attributes that play a defining role in 
shaping or checking the behaviours of leaders. In contrast, Antonakis and House 
(noted in Miles, 2007:4) “offered an extension of the full range leadership theory, a 
scale of non-leadership called ‘laissez-faire leadership’ that indicated an absence of 
leadership. Antonakis and House described laissez faire management as a situation 
where the leader did nothing while expecting results from the followers.” In building 
on Bass’s work, Antonakis and House (noted in Antonakis, 2006:9) “expanded the 
full range theory to account for the effects of leader expertise on organizational and 
follower performance, referring to this form of leadership as ‘instrumental 
leadership’.” According to Antonakis, “this kind of leadership focused on actions that 
ensured organizational adaptation, reification of vision, and facilitation of follower 
work outcomes.” 
I note that the merit with the full range theory is that it incorporates a moral element 
into leadership that was missing from charismatic leadership. This factor is critical to 
mitigate the egocentric excesses of leaders expressed in the theory of 
personification. Similarly, Laguerre’s (2010:17) citing Burns’ assertion argued that 
transformational leaders are charismatic, inspiring, morally uplifting and, most 
importantly, working to develop followers into leaders themselves. This contention 
accentuates my argument transformational leaders transcend personal interests and 
espouse moral and egalitarian principles of governance. However, According to 
Avolio (noted in Nawaz & Bodla, 2010:210), the full range leadership model did not 
cover all the dimensions of leadership. I could not agree more with Avolio’s 
argument, since in my reckoning; the theory of personification offers a more 
comprehensive dimension of leadership. For instance, the theory allows one to 
understand why leaders negate transcendent collective interests, in preference for 
personified leadership styles of governance. Equally important, the theory also holds 
national leaders accountable for development outcomes in their jurisdictions. 
2.6 Conclusion of Chapter Two 
In conclusion, this section developed arguments and an analytical framework 
regarding the theory of personification, and then highlighted factors that precipitate 
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personified behavioural inclinations and, ultimately, systems. Building on the latter, 
the study highlighted how national leaders entwine their personalities into the fabric 
of national institutions, and how the latter affects national development. The study 
also established that personality psychology relates to the theory of personification 
from ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives. The above context 
enabled this study to analyse the diversity of human nature with respect to the 
different psychological development processes that lead to personified leadership 
behaviour. Subsequently, the study demonstrated that personification has a direct 
impact on the trajectory of national development and governance. This is especially 
significant for citizens, since national leaders play a pivotal role in determining the 
course of national development and governance. Likewise, this chapter 
demonstrated the effect of the personified leadership disposition on societal 
functioning and processes. The occurrence of personified governance has a ripple 
effect on citizens and can progressively create a cadre of persons who acquiesce to 
the system. Overall, the chapter demonstrated how personification influences the 
relationship that leaders have with their subjects, and its effects on the course of 
national governance and development. The empirical arguments highlighted in this 
chapter accentuated the theoretical arguments in the theory of personification that 
explains the concept of leadership, the implications of different leadership techniques 
and antecedents that affect a leader’s disposition. Because of its testability, I believe 
the theory of personification is beneficial in measuring and predicting the outcomes 
of national leadership styles, especially in relation to governance and development.  
The next chapter will explore the correlation between personified leadership, 
governance, and development. The chapter will first analyse and discuss personified 
leadership within the context of national governance, and subsequently 
development. I then delve into an in-depth analysis on the general essence and 
features of personification; finally, I conclude the chapter by analysing the effects of 
personification on national institutions and society. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
CORRELATING LEADERSHIP, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyse how a personified leadership style influences governance 
and development policies. This entails an exposition of the meaning of leadership in 
light of national governance and related development outcomes. I draw on 
philosophical, traditional and empirical concepts of leadership to guide my 
discussions on how personified leadership relates with governance and 
development. Existing literature on the subject of leadership is not comprehensive in 
articulating the entirety of leadership. Upon reviewing available literature, it is evident 
that experts have failed to provide convincing definitions of leadership. For instance, 
Rost (noted in Winston & Patterson, 2006:6) “reviewed leadership definitions, only to 
end up with the same social science research reductionist flaw when he concluded 
his work on the definition of leadership.” Similarly, in his review of the leadership 
definitions used to date, Barker (noted in Winston & Patterson, 2006:6) “also 
concluded that leadership is about two things – process and behaviours.” 
Accordingly, I will endeavour to discuss the subject of leadership within the context 
of personification, with a specific focus on the formation, actualisation and 
behaviours of leaders. I will also examine pertinent leadership models to help 
comprehend their relation to the theory of personification. In subsequent sections, I 
will draw on philosophical concepts of governance and development to guide my 
discussions on the empirical dimensions of leadership. In this study, I will also 
discuss how ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjuncts of governance correlate with leadership and 
development outcomes. The subsequent sections then delve into an in-depth 
analysis on the general essence and features of personification in light of 
behavioural stimuli of the conduct; finally, I conclude the chapter by analysing the 
effects of personification on national institutions and systems, then I close the 
chapter with a discussion on personification and society. 
3.2 Governance 
This section will address the second study question, “How does personified 
leadership style influence governance [and development] policies in East Africa?” 
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The research question was, among other factors, influenced by research like the one 
Hofstede conducted on leadership values in cross-cultural settings (1980, noted in 
Dumah, 2008:42). Hofstede highlighted how these studies showed differences in 
leadership styles that affected governance or management of a country, and also 
brought to the fore the need to understand how the state governs society.  
Jessop (noted in Stoker, 1998:18) posited that “Academic literature on governance is 
eclectic and relatively disjointed.” According to Treib, Bähr and Falkner (2005:4), 
“existing understandings classify governance according to emphasis on politics, 
polity or policy.” On the other hand, Börzel and Risse (2010:114) contended that 
“governance consists of both structure and process.” They argued that governance, 
as structure, related to institutions and actor constellations. Börzel and Risse 
maintained that “the process of governance pinpointed to the modes of social 
coordination by which actors engaged in rulemaking and implementation and in the 
provision of collective goods.” Kaufmann (noted in Essien, 2012:24) contended that 
the subject of governance has fascinated humankind for ages. Early discussions on 
governance go back to at least 400 B.C., during which time Kautilya, thought to be 
the chief minister to the King of India, ostensibly developed Arthashastra, a 
fascinating treatise on governance. Kaufmann maintained that “in the treatise, 
Kautilya presented key pillars on the ‘art of governance’ that emphasized justice, 
ethics, and anti-autocratic tendencies. Kautilya further detailed the duty of the king to 
protect the wealth of the state and its subjects; to enhance, maintain and safeguard 
such wealth, as well as the interests of the subjects.” 
I agree with the above discussions that governance is generally diverse in 
dimensions. In other words, governance assumes multiple dimensions depending on 
the actions and objectives of the person(s) in control. On the other hand, I disagree 
with Jessop’s assertion that governance is disjointed.  This is because under the 
theory of personification, governance actions are premediated and conscious actions 
by national leaders orchestrated to disenfranchise the citizens. This study agrees 
with Börzel and Risse that governance is a structure that relates to institutions. This 
is because the theory of personification argues that leadership actions can 
progressively systematise institutions to reflect the essential character of the leader. 
Whereas I agree with Börzel and Risse that governance provides avenues for 
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coordination, rulemaking and implementation especially of national policies, I differ 
with their assertion that governance results in the provision of collective goods. This 
is because under personified systems, we note that governance does not 
necessarily yield collective but rather ‘individualised national goods’ that in extreme 
cases are personal to the leader. I apply the foregoing trend of argument by 
diverging with Kaufmann’s contention that governance maintains and safeguards 
wealth in the interests of the subjects. Again, under personified systems, the leader 
usually amasses wealth egoistically and seldom protects the interest of the citizens.  
Other experts like Hyatt and Jessop and Rosenau (noted in Fox & Ward, 2008:3) 
posited that “the governance of daily life posed both practical challenges and 
theoretical questions about balances between the rights, concerns and values of 
individuals, the state, commerce, professions and other groupings.” I draw on the 
latter to illustrate that the East African region has transitioned through various 
governance styles since the advent of independence. Although each governance 
style has been distinctive and productive to some degree, the general outcome has 
been the same – despondent, especially where the incumbent leader forcibly 
perpetuates their stay in power. Nevertheless, the EAC has a vibrant population of 
140 million and an overall GDP of $100 billion (IMF, 2013), although over 50 % of the 
population lives on less than $1 a day, a figure that is below the poverty line of $1.25 
a day (ADB, 2017). A Corruption Perception Index (CPI) conducted by Transparency 
International (2013) shows that only Rwanda of all the five EAC nations surveyed is 
among the top-ranked 50 countries, with the rest trailing at the bottom. Accordingly, 
this section of the study explores theoretical and empirical concepts to attempt to 
contextualise governance styles in East Africa. A review of available literature and 
the researcher’s own 30-year observation shows that that East African nations have 
made credible attempts to champion democratic principles. However, weaknesses in 
internal state legitimacy and capability have diminished reasonable progress, largely 
due to ineffective leadership. 
Because of its vital role in governance and development, I discuss how leadership 
influences national governance in subsequent paragraphs. Fox and Ward (2008:2) 
contended that “governance addresses a wide range of issues including social, 
economic and political continuity, security and integrity, individual and collective 
safety and the liberty and rights to self-actualization of citizens.” Conversely, Stoker 
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(1998:17) asserted that “governance is primarily concerned with creating the 
conditions for ordered rule and collective action”. Stoker maintained that the outputs 
of governance are not different from those of government. It is rather a matter of a 
difference in processes. Similarly, Stoker argued that the traditional use of 
‘governance’ and its dictionary meaning defined it as a synonym for government. 
Stoker further contended that, “in the growing work on governance, there is a 
redirection in its use and import.” In the same regard, Rhodes (noted in Stoker, 
1998:17) posited that “governance signified ‘a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or 
the new method by which society is governed’.” Likewise, Avellaneda (2006:2) 
contended that “neo-institutional scholars have conducted several cross-national 
empirical studies that have found a positive relationship between the quality of 
institutions, governance structures and growth.” In this context, Avellaneda 
maintained that “a broad consensus among growth economists, development 
experts and aid donors views ‘good governance’ as a pre-requisite for sustained 
increases in living standards.” Kjær (noted in Cubitt, 2014:2) therefore advocated 
“that it is necessary to explore alternative routes to ‘growth-enhancing’ governance 
that are not dependent on predefined good governance institutions that fail, but more 
dependent on good research into the right political incentives for change.” 
It is apparent from the above discussions that there are multiple perspectives 
pertaining to the subject of leadership and governance. Accordingly, drawing on a 
diverse assemblage of literature, I attempt to identify models that sustainably 
advance constructive governance and ultimately, development in East Africa. The 
multiple perspectives on the subject points to the need for more systematic research 
on ‘what works’, to avoid perpetuating approaches that have little impact. First, we 
need to develop a definite, distinct, and clear understanding of what governance is 
before we relate it to other subjects. 
 Definition of Governance 
Before embarking on an in-depth discussion on the subject of ‘governance’, this I 
defined the term ‘governance’ in subsequent paragraphs. At the end of this section, I 
synthesised the various definitions of governance in order to arrive at a functional 
description of the term. 
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According to Jessop and Starkey (noted in Morrell, 2009:5), “the origin of the word 
‘governance’ lies in the Greek term kybernesis (κυβέρυησις): ‘piloting’.” Jessop and 
Starkey maintained that “‘governance’ has contemporary connotations of steering or 
stewardship and different writers acknowledged this core sense.” Conversely, 
Rhodes and Stoker (noted in Stoker, 1998:17) posited that “there is great variation 
across different disciplines and literatures with no agreed definition on the word 
governance.” Rhodes and Stoker maintained that reviews of the literature generally 
concluded that “the term ‘governance’ had a variety of uses and meanings.” In the 
same manner, Stoker (1998:17) posited that “governance referred to the 
development of governing styles in which boundaries between, and within public and 
private sectors had become blurred”. Stoker maintained that “the essence of 
governance is its focus on governing mechanisms, which do not rest on recourse to 
the authority and sanctions of government.” Likewise, Kooiman and Van Vliet (noted 
in Stoker, 1998:17) contended that “the concept of governance pointed to the 
creation of a structure or an order, which one could impose externally, but is the 
result of the interaction of a multiplicity of governing [issues] and other influencing 
actors.” In the same vein, Jessop (noted Morrell, 2009:5) asserted that “proponents 
have described ‘governance’ as a ‘vague’, ‘pre-theoretical’, ‘buzzword’.” Lynn, 
Heinrich and Hill (noted in Morrell, 2009:5) pointed to a ‘breadth and ambiguity of 
definitions’ concerning the term ‘governance’. Bache (noted in Morrell, 2009:5) 
stated that the use of the term ‘governance’ often lacks definitional clarity. Rhodes 
(noted in Morrell, 2009:5) argued that “the term ‘governance’ had, ‘too many 
meanings to be useful’.”  
However, despite the convolution surrounding the definition of governance, in 
subsequent paragraphs, I highlight how leading international institutions, the 
academic fraternity, and research consortia have made plausible attempts to 
develop functional definitions of the term ‘governance’.  
The United Nations, a universal organisation, and the World Bank and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the two largest 
multilateral donors, provide definitions of governance worth considering. The OECD 
(1995:14) defined “governance as the use of political authority and exercise of 
control in a society in the management of its resources for social and economic 
development.” The latter “encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing 
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the environment for economic operators to function and also to determine the 
distribution of benefits and the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled” (OECD, 1995:14). The OECD maintained that “governance is the way in which 
the underlying values of a nation are ‘institutionalized’.” This has formal aspects such 
as separated powers, checks and balances, means of transferring power, 
transparency and accountability.  
Similarly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “defined governance as 
participation, accountability, transparency, consensus, sustainability, the rule of law 
and the involvement of poor and most vulnerable people in shaping decisions on 
allocation of development resources.” Of equal universality is the World Bank’s 
definition that “governance is the exercise of power to manage a nation’s affairs 
(World Bank, 1989:60). This is not to be confused with government, which comprises 
the instruments used to implement governance – “the security forces, civil services, 
justice system and so forth.” In the same manner, the World Bank Institute has 
compiled a widely used set of aggregate data from a broad range of sources that 
measure the following dimensions of good governance: political stability and 
absence of violence, the rule of law, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption, and environmental governance. 
However, Fukuyama (2013:1) argued that “four of the six World Bank Institute’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators purport to measure state aspects of state capacity 
(government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and stability and absence of violence, 
control of corruption), but these are aggregates of other existing measures and it is 
not clear how they map onto the Weberian categories. For example, does a good 
absence of violence score mean that there is effective policing?” Well, in this study 
we affirmed that the answer to the latter is “no” since other factors also contribute to 
the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of governance.  
The argument by Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003:1) that “governance is not 
synonymous with government” augurs well with the position of this study. Since 
governance is not about government, what is it about? To Graham et al. (2003:1), 
“governance is partly about how governments and other social organizations 
interact, how they relate to citizens, and how they take decisions in a complex 
world.” Graham et al. (2003:1) maintained that “governance is a process where 
societies or organizations made their important decisions, determined whom they 
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involved in the process and how they rendered account.” Another description that 
“advocates for ‘control’ defined governance as the guidance or control of an activity, 
in order to meet a specified objective” (Jewson & MacGregor; Rosenau, noted in Fox 
& Ward, 2008:4). Benz in (noted in Treib et al., 2005:5) argued that “the core 
meaning of governance connotes the steering and coordination of interdependent 
(usually collective) actors based on institutionalised rule systems.” Treib et al. 
(2005:5) contended that “the above definition covered all three views of governance 
that belonged primarily to the realms of politics, polity or policy.” I agree with Graham 
et al. that governance is the process of governing government since in my view; 
governance connotes a deliberate action towards some goal. This distinction is 
important in the theory of personification since it links leadership actions to 
governance outcomes. I also concur that governance entails the involvement of 
various actors in decision-making and management of institutions. I hasten to add 
that these actors and institutions are often dependent on leadership decisions, as is 
illustrated in the theory of personification. I point out that the use of the words 
‘policy’, ‘control’ and ‘coordination’ in the rendering of the term governance is critical 
in this study as these bridge leadership action with related outcomes. 
In addition, “people use the word governance as a generic fundamental concept, 
which comprises of all institutionalized forms of political steering and integration of 
societies” (Blatter, 2012:3). Similarly, “the term entails larger decisions about 
direction and roles” (Graham & Wilson, 2004:2). In combination with specifying 
adjectives, governance also signifies those specific forms of control that are based 
on political, economic and sociological theories of behaviour. Richards and Smith 
(noted in Kitthananan, 2006:2) suggested that governance is a descriptive label that 
highlighted the recent changing nature of policy processes. Kitthananan maintained 
that governance demands that “we consider all the actors and locations beyond the 
core executive involved in the policy-making process.” Similarly, Richards and Smith 
(noted in Kitthananan, 2006:2) contended that “the concept of governance 
suggested that governments have lost their ability to solely control and shape both 
policy and society.” To Richards and Smith, “governments have to operate in a 
diverse, fragmented, complex and decentralized environment.” In essence, Kohler-
Koch (noted in Treib et al., 2005:5) argued that “governance is about the ways and 
means by which citizens translated their divergent preferences into effective policy 
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choices; how the pluralities of societal interests transformed into unitary action, and 
how the compliance of social actors are achieved.” 
Whereas I agree with Blatter that governance gives character to political navigation 
and inclusiveness of societies, I contend that the above is not possible under 
personified regimes. This is because in the latter, politics is very much entangled 
with the leadership as it is with the institutions, and ultimately society. I agree entirely 
with Graham & Wilson that governance entails decisions about direction and roles. 
This notion corroborates the theory of personification that ties the determination of 
national courses of action and different functions to the incumbent leader. To the 
extent that Government refers to the governing body, I agree with Richards and 
Smith that governments have lost their ability to solely control and shape both policy 
and society. However, the theory of personification argues that Government only 
loses its mandate when a leader with personified inclination hijacks state institutions 
and systems. In essence, the governing body loses its powers to make independent 
decisions in a democratic manner.  
In descriptive terms, Hall (noted in Moti, 2012:16) contended that “the shift towards 
governance meant that government had become more of an enabling state, than it is 
a hierarchical, commanding state governing through its own authority.” In contrast to 
the above, Wohlmuth (1998:7) posited that “governance is the manner in which a 
government exercised political power.” Wohlmuth maintained that “governance 
relates to institutions and structures used for exercising power; considered all 
relevant public decision-making processes; implied that the implementation capacity 
for government action in a country is of relevance; and encompassed the relation 
between the government and the public.” However, on the subject of government 
capacity, Fukuyama (2013:13) posited that “the quality of government is ultimately a 
function of the interaction of capacity and autonomy, and that either one 
independently would be inadequate as a measure of government quality.” 
Furthermore, Göran Hydén in (noted in Carothers & de Gramont, 2011:4) asserted 
that “the objectives of governance form a continuum between effectiveness and 
legitimacy, with the former dealing with managerial efficiency and the latter 
addressing the relationship between citizens and the state.”  
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This researcher argues that Hall’s assertion reduces government to a passive 
constituent that mostly enables actions rather than administering the state. This is a 
precarious position for government, as singular or collective individuals with 
personified inclinations can easily usurp its powers. Similarly, although Wohlmuth 
credibly covers institutional and bureaucratic elements of governance, he does not 
particularly expound on the role that a personified leader plays in governance. This 
notion separates personality from the abstract entity called “government”, making it 
easy for leaders to negate their roles. Fukuyama’s arguments come close to the line 
of argument taken in this study. This is because he argues that governance is a 
function of capacity and autonomy that in turn are indicators of the quality of any 
government. Accordingly, we see the importance of the theory of personification for 
measuring the quality of governance and government effectiveness. This is because 
the theory resolutely links personalities of national leaders to outcomes of their rule. 
 The concept of governance: its ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjuncts 
The notion of good governance is relatively new. It surfaced prominently in a World 
Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa, “describing the crisis in the region as a crisis of 
governance” (World Bank, 1989). Overviews of general usage and origins of 
governance show that the term’s first introduction was normative. By the late 1980s, 
the limitations of African states – reflected in weak policy formulation, ineffective 
public administration, and corruption – featured prominently in official diagnoses from 
both sides of the structural adjustment debate (UNECA & World Bank, noted in 
Alence, 2004:164). Likewise, consensus emerged that dysfunctional political 
institutions and poor governance bear much of the blame for the region’s 
disappointing economic performance, hindering the successful pursuit of any 
development strategy, irrespective of its ideological orientation (Mkandawire & 
Soludo 1999; Ndulu & O’Connell; Sandbrook; van de Walle, noted in Alence, 
2004:164). Whereas discussions in the 1980s concentrated on economic reform and 
structural adjustment, the focus now is on the ‘good governance’ as being an 
important factor for sustainable growth (Wohlmuth, 1998:78). Accordingly, in the 
1990s, both the IMF and the World Bank became powerful advocates of high 
standards of legitimacy, representation, and accountability in governments seeking 
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to borrow from them. These institutions gave these standards the label ‘good 
governance’ (Woods, 2000:823). 
Despite the need by international organisations to address challenges with attaining 
sustainable growth, they still had to circumnavigate the question of national 
sovereignty. For instance, the World Bank (noted in Stankowska, 2014:45) asserted 
that “good governance should have three aspects that include the form of political 
regime; the process by which a country’s management exercises authority over 
social and economic resources for development, and lastly, the capacity of the 
government to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions.” 
However, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2017:13) pointed out that the World 
Bank’s mandate prohibits its involvement in politics. Thus, the IMF highlighted the 
fact that “the Bank’s work on good governance, notably in the earlier period, typically 
was restricted to the latter two aspects on the assumption that the political element 
can be kept distinct.” Similarly, the IMF (2017:11) maintained that the Fund’s 
mandate restricts the definition of “good governance” for Fund purposes to economic 
aspects. Accordingly, the IMF (2017:8) posited that other organisations including 
regional banks have followed this approach, which by definition explicitly remained 
policy-neutral and has focused solely on effectiveness in implementing chosen 
policies. The IMF maintained that “recently however, the World Bank has moved 
away from using the term ‘good governance’. This reflects a shift from a normative to 
a functional-organizational approach, which focuses more on the nature and details 
of governance arrangements and targets assistance to improve organizational 
arrangements, functions, and outcomes.” 
Conversely, the UNDP began exploring the concept of “good governance” at almost 
the same time as the World Bank. Unlike the World Bank, the UNDP had for some 
time already been involved in supporting government capacity in developing 
countries with the so-called Management Development Programs (IMF, 2017:16). As 
a result, the UNDP had attained a close understanding of the broad relevance of 
governance for development. However, the UNDP embraced the political (power-
related) and democratic aspects to a much greater degree than the World Bank did. 
First, differences in mandate allowed the UNDP to come to the issue of development 
from a different perspective, mindful of the role of democratic political processes. 
Second, the UNDP’s areas of concern notably cover social indicators, involving such 
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topics as health and education, as well as access to decision-making processes on 
the distribution of public goods (IMF, 2017:16). 
With the above background, this study explores some key definitions of the phrase 
‘good governance.’ The definitions highlighted below reasonably capture the varied 
viewpoints on the subject, and are contextually pertinent for this study. From a 
broad-spectrum, Chowdhury and Skarstedt (noted in Essien, 2012:26) reasoned that 
“good governance is a normative principle of public administration and administrative 
law, which obliges the State, nation or organs of government to perform its functions 
in a manner that promotes the values of efficiency, non-corruptibility, and 
responsiveness to civil society.” Similarly, Bang and Esmark (2013:1) “described 
good governance as an empirically observable politico-administrative way of making 
public policy-making, reforming and organizing. As such, good governance covers 
three basic politico-administrative domains: public governance, policy and 
organization.” However, Zaid (2015:2) argued that “good governance is not – in and 
of itself – an end; it is rather a means for a greater good, which is an effective and 
efficient delivery of public goods by the government.” Equally, the ADB (noted in 
Wohlmuth, 1998:6) asserted that “the issue regarding the quality of public goods 
supplied at country-level makes ‘good governance’ such an important concept.”  
On the other hand, Wohlmuth (1998:6) maintained that “‘good governance’ refers to 
the developmental potentials of democracy in Africa – as accountability, rule of law, 
public choice of government, and freedom of expression and association are 
important elements of Africa’s renewal.” Moreover, good governance, according to 
Wohlmuth (1998:6), also referred to the consolidation of market reforms, although 
different development paths are possible in market-oriented economic systems. 
Good governance therefore requires an adaptation and continuous improvement of 
market-oriented systems in a specific socio-economic context, especially in Africa. 
Conversely, Noman, Botchwey, Stein and Stiglitz (noted in Cubitt, 2014:1) asserted 
that, having focused for decades on market-based approaches that failed, 
developmental approaches to governance that promote a bigger role for African 
states now pre-occupy international actors. They maintained that the idea is to move 
away from policy that restricts and restrains state activity, to that which strengthens 
and enables capacity for growth and development. However, Hewitt de Alcántara 
(noted in Munshi, Abraham & Chaudhuri, 2009:13) argued that “in recent years, 
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giving prominence to the concept of governance in the analysis of development 
problems has allowed international lending institutions (and the donor community in 
general) to work themselves out of an intellectual and practical dead-end that relied 
heavily on free-market ideals.” 
Additionally, Hope (noted in Khan, 2015:10) averred “that good governance 
comprises of political accountability; bureaucratic transparency; the exercise of 
legitimate power; freedom of association and participation; freedom of information 
and expression; sound fiscal management and public financial accountability.” Hope 
maintained that “good governance consists of respect for the rule of law; a 
predictable legal framework encompassing an interdependent and credible justice 
system; respect for human rights; an active legislature; enhanced opportunities for 
the development of pluralistic forces including civil society; and capacity 
development.” Stankowska (2014:44) built on the subject of human rights and 
posited that “good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing.” 
Stankowska (2014:44) maintained that “human rights principles provide a set of 
values to guide the work of governments and other political and social actors. They 
also provided a set of performance standards against which hold these actors 
accountable.” 
On the other hand, without good governance, one cannot respect and protect human 
rights in a sustainable manner. In this respect, Khan (2015:35) “defined good 
governance as the overall capacity development for government.” Khan maintained 
that capacity broadly includes the service delivery by the government. Similarly, 
Khan defined capacity development as “the promotion of the competency of a range 
of social actors, who perform the activities in a sustainable manner for positive 
development.” Smith (noted in Khan, 2015:10) emphasized “capacity development in 
an equitable manner for good governance in developing societies.” Likewise, Howe 
(2012:345) posited that “good governance refers to efficiency in the provision of 
services and economic competitiveness.” He maintained that “with time, good 
governance has also come to mean accountability in the provision of services and in 
the generation and distribution of the collective good.” 
I observe that because of the indeterminate definitions of governance, many leaders 
in sub-Saharan countries claim to practise ‘good’ governance and participatory 
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development. The ambiguity of the term ‘good’ governance confuses national 
citizens themselves. The idealistic appendage ‘good’ complicates the already 
convoluted definition of governance. Apparently, neoliberals added concern for ‘good 
governance’ into economic programmes in order to ‘make them more efficient’. For 
instance, “neoliberals mulled over the question: ‘what happens to the concept of 
governance in a state that has limited power to make decisions?’ The answer for 
neoliberals has been to vaunt the merits of self-regulating markets and to suggest 
that markets functioned best when the state had no regulatory powers (Ives, 
2015:11)”. However, some actors abuse the term ‘good governance’ by ascribing to 
it so many indicators that it becomes nearly impossible to achieve good governance. 
“At the same time, many governments engage in conflicts of interests between trying 
to do the right things and doing the urgently needed things right,  which consume 
their energies and resources” (Grindle, 2004, noted in De Vries, 2013:3).  
However, in order to unravel the ambiguity surrounding the concept of ‘good 
governance’, I pose the question: “what makes a concept good?” Gerring (1999:357) 
attempted to provide an answer in his argument that “‘goodness’ in concept 
formation cannot be reduced to ‘clarity,’ to empirical or theoretical relevance, to a set 
of rules, or to the methodology particular to a given study”. Of the eight ‘criteria of 
conceptual goodness’ spelt out by Gerring, the term ‘good governance’ in the context 
of this study lacks five, namely parsimony, differentiation, coherence, theoretical 
utility, and field utility. This probably explains why successes for the spirited attempts 
to coin a functional definition of the term ‘governance’ have eluded experts. Of 
significant interest on the discussion, De Vries (2013:4) posited that “the term 
governance has become dangerous in that scholars as well as (international) 
organizations have added a normative prefix to it, namely ‘good’. To De Vries, the 
latter is indicative of neglect for outputs and outcomes that increases the criteria for 
‘good governance’ imposing an agenda on government which by now is overloaded.” 
A UNDP Governance Policy Paper (1997) stated that “good governance is 
participatory, transparent and accountable; it is also effective and equitable, and it 
promotes the rule of law.” The UNDP Paper maintained that, “… good governance 
ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus 
in society.” The Policy Paper also equally stresses that the voices of the poorest and 
the most vulnerable are to be heard in decision-making over the allocation of 
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development resources. Correspondingly, Stankowska (2014:45) defined good 
governance as a mechanism of managing resources to achieve a fair, efficient and 
effective development. Thus, Stankowska maintained, we achieve good governance 
when in the process of checks and balances, there is a balanced system between 
the element of the state and societal institutions – where none of them has an 
absolute control. 
Relatedly, Rotberg (noted in Onolememen, 2015:2) argued that “depending on the 
manner and mode of administering, governance can be good or bad.” Habtamu 
(2008) stated that “Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor economic performance is largely 
attributable to bad governance”. I argue that, in part, egocentric leadership motivates 
bad governance. I associate bad or failed governance with the Africa continent-wide 
ills, and, to cure Africa of its malaise, we must improve governance by some means. 
According to Rothstein (noted in Cubitt, 2014:5), “bad governance is not culturally 
restricted, but a universal challenge that affects all nations at some point in their 
development history.” Cubitt” (2014:3) added that “The current orthodoxy, which 
focuses on state building, technocratic style solutions to government challenges, 
simply will not do. Lundgren, Thomas and York (2013:9) corroborated the above 
argument in their argument that, “those who maintain that weaknesses in … 
macroeconomic management and poor governance seem to have played a 
prominent role in squandering sub-Sahara’s resources.” Lately, experts have been 
debating the idea pertaining to “good enough governance” by pondering whether the 
message behind the ‘good governance agenda’ is tenable. On this note, Grindle 
(2007:1) “suggested that not all governance deficits need to be (or can be) tackled at 
once, and that institution and capacity building are products of time. Conversely, 
governance achievements can also be reversed.” Equally, Maghraoui (2012) 
contended that the fact that “the concept of good governance is grounded in a 
technocratic, politically neutral view of power is detrimental to accountability and 
oversight.” To Maghraoui, such a conception is ineffective when it comes to fighting 
corruption. He contended that “claims by proponents that ‘good governance’ 
provides techniques of policing and improving institutional performance are 
unrealistic. This is especially true in a context where senior government officials are 
not held accountable to a body that has oversight, authority and the power of 
enforcement.” 
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The above arguments underscore the intricate relationship between leadership and 
governance. The arguments clearly highlight the need for accountability by persons 
in leadership position. However, in personified regimes, national leaders are 
unwilling to be accountable to their citizens and national institutions since this 
constrains their rapaciousness. Olukoshi (noted in Cubitt, 2014:4) identified that 
“bureaucratic obstruction, weak judiciaries, political and administrative arbitrariness, 
the absence of the rule of law, corruption and rent seeking among governors, are 
distinguishing characteristics of bad governance that are principally to blame for the 
failure [of sustainable growth in Africa].” Olukoshi maintained that “it is the case that 
African politics is bedevilled by a number of characteristics that conspire to produce 
an image of bad governance on the continent. There is evidence of corruption, 
militarism, authoritarianism, clientelism, neo-patrimonialism or tribalism.” 
In contrast, cross-national studies show that good governance is a key determinant 
of economic performance. “Experts have challenged econometric works showing 
that institutions are the key determinant of economic performance on the grounds of 
conceptual vagueness, causality/endogeneity problems, missing-variable 
considerations, measurement errors, and modelling and specification limitations” 
(Avellaneda, 2006:196). Avellaneda maintained that “most decisively, the new 
political economy of growth still lacks a proper grasp of the channels through which 
institutions affect growth, and the political sources of good institutions.” She asserted 
that, “one of the most difficult issues in the field of governance is the imperfect 
understanding of how politics shapes governance and development.” Likewise, 
Sørensen and Torfing (2009:234) asserted that “governance through the formation of 
networks composed of public and private actors might help solve wicked problems 
and enhance democratic participation in public policymaking, but it may also create 
conflicts and deadlocks and make public governance less transparent and 
accountable.” However, Stoker (1998:24) argued that “the paradox of governance is 
that even where government develops appropriate operating codes, governance 
failure may still occur.” Stoker maintained that “tensions and difficulties with the 
institutions of civil society, as well as inadequacies in the organizations that bridge 
the gaps between public, private and voluntary sectors may lead to governance 
failure. Equally, failures of leadership, differences in time scale and horizons among 
key partners and the depth of social conflict can all provide the seeds for governance 
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failure.” On the other hand, Cubitt (2014:6) posited that, “living with the realities of 
failed or ineffective governance, African citizens commonly look to alternative 
sources of support – religious groups, chiefs or other traditional authorities, family 
networks and so on.” 
 I observe that the above arguments corroborate Fukuyama’s (2013:3) assertion that 
“governance denotes government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver 
services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not.” On this note, I 
argue that the theory of personification addresses gaps in above arguments, 
especially regarding Avellaneda’s assertion that there is imperfect understanding of 
how politics shapes governance and development. The theory of personification 
agrees with the insinuation by Sørensen and Torfing governance may create 
conflicts and deadlocks. This is because under personification, the dispensation of 
governance is prone to conflicts owing to its undemocratic nature. Stoker also 
echoes my argument in asserting that failures of leadership can lead to conflict and 
ultimately governance failure. Eventually, resistance to leadership over undemocratic 
decisions may lead to deadlocks.  
Under the pretext of restoring democratic participation in national development, 
some donors have exploited the gaps in sub-Saharan countries caused by the 
ambiguity in the term ‘governance’. Studies show that, in order to preserve their 
economic interests, some donors purposely ensnare African countries in the cyclical 
aid trap. For instance, a recent study on US-funded programmes focusing on trade 
development in emerging markets found that for every one dollar spent on trade, $53 
accrued in merchandise exports for the United States. Similarly, Rabatsky (2011) 
agreed, noting that “with job creation becoming more dependent on expanding 
American exports overseas, international aid efforts are one of USA’s most effective 
ways to promote economic growth.” Rabatsky (2011) also argued that the United 
Kingdom understands the importance of the facts that developing countries create 
jobs and reduce competition for domestic jobs, create new markets for their goods 
and services, and provide long-term payoff in trade and security. It is apparent, 
therefore, that there is a strong motivation for some donors to support undemocratic 
leaders and their governments, even at the expense of the citizens – provided the 
situation meet the donors’ interests. To do this, treacherous donors have coined their 
own skewed definitions of “good governance” to describe otherwise errant regimes. 
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In line with the above, Carothers and de Gramont (2011:3) argued that, for many 
years, aid practitioners struggled with how to address the punishing impact of 
ineffective, unaccountable and often rapacious states in developing countries. At the 
World Bank, for example, there was cumulative frustration with persistent failures of 
development programmes in many parts of sub-Saharan countries in the 1970s and 
1980s. This led some World Bank officials to push for focus on governance, resulting 
in the publication of a landmark 1989 report that highlighted governance 
shortcomings in Africa. Carothers and de Gramont maintained that it was only in the 
1990s that a confluence of factors emerged that propelled governance onto the main 
stage of international development, where it has since assumed varying definitions. If 
we are to be guided by the indicators of good governance devised by the World 
Bank, the region of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the lowest score on the measure 
of Government Effectiveness. Compared with other developing regions, it has 
remained the lowest performer in this indicator for the past decade (Cubitt, 2014:2). 
According to Clapham, Rothschild and Olorunsola (noted in Alence, 2004:178), 
“clientelism and ethnicity are both often associated with poor governance, in that 
they tend to encourage competition for a fixed basket of particularistic benefits, at the 
expense of providing more general welfare-enhancing public goods.” As discussed 
earlier, the contention is that within this broad spectrum, governance either hinders 
or promotes development. In the same manner, Ilufoye Ogundiya (noted in Ojo, 
Aworawo & Elizabeth, 2014:135) argued that, “governance surely hinders 
development where it manifests in corrupt practices; greed and insatiable appetite 
for resource accumulation.” On the other hand, Maghraoui (2012) argued that 
“strong empirical evidence supports the connection between corruption and the lack 
of good governance.” Maghraoui maintained that “opportunities for corruption are 
greater where there is a lack of institutional transparency, accountability, capability, 
effectiveness, fairness and access.” On the same note, Transparency International 
(1999) contended that “where corruption is endemic, the tasks of improving 
performance are more difficult.” Furthermore, scholars, professionals and policy 
makers are at odds on the contributory linkage between corruption and good 
governance, and so they emphasise the different components of the latter. 
In discussing bad governance, Aliyu and Elijah (noted in Ojo et al., 2014:136) 
“underscored the consequence of corruption that it carts resources away from 
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government capital expenditure and human capital development and ends up in 
private pockets.” However, I argue that governance is much broader than ‘corruption’ 
is. Nonetheless, I agree that corruption is a typical symptom of bad governance, and 
it can be a particularly pernicious one. Correspondingly, Fritz (2007) argued that 
“oppression and the denial of rights can be other dimensions of bad governance, 
while yet others are lawlessness and the spread of crime, often in the context of 
political instability.” Similarly, Aliyu and Elijah (noted in Ojo et al., 2014:139) argued 
that “the manifestations of illiberal and corrupt governance would not only breed and 
spread poverty, for instance, as a result of wasted resources as well as distorted 
investment, but also portend threats to state and human security. Furthermore, 
chronic fiscal drain through corrupt practices would drive away crucial resources in 
terms of direct and indirect foreign investment.” 
In concluding the section on the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjuncts of governance, I 
established from the literature review that many experts agree that good governance 
is a fundamental factor for poverty eradication and advancement of national 
development. This study also established that actors generally agree that good 
governance is an ideal way of advancing good public policymaking, as well as 
reforming and organising politico-administrative domains. In addition, good 
governance can also influence the manner in which a country exercises authority 
over social and economic resources for development. I concur that the virtues 
associated with good governance are strong pillars that can mitigate or even 
truncate the proliferation of personified regimes. As discussed in the literature 
review, good governance facilitates the rule of law; promotes a functional and ethical 
justice system; values human rights; and advances better opportunities to develop 
varied stakeholders. The above pillars present an institutionalised system of checks 
and balances against personified reign. However, I also established that ineffective 
political institutions and poor governance hinder efficient economic performance and 
constrain the attainment of meaningful development. Despite the apparent negative 
effects of bad governance, there is still disagreement between scholars, 
professionals, and policymakers on the causal relationship between dysfunctional 
political systems and governance. This section also established that there is a 
problem of conceptual clarity when it comes to understanding the term ‘good 
governance’ due to the varied interpretation of the phrase. In this respect, I concur 
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that this ‘fuzziness’ is problematic for the practical outcomes that development 
institutions are trying to achieve. I also argue that the varied interpretations of good 
governance renders it challenging to measure, and then use such measures to 
inform national policy processes. Accordingly, the next section will analyse theories 
and concepts of governance to help describe, interpret, test and categorise 
information on personified national leadership.  
 Overview of theories and concepts of governance  
The theories and concepts of governance assume many dimensions across diverse 
disciplines. There are several actors involved in any national governance processes 
ranging from citizens, academia through non-state actors like international 
organisations. Thus, this section provides an understanding of the concept and 
theories of governance as well as its evolution. Likewise, this section also enables 
me to crystallize my own notion of governance, a factor that will latter guide 
recommendations on how stakeholders can apply the concept in the real world. The 
latter eventually enables the user of this research to apply these concepts to current 
issues on governance and development that I discuss in chapter four. Using 
examples from the theories, I draw the reader’s attention to factors that enhance 
citizen participation in governance and at the same time improve accountability by 
national institutions. Drawing on my analysis in section 3.2.2, I discuss the elements 
or characteristics of governance as introduced by different theories and models on 
the subject. I commence my discussions by analysing the role of non-state actors in 
governance given their importance in the power dynamics of developing countries. 
I hypothesise that the key rationale supporting direct involvement of non-state actors 
in governance is the supposition that if they can influence policy processes, they will 
most likely recognise the outcomes of functional national policies. I maintain that this 
is true even if the policy outcomes do not fully accommodate the interests of the non-
state actors. In other words, the unencumbered involvement of various crosscutting 
stakeholders in decision-making will most likely legitimise governance outcomes. 
“This is the major theoretical argument in favour of directly involving non-state actors 
in governance” (Reinicke; Kaul, Grunberg & Stern; and Reinicke, Deng, Witte, 
Benner, & Whitaker, noted in Börzel & Risse, 2010:127). In the subsequent 
paragraphs, I analyse and discuss theoretical constructs and concepts of 
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argumentative theory, cultural theory, democratic and legal theory, gender theory in 
political science, network theory, political economy, and theories of system transition 
and transformation as they relate to the theory of personification. 
Gottweis (2006:461) posited that “during the 1990s, argumentative policy analysis 
became a major strand in the contemporary study of policymaking and policy theory 
development. The term argumentative policy analysis subsumed a group of different 
approaches towards policy analysis.” Gottweis maintained that “these approaches 
share an emphasis on language as a key feature of any policy process, and is thus 
as a necessary key component of policy analysis.” According to Fischer and Miller 
(2006:238), “argumentative policy analysis links post-positivist epistemology with 
social theory and methodology and encompasses theoretical approaches such as 
discourse analysis, post-structuralist approaches, frame analysis and interpretative 
policy analysis.” Fischer and Miller (2006) maintained that “although these different 
approaches are hardly synonymous, they nevertheless share the special attention 
they give to argumentation and language and the process of utilizing, mobilizing and 
weighing arguments and signs in the interpretation and praxis of policymaking and 
governance.” In the same manner, Alejandro (1993:92) posited that “this 
epistemological orientation is critical of the understanding that institutions of 
governance are not simply out there at the disposal of policymakers or citizens using 
them. Rather, practices and institutions are [also] present in language through 
concepts and ideas that embody human experience and normative claims.” 
Likewise, Ruysenaar (2014:45) contended that “infused within meaning-making 
processes and the centrality of language, is the importance of power and knowledge, 
which are expressed through them.” From another perspective, Habermas (noted in 
Ruysenaar, 2014:45) emphasised that “the importance of communication in securing 
and fostering the acceptance of the unequal distribution of power as well as the 
policy consequences that flow from it.” Habermas maintained that “ultimately, acts of 
end-user rendering or utility constitute the essence of institutions and the formation 
of political identity.” 
From a cultural perspective, van Gunsteren (noted in Hoppe, 2007:289) argued that 
public policymaking appears to invent and impose a unitary, supposedly consensual 
governance culture on the many different cultures “out there” in society. Yet, Hoppe 
(2007:289) articulated that “taking cultural difference seriously and making it an ally 
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instead of an enemy is the only sensible response for a policy analysis profession in 
tune with its times.” In the same vein, Ross (noted in Lichbach & Zuckerman, 
2009:134) contended that “to examine how culture operates, we must approach it 
through the formal and informal verbal and nonverbal narratives about the social and 
political worlds that people in the same culture share.” To this end, Ross maintained 
that culture is a worldview containing specific scripts that shape why and how 
individuals and groups behave as they do. According to Ross (noted in Lichbach & 
Zuckerman, 2009:137), this “includes both cognitive and affective beliefs about 
social reality and assumptions about when, where and how people in one’s culture 
and those in other cultures are likely to act in particular ways.” Regarding cultural 
theory as developed in anthropology (and later introduced into political science), 
Douglas (noted in Jenkins-Smith, 2012:1) posited that “cultural theory supports four 
distinctive worldviews or ‘cultural biases’.” Wildavsky (noted in Jenkins-Smith, 
2012:1) stated that “these worldviews are egalitarianism, hierarchism, individualism 
and fatalism – that serve as the primary combinations of values that guide how 
individuals formulate both broad social orientations and derive more specific policy 
perspectives.” Accordingly, cultural theorists claimed, “that the social world ticks the 
way it does due to selective affinity and mutual dependency between social relations, 
cultural biases and behavioural strategies” (Hoppe, 2007:290).  
Equally, “cultural theory scholars hypothesized that different types of social and 
political relations are accompanied by values and beliefs, including constructs of 
human and physical nature, that allow people to justify these relationships to each 
other” (Swedlow, 2014:468). I note that the reinstatement of ‘cultural theory’ as a 
constructive technique for examining political issues will facilitate the in-depth 
understanding of contemporary politics from multiple perspectives. This is because 
culture plays a pivotal role in African politics as much as it does in shaping or 
regulating societal discourses. In corroboration of this, Matlosa (2003:86) 
emphasized that “the importance of a culture to societal development, identity and 
destiny is as critical as that of political culture to a political system.” Matlosa 
maintained that “political culture has both direct and indirect bearing and permutation 
on political and economic governance processes. Furthermore, the concept of 
political culture denotes a broad array of norms, values, beliefs, attitudes and 
traditions that shape systems, institutions and processes of governance. Similarly, 
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we can justifiably trace policy initiatives and actions of key agents in any political 
system at any particular time to the nature of the political culture prevailing in a given 
polity”. I postulate that culture has a critical role to play as a check to the excesses in 
personified dispensation in East Africa that is still heavily rooted in traditional society. 
Culture can potentially infuse strong ethics in a society, help build trust, foster strong 
collaborative networks, and provide conflict resolution mechanisms.  
For a while, governance studies that focused primarily on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of given arrangements had neglected implications of the various 
modes of governance for democracy. While the new modes of governance have the 
potential to increase participation and citizen involvement, and may enhance the 
problem-solving capacity of politics, critical questions remain. According to Immergut 
(2011:70), “the link between democratic theory and public policy begins with the 
conception of public policy as embodying the principle of ‘democratic governance’.” 
Immergut (2011:71) maintained that democratic theory comprises normative models 
that classify democratic choice according to the types of judgments they make about 
inputs and outputs to the democratic process. In the model, Immergut asserted that 
“…‘inputs’ are the demands and preferences of individuals and groups, while 
‘outputs’ are the public policies produced. Political theories vary with regard to 
whether they apply substantive (institutionalist, etatist) or formal (neo-utilitarian, 
pluralist) standards to evaluate these inputs and outputs. We base a substantive 
standard on a transcendent value or norm, such as justice or equality of result. By 
contrast, we base a formal theory, on a procedural or immanent standard.” 
Congruently, Qian (Qian, 2012:193) argued that, “enhancing democratic governance 
is a holistic measure to prevent the executive-led system from degenerating into 
authoritarian rule and to boost legal system construction, laying a sound foundation 
for rule of law moving forward.” Qian (2012:186) maintained that “democratic 
governance through ‘consensus democracy’ and democratic politics requires, as a 
matter of course, the regulation, constraints and safeguard of the democratic system. 
Such democratic political system in practice is also dependent on a matching value 
system that encompasses tolerance of competing aspirations, cooperation and 
compromise.” 
On the other hand, Edley Jr. (1991:582) argued that “legal theory must flow from, 
and integrate with a political ideology. This proposition is valid at three levels. First, 
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legal theory must have a related and embracing political ideology to find a welcoming 
climate of public and elite opinion for the theory's prescriptions at the level of doctrine 
and reform. Second, the companion ideology, or socio-political critique, provides the 
test of whether the prescriptions are sound. Third, the theory itself is likely incapable 
of generating concrete or useful prescriptions, and thus flawed, unless the theory is 
informed in an immediate sense by an ideology that can provide a direction and 
purpose to the abstract reasoning.” Similarly, Jones, Hesterly and Borgati (noted in 
Wilikilagi, 2009) contended that network governance involves a select, persistent 
and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in 
creating products or services. Jones et al. maintained that “the latter hinges on 
implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges wherein these contracts are not legally binding 
socially.”  
In addition to the above, Turnbull (noted in Wilikilagi, 2009) defined “Network 
governance as following the architecture used by nature to construct and govern 
complex systems like living things based on decentralism, pluralism and associative 
relationships rather than centralism, a social monoculture that relies only on 
competitive relationships that dominate the existing form of capitalism.” In the same 
vein, Rhodes, March and Olsen (noted in 2016 IK Vienna School of Governance, 
2016) argued that “network theories of governance include approaches that 
investigate patterns of interest intermediation and public-private cooperation in the 
making and implementation of public policies. Their common concern is on how 
actors and agencies come to form networks, what holds them together, what 
determines their choices and how they influence political decisions.” From a 
functional point of view, Dedeurwaerdere (2005:2) posited that “the aim of network 
governance is to create a synergy between different competences and sources of 
knowledge in order to deal with complex and interlinked problems. In this functional 
perspective, we accomplish governance through decentralized networks of private 
and public actors associated with international, national and regional institutions.” 
Dedeurwaerdere maintained that “from a theoretical point of view, profound 
ambiguity characterizes the concept of network governance.” Thus in this concept, 
Schout and Jordan (noted in Dedeurwaerdere, 2005:2) argued that “we can 
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distinguish between two models of network governance: one that focuses on 
networks as self-organizing systems and another that involves active steering.”  
However, I find the concept of network governance rather ambiguous; for instance, 
what drives or holds networks together in the theory? I argue that there has to be a 
common binding factor like culture or some sort of organic solidarity based on 
interdependence. I note that the absence of the binding factor among other aspects 
leads to the acquiescence of helpless citizens to personified regimes. In addition, 
when related to the theory of personification where individuals are central, we 
immediately note that the theory of network governance does not explain in detail the 
role of the individual leader in influencing network decisions. Conversely, Provan and 
Kenis (2008:231) argued that “although all networks comprise a range of interactions 
among participants, a focus on governance involves the use of institutions and 
structures of authority and collaboration to allocate resources and to coordinate and 
control joint action across the network as a whole.” I posit that the above assertion 
assumes that persons in authority are willing to share information or coordinate joint 
programmes. This argument does not consider national leaders who personify 
institutions and systems in order to aggrandise themselves at the expense of the 
citizenry. Similarly, if we focus on the ‘‘nodes’’ and ‘‘relations’’ that comprise the 
network (cf. Graddy & Chen; O’Toole & Meier, noted in Provan & Kenis, 2008:232), 
then we cannot ignore the actuality of national leaders with personified inclinations.  
Of further significance to this study is the “ideal-typical, ‘network governance’” of 
Beate Kohler-Koch (noted in Falkner, 1999:8), which is “characterized by co-
operation among all interested actors (instead of competition) and by joint learning 
processes.” According to Kohler-Koch (1999, noted in Falkner, 1999:8), “hierarchy 
and subordination yield to a trade-off based on equality that aims at solving problems 
jointly” in a manner that dissipates across the system. I aver that instead of the self-
centred lobbying that many individuals pursue, the above scenario requires 
cooperation that is more transparent. I also note that, like other network governance 
theories, Beate’s argument assumed equality and cooperation over self-interest. To 
the contrary, in the theory of personification national leaders with personified 
inclinations will govern with egocentric tendencies. They usually subvert policies that 
advance cooperation and equality, in preference for repressive strategies. 
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According to Chattopadhyay (noted in Van Der Pijl, 2009:2), “the term ‘political 
economy’ applied ‘economy’ (‘house holding’, from the Greek oikos, manor or 
household, and nomos, laws/rules) to the ‘polity’, the state.” The above broad 
definition sets the stage for subsequent discussions on the subject of political 
economy. I present below a detailed analysis of “political economy and class conflict” 
from classical perspectives. Van Der Pijl (2009:1) asserted that “the core axiom of 
contemporary, ‘neoclassical’ economics is that all humans are by nature self-
interested, utility-maximizing subjects.” The subject of human self-interest is 
significant for understanding how political economy correlates with the theory of 
personification where egotism plays a central role. According to Van Der Pijl 
(2009:2), classical thinkers, like Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776), 
defined the economy as the field in which rationally self-interested individuals (a 
‘natural’ given) entered into ‘barter, truck and exchange’ with each other (another 
natural trait). Consequently, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market reconciled their 
individual pursuits into a system of common well-being. Equally, in his Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation (1817), David Ricardo (also referred to in Van Der 
Pijl, 2009:3) analysed the process of capitalist development in terms of a class 
conflict between landowners, capitalists and labour over the distribution of the wealth 
thus generated. Conversely, in The Poverty of Philosophy (1847), Karl Marx (as 
noted in Van Der Pijl, 2009:3) “challenged Ricardo’s interpretation of capitalism as a 
natural, final order of things. Additionally, Marx’s ‘Critique of Political Economy’ 
aimed to demonstrate that the capitalist economy was not an eternal, self-
equilibrating system.” 
Further to the above, in discussing the ‘political economy’, the liberal thinker John 
Stuart Mill (noted in Brink, 2013:234), reasoned that “representative democracy was 
the best form of government for societies with sufficient resources, security, and 
culture of self-reliance.” In particular, Mill contended that representative democracy 
is good when it best satisfies two criteria of all good government. First, Mill posits, is 
that government is good insofar as it promotes the common good like the moral, 
intellectual, and active traits of its citizens. Secondly, Mill maintained that 
“government is good insofar as it makes effective use of institutions and the 
resources of its citizens to promote the common good.”  
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I find it noteworthy that the above discourses by classical thinkers emphasise the 
centrality of the individual in the political economy. However, none of the theories 
explored in the preceding literature review explicitly expounds on how the dynamics 
of a political economy play out under personified dispensations. I argue that the 
problem with the classical thinkers is that they expound on things in society ‘as is,’ 
largely from observed perspectives. Conversely, the theory of personification goes 
deeper to link an individual’s formative stages in infancy to mature and conscious 
leadership actions later in life. I argue that personified actions ultimately affect the 
development and governance of any given economy. In effect, personification theory 
attempts to rationalise how the actions of given personalities take shape to enable 
them relate, self-regulate, and empathise with others.  
According to Leslie (1876:265), “political economy is ‘the science which treats of the 
nature, the production and distribution of wealth. Political economy investigates the 
nature of wealth and the laws of its production and distribution; including directly or 
remotely, the operation of all the causes by which the causes by which the condition 
of mankind, or of any society of human beings is made prosperous or the reverse.” 
Similarly, Caporaso and Levine (1992:1) contended that “in its earliest period, 
political economy sought to advise the statesman on how he could best manage the 
economic affairs of the state so that the wants of the citizens would be met. The 
emergence of political economy brought with it a debate over responsibilities of the 
State (or statesmen) with regard to the economy. ” Of contextual relevance in their 
theory, Caporaso and Levine (1992:44-6) asserted that the state serves as an 
instrument of forces emerging among individuals or classes. Contemplated through 
the lens of personified theory, this study argues that the “state centred approach to 
political economy”, which Caporaso and Levine (1992) postulated that, “constrains 
sound governance since it allows ‘individuals’ the latitude to influence State affairs.” 
Accordingly, I argue that under this system, national leaders can deviously use the 
State as an instrument of force to serve personal interests. Relatedly, Caporaso and 
Levine (1992) corroborated my line of argument in their assertion that “the 
aspirations of State leaders vary significantly from that of society they govern. 
Consequently, in any political discourses that ensue, State leaders resist pressures 
from private interests and translate their will into public policy.” The researcher points 
out that the theory of personification ably explains the above contention. 
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Kollmorgen provides compelling arguments for the theory of transformation to 
describe focal points and corresponding theoretical-methodological tools.  
Kollmorgen (2010:3) argued that first, “societal transformations represent a social 
practice implying the liquefaction of the social. Thus, process analyses must be the 
central programmatic orientation. Secondly, focal point and theoretical-
methodological tools include the centrality of actors and institutions as well as the 
attempts to control or steer the radical change of society.” According to Kollmorgen, 
the latter “depends on whether one accepts the politically projected character of 
societal transformations and the crucial role of macro- and mezzo-actors in 
(trans)forming formal actor-institution-complexes by borrowing or transferring from 
hegemonic “model”-societies and re-combining them with remnants of the old order. 
The third focal point and theoretical-methodological tool constitutes the complex 
dimensionality and contextuality of societal transformations.” Kollmorgen (2010:4) 
further argued that, the success of middle-range theories of transformation dealing 
with partial processes as the political transition or the economic transformation 
depends on explicit and intensive regard to the holistic or total character of the 
societal transformation as well as the specific contexts the concrete transformation 
takes place. The fourth aspect includes modes of transformation and transformation 
paths. The mode of transformation refers, on the one hand to the concrete national, 
international and world-societal contexts of the transformation. On the other hand, it 
implies the decisive factors and factor combinations propelling and controlling the 
(institutional) change (Kollmorgen, 2010:5).” 
However, Wright (2010:200) posited that “the ultimate target for a ‘theory of 
transformation’ is the impetus to significantly extend and reinforce the context of 
social empowerment within economic structures in capitalist societies in order to 
advance unrestricted democratic paradigms.”  
Even so, Wright (2010:200) maintained that, “significant movements towards real 
social empowerment is a threat to the interests of powerful actors who benefit most 
from capitalist structures and who can use their power to oppose such movements.” 
Under the theory of transformation, social empowerment is a threat to the interests of 
powerful actors, which is symptomatic of personified systems. This is because under 
personified dispositions, self-interested powerful national leaders usually use their 
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positions to constrain rather than empower the masses. On the other hand, Wright 
(2010:210) argued that “coercion is more effective when rarely used because most 
people comply with laws out of duty or self-interest.” The abovementioned statement 
by Wright that people comply with laws out of duty or self-interest complicates the 
hypothesis for this study. This is because national leaders and other citizens alike 
are all ‘self-interested’, as mooted by the theory of transformation. Similarly, Wright 
(2010:210) averred that “ideologies are more robust when they mesh with important 
aspects of material interest. Thus, in the despotic form of social reproduction, the 
primary mechanism of social reproduction is coercion, coupled with specific 
institutional rules that exercise coercion. [Despotic systems also] maintain social 
order largely through fear, and various forms of repression primarily block potential 
transformative challenges.” 
In discussing the theory of transition, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (noted in 
Grimm, 2013:5) postulated that “a transition represents an intermediate state 
between two more durable [entities] – an interval between one political regime and 
another.” In this respect, Grimm (2013:5) argued that “we see the transition process 
as moving on a continuum from autocracy at the one end to democracy at the other. 
Thus, we could evaluate transitions by their progress along such a linear trajectory 
and notions of ‘stability’ and ‘fragility’ that depict the odds of an emerging stable 
democratic regime.” Accordingly, “transitions that failed to establish Western-style 
liberal democratic orders were termed failed or defective, and their respective regime 
outcomes labelled ‘democracies with adjectives’” (Collier & Levitsky; Diamond; 
Mácków; Merkel & Croissant, as noted by Grimm, 2013:5). Heydeman (noted in 
Grimm, 2013:6) asserted that “autocratic regimes occasionally modify their 
modalities of rule and configurations of power.” When this happens, Diamond; 
Levitsky and Way; and Nonneman (as noted by Grimm, 2013:6) contended that “the 
autocratic regimes prove to be highly creative and reinvent themselves as quasi-
democracies or electoral democracies embedding their authoritarian core into a 
formally pluralist and democratic cover structure.” Equally, O’Donnell and Schmitter 
(noted in Mainwaring, 1989:4) argued that “the process of dissolution of an 
authoritarian regime delimits transitions on the one side, while on the other, by the 
installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, 
or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.” “Such reformative steps and partial 
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openings [serve] as a substitute for, rather than a step toward, democratization” 
(Ottaway & Choucair-Vizoso, noted in Grimm, 2013:6). Similarly, in his analysis of 
transitional effect, McElhinney (2012:3) asserted that “transition in democratic regime 
characteristics directly links to the development of human rights.” McElhinney 
(2012:5) also revealed that “the presence of democratic building blocks would 
encourage less repressive behaviour by the government and remove potential 
hindrances in the transition to a democratic system.” 
In analysing the theory of transformation, this study found contextual relevance in 
Kollmorgen’s discussion of the centrality of actors and institutions in the control or 
steering of change in society. Two issues are pertinent in the foregoing statement: 
actors and institutions. This is because in the theory of personification national 
leaders play a key role in determining actions of institutions, thus influencing 
decisions that generally affect society. From the theory of transition, this study draws 
inspiration from Wright’s argument highlighting how real social empowerment is a 
threat to the interests of powerful actors who subsist on coercion. Again, I note a 
relatable argument with the theory of personification where leaders disempower 
society using coercive means in order to aggrandise themselves or maintain illicit 
hold on power. However, the theory of transition did not adequately cover the role of 
individuals in regime governance. Nonetheless, this study provides an answer by 
arguing that the extent of the personification of any given regime explains the 
likelihood of transitions to or from democracy. In other words, the political will of a 
national leader practising personification will determine the possibility of a regime 
transitioning to democracy. Finally, Diamond; Levitsky and Way; and Nonneman 
articulated how autocratic regimes can reinvent themselves as quasi-democracies or 
electoral democracies.  In the theory of personification, leaders have mastered the 
ability to stage manage democratic practices to dupe citizens and the international 
community. These regimes also manipulate electoral processes to their favour.  
 Overview of empirical concepts on governance 
This section now turns to explore empirical concepts of governance by analysing 
researched material on governance in order to understand what is going on in East 
Africa. During this analysis, I lay emphasis on unravelling features of personified 
governance, as well as describing of the status of personification in East Africa. This 
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research has explored numerous theories that have potentially useful empirical and 
disciplinary applications. From these concepts, I highlight the associations between 
variables that affect governance in the region from which I develop an empirically 
useful model that can be tested in analytical studies. I hope my analysis can 
establish a direct link between the theoretical construct in this thesis and practice in 
East Africa – the area of study (and possibly beyond). Where feasible, I draw on 
examples from case studies in order to focus my arguments. I hope that the 
empirical discussions in this segment will improve the empirical inquiry in this thesis 
by strengthening overall discussions on its theoretical foundations. 
Complex outcomes of governance practices have generated significant interest in 
empirical research on the effectiveness of governance institutions and mechanisms. 
Lynn Jr., Heinrich and Hill (2001:11) advanced an approach based empirical 
research that attempts to address “big questions” on governance. Lynn Jr. et al. 
(2001) proposed “a framework for research premised on the notion that any 
particular governance arrangement relating to a policy domain, government activity, 
a particular jurisdiction, an organization or organizational field subsists in a wider 
social, fiscal political context.” Lynn Jr. et al. (2001) maintained that, “investigators 
often model governance in a way that loosely connects to or even decouples from a 
wider context. Thus, too often, research designs do not incorporate the possibility 
that broader patterns of interrelationships affect outcomes. These shortcomings may 
ignore hierarchical organizational and management variables, or to some extent, 
system wide or institutional mandates and incentives.” To this end, Lynn Jr. et al. 
(2001) proposed a  governance logic that “highlights relationships between structure 
and action at various levels of the governmental process and the outcomes of 
performance of governmental activity.” Accordingly, in the subsequent paragraphs in 
I explore the extent to which empirical models of governance compellingly connect to 
wider political contexts. This analysis will help this study conceptualise broader 
patterns of interrelationships that affect governance outcomes. As posited by Lynn 
Jr. et al. (2001) in their argument, this study corroborates the view that donor 
agencies and experts face challenges in measuring and assessing governance.  
Illustratively, a position paper on Aid, Governance and Fragility (UNU-WIDER, 
2014:29) posited that “donors purport to design and implement ‘measurable’ 
evidence-based policies on governance reform. They justify their focus on good 
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governance partly because of evidence that better governance promotes economic 
development.” In echoing the latter, the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, 
(cited in Gisselquist 2012:1) noted that “good governance is perhaps the single most 
important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” However, I 
argue that many donors and governance experts prescribe concepts that are not 
responsive to local political realities, leadership characteristics, and citizen 
preferences. Gisselquist (2012:14) contended that “Rwanda provides an illustration 
of some of the challenges faced by donors and experts in defining good governance. 
Many observers note that Rwanda has made clear progress in terms of economic 
growth, public sector management, and regulatory reform since the end of genocide 
in 1994.” “This trend continued through 2010, but there were numerous violations of 
civil and political rights, and the government failed to fulfil its professed commitment 
to democracy” (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2011). Should we consider Rwanda 
well governed because of its economic progress, or poorly governed because of its 
democratic deficits? Below, I discuss the above paradoxical question in light of the 
theory of personification. The UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), for instance, has been the largest bilateral donor in Rwanda, “effectively 
arguing that Rwanda is well governed.” Human Rights Watch, among others, 
“sharply criticized DFID policy in 2011, effectively acknowledging the democratic 
deficits” (Gisselquist 2012:14). As discussed above, the varied interpretations of 
good governance renders it challenging to measure, and then use the ensuing 
outcomes to inform national policy processes. In addition, autocratic leaders exploit 
disparities in the definitions of good governance to rationalise their actions because 
any ambiguous definitions can suffice without contest.  
Conceptually, Rothstein (noted in Cubitt, 2014:4) contended that “good governance 
can mean social trust, security, hope and well-being, for example, which are 
essential for the buy-in of local people to any development project, yet there are 
currently no alternative normative political theories that connect these concepts, and 
others, to the search for good governance in Africa.” The statement by Rothstein, 
that “no distinct normative political theories draw cogent connections between 
concepts of governance”, is contextually similar to the assertion by Lynn Jr. et al. 
(2001) that “governance models do not account for the likelihood of broader patterns 
of interrelationships that affect outcomes.” I argue that these assertions pose 
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technical challenges with rational analysis of the empirical concepts of governance. 
The issue is that both scholars are challenging the scientific integrity or rigorous 
testability of the models. In consonance, Gisselquist (2012:21) highlighted “the 
problem of conceptual clarity when it comes to ‘good governance’ and why this is 
problematic for the practical outcomes that development institutions and the like are 
trying to achieve.” Accordingly, Gisselquist (2012:18) maintained that, “without 
explicit measures, donors [and experts], cannot rigorously test empirical hypotheses 
on how political and economic institutions change, much less develop evidence-
based strategies about how to positively influence this change.” I note that the lack of 
evaluation approaches, based on evidence, can affect the capacity to assess the 
logically fundamental correlation between governance and development outcomes. 
Further to the above, this section highlights the critical factors that affect the 
empirical conceptualisation of good governance. According to Streeck and Schmitter 
(noted in Treib et al., 2005:5), empirically, “only hybrid forms [of governance exist] 
since one mode of governance always entails elements of other modes of 
governance. Otherwise, effective steering and co-ordination would not be possible, 
e.g., markets have to rely on a hierarchical authority in order to ensure adherence to 
contracts.” Likewise, Treib et al. (2005:9) maintained that “empirically, no mode of 
governance includes either only public or only private actors. We can only state that 
a certain type of actor is predominant. Similarly, empirical evidence suggests that 
weak or limited statehood does not automatically translate into weak governance.” In 
congruence with the above, Risse and Lehmkuhl; and Risse (as noted by Börzel & 
Risse, 2010:120) contended that “the concept of ‘governance without a state’ 
appears to be an empirical reality in many parts of the world.” Börzel and Risse 
(2010:120) provided extreme examples like failed states and war-torn societies. 
According to Börzel and Risse, “for the past fifteen years or more, Somalia has not 
enjoyed functioning statehood. Yet parts of the country, like the northern province of 
Somaliland, have been well governed throughout this period with rather low levels of 
violence.” Chojnacki and Branovic (2010, noted in Börzel & Risse, 2010:120) noted 
that “under specific circumstances, even warlords sometimes provide security as a 
public rather than a private good under specific circumstances”. “Likewise, 
multinational companies’ police local communities, voluntarily protect the 
environment, provide HIV/AIDS-related services, or agree to use sustainable energy” 
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(Hönke, Kranz, Börzel & Héritier; Hönke; Müller-Debus, Thauer & Börzel, as noted 
by Börzel & Risse, 2010:120). Moreover, Risse (2010:3) argued that “limited 
sovereignty [or statehood] does not represent the end of governance. Rather, 
various combinations of state and non-state actors provide rule-making, collective 
goods and services using predominantly non-hierarchical modes of steering.”  
Using empirical concepts, the above paragraph highlights the multifaceted 
dimensions of governance that in themselves pose conceptual challenges with 
measurement. This is especially true where arguments by Koechlin and Förster 
(2014) and Börzel & Risse (2010) challenge the assumption that “governance only 
exists where there is a government or some other authority.” According to Koechlin 
and Förster (2014), “this dialectical relationship necessitates a novel approach to 
governance that does not build on the usual presumptions that originate in the 
Western historical experience of a functioning State.” “It is also understandable that 
leaders as well as citizens in these countries view calls for ‘good governance’ as a 
cover for extending Western influence in the global arena” (Hydén & Court, 2002:23). 
On the other hand, Risse (2010:2) asserted that “emphasizing governance rather 
than statehood then allows us to ask who is providing which rules structures and 
which public services under these conditions.” Accordingly, I aver that the theory of 
personification provides a framework to disentangle conceptual confusion 
surrounding the subject of governance. In essence, the theory of personification 
points to the ‘leader’ as constituting the most important factor that determines a 
particular course of governance.  
Therefore, rather than focus on institutional structures that are merely instruments of 
governance, this study contends that it is imperative to focus on the national leader 
who drives the governance process. Furthermore, I argue that this concept of 
‘personified leader-driven governance’ is critically significant because of the fluidity of 
the term ‘governance’. Risse’s (2010) assertion that “areas of limited statehood can 
be parts of a territory or policy area” corroborates my argument. “This 
conceptualization implies that even fully consolidated states might contain areas of 
limited statehood in which they do not enjoy domestic sovereignty, at least 
temporarily” (Risse, 2010:2). The theory of personification presents an unambiguous 
example of ‘limited statehood’ since governance under such dispensations is 
discretionary rather than purposeful. In essence, a State under personified 
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governance will most likely have isolated pockets of functioning systems that 
subscribe to democratic ideals.  
 Relating leadership styles to governance 
This section examines leadership styles in relation to governance and development. 
The East African region has experienced serious challenges with distinctive national 
governance styles that have ultimately affected development outcomes. Although 
there have been atypical cases of good governance, these seem to have arisen by 
accident rather than by replicable design. The researcher contends that the end 
result of any governance action is usually traceable to a leadership style.  
The OECD (2001) maintained that “‘leadership’ is at the heart of good governance 
and it plays a critical role in influencing national institutions.” In corroboration of the 
foregoing statement, Craig (2005) quoting Rev. Charles Stith, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Tanzania, “postulated that Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of 
Botswana, is the personification of good governance.” Craig argued that “Masire’s 
exemplary record as President and his experience in regional conflict resolution 
made him one of the most respected leaders on the continent of Africa.” According to 
Chikerema, Sithole, Chakunda and Kudzai (2012:67), “the type of leadership in a 
country and/or continent determines good governance and democracy.” Chikerema 
et al. maintain that leadership in Africa has struggled to promote pro-people policies 
that accommodate the needs of the populace. Similarly, Chikerema et al. (2012:67) 
contended that “African states and their leaders have exploited and monopolized 
internal sovereignty to mean absolute power, personalization of state-like services.” I 
argue that it is apparent that as an individual competency, leadership plays a critical 
role in shaping the direction and context of governance. It is the vision and 
disposition of the individual that determines leadership style. However, it is often 
difficult to discern how the leader’s action influences a system because intricate 
governance structures subsume these actions. The latter makes it challenging to 
diagnose personified leadership styles to address its related intricacies. 
Nzongola-Ntalaja (noted in Onolememen, 2015:3) identified “three main types of 
governance namely political or public governance, economic governance, and social 
governance. The three types of governance are inseparable and interrelated.” 
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Conversely, Hydén and Court (2002:11) contended that “governance has three legs: 
economic, political and administrative. Economic governance includes decision-
making processes that affect a country’s economic activities and its relationship with 
other economies. Political governance involves the formulation of policy, while 
administrative governance is the system of policy implementation.” However, I argue 
that all these types of governance require good leadership, despite the fact that they 
are pivotal to successful statecraft. Without good leadership, one or all of the three 
‘legs’ of governance will inevitably suffer. Accordingly, the subsequent paragraphs 
will explore what drives governance styles in East Africa.  
According to Fuertes (2012:241), “in a new mode of governance inspired by 
partnership working, the beneficiaries and other stakeholders may have a greater 
involvement in the development and implementation of national policies or 
programs.” However, the latter requires a governance style that encourages broad 
multilevel citizen participation to achieve sustainable development. A study 
conducted by Lameira and Ness (2010:4) “revealed a positive relationship between 
levels of governance and economic development.” Lameira and Ness maintained 
that “further evidences of the relationship between the level of governance and 
outcomes of development are observed in the works of other scholars” (e.g. 
Kaufmann & Kray; Kaufmann; & La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer). 
3.2.5.1 Holistic leadership and governance 
From an environmental perspective, Orlov (2003:1) asserted that “‘holistic 
leadership’ denotes the ability to lead from the mind, the heart and the soul. It entails 
the application of a methodology that encompasses a developmental systemic 
approach in order to impact oneself as leader, others as followers, and the 
environment; and journey towards transformation at individual, team and 
organizational/community levels.” Orlov’s holistic leadership model is quite 
analogous to behavioural aspects in the theory of personification, particularly the role 
of personality and transformation of the individual. The distinctive difference between 
the two models is that personification theory focuses more on the aggrandising the 
leader, while Orlov’s model focused on how the leader and the led interact with the 
environment. Theoretically, Orlov’s model presented a holistic approach to 
development and governance, with a delicate balance orchestrated between humans 
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and the environment. However, of specific significance for this study, is Tice (noted 
in Best, 2012:7), who “describes holistic leadership as a people-centred approach 
that is both process and outcome oriented.” It is immediately apparent that Tice’s 
model runs contrary to the theory of personification, which is more egocentric than 
people-centred. The researcher contends that a people-centred approach is more 
likely to lead to equitable distribution of resources, participatory decision-making, and 
ultimately, the development of human potentials. This study maintains that for the 
latter to materialise, an altruistic leader must drive the development and governance 
system. However, the fact that Tice’s model is process and outcome oriented 
renders it useful for understanding individuals from multiple perspectives, rather than 
categorizing persons using dominant or skewed perceptions.    
Similarly, Taggart (2011:26) described “an integrated approach to leadership with the 
individual at the core.” In Taggart’s model, “the individual represents a person who 
has attained a high level of comfort and competency with the four principal 
leadership components: teaching, directing, participating and nurturing.” Other 
enabling elements, discussed below, support each of the four components. 
According to Taggart (2011:28), “teaching as a holistic leader, comprises five 
enabling elements: reflection and inquiry, openness, sharing, stewardship and 
personal mastery. Directing encompasses five enabling elements: vision, strategic, 
urgency, mobilize and results. The enabling elements for participatory aspect of 
holistic leadership include power sharing, inclusion, enrolling/aligning, collaboration 
and commitment. Finally, the five tightly interwoven enabling elements for embracing 
a nurturing mind-set, whether one is male or female, include empathy, 
communication, diversity, bonds and wellness.” In essence, Taggart’s model 
“assumes the ‘centred’ individual has achieved balance, which does not mean using 
the four components in equal measures. Instead, the ‘centred’ individual is able to 
alter their leadership behaviour seamlessly to meet the needs of followers.” 
However, Shelly (2015:33) raised an important factor in that “the leader needs to 
understand their emotions clearly in order to alter their behaviours to meet the needs 
of their followers.” This is “because leadership is inherently social and emotional” 
(Goleman, Boyatzis & MacKee, noted in Shelly, 2015:33). Equally, “leaders have the 
ability to influence the feelings of their follower because their emotions are 
contagious” (Ashkamasay & Dasborough, noted in Shelly, 2015:192). In the above 
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respect, we can comfortably assume that the outcome of any given leader’s 
influence potentially affects their followers (Walter, Cole & Humphrey, noted in 
Shelly, 2015:192). Goleman and Walter’s assertion corroborates the line of argument 
mooted by this study that the behavioural attributes of a leader ultimately shape their 
actions. However, this study goes further beyond their arguments to assert that the 
cognitive aspects, including the degree of childhood animism and surrounding 
environment factors, work in concert to shape a leader’s actions. 
From a sociological perspective, Dahlbäck (noted in Allwood, 1973:3) asserted that 
“the discussion on individual-holism problem has been in existence since the advent 
of this science. We can find an early example of holism, in Adam Smith’s ‘The wealth 
of nations.’ Smith wrote on the division of labour, and by means of the example of a 
pin factory, he brought out one of the most important tenets of sociological holism. 
Equally, Smith posited that when people pool their efforts together, they manage to 
significantly yield much more rather than working individually. Holists, then, hold that 
something new and interesting happens when individuals combine and start to 
interact with each other. So called social wholes emerge, these social wholes are 
just as real as the individuals that make up the social wholes. However, most 
importantly they have properties that are different and distinct from the properties of 
the individuals that make up the social whole.” Likewise, Emile Durkheim “developed 
a concept of holism that opposed the notion that a society was nothing more than a 
simple collection of individuals” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2014). Recently, 
anthropologist Louis Dumont “contrasted ‘holism’ to ‘individualism’ as two different 
forms of societies. According to him, modern humans live in an individualist society, 
whereas ancient Greek society, for example, could be qualified as ‘holistic,’ because 
the individual found identity in the whole society. Thus, the individual was ready to 
sacrifice himself or herself for his or her community, as his or her life without the 
polis had no sense whatsoever” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2014). 
With respect to the above, I argue that individual-level factors should also ideally 
explain societal phenomena. I also argue that such individual-level factors ultimately 
shape societal trajectories, when aggregated together. This study contends that we 
can trace many societal phenomena to the individual level in a clear and strict way. 
However, when we study personified leadership we need to analyse individual 
influences more holistically in order to contextualize it in the complexity of societies.  
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Conversely, “the systems thinking perspective asserted that managers face ever-
increasing complexity (Jackson, 2006:647).” Similarly, the managers also faced 
change and diversity, and yet the solutions they have at their disposal to cope with 
these issues are inadequate. In essence, Jackson (2006:649) contended that 
systems’ thinking is holistic rather than reductionist. Thus, Jackson maintained that 
the notion of holism itself, and the concepts associated with it, provide for ‘systems 
thinking.’ Of particular significance to this study, Jackson argues that managers are 
not holistic enough because they concentrate on the parts of the organization rather 
than the whole. In doing so, they miss the crucial interactions between the parts. 
Accordingly, managers and leaders need to espouse systems thinking that is holistic 
rather than reductionist and, at least in the form of critical systems thinking, that does 
everything possible to encourage creativity. Equally, Jackson (2006:654) posited that 
“creative holism suggests that we must consider the perspectives of four 
paradigms—functionalist, interpretive, emancipatory and postmodern. It provides 
‘generic methodologies’, representing each of the four paradigms. One advantage of 
creative holism is that it provides explicit theoretical link back to the paradigms. This 
allows us to operationalise better and more obviously, the hypotheses of particular 
paradigms and to test these in real-world interventions.” Midgley (noted in Jackson, 
2006:654) added that “creative holism also encourages the maximum possible 
flexibility to ‘decompose’ existing methodologies.” In addition, “it also enables the 
systems practitioner access to the full range of methods to use in combination, as 
they deem appropriate, in support of the generic systems methodologies” (Jackson, 
2006:654). 
3.2.5.2 Personified leadership and governance 
This study has extensively covered discussions on personified leadership and 
governance in other sections of this thesis. However, to ensure a logical flow as well 
as the theoretical and empirical integrity of this chapter, I briefly explore relationships 
between personified leadership and governance in subsequent discussions. This 
analysis will enable the reader to form an independent opinion on the hypothesis that 
there is a correlation between personified leadership and governance.  
Winter and colleagues (Winter; and Winter & Stewart, noted in Magee & Langner, 
2008:1548) have argued that “an egoistic, at times antisocial, desire for power and 
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influence is separable from a concern with avoiding the depraved aspects of power 
and instead wanting to use influence for others’ benefit.” Similarly, McClelland and 
Wilsnack (noted in Magee & Langner, 2008:1548) “have found that one can desire to 
have influence over others either for self-serving, ‘personalized,’ reasons, or for 
other-serving, ‘socialized,’ reasons.” The above arguments bring to the fore 
potentially conflicting dynamics that leaders face in administering governance – 
whether to serve the self or others. Under personified dispensations, the default 
action for the leader is to serve self above others. However, where serving others is 
in the leader’s interest, then they impassively pursue that course, as I explain below. 
“In [some] regimes, the distribution of de facto power allows favouritism. Thus, rulers 
can target effectively to create political support. In this respect, ‘patrimonialism’, also 
called ‘neo-patrimonialism’, ‘personal rule’ or more simply ‘clientelism’, is a style of 
governance where politicians control power through a system of personal 
relationships where policies/favours are distributed in exchange for political support” 
(Claes & Knutsen, 2011:167). Similarly, Weber (1947) “coined the phrase 
patrimonialism to describe situations where the administrative apparatus is 
appointed by and responsible to the top leader.” Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) 
asserted that “deputies to the rulers’ receive delegated jurisdiction over certain 
domains, and they also receive a wide leeway pertaining to how to act.” These 
measures are mostly informal or off the record. On the other hand, Bratton and van 
de Walle in (noted in Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002), argued that “neopatrimonialism 
signifies an administrative system where the customs and patterns of patrimonialism 
co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions.” However, Claes and Knutsen 
(2011:167) noted that “there are several reasons that this is disastrous for economic 
policy and performance and they hinge mostly on how the exchange is structured in 
order to maximize the control and bargaining power of those running such regimes.” 
Equally, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:1) argued that “in many cases, informal 
systems of clientelism and patrimonialism contribute significantly to stifling popular 
participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of 
public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress.” In 
terms of costs and benefits, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) cited “five economic 
and social phenomena associated with clientelism and patrimonialism, that is, rent-
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seeking activity, public corruption, interrupted and weak implementation, ethnic 
politics, and the perpetuation of poverty and social exclusion.”  
The discussion by Winter and colleagues linking egoism with a desire for power and 
influence is very analogous to the theory of personification that centres on egoistic 
leaders. The foregoing argument corresponds to McClelland and Wilsnack who go a 
notch deeper to link inconsiderate influence over others with self-serving or 
personalized inclinations. I argue that we can directly correlate the foregoing 
statement with self-centred leadership actions under personified governance. 
Regarding other significant areas of interest from the above literature, I assert that in 
extreme cases, patrimonialism is a variant of personification. They share a similarity 
in that, under both regimes, a small number of selected people profiteer at the 
expense of other citizens. For example, the assertion by proponents of 
patrimonialism that under personal rule politicians govern through individualised 
relationships is also very characteristic of personified governance. Such 
dispensations usually affect policymaking, especially development projects, by 
squandering national resources on frivolous expenses aimed at sustaining personal 
relationships. In fact, personified leaders running such regimes prefer to preside over 
dysfunctional institutions operated through favouritism rendering them too weak to 
erode their power bases. As posited by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), 
“clientelism and patrimonialism impede democracy and development by limiting 
political participation or creating economic stagnation.” 
3.2.5.3 Egocentric versus citizen-centric governance 
I now approach discussions in this section rationalistically, drawing on well-balanced 
case studies of egocentric and citizen-centric governance across East Africa. I argue 
that this study can best illustrate any form of “centrism” as comparative literature 
rather than an absolute narrative. This approach will enable the researcher to 
explore literature across boundaries of unique East African nations and cultures, and 
to enable logical juxtaposition with historical, political and social realisms in this 
region. Thus, the structure of this section will enable the researcher to combine the 
extensiveness of scholarship with ample attention to detail, without overlooking 
ideological constructs inherent in distinctive polities. I will conclude section 3.2.5 with 
an overall discussion that knots together empirical similarities identified throughout 
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the literature or points out of the divergences threading through the various 
paragraphs in this chapter. 
In order to enhance comprehension of the meaning of citizen-centric governance in 
light of this study, I explore existing literature on the subject to give focus to this 
analysis. Subsequently, I link theoretical constructs on citizen-centric governance to 
empirical cases in East Africa, with specific focus on egocentrism. To contextualise 
subsequent arguments, this study draws inspiration from the definition of governance 
by Shah and Ivanyna (2010:4), who defined governance “as an exercise of authority 
and control to preserve and protect public interest and enhance the quality of life 
enjoyed by citizens.” Of significance to this study, this definition encompasses both 
the governance environment (quality of institutions and processes) and governance 
outcomes. Thus, Shah and Ivanyna maintained that a citizen-centric framework for 
measuring governance quality is based on four dimensions: responsiveness, 
fairness, responsibility and accountability. On the other hand, Stoker (1998) asserted 
that citizen-centric engagement is more compatible, by contrast, to the 
developmental model of democracy. I argue that the occurrence of strong 
foundations of responsiveness, fairness, responsibility and accountability in any 
political system can be a formidable check on personified governance. 
Despite its significance, citizen-centric or people-centred governance is a subject 
that has been largely unexplored. The paltriness of the literature in this field reflects 
the challenges associated with the subject. However, experts have made credible 
attempts to define citizen-centric or people-centred governance. Unambiguously, the 
concept of people-centred governance has grown to surpass the conventional 
concept of ‘good’ governance. Yates (2005) contended that “contrary to the notion of 
good governance, people-centred governance has a bias and responsiveness to the 
poor and marginalized [community].” Equally, Yates (2005) maintained that people-
centred governance offers a decent floor of social protection, insurance and income 
[to citizens]. Yates (2005) outlined eight policies to promote people-centred 
governance, which are “participation, accountability, decentralization, freedom of and 
access to information, legally enforceable obligations, access to justice, national 
cooperation and coordination, and international cooperation and coordination.” In 
empirical contexts, subsequent paragraphs will highlight the point that most East 
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African countries barely meet the parameters of citizen-centred governance as 
propounded by Yates. 
Going one notch deeper, Shah (2007) posited that “citizen-centred local governance; 
that is, reforming institutions at local governance level requires agreement on basic 
principles.” According to Shah (2007:184), “these legal and institutional frameworks 
include both direct and indirect facilitative mechanisms (such as laws on participatory 
budgeting and independent media). The emphasis, however, is on direct provisions, 
principally those concerned with participation in and oversight of local representative 
government (legislative functions) and those concerned with bureaucratic 
transparency and accountability at all levels of government (executive functions).” 
Shah advanced three basic principles on citizen-centred governance. ‘Accountable 
governance’ that ensures accountability is not only restricted to public governance; it 
is a basic principle of regulation and expectation in all social relations. Private sector, 
non-profit, and civic organizations must all be accountable to the public and to their 
institutional stakeholders (Shah, 2007:61). Under ‘responsible governance,’ public 
agencies are also responsible for democratic processes and responsiveness to 
citizens (Shah, 2007:92), as well as ensuring government manages its fiscal 
resources prudently (Shah, 2007:117). “Finally, ‘responsive governance’, is a 
situation where citizen empowerment assumes critical importance in combating 
corruption, because it may have a significant impact on the incentives faced by 
public officials to be responsive to public interest (Shah, 2007:242).”  
From the above discussions, I agree with Yates that by taking into consideration 
poor and marginalized persons, people-centred governance is a democratically 
inclusive approach. I also agree with Yates that this model of governance enhances 
welfare and protection rather than exploitation and exposure associated with 
personified dispensation. Turning to Shah’s narrative, I note that he touches on the 
need to reform institutions at local governance level that I deem would benefit most 
East African countries that practice decentralisation. I pick particular interest in 
Shah’s arguments because most East African national institutions have become 
personified and are therefore not transparent, independent and accountable to the 
citizens. Having scrutinised the concept of citizen-centred governance, in the next 
section I discuss the concept of development and the factors that advance or impede 
development. Thus, in the subsequent paragraphs, I discuss to what extent 
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governments are being responsive and accountable to development needs of its 
citizens. This analysis will enable the reader to comprehend and make subjective 
deductions on how personified governance affects development. 
3.3 Development 
Hydén and Court (2002:2) posited that “since the international community adapted 
the concept of development for use in the late 1940s and early 1950s, development 
has always been a moving target, thus constantly generating demands for new 
approaches.” To this end, Hydén and Court maintained that “it is possible to identify 
at least four distinct ways by which the international community has tried to make 
operational a sense of development. The initial manner goes all the way back to the 
days of the Marshall Plan, the first major transfer of public capital to enhance the 
pace of international development.” “In the perspective of these economists, 
development in the emerging states (also known as the Third World), was best 
achieved through transfers of capital and technical expertise” (Rapley, noted in 
Hydén & Court, 2002:2). Hydén and Court (2002:3) argued that “in this first phase of 
development thinking that lasted into the late 1960s, the project level where 
Government and other public institutions played a pivotal role was the most 
important component. Development, then, was a top-down exercise by public 
agencies for the people. The second phase began in the late 1960s, when analysts 
and practitioners begun to recognize that a singular focus on projects in the context 
of national plans was inadequate. For instance, the assumption that development 
would ‘trickle down’ from the well-endowed to the poor, thus generating ripple 
effects, was a mistake. Similarly, projects were inevitably ‘enclave’ types of 
intervention with little or no positive externalities. Convinced to do something else to 
reduce global poverty; the international community decided that a sectoral approach 
would be more effective. In operational terms, this means substituting program in 
place of project as the principal concern. Two important things emerged in this 
second phase, the design of integrated programs to address a whole range of 
human needs, and the emphasis on developing human capital.”  
Further to that above, Hydén and Court (2002:4) contended that “at the end of the 
1970s, there was another shift, after it became apparent especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa, that the state lacked the technical capacity to administer the heavy 
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development burden placed on their shoulders. Accordingly, analysts shifted their 
strategic focus to the level of policy. They maintained that the World Bank took the 
lead on these reforms that culminated in the development of a principal guide for 
structural adjustment in Africa in the 1980s. The International Monetary Fund 
complemented these reforms by imposing the parallel financial stabilization 
measures. The highlight of this era was the entrance of NGOs to step in where 
government had failed to offer services to the people.” According to Hydén and Court 
(2002:5), “in the 1990s there was the recognition that development is not only about 
projects, programs and policies, but also about politics.” They posited that “[experts] 
recognized that ‘getting politics right’ is, if not a precondition, at least a requisite of 
development, especially in developing countries. The latter implied that actions taken 
by the international community challenged and undermined conventional notions of 
state sovereignty. Underlying this shift toward creating a politically enabling 
environment is the assumption that development is the product of what people 
decide to do to improve their livelihoods.” 
Barder (2012) contended that “Amartya Sen, the Nobel prize-winning economist has 
twice changed our understanding of development.” Barder maintained that traditional 
welfare economics had focused on incomes as the main measure of well-being until 
Sen’s ground breaking work in the 1980s, which showed that that poverty involved a 
wider range of deprivations in health, education and living standards, which were not 
captured by income alone. According to Barder, Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’ led to 
the introduction of the UN Human Development Index and subsequently the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index, both of which aim to measure development in this 
broader sense. Then, in 1999 Sen moved the goalposts again with his argument that 
freedoms constitute not only the means but also the ends of development. Barder 
posited that Sen’s view that “we must judge development by its impact on people, 
not only by changes in their income but more generally, in terms of their choices, 
capabilities and freedoms” is now widely accepted. To this end, Barder argued that 
“we should be concerned about the distribution of these improvements, not just the 
simple average for a society.” Drawing on Sen’s perspectives on deprivation-induced 
poverty and the need to distribute benefits equitably, I draw an analogy for actions of 
a national leader with personified inclinations. In this comparison, I note that 
personified dispensations wilfully deprive citizens of their entitlements in order to 
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impose poverty and ultimately induce dependency. The leader usually amasses, 
rather than distributes, benefits to the citizens, creating artificial shortages and 
income inequality. 
As an alternative, this study argues that development is not a function of well-being 
alone, but also includes other influencers that shape its trajectory. Illustratively, 
Seers (1969:1) argued that “it is very slipshod to compare development with 
economic development, and economic development with economic growth.” Seers 
(1969:5) maintained that “in order to understand a country’s development, we should 
ask the question: what is the status of poverty, unemployment and inequality. If all 
the three factors have declined from high levels, then this equates to development.” 
Likewise, Seers (1969:5) argued that “the fulfilment of human potential would 
complete the balance of development.” Seers reasons that “these factors include 
adequate educational levels, freedom of speech, and independence of the citizens of 
a nation that is truly independent both economically and politically.” This study 
agrees with Seers’ holistic perspectives that development can actually improve the 
welfare of citizens. Of the three factors Seers lists as affecting development, this 
study agrees that poverty and inequality are significant. In consonance with the 
latter, Singh (2002:38) contended that “we need to change directions of development 
from only working to achieve knowledge and efficiency, to achieving wisdom that 
leads towards effectiveness.” Singh (2002:38) believed that “managing 
transformation, developing transformational leaders and focusing on human capital 
are the keys to success.” He further posited that “the ultimate end of the civilized 
society should be human development through sustainable development.”  
On the subject of human development, Sen (noted in Kabumba, 2005:11) postulates 
that “it entails expanding the choices for all people in society.” Sen sees 
development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy.” 
Essentially, Sen views “the expansion of freedom as both the primary end and the 
principal means of development.” Similarly, Singh (2002:31) “described the term 
human development as a systems framework focusing all issues in society. From the 
perspective of people, these values are economic growth, trade, employment, 
political freedom or cultural values. It focused on enlarging human choices that in 
principle are infinite and can change over time.” Singh maintained that “the three 
essential ingredients of the choices should enable people to lead a long and healthy 
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life, acquire knowledge and wisdom, and access requisite resources vital for a 
decent standard of living.” The UNDP asserted that “leadership capacity, from a 
human development lens connotes the capacity of human beings to collectively 
generate required decisions, actions and behavioural and/or role changes necessary 
for the pursuit of a shared goal.” The perspective of the UNDP (2006:5) relates Sen’s 
and Singh’s points of view. This perspective refers to the “group’s capacity to 
generate leadership initiatives and exercise influence over its authorized leaders.”  
Analogously,  Harish (2015:88) argued that “transformational leaders have such an 
integrated view of every issue and situation, and can usher in a new paradigm of 
human development that ensures peace, security and well-being for all.” 
Accordingly, this study points out that we can trace the promotion of exclusionist 
policies by a national leader to influences in the cognitive development stages. I 
draw on Bierman’s (2003) arguments “highlighting that most children rejected by 
their peers, among other factors, display low rates of prosocial behaviour and high 
rates of aggressive or disruptive behaviour.” In line with the reasoning of this thesis, 
the external influence that shapes that development of a child who eventually 
becomes a national leader frequently correlates with the degree of national 
development that the subject leader advances. In other words, this study argues that 
a national leader, who has led a deprived childhood life, presents with a higher 
likelihood of advancing personified exclusionary development policies in the 
economic, social, cultural and political domains. 
In light of the above discussions, what then is development? Hornby (noted in Orga, 
2017:94) defined “development as the gradual growth of something so that it 
becomes more advanced and stronger.” Similarly, Abianga (noted in Orga, 2017:94) 
defined “development as the act or process of growth, progress and improvement 
within a physical setting.” On the other hand, Todaro and Smith (noted in Kabumba, 
2005:11) defined “development as the process of improving the quality of all human 
lives.” They refer to three important aspects of development: raising people’s living 
levels – their incomes and consumption levels of food, medical services, education, 
etc. Todaro and Smith contended that we achieve these aspects of development will 
be through relevant economic growth processes; thus creating conditions conducive 
to the growth of people’s self-esteem. Todaro and Smith maintained that “we can 
achieve self-esteem through the establishment of social and economic systems and 
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institutions that promote human dignity and respect; and increase people’s freedom 
by enlarging the range of their choice variables, as by increasing varieties of 
consumer goods and services.” According to Meisel and Aoudia (2008), 
“development is basically, a process of institutional change. It is a result of the 
combined effects of numerous economic, democratic, political and social factors. It 
involves, by definition, a far-reaching transformation of human groups’ social 
regulation systems. Institutional change takes place over a timescale that is neither 
that of the immediate economic situation nor that of long, historical periods.” 
I note that the common thread running through the above literature is the focus on 
enlarging human choices, while equally examining the phenomenon of development 
from multiple perspectives. These arguments highlight the fact that development 
should be free, inclusive and comprehensive. I argue that the concept of freedom 
and inclusivity is deficient in personified regimes that deliberately thrive on deliberate 
social exclusion. That is why human development is rather constrained under 
personified regimes. 
 Linking governance and development 
According to Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2010:4608), “the adoption of institutions and 
policies that create incentives for its citizens to save, invest and innovate causes 
development in society. Though institutions secure property rights create huge 
potential Pareto improvements in society, in general, growth-enhancing institutions 
have important distributional effects.” Rodrik and Rosenzweig (2010:4601) 
maintained that “while there is evidence that a ‘cluster of institutions’ does have a 
causal effect on economic development and it is plausible that governance is 
connected to this, as yet governance has not been unbundled so we do not have 
definitive evidence for the importance of governance.” However, Spence and Brady 
(2010:144) contended that “experts have demonstrated that democracy is not 
necessarily associated with better development outcomes and yet some 
dictatorships are developmental. However, we do not understand yet why some 
dictatorships are more developmental than others are; for instance, Sub-Saharan 
Africa has never had a developmental dictatorship.” Spence and Brady’s statement 
on the lack of developmental dictatorship in sub-Saharan Africa is very pertinent for 
this study. The latter accurately depicts the East African region in sub-Sahara Africa, 
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which has considerable resource endowments but is still lagging in development 
indices. Of seven African economic community blocks analysed in the CIA World 
Factbook (2005), the EAC had the lowest GDP purchasing power parity. This study 
argues that the low level of development in the EAC is attributable to poor 
governance caused by personified regimes. 
The work of Daniel Kaufmann (noted in Grindle, 2007:4), ‘on the impact of corruption 
on growth’, notably reasoned that the link between governance and development is 
more than correlational, rather, it is causal since good governance makes 
development possible.” Likewise, The World Bank (noted in Grindle, 2007:4) 
reviewed 40 different studies and concluded that “there is overwhelming evidence 
that good governance is crucial for successful development, as measured by high 
per capita income.” The World Bank maintained that “per capita income is a strong 
predictor of poverty rates, infant mortality and illiteracy, suggesting that good 
governance improves the well-being of the poor.” However, this study contends that 
although ‘good governance’ is essentially necessary, it is not singularly sufficient to 
advance development. To the contrary, competent leadership is antecedent to good 
governance, which in turn advances sustainable development. Other scholars have 
also questioned the term ‘governance’ on its own is sufficient to describe 
development without including a suffix like ‘good’. For instance, Rodrik and 
Rosenzweig (2010:4601) argued that, “the proponents of ‘governance’ have not yet 
made a strong case that there is something called ‘governance’ which is 
conceptually distinct and which is causally related to development.”  
The foregoing assertion helps rationalise why the theory of personification is relevant 
for the study of governance. The researcher contends that this study looks at the 
national leaders who drive the governance process, an outcome of an action, rather 
than focuses on the action itself. In other words, governance is a conduit that 
channels leadership action to implement development. 
However, Kabumba (2005:2) contended that “we should pursue development before 
paying attention to good governance.” Although experts see a relationship between 
the two phenomena, they emphasise good governance, which forms the basis of, 
and accompanies, sustainable development. To the contrary, this study argues that 
the persona of the leader is even more critical for development than good 
139 
 
governance is. I point out that the pursuit of development per se, or even 
governance, is not sufficient alone to transform a country. National leadership 
actions need to drive both agendas in order to combine the different strands of 
governance and development to achieve sustainable growth in the country. In 
essence, the ideal national leader should respect and follow the provisions of their 
constitutions, and cultivate a culture of constitutionalism, democracy and good 
governance. Once we lay down this foundation, then sustainable development will 
follow. 
 Holistic national development 
In this section, the study links holistic leadership to holistic national development. 
According to Jackson (2006:650), “holism, an approach to gaining understanding, 
has at least been around for as long as reductionism.” Jackson maintained that the 
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, for example, reasoned that “the parts of the 
body only make sense in terms of the way they function to support the whole 
organism, and used this biological analogy to consider how individuals need to relate 
to the State.” I concur that the concept of holism has been around for long. Inherent 
in its proponents’ lines of reasoning is the point that, since the advent of time, man 
has been trying to harness synergies of their ‘wholeness’ and ‘interdependence’ to 
achieve certain objectives. I posit that Aristotle, an empiricist, makes the strongest 
case for holistic national development in his assertion that ‘the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts.’ However, personification – the subject of this study – is a more 
antagonistic form of sociality that thrives on competitive pursuit of self-interest and 
predation. Accordingly, its relevance for holistic development is questionable. 
Like Aristotle, I aver that holistic leadership is not only about the leader, but also 
about those subject to the leader. It is about how the entire state system functions in 
relation to the individuals who constitute it. Furthermore, the crucial attributes of the 
holistic leader draw on their inner and outer resources, as well as social and political 
environment, to achieve a position of leadership over a body of individuals. Because 
holistic leadership universally incorporates what leaders need to do, how they need 
to do what is required, and who the leader is or influences, this study will explore in 
subsequent paragraphs the relationship between holistic leadership and holistic 
national development. Since all the parts of a national system essentially interrelate, 
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we need to understand the whole system in order to know how a particular 
leadership intervention, designed to improve it, might actually improve it or not. 
Similarly, it is critical to understand how the centralities of the individual under holistic 
leadership and personified leadership correlate with holistic development. Although 
both leadership styles centre on the individual, their behavioural trajectories are 
divergent. Fundamentally, holistic leadership theory focuses on the holistic system of 
development rather than on the leader, the follower, the circumstance or the 
relationship exclusively. Conversely, personified theory focuses more on the intrinsic 
personality of the leader in relationship to their leadership style. Therefore, both 
divergent leadership styles will provide an ideal comparison for purposes of this 
study. 
According to Anheier and Isar (2010:202), “more recently, widespread community 
sustainability initiatives have encouraged a holistic system-based planning approach 
[to development] frequently including, cultural, economic, environmental and social 
dimensions of sustainable development.” Correspondingly, Nieto (1997:41) argued 
that “understood in holistic terms, sustainability is a complex and multifaceted vision 
of development. It is a multidimensional model of development, which limits 
economic growth and other human activities to the capacity of nature for self-
regeneration, places the improvement of the human condition (social and human 
development) as its primary goal, and places respect for environmental quality and 
the limits of nature at the core of any economic, political, educational and cultural 
strategy.” According to Raskin (noted in Nieto, 1997:41), “we should base 
development on equality in order to be compatible with the principles of a holistic 
understanding of sustainability.” Raskin maintained that “this implies that poverty, 
underdevelopment and political deprivation, as well as wealth and opulence as its 
antithesis stand in a causal relationship with environmental degradation.” On the 
other hand, Nieto (1997:42) defined ‘sustainable development’ “as that development 
which allows us to meet the needs and aspirations of both present and future 
generations always in a concrete social-historic and environmental context.” Nieto 
maintained that “we accomplish the latter without undermining the capacity of nature 
and cultures for self-regeneration, while giving special attention to the eradication of 
poverty, social injustice and inequalities in the relations among nations.” 
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Conversely, in discussing aspects of sustainable development, Tacconi and Tisdell 
(1993:411) contended that “sustainable development is a holistic concept and may 
defy exact definition and measurement.” Analogous to Anheier and Isar’s (2010) 
assertions cited earlier, Tacconi and Tisdell “highlighted the emergence of a holistic 
approach to sustainable development that incorporates economic, ecological, social 
and political factors.” Of significance in the argument of Tacconi and Tisdell 
(1993:413) is the point that “moral values influence economic decisions made on a 
rational basis with concern for economic goals.” Applied within the context of this 
study, the above assertion implies that leaders who demonstrate personified 
tendencies could espouse moral values to enable them make more rational 
development decisions. Of additional interest is Tacconi and Tisdell’s (1993:413) 
argument that “economic decisions do not always hinge on selfish interests of the 
narrow type implicit in the dominant neo-classical model. Conversely, they assert 
that a society’s cultural background also determines its relationship with its 
environment, and influences the co-evolution of the socio economic and ecological 
systems.” As a reflection, in Chapter 2 of this study, we explored how “culture and 
socialisation patterns” shape the disposition of a national leader. I now point out that 
Tacconi and Tisdell’s version enables this study to infer that a cultural catalyst that 
induces influence over socio-economic and ecological systems can ‘tame’ leaders 
who entertain personified inclinations.  
However, Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:413) also assert that “the cultural identity 
determines, for example, how a certain community adapts itself to its environment, 
how institutions are established and evolve and how technological development may 
be environmentally appropriate to or disruptive of the ecological system.” Tacconi 
and Tisdell (1993:411) maintained that “participation by individuals especially at 
community level is important for achieving sustainable social, political, environment 
and economic outcomes.” I observe that participation, as mooted by Tacconi and 
Tisdell, is a concept that is deficient in personified dispositions. However, of 
distinctive similarity to the researcher’s line of argument, Tacconi and Tisdell posited 
that “a centralized [governance] system will hardly embrace participation. Personified 
systems that typically ‘centralize’ around the leader negate the concept of 
participation that is crucial for achieving sustainable development in society.”  
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Still on sustainable holistic development, Starik and Kanashiro in (noted in Dominici, 
Roblek & Lombard, 2015:3) contended that, “for holistic models to guarantee 
sustainable development, they should apply the sustainable paradigm beyond its 
environmental dimensions.” Similarly, Gibson, Hassan and Tansey (noted in 
Dominici et al., 2015:3) argue that “a valid sustainable strategy should include both 
an economic and environmental perspective and the socio-political and cultural 
aspects of development.” Accordingly, in their analysis of sustainable development, 
Dominici et al. (2015:3) “designed a holistic framework by constituting a set of 
indicators patterned along social, economic, environmental and health perspectives.” 
Of particular significance to this study is the concept of indicators mentioned in 
Dominici’s framework that could guide decision-makers, especially leaders, to 
assess progress made towards the achievement of intended targets. Equally, 
Confino (noted in Dominici et al., 2015:11) argued that “as policymakers and non-
government organizations seek to build long-term value, particularly at the macro 
level, they need to conceive value creation in a holistic sense when formulating 
strategy and apportioning dwindling resources.” I argue that although Confino rightly 
points out the need for policymakers to espouse “value creation in a holistic sense”, 
Dominici’s inclusion of indicators to measure progress is a crucial addition to help 
assess progress being made with governance and development. 
Kapur (2015:1) hypothesised perhaps the most contextually relevant argument on 
the subject of holistic development. According to Kapur (2015:1), “holistic social 
development entails the social development of the human being into a whole person 
by developing capacities into nine domains: a) temperament, personality and self-
views, b) cognition and thinking, c) affect and emotions, d) conation volition or self-
regulation, e) physical and bodily-kinaesthetic, f) social/interpersonal, g) 
spiritual/transpersonal, h) moral character and i) citizenship.” In the same way as 
Aristotle (noted in Jackson, 2006:650) did, Kapur (2015:4) argued that the “holistic 
social development of an individual is concerned with dealing with integrated wholes 
rather than parts of it; the main motive of holistic social development is to bring about 
sustainability, exponential growth and progression of an individual.” Kapur (2015:1) 
maintained that “it is not just the cause of widespread poverty within the developing 
nations that have been the main impediment for holistic social development; on the 
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other hand there is an extensive agreement that appalling governance and 
dishonesty in particular are progress and social development inhibitors.” 
I find Kapur’s argument pertinent to this study because he advocates for the holistic 
development of an individual, which, I believe, can mitigate the proliferation of 
personified tendencies. Similarly, Kapur endeavours to link the success of social 
development and governance. However, I point out that not all the above holistic 
models discuss the most crucial aspect – the persona of the leader, which is a 
crucial factor in determining national leadership and governance style. Given that 
holistic, sustainable development may entail all or a combination of “social, 
economic, environmental, cultural and health perspectives”, I argue that the success 
of all these factors hinges on leadership. Under personified dispositions, the holistic 
perspectives may exist singly or wholly, yet sustainable development is barely 
achievable because of egocentric leadership. Therefore, in order to attain holistic 
development, experts should first address the question of leadership as a critical 
factor in the composite holistic model. 
 Personified national development 
What is personified development? In order to conceptualise this clearly, we first have 
to review the meaning of “personify” that this thesis covered in Subsection 2.2.1. 
Briefly, this study defines personify as “an abstract attributable to a unique personal 
or human characteristic, especially leadership.” Therefore, the researcher defined 
the term personification as comprising the “effects of abstractions attributable to a 
unique personal or human characteristic, especially national leadership.” Conversely, 
in Section 3.3, I explored literature, highlighting the point that the “definition of 
development goes beyond the expansion of income and wealth, and focuses on core 
factors of both human freedom and human development.” To this end, I point out 
that contemporary definitions of development concentrate on enlarging human 
choices from multiple perspectives, a concept that has overcome the limitations of 
the previous philosophies based on ‘economic growth’ and ‘economic development’. 
I emphasise the point that the ability of individuals to make unencumbered choices is 
critical in mitigating personified inclinations in leaders and among citizens. 
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3.4 Unravelling the epitome of personification 
The Free Dictionary offers two contextually relevant definitions of the verb to 
“personify.” The general English or Thesaurus version defined ‘personify’ as: “1) to 
think of or represent (an inanimate object or abstraction) as having personality or the 
qualities, thoughts, or movements of a living being; 2) to represent (an object or 
abstraction) by a human figure, 3) to represent (an abstract quality or idea), and 4) to 
be the embodiment or perfect example of.” The legal dictionary defines the verb to 
personify as “to ascribe personal qualities to, be the embodiment, characterize, copy, 
embody, embrace, humanize, incarnate, manifest, orationem attribuere, symbolize, 
treat as human, and typify.” Conversely, the Encyclopædia Britannica (2015) defined 
‘personify’ as a transitive verb that means “1) to conceive of or represent as a 
person, or as having human qualities or powers: impute personality to, and 2) to be 
the embodiment or personification of; incarnate.” 
Using a ‘content analysis program’ to code for specific words or patterns that are 
responsive to the research question, I identified occurrences of words that are 
contextually relevant to the subject of personification. The program revealed that 
each of the verbs represent and personify appear four times. The program also 
revealed that each of the explicatory words qualities, human and embodiment 
appears thrice. Similarly, words like personality, object, incarnate, having and 
abstraction appear twice. Because of their inapplicability, the researcher did not 
consider the usage and frequency of indefinite articles – which introduce new 
concepts into a discourse, conjunctions – which combine words, clauses or 
sentences, and prepositions – which express relations between parts of a sentence. 
Accordingly, the researcher defines personify as “an abstract attributable to a unique 
personal or human characteristic, especially leadership.” Therefore, in this study, the 
term personification means the “effects of abstractions attributable to a unique 
personal or human characteristic, especially national leadership.” 
 Behavioural stimuli of personified disposition 
In their description and discussion of personification, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv 
(2013:228) “explain that the concurrent experiences [of personification] are not 
purely sensory, but are rather conceptual properties, for example, personality types. 
145 
 
Moreover, [the latter] are at times social descriptions and this suggests that in 
sequence-personality synaesthesia, the concurrent belong to the interpersonal 
domain.” “These attributes may reflect individual characteristics (gender, personality, 
physical appearance, cognitive abilities, occupation, mental states, moods, attitudes, 
interests, inclinations) and ‘social interactions’ between inducers (e.g., emotive and 
behavioural responses to other units” (Amin et al. & Simner et al., as noted by 
Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229). Likewise, Smilek et al. (as noted in Sobczak-
Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:229) “classified the social and affective characteristics 
attributed in sequence-personality synaesthesia into four more specific types: 
physical (gender, physical appearance), personal (cognitive abilities, occupation, 
personality, mental states, moods, attitudes, interests, inclinations), relation (emotive 
and behavioural responses to other units), and social role (occupation, familial and 
non-familial relationships).” 
The above literature corroborates the theoretical argument in this study that mental 
states, moods, and attitudes precipitate behavioural responses in personalities. The 
latter in turn shape the interests and inclinations in individuals. I argue that, by 
inference, mental states, moods and attitudes characterise the personalities of 
individual national leaders. I posit that we can rephrase the foregoing to denote that 
behavioural stimuli in national leaders directly influence the ultimate course of their 
social, political and economic interests and inclinations. Accordingly, in order to 
understand the primary actions and ideological inclinations of national leaders, one 
must first analyse their behavioural disposition. Hence, a behavioural analysis could 
help experts to decipher the personality traits that drive national policies and 
governance. 
In discussing “the psychology of personality”, Underwood (2002:111) posited that 
“while personality theories focus primarily on internal structures and processes, 
experts universally recognize that varying degrees of situational factors influence 
individual behaviours and actions.” She maintained that “whereas the issue of 
personality formation falls more clearly within the purview of psychology than of 
social psychology, some of the factors in personality formation have implications for 
belief and attitude formation. As higher order constructs, beliefs are antecedent to 
attitudes. While attitudes often emanate from beliefs, (some attitudes have non-
cognitive bases).” Underwood (2002:106) argued that “beliefs, or what an individual 
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holds to be true or real, refer to a person’s subjective judgments concerning some 
aspect of self or of the world. Therefore, the potential contents of beliefs are 
unlimited in scope. A belief associates an object with some attribute and, thus, 
involves cognition. On the other hand, an attitude is a psychological tendency or 
mental predisposition that one expresses by evaluating an object or entity with some 
degree of like or dislike, favour or disfavour. Attitudes are affective, reflecting 
emotions or feelings attached to categories or objects (people, things, places, 
issues, ideas, etc.).” 
I contend that the above literature accentuates the arguments I made in preceding 
paragraphs that beliefs, values and attitudes play an integral role in the processes of 
socio-economic transformation. Underwood’s argument links behavioural actions of 
persons to their intrinsic beliefs, values and attitudes. The concept is significant in 
understanding how environmental constructs influence the cognitive development 
that an individual subsequently transforms into practices. I maintain that the 
conceptualisation of the ‘self’ in relationship to ‘others’ or the ‘world’ determines how 
an individual might possibly perceive national development policies or governance 
styles. This literature underscores how individual beliefs and attitudes act as models 
for self-interests and inclinations. 
Whereas Underwood “dwelt on situational behavioural stimuli in the realm of social 
psychology”, Ozer and Benet-Martinez (2006:404) “specifically highlight how genetic, 
cultural and environmental factors form personality. [They assert that] among the 
most important of the latter are cultural influences.” Correspondingly, in amplifying 
the significant influence of genetic factors on individual psychology, Bouchard (2004) 
“downplays common environmental influences as frequent, but not always less 
important than genetic factors; and this often decreases to near zero after 
adolescence.” The foregoing juxtapositions highlight the inherent complexities 
entailed in the analysis of personality psychology. However, the common theme in 
the discussions is the pivotal role of genetic and environmental factors as 
behavioural stimuli. The latter enriches the theoretical argument of this study by 
highlighting the point that, in addition to other already discussed stimuli, genetic 
heritability plays an equally significant role in shaping psychological traits, and, in 
essence, outward individual disposition. 
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The amplification of culture as an important personality influence as noted by Ozer 
and Benet-Martinez (2006:408, 415) “underscores the role of society in shaping an 
individual.” The cultural psychology view that Ozer and Benet-Martinez (2006) 
posited “endorses relativist and constructivist notions of personality, and tends to 
favour emic (i.e., indigenous) over imposed-etic (i.e., imported) approaches to theory 
and instrument development. Specifically, the theory posited that recent cross-
cultural studies of subjective well-being (SWB) shed light on the relation between 
personality influences and SWB (Benet-Martinez & Karakitapoglu-Aygün; Kwan, 
Bond & Singelis; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, Oishi, Dzokoto & Ahadi, as 
synthesised in Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006:404). First, culture moderates the links 
between extraversion, neuroticism and SWB. Secondly, across cultures, the links 
between the Big Five and SWB are largely mediated by intra- and interpersonal 
esteem evaluations.” In concordance with the above, Maccoby (noted in Triandis & 
Suh, 2002:135), argued that “environment, among other factors, shapes the culture, 
which in turn shapes the socialization patterns, which shape some of the variance of 
personality.” Building on the latter, Triandis and Suh (2002:139) “highlight the 
significance of socialization in relation to culture.” In their analysis, Triandis and Suh 
identified “dimensions of socialization that are related to cultural syndromes, such as 
the emphasis on child independence found in individualist cultures and the emphasis 
on dependence found in collectivist cultures.” Similarly, Rohner (noted in Triandis & 
Suh, 2002:135) endeavoured to “demonstrate that socialization practices 
consistently link with personality elements.” 
In the realm of development psychology, Sobczak-Edmans and Sagiv (2013:232) 
asserted that “personification in synesthetic adults may represent an excessive 
manifestation of the human tendency to perceive reality using the self as a model. 
This in turn derives from younger children’s animistic thought, used as an 
undeveloped filter through which they learn about the social world. Thus, synesthetic 
personification could represent a residual expression of childhood animism, an early 
stage in social cognitive development.” Piaget (noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 
2013:232) studied “animistic thought in children and hypothesized that the excessive 
animistic mode of thinking (including personification) serves as a mechanism for 
constructing reality with the self as a model. This is in line with contemporary 
accounts of the way in which we construct social reality. The brain areas associated 
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with self-referential processing such as the insular, the precuneus, the inferior frontal 
cortex, and the posterior cingulate, have been found to be involved in 
implementation of animistic thought” (Sobczak, Sobczak-Edmans, Sagiv & Williams, 
noted in Sobczak-Edmans & Sagiv, 2013:232). Furthermore, Sobczak-Edmans and 
Sagiv (2013:232) argued that “evidence from neuropsychology suggests that lesions 
of the right (and sometimes left) parietal cortex may result in peculiar misattributions 
of agency, which might itself sometimes involve animistic attributions.” The 
researcher posits that the attributions cited above are significant for understanding 
the concept of personified inclinations. In other words, what degree of animistic 
attribution results in personified leadership inclinations? 
The above literature highlights how individuals’ perceptions of themselves structure 
their view of reality around them. This literature reinforces the researcher’s 
arguments that personification emanates from the early stages of social cognitive 
development and ultimately defines one’s definitive behavioural disposition. The fact 
that personification is possibly a residual expression of childhood animism reveals 
the reason why some national leaders perceive their ideas as infallible “models” of 
national practice. The above literature provides a scientific basis for theorising that 
the degree of childhood animism by which individuals formed their perceptions of 
social reality influences the personification of national development and governance 
policies. The researcher further argues that the ‘external environment’ may be the 
foremost important influence on the intrinsic degree of childhood animism. 
Consequently, understanding childhood animism will help experts to forecast the 
possible trajectory of a national leader’s policy actions and governance styles. 
In close context with the “… perceiving the self as a model” cited elsewhere in this 
thesis, Wilson et al. (1996:285) argued that “as a strategy of social conduct, 
Machiavellianism involves manipulating others for personal gain, often against the 
other’s self-interest.” Wilson et al. maintained that “everyone is capable of 
manipulative behaviour to some degree, but some are more willing and more able 
than others are.” Dawkins and Krebs (noted in Wilson et al., 1996:286) stated that 
“natural selection favours individuals who successfully manipulate the behaviour of 
other individuals, whether or not this is to the advantage of the manipulated 
individuals”. Humans frequently restrict pro-social behaviours to members of their 
own group, while openly exploiting other groups. Leaders who are responsible for 
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conduct toward other groups exhibit Machiavellian traits. The latter is close to the 
spirit of Machiavelli himself, who combined his manipulative political ways with 
genuine loyalty toward his own city. Barber (noted in Wilson et al., 1996:293) tested 
the hypothesis of genetic relatedness in Machiavellianism. Barber “administered a 
modified ‘Mach test’ toward specific categories of people such as family members 
and friends”. On average, participants “indicated a lower degree of Machiavellianism 
toward family members and friends than toward people in general.” From the 
foregoing, I assert that the concept of manipulative behavioural disposition in 
Machiavellianism can be important for understanding national leaders’ governance 
styles. This is especially crucial in personified dispensations where leaders 
manipulate citizens for their own selfish interests. 
As hypothesised in the above literature survey, I contend that Machiavellian 
behaviours can potentially rationalise political and socio-economic actions of national 
leaders. It is significant that Machiavellianism defined individual conduct toward other 
groups. The latter validates the assumptions of this study that personified systems 
promote egocentrism in leaders and favouritism towards persons sympathetic to 
incumbent regimes. More importantly, Wilson et al. (1996:288) argued that “we can 
make specific predictions about the propensity to manipulate others as a function of 
their in-group versus out-group status.” In the same manner, “we can develop 
specific hypotheses to predict the effects of genetic relatedness, age, gender and 
situational factors on the adaptedness of Machiavellianism.” Based on the foregoing, 
I argue that we can assume that experts can predict the inception of personified 
leadership and its ultimate influence on national development and governance. 
However, Wilson et al. (1996:296) maintained that “the psychological literature on 
Machiavellianism lacks a conceptual framework for guiding empirical research.” This 
factor limits the concept’s applicability to the empirical contextualisation of 
personified systems since it cannot guide empirical studies. 
3.5 Institutionalised impersonation by personification 
In the preceding section, the researcher unravelled how behavioural stimuli 
precipitate personified disposition. In this section, the researcher will explicate the 
personification of national institutions through impersonation. Specifically, the 
researcher will examine literature on how national leaders entwine their personalities 
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into the fabric of national institutions. The researcher will attempt to highlight how 
some elements that bind members of a particular state are traceable to influences on 
the formative character of that state by adaptable human nature. In this respect, I will 
examine below the evolution of the individual in contemporary culture. 
According to Pickel (2004:327), “homo nationis is a dominant type of individual who 
has emerged in the twentieth century. This individual is born and raised in a 
particular national culture, and lives most of their life in as a citizen in a nation-state.” 
Pickel maintained that “the ‘nationalized personality structure’ is fundamental in most 
state-societies today. Like homo oeconomicus, individual interests drive Homo 
nationis, and like homo sociologicus, by social norms. However, a particular 
nationality – or national identity in a broad sense – gives a crucial and distinct 
psycho cultural specificity and political and economic context to people’s individual 
interests and social norms.” Pickel also argued that “the national habitus, a nationally 
specific personality structure, is the socio-cultural complement to the nation-state 
structure.” He asserted that “habits can be cognitive, emotional or moral. Habits may 
also be simple and automatic such as a particular gesture, or complex and reflected 
such as in modes of moral reasoning.”  
Pickel (2004:328) pointed out subjects that this study finds relevant, for instance, 
“how moral reasoning, personality structure and national identity, all give political and 
economic context to people’s individual interests and social norms.” Similarly, the 
above argument illustrates how the moral reasoning and personality structure of a 
national leader correlates to their management of social, political and economic 
milieus. Pickel’s identification of the “nationalization of personality” directly points to 
the notion that individuals can actually impose their essential character over national 
systems. In this study, this is the primary tenet of personified reign. 
In addition, Pickel (2004:i) rationalised the view that “the concepts of homo nationis 
and national habitus underscore that modern individuals are historical individuals, i.e. 
they have personality structures that are unlike those of individuals in other historical 
epochs.” According to Pickel, we should explicitly conceptualise individuals as 
historical, rather than as a trans-historical homo oeconomicus or homo sociologicus. 
Pickel maintained that “the trait of national group identity, the ‘national character’ is a 
layer of the social habitus entrenched firmly into an individual’s personality structure.” 
151 
 
In corroboration of the latter, Weber (as noted by Pickel, 2004:331) argued that 
“most routine action stimulates automatic reaction to habitual stimuli which guide 
behaviour in a repetitively followed course. Therefore, Weber viewed habit as the 
foundation of modern political and legal orders.” 
I contend that the above conceptual constructs clearly link individual personality 
structure to the progression [or lack thereof] of political and socio-economic factors in 
a nation state. The argument that “cognitive, emotional or moral habits influence 
individual interests, which in turn shape ‘national character’” lends credence to this 
study’s hypothesis that the personification of national systems by leaders is rooted in 
their behavioural stimuli. This argument highlights how individual personality eclipses 
national group identity, to the extent that the State starts projecting the essential 
character of its national leaders. In summary of the preceding arguments, I posit that 
the literature provides evidence that an individual leader demonstrates varying 
degrees of influence on the formation and eventual sustenance of national 
institutions. Other literature that corroborates my line of argument is the assertion 
that “our appreciations on how norms, rules, habits, conventions and values 
influence our perspective on the way societies systematize and evolve.” ‘New 
institutionalists’ like Posner and Schotter and Williamson (noted in Hollingsworth, 
2000:602) assumed “that at one time there was a state of nature and that there was 
a movement from individuals to institutions.” Popper and Hodgson (noted in 
Hollingsworth, 2000:602) called the approach “methodological individualism.” 
“Moreover, there are numerous instances where methodological individualists 
demonstrate that individuals create new rules of behaviour (Hollingsworth, 
2000:602).” Hollingsworth maintained that “institutions not only constrain, but also 
shape individuals that embed in a complex institutional environment.” In consonance 
with my line of reasoning, Hollingsworth posited that in order to determine which 
came first – individuals or institutions – he argued that “of course, individuals’ form 
and change institutions; just as institutions shape and constrain individuals.” 
I concur with Hollingsworth’s argument that the relationship between individuals and 
institutions are commutative. In this respect, the theory of personification 
hypothesises that whereas the personified inclinations of national leaders permeate 
and influence entire national institutions and systems, the personified institutions that 
have assumed the essential character of the leader begin to prop up the ideals of the 
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regime. In this study, we even established that, in addition to institutional influences, 
whole communities or ethnicities can actually precipitate personified inclinations, as 
in the case of Rwanda. 
3.6 Effects of personified leadership disposition on society 
On the subject of leadership, Zoogah (noted in Zoogah 2009:204) suggested that 
“the ability of strategic leaders’ to exert influence on situations, particularly 
ambiguous and unpredictable ones, influences leadership efficacy.” Likewise, 
Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen and Zoogah (noted in Zoogah, 2009:204) “used 
demands (expectations or obligations created by situational characteristics—high 
and low) and functions (active features or characteristics that define situations—
socio-cognitive and economic) dimensions of situations to propose four generic 
situations that generally emerge from uncertain environments and affect 
organizational functioning and processes.” According to Vansteelandt, Van 
Mechelen and Zoogah, “the generic situations are deprivation, conflict, exploitative, 
and opportunistic situations.” Vansteelandt et al. maintained that “the behaviours of 
strategic leaders in these situations affect organizational productivity.” Still on the 
subject, Chemers, Hackman, and Walton (noted in Zoogah, 2009:204) posited that 
“functional leadership models suggest image management, relationship 
development, resource deployment, and conflict management as four major 
functions executives have to fulfil as strategic leaders.” Picking up from the latter, 
Zoogah (noted in Zoogah, 2009:204) suggested that the models include “image 
management, relationship development, resource deployment, and conflict 
management as four major functions executives have to fulfil as strategic leaders.” In 
the foregoing introduction, scholars have contextualised influences on the behaviour 
of leaders in diverse situations, as well as leaders’ interactions with the surrounding 
environment. These influences range from cognitive parameters to occurrences in an 
individual’s environment. With this concept in mind, the researcher in subsequent 
paragraphs will analyse some of these factors that relate to the evolution of 
personified leadership disposition on society. 
John and Srivastava (noted in Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling & Ha, 2010:113) 
“provide evidence of core personality traits organized along five underlying factors 
that emerged over time. Of the five traits, three are contextually relevant to describe 
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[the effects of personified disposition] on society.” In describing these traits, John 
and Srivastava maintained that “extraversion implies an energetic approach to the 
social and material world. In contrast, agreeableness distinguishes a pro-social and 
communal orientation toward others with antagonism. Lastly, conscientiousness 
illustrates socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task and goal-directed 
behaviour.” The above literature underscores the influence of personality on society, 
with ‘agreeableness’ specifically echoing Machiavellian undertones (discussed in 
Subsections 2.2.3 and 3.4.1). However, I argue that the above theory does not 
define how society assumes, and then adapts to, the personality of a domineering 
national leader. Similarly, I argue that ‘conscientiousness’ is a factor that is lacking in 
individuals with personified inclinations, since such persons are to a great extent – 
imprudent. I believe that is why John and Srivastava branded such leaders as 
exercising ‘impulsive control’. Of particular significance, I argue that the absence of 
the three values of “extroversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness” in 
individuals subject to personified leaders will inevitably yield a class of acquiesced 
citizens. 
Accordingly, a better conceptualisation of the relationship between personification 
and acquiesced citizens will enable a clear understanding of development and 
governance outcomes to be attained. McAdams and Pals (2006:211) formulated a 
“model [that] provides a credible attempt to highlight how society adapts to 
personality stimuli.” McAdams and Pals argued that “characteristic adaptations are 
situated in particular social, cultural, and developmental contexts.” They maintained 
that “goals and interests reflect personal investments in activities, programs, and life 
trajectories that society makes available for the individual. Values and virtues reflect 
selective commitments to particular ideals that generations have passed down in 
families and through religious, civic, and educational institutions.” However, 
Pettigrew, Stewart and Healy (noted in McAdams & Pals, 2006:211) contended that 
“more so than traits, social class, ethnicity, gender, and even historical events help 
contour characteristic adaptations.” Likewise, Elder (noted in McAdams & Pals, 
2006:211) argued that “characteristic adaptations will change over time, with 
changing life circumstances, roles expectations and with maturation over the life 
course.” However, McAdams and Pals averred that the [adaptations] “should not 
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imply that individuals passively acquiesce to the dominant values and goals of their 
given society.” 
I agree with McAdams and Pals to the extent that they aver that goals and interests 
reflect personal investments in specific undertakings. This is analogous to 
personified leadership where the pursuit to fulfil personal goals and interests 
influences how leaders behave. However, in a point of departure, the theory of 
personification goes further to link individual leadership actions to the leader’s 
formative stages. On the subject of acquiescence, I agree with McAdams and Pals 
that individuals will not acquiesce willingly to authoritarian values and goals. That is 
why the theory of personification hypothesises that personified reign will most likely 
precipitate a wave of rebellion to surmount its associated injustices. This is true even 
where personified values and goals have permeated any given society. 
Conversely, Jones and Olken (2005:854) argued that “on average, leaders have 
detectable, causative impacts on national growth.” However, they assert that “the 
degree to which leaders matter may well be a function of their context, as different 
institutional systems might amplify or retard a leader’s [societal] influence.” Similarly, 
in analysing institutional constraints, Marshall and Jaggers (noted in Jones & Olken, 
2005:855) argued that “autocratic leaders on average have a significant causative 
influence on national growth.” In affirmation, Jones and Olken (2005:855) 
rationalised the above by arguing that “autocrats have more effect than democrats 
do. This is because the role of leaders in democracies and autocracies differ by the 
constraints placed on the leader’s power, how leaders are selected, and in the ease 
with which bad leaders are removed from power.” Jones and Olken (2005:856) 
maintained that “among autocrats, we also find particularly strong leader effects in 
regimes without political parties or a legislature.” Overall, Jones and Olken 
concluded that “these results provide further and more textured support for the 
Weberian hypothesis that leaders matter when institutions are weak.”  
I concur with the common thread in the above literature that emphasises the leader’s 
unfettered influence. However, I disagree that national burdens imposed upon the 
leader have a significant influence on the governance style. In this respect, I deviate 
from the Weberian hypothesis by asking, “What happens to leaders when institutions 
are strong?” Again, the theories wrongly assume that leaders will always be 
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‘selected’ or that institutions can sway the thinking of leaders. Under personified 
governance, institutions assume the character of leaders and eventually start 
implementing only those programmes and policies that align with the incumbent 
leader’s ideology. Similarly, the above literature does not adequately address what 
happens to citizens in the case of dictatorship. Equally, Jones and Olken’s 
arguments are also devoid of strategies on how societies change leaders. In 
essence, we note that the literature does not clearly elucidate the reaction and 
adaptation of citizens to personified systems. This presents a gap in a thorough 
comprehension of personified leadership disposition on society. 
From a different perspective, Inkeles (1996:15) argued that “national character exists 
to the extent that modal personality traits and syndromes occur. How many modes 
there are, is an important empirical and theoretical manner, but one that is not 
relevant to the definition of national character.” Inkeles (1996:16) maintained that 
“[characterization of society] in terms of plurality of modes provides a more adequate 
psychological basis for understanding the internal dynamics of the society such as 
political cleavages, shifts in educational, industrial or foreign policy, and conflicting 
elites in various institutional structures.” In contrast, I argue that a plurality of modes 
provides a psychological basis to understand the internal dynamics in democratic 
and not personified systems. Furthermore, I posit that the attribution of modal 
personality to national institutions takes ontological precedence over the 
phenomenological simulation emphasised by Inkeles. I therefore rationalise that 
personality characteristics in plural modes cannot be uniform, as other modal 
personalities may have stronger individual traits than others may. Inkeles (1996:16) 
affirms the latter in arguing “… the first empirical problem is to determine what 
modes of personality, if any, exist in any given society.” 
Further to the above, I argue that the adoption of usually inflexible personality 
characteristics of national leaders curtails the sustainability of national institutions. 
However, Jones and Olken (2005:839) contended that “the ability of institutions to 
restrain leaders in democracies emanates from one direction – leadership selection.” 
More broadly, Tsebelis (noted in Jones & Olken, 2005:839) argued that “the 
presence of many ‘veto players’, either constitutionally based institutions or opposing 
political parties, may [also] severely constrain the action space of leaders and policy 
outcomes.” On the other hand, “there is evidence that, in the context of legislatures, 
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politicians are not fully constrained by electoral pressures, allowing some room for 
personal ideological views and party affiliations (Jones & Olken, 2005:839).” Jones 
and Olken maintained that “the evidence suggests that the degree to which political 
leaders may affect economic outcomes may depend on the institutional context. 
Nevertheless, if institutions have explanatory power, it is then perhaps a natural next 
step to ask whether national leaders, who may partly control or substitute for formal 
institutions, exert personal influences on growth.”  
I note that the above argument is premised on the assumption that democracies 
prevail in a given polity. This assumption is not synonymous with the dispensation of 
personified regimes that negate democratic ideals. It is also significant for this study 
that Jones and Olken “link actions of political leaders to economic outcomes.” 
Therefore, I contend that personified development occurs if a national leader 
manipulates national resources, both human and material, to serve their personal 
interests at the expense of preferential choices by other citizens. Owing to its novelty 
in academia, there is limited or no coherent literature on the subject of personified 
development. As an alternative, this section of the study will draw inferences from 
literature on the development impacts of “personal or personalised” rule. As I 
highlighted in Chapter Two, personal or personalised rules are ‘causative’ to 
personified rule. Jackson and Rosberg (1982:19) “defined personal rule as a system 
of relations linking rulers not with the public or even with the ruled but with patrons, 
associates, clients, supporters and rivals who constitute the system.” The assertion 
by Jackson and Rosberg (1982:23) that “personal rule removes constitutional rights; 
eliminates institutional checks and balances, and centralizes power in the 
presidency” is very analogous to the theory of personification. I argue that personal 
rule erodes catalysts of human development like choices, capabilities and freedoms 
of citizens, which ultimately affects national development.  
On the other hand, Evans (noted in Lange & Rueschemeyer, 2005:55) contended 
that “when legal rule is absent, States lack do not have effective mechanisms for the 
control of larger numbers of state actors. This in turn promotes rampant rent-seeking 
and unstable hierarchy of power dominated by individuals. Such personal rule frees 
state actors to use their coercive power to prey indiscriminately on other for personal 
gain and aggrandizement.” Lange and Rueschemeyer (2005:55-6) argued that 
“tendencies akin to the above impede corporate action and therefore state 
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implementation of development projects.” Accordingly, this study notes that, as is the 
case under personal rule, the abuse of state power for self-aggrandisement is also 
characteristic of personified regimes. In both instances, individuals in positions of 
power draw on national resources to satisfy their own, and not national, interests. 
Lange and Rueschemeyer (2005:56) argued that “a bureaucratic state promotes 
human and social development by preventing state actors from using their positions 
for personal gain.” However, I agree generally with Perrow (noted in Lange & 
Rueschemeyer, 2005:51) who, contrary to other scholars, recognises that 
“bureaucracy often places power in the hands of individuals and thereby allows elites 
to use the structure for personal benefits.”  
The term ‘bureaucracy’ connotes rigidity and excessive regulation, which in my 
reckoning is counterproductive for development. Similarly, bureaucracies frequently 
suppress citizens in order to serve the interests of those in power. In other words, 
there is a risk under bureaucratic systems for over-centralisation of power and 
resources, to the detriment of the ordinary national citizens. Deva (1986:149) clearly 
articulated the confusion surrounding the role of bureaucracy in development. 
According to Deva, “extreme and opposing formulations mark the theory of 
bureaucracy.” On the one hand, there is the view, presented by Burnham and 
Galbraith (noted in Deva, 1986:149) that “the management or ‘techno structure’ has 
come to rule, primarily in self-interest.” Deva maintained that “on the other hand, 
schools of business and public administration teach pragmatically that bureaucracy 
is a rational and neutral instrument of development and general welfare. Therefore, 
the fact that bureaucracies support the ruling class rather than the masses is a 
recipe for personified rule that negates equitable national development.” 
The theory of personification also draws causativeness from clientelistic practices 
and patronage-ridden politics. Roniger (2004:353) argued that “in the 1960s and 
1970s an interpretive approach assumed that clientelism was a vestige of early 
modern development, and that political and economic modernization would render it 
obsolete.” Roniger maintained that “since the 1980s, experts have recognized the 
systemic persistence of clientelism and patronage.” Yet in Roniger’s view, “analysts 
have only begun to investigate the institutional sequences and indicators of political 
clientelism, tying them in with such issues as democratic governance and interest 
representation.” According to Roniger, “clientelism implies mediated and selective 
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access to resources and markets that normally excludes others. Compliance or 
dependence on the goodwill of others conditions this access on subordination. The 
patrons, sub patrons and brokers provide selective access to goods and 
opportunities and place themselves or their supporters in positions from which they 
can divert resources and services in their favour.”  
On the other hand, “sceptics have questioned whether democracy can possibly to 
alter the neopatrimonial governance widely blamed for African states’ failures as 
agents of development” (Alence, 2004:165). According to Callaghy; Jackson and 
Rosberg; and Médard (as noted by Alence, 2004:165), “‘neopatrimonialism’ 
described states that, despite possessing the formal structures of modern 
bureaucracies, operate on patrimonial principles – characterized by personalized 
political authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and 
pervasive clientelism.” Alence (2004:165) added that “enhancing such states’ 
developmental performance requires the insulation of policymaking and 
implementation from arbitrary political interference.” I argue that the fact that 
scholars proclaim pithily that personalised authority and pervasive clientelism typify 
patrimonial principles is significant for this study. This scholarly view synchronises 
the terminologies ‘personalised’ and ‘clientelistic’, linking them to poor governance 
and ‘failed’ development. Therefore, I perceive both terminologies to be causative to 
the materialisation of personified leadership. I interpret this to connote that 
personification advances the appropriation of public resources and political 
interference for personal gain, hindering the successful pursuit of national 
development. 
Accordingly, this study reasons that the exclusionist characterisation cited above 
renders clientelism analogous, and even causative, to personified development. The 
manipulation by national leaders of public goods for selfish rather than national 
interests ultimately results in underdevelopment. Bates and Herbst (noted in Alence, 
2004:167) pointed out “the occurrence of clientelistic distribution of state patronage 
over the provision of welfare enhancing public goods.” “Such clientelistic actions 
usually permeate the state’s administrative structures, compromising public-service 
effectiveness and fuelling corruption” (Bayart; Chabal & Daloz; and Ekeh, noted in 
Alence, 2004:167). This pattern so profoundly affects opportunities for social 
advancement that class formation ends up being more determined by relationships 
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to political power than to economic resources (Diamond & Sklar, noted in Alence, 
2004:167). Correspondingly, in his analysis of clientelistic networks, Auyero (noted in 
Roniger, 2004:366) affirms that “clientelism maintains the general skewed structure 
of income and opportunities open to lower-class citizens, perpetuating poverty, 
underdevelopment and dependency.” To this end, I contend that clientelism 
invigorates personified leadership behaviours, like enforcement of unequal economic 
and social status, thus mitigating economic progress and national development. 
In the next chapter (four), I will draw on the lessons from Chapter Three to describe 
how personified leadership influences governance and development policies in East 
Africa. Thus, Chapter Four will focus on empirical concepts in the theory of 
personification, and expound on themes that are relevant for the deeper 
understanding of empirical concepts of personification. The researcher will juxtapose 
traditional African concepts of governance with the empirical thrust of personified 
rule in East Africa. By the end of the next chapter, readers should be able to discern 
the extent to which leaders place the “governance and development interests and 
needs of their followers ahead of their own self-interests and needs.” 
3.7 Conclusion of Chapter Three 
Chapter Three analysed the correlation between leadership, governance and 
development. In particular, I analysed how personified leadership style influences 
governance and development policies. I have summarised this section in two distinct 
categories for ease of reference. 
 Conclusion on governance  
In examining how leadership styles affect governance of a country, I established that 
the current literature on governance mainly focuses on creating conditions for 
regimented rule and mutual action. I also affirmed that governance outputs do not 
significantly differ from a government’s own outputs. However, this study delved 
deeper to understand the general perceptions of national growth economists, 
development experts and aid donors, who view ‘good governance' as a pre-requisite 
for achieving sustained increases in living standards. In order to align the term 
‘governance’ with this thesis, I explored the literature on governance. In the end, we 
see that the theory of personification is important for measuring quality of 
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governance and government effectiveness. This is because the theory resolutely 
links the personalities of national leaders to the outcomes of their rule. However, I 
also noted that, because of the indeterminate definitions of governance, many 
leaders in sub-Saharan countries claim to practise ‘good’ governance and 
participatory development. The blurriness of the term ‘good’ governance confuses 
national citizens themselves. The ambiguity in understanding the term ‘good 
governance’ underscores the intricate relationship between leadership and 
governance, and the need for accountability by persons in leadership positions. 
Perhaps one of the most significant findings in this chapter is that leaders and other 
stakeholders, like donors, exploit the lack of clarity in the term ‘good governance’ to 
perpetuate personified reign.  
I also explored the realm of policy analysis in order to understand arguments, 
interpretation and praxis of policymaking and governance. In this area, I delved deep 
in analysing the unequal distribution of power and the policy consequences that flow 
from it. I also studied how cultural biases and social orientations influence the 
process of policymaking and, ultimately, governance. I learnt that political culture has 
both direct and indirect bearing and permutation on political and economic 
governance processes. Of critical significance, we can justifiably trace policy 
initiatives and actions of key agents to definite political culture. I ventured to analyse 
how the theory of personification juxtaposes with other relevant theories with respect 
to governance. In contrast with other theories, the theory of personification 
centralises the role of an individual leader in influencing decisions. The theory of 
personification also highlights how national leaders with personified inclinations 
govern with egocentric tendencies. Unlike other theories, the theory of 
personification goes deeper to link an individual’s formative infancy stages to mature 
and conscious leadership actions later in life. In effect, personification theory 
attempts to rationalise how the actions of given personalities take form to enable 
them to relate, self-regulate, and empathise with others. Ultimately, this study 
highlights how the political will of a national leader practising personification will 
determine the possibility of that regime transitioning to democracy. 
Turning to empirical concepts on governance, I explored numerous theories that 
have potentially useful empirical and disciplinary applications. The review of 
literature brought to the fore the challenges that donor agencies and experts face in 
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measuring and assessing governance. For instance, because of the ambiguity in the 
phrase ‘good governance,’ many donors and governance experts prescribe concepts 
that are not responsive to local political realities, leadership characteristics and 
citizen preferences. As a result, autocratic leaders exploit disparities in the definitions 
of good governance to rationalise their actions. I pointed out that the objective to 
achieve good governance should not overtly rely on policy change at the expense of 
institutional mechanisms. Additionally, I argue that any ‘good governance’ system 
should focus on the leader as the primary driver of the institution. Nonetheless, I 
agree with other arguments that, without explicit measures, donors and experts 
cannot rigorously test hypotheses empirically on how political and economic 
institutions change, much less develop evidence-based strategies about how to 
influence this change positively. I also argue that the latter will also ultimately affect 
the ability to measure the causal relationship between governance and development 
outcomes. Similarly, the multifaceted dimensions of governance pose conceptual 
challenges with measurement. Accordingly, I argue that the theory of personification 
provides a framework for disentangling conceptual confusion surrounding the subject 
of governance. In essence, the theory of personification points to the ‘leader’ as 
being the most important factor that determines a particular course of governance. In 
essence, the theory of personification presents an unambiguous example of ‘limited 
statehood’, since governance under such dispensations is discretionary rather than 
purposeful. 
The study then examined how leadership styles relate to governance and 
development. I contend that the outcome of any governance action is usually 
traceable to a leadership style. However, it is often difficult to discern how a leader’s 
action influences a system because intricate governance structures subsume these 
actions. The latter makes it challenging to diagnose personified leadership styles to 
address its related intricacies. I argue that a people-centred approach is more likely 
to lead to equitable distributions of resources, participatory decision-making and, 
ultimately, the development of human potentials. This study maintains that, for the 
latter to materialise, an altruistic leader must drive the development and governance 
system. Similarly, the researcher asserts that cognitive aspects, including the degree 
of childhood animism as well as surrounding environment, play a critical role in 
shaping the actions of a leader. Likewise, individual-level factors ultimately shape 
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societal trajectories when aggregated together. In this respect, we can trace many 
societal phenomena to the individual level in a clear and strict way. However, the 
study of leadership brought to the fore potentially conflicting dynamics that leaders 
face in administering governance – to serve the self or others. Under personified 
dispensations, the natural incentive for the leader is to serve self above others. 
Conversely, where serving others sustains the leader’s interest, they impassively 
pursue that course. For example, under patrimonial regimes, “a small number of 
selected people profiteer at the expense of other citizens.” Such dispensations affect 
policymaking and development projects by squandering national resources on 
frivolous expenses. 
 Conclusion on development 
In analysing the concept of development, this study delved all the way back to the 
days of the Marshall Plan. The Plan was the first major transfer of public capital to 
enhance the pace of international development through the introduction of the ‘UN 
Human Development Index,’ and subsequently the ‘Multidimensional Poverty Index,’ 
both of which aim to measure development more broadly. This study particularly 
notes that the Sen’s deprivation-induced poverty model accurately describes factors 
associated with personified dispensations. In essence, the latter wilfully deprives 
citizens of their entitlements in order to impose poverty and ultimately induce 
dependency. The researcher notes that the common thread running through most 
development models is the enlarging of human choices, while ensuring that 
development is inclusive and comprehensive. However, this study argues that the 
concept of inclusivity is deficient in personified regimes that deliberately thrive on 
deliberate social exclusion. I point out that we can trace the promotion of exclusionist 
policies by a national leader to influences in the cognitive development stages. In 
other words, a national leader who was deprived in childhood presents with a higher 
likelihood of advancing personified exclusionary development policies, in the 
economic, social, cultural and political domains. 
While examining the linkage between governance and development, I encountered a 
paradox that “democracy per se is not necessarily associated with better 
development outcomes and some dictatorships are developmental.” Accordingly, I 
argue that good governance is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
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development. To the contrary, competent leadership is antecedent to good 
governance that in turn leads to sustainable development. That is why this study 
looks at the national leaders who drive the governance process – an outcome of an 
action – rather than focusing on the action itself. Since the advent of time, man has 
been trying to harness synergies of their ‘wholeness’ and ‘interdependence’ to 
achieve certain objectives, such as better ways to govern society that lead to holistic 
development. However, personification is a more antagonistic form of sociality that 
thrives on competitive pursuit of self-interest and predation. Accordingly, its 
relevance for holistic development is doubtful. In this context, I aver that holistic 
leadership is not only about the leader, but also about those subject to the leader. It 
is about how the entire state system functions in relation to the individuals who 
constitute it. Furthermore, the crucial attributes of the holistic leader draw on their 
inner and outer resources, as well as the social and political environment, to achieve 
leadership over several individuals. Given that holistic, sustainable development may 
entail all, or a combination, of social, economic, environmental, cultural and health 
perspectives, I argue that the success of all these factors hinges on leadership. 
Having noted how leadership and personification correlate, I proceeded to 
understand the effects of behavioural stimuli on personified disposition. I established 
that mental states, moods and attitudes precipitate behavioural responses in 
personalities. The latter in turn shapes interests and inclinations in individuals. I 
argue that, by inference, mental states, moods and attitudes characterise the 
personalities of individual national leaders. I rephrased the foregoing to denote that 
behavioural stimuli in national leaders directly influence the ultimate course of their 
social, political and economic interests and inclinations. Accordingly, in order to 
understand the primary actions and ideological inclinations of national leaders, I 
contend that one must first analyse their behavioural disposition. Of particular 
significance, the way in which a leader conceptualises himself will determine how 
that individual may possibly perceive national development policies or governance 
styles. Perhaps more significantly, this study linked personification to early stages of 
social cognitive development that ultimately define one’s definitive behavioural 
disposition. Thus, the study identified a scientific basis for theorising that the degree 
of childhood animism by which individuals formed their perceptions of social reality 
influences the personification of national development and governance policies. 
164 
 
Consequently, comprehending childhood animism will help experts to forecast the 
possible trajectory of a national leader’s policy preferences and governance styles. 
In studying the effects of personified leadership disposition on society, I established 
that most literature did not define how society assumes, then adapts to, the 
personality of a domineering national leader. Yet, this study maintains that the 
reaction of citizens to personified leadership disposition will create a class of 
indisposed subjects called acquiesced citizens. Accordingly, the adoption of usually 
inflexible personality characteristics of national leaders curtails the sustainability of 
national institutions. Therefore, this study contends that personified development will 
occur if a national leader manipulates national resources, both human and material, 
to serve their personal interests at the expense of the preferred choices of other 
citizens. Interpreted within the context of this study, personified leadership advances 
the appropriation of public resources and political interference for personal gain, 
hindering the successful pursuit of national development. 
The next chapter will focus on empirical concepts in the theory of personification and 
expound on the different terminologies associated with this study. I will juxtapose 
traditional African concepts with the empirical thrust of personified rule in East Africa, 
referring to case studies of Kenya and Rwanda. The chapter will also explore the 
extent to which leaders place the governance and development interests and needs 
of their followers before their personal egotisms and aspirations. I hope that the 
discussions will shed more light on whether, and how, personified leadership affects 
national governance and development.  
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
INFLUENCE OF PERSONIFICATION ON GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I answer the thesis question, “How does personified leadership 
influence governance and development policies in East Africa?” The chapter focuses 
on empirical concepts in the theory of personification, drawn from literature and the 
researcher’s own observation. The section also expounds on different terminologies 
associated with this study, but which are specifically relevant for gaining a deeper 
understanding of the empirical concepts of personification. I will juxtapose traditional 
African concepts of Ubuntu with the empirical thrust of personified rule in East Africa. 
To this end, the study discusses how Ubuntu, a variant of servant leadership, could 
move leaders away from “controlling activities” towards a more synergistic 
relationship between leaders and citizens. The section will also explore the extent to 
which leaders place the governance and development interests of their followers 
before their personal egotisms and aspirations. 
4.2 African governance model: Personified leadership versus Ubuntu in 
East Africa 
This section discusses how personified leadership correlates with the ‘servant 
leader’ model and leadership in the African culture of Ubuntu. According to Ezeanya-
Esiobu (2017:23), “African countries have long overlooked home grown strategies 
and grassroots based approaches to governance and public administration, settling 
instead for foreign concepts and ideas. We can trace the reason to the colonial era 
when colonial masters imposed ideas and strategies that formed the bedrock of 
policymaking across their controlled territories. Decades after colonialism, some 
African countries are now beginning to question the effectiveness of inherited 
governance mechanisms due to their failure to generate much needed development 
for the region.” Accordingly, this section will explore several concepts in African 
governance models to establish their relevance to the theory of personification. 
The concept of ‘servant leadership’ is important since it freely borrows terms from 
different disciplines covered in this study. For instance, “the concept of servant 
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leadership draws on religious terms such as God, soul and spirit; and psychological 
concepts such as personal growth, self-awareness and identify; and from 
management ‘buzz words’ terms such as flat organization and shared vision” (Page 
& Wong, 2000). Furthermore, “the fact that leadership begins from within” (Bender, 
1997, noted in Page & Wong, 2000) lends more credence to the juxtaposition of 
servant leadership and personified leadership that likewise emanates from an 
intrinsic character. Even more significant to this study is the assertion by Kohls 
(1998:114) that “the servanthood in traditional African leadership seems to have 
been lost completely.” On the other hand, Ubuntu, which holds that “no one is above 
the law”, forms the basis of law and politics in the [African] philosophical domain 
(Nabudere, 2005:6). Nabudere (2005:6) argued that “this explains why in Ubuntu 
political philosophy royal power is expected to spring from the people or in modern 
parlance ‘power belongs to the people’.” Nabudere (2005:2) argued that “the 
philosophy of Ubuntu is therefore important because it provides Africans a sense of 
self-identity, self-respect and achievement. The latter enables them to deal with their 
problems in a positive manner by drawing on the humanistic values they have 
inherited and perpetuated throughout their history.” I concur that a philosophy like 
Ubuntu that restores and assures “a sense of self-identity, self-respect and 
achievement” is crucial to mitigate the effects of personification on citizens. 
People usually think that the words ‘servant’ and ‘leader’ are opposites. Spears 
(2005:1) contended that when two opposites come together in a creative and 
meaningful way, a paradox emerges. According to Spears (2005:1), experts have 
brought together the words ‘servant’ and ‘leader’ to create the paradoxical idea of 
servant leadership that is both logical and intuitive. Similarly, the term Ubuntu is a 
composite of two words that, according to Ramose (noted in Nabudere, 2005:2), 
“connotes a wellspring that flows within African existence and epistemology in which 
the two aspects ubu and ntu constitute a wholeness and oneness. Thus Ubuntu 
cannot be fragmented because it is continuous and always in motion.” Building on 
the latter, I argue that within the context of this study, the ‘servant leader’ model is 
the opposite of personified leadership in that it builds trust around the leader, 
develops the ‘led’ using power entrusted to the leader, and accommodates the 
opinions of others positively. Conversely, the egocentrism associated with 
personified leadership centres power around the national leader, thus denying 
167 
 
citizens their inalienable rights. Contrary to the personified leadership model, 
McMinn (noted in Thompson, 2010) suggests that “servant leaders develop people, 
and help them to strive and flourish.” From the study he conducted, Thompson 
(2010) corroborates this, noting that “[leaders] who are committed to the growth of 
[team members] are more effective in contributing towards successful [outcomes].”  
Of particular relevance to this thesis, “servant leader behaviours relate to the African 
[traditional and cultural] concept of Ubuntu” (Brubaker, 2013:114). “A person with 
Ubuntu is open and available to others, affirms of others; does not feel threatened by 
others’ abilities and goodness (Van Niekerk, 2013:1).” Van Niekerk (2013:1, 96, 99) 
maintained that “this is because they have the self-assurance that comes from 
knowing that they belong in a greater whole, and is diminished when others are 
humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they 
were less than who they are.” Accordingly, the focus on Ubuntu allows the 
researcher to draw on a home-grown, traditional African governance model in order 
to understand contemporary leadership dynamics in East Africa. The gist of this 
section is that Africa once had its own functional governance and indigenous 
traditional political systems. To this end, Arowolo (2010:1) argued that “colonialism, 
slave trade and missionaries are the bastion of Western civilization and culture in 
Africa.” This is correct to the extent that colonialism serves as a vehicle of 
implantation of cultural imperialism in Africa. Arowolo (2010:1) explained that 
“colonialism, perceived in this context, is an imposition of foreign rule over 
indigenous traditional political setting and foreign dominance and subjugation of 
African people in all spheres of their social, political, cultural, economic and religious 
civilizations.” Therefore, I will endeavour to unravel how the interruption of Africa’s 
traditional mode of governance relates to the occurrence of personified governance.  
Haegert (noted in Winston & Ryan, 2008:217), “in a conceptual article, presented an 
ethic of care for African nursing that relies on Ubuntu and takes the definition of 
Ubuntu deeper by tying the concept to an African Proverb: ‘a person is a person 
through other persons’.” The East African countries of Rwanda (Brubaker, 2013:95) 
and Kenya (Koshal, 2005:1, 8, 12), case studies in this section, have espoused the 
concept of respecting the individual, and have placed value on working as a team 
and supporting each other. The edifice of Ubuntu articulates “I am because we are; I 
can only be a person through others” (April & Ephraim; Nussbaum, noted in 
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Oghojafor, Alaneme & Kuye, 2013:9). In essence, “Ubuntu focuses on the person 
not living for himself or herself, but rather living for others” (Gakuru; Mamadou, noted 
in Koshal, 2005:4). Most importantly for this segment, the philosophy of Ubuntu 
allows for an interactive process where everyone is essentially a leader, as they can 
participate and show initiative in discussing, suggesting solutions, and participating 
in agreed actions. Accordingly, Jolley (2011:2) asserted that “Ubuntu in a religious 
environment, in families, in communities, and marriage counselling is and has been 
effective.” Jolley maintained that “Ubuntu seeps into society, to gain a foothold and 
assist individuals, families, and communities, leaders, and managers to increase 
respect and dignity in communities.” 
According to Le Grange (noted in Brubaker, 2013:115), [society regards] “Ubuntu as 
an African worldview able to counteract the continent’s plague of genocide, 
patriarchy, autocratic leadership, corruption and human suffering.” Likewise, Ncube 
(noted in Brubaker, 2013:115) “discussed problems concerning post-colonial 
discrimination, leadership scandals, and extensive corruption.” According to Ncube, 
“African leadership theorists suggest that the philosophy of Ubuntu holds promise for 
progressive and ethical change for Africa.” “The Bantu languages in East, Southern 
and Central Africa use the term Ubuntu to refer to a worldview or philosophical 
approach to human relationships that elevates the importance of humanness and 
shared community” (Le Grange; Murithi, noted in Brubaker, 2013:119). Similarly, 
Muchiri (noted in Brubaker, 2013:119) contended that “the behavioural expression of 
Ubuntu demonstrates compassion, dignity, respect, and a humanistic concern for 
relationships.” On the other hand, Mhlaba (noted in Brubaker, 2013:101) provided an 
example on the latter in his assertion that “in apartheid South Africa, marginalized 
families only survived on account of Ubuntu, as the community responded by sharing 
with those in need.” “Ubuntu also accounts for the transformation of atrocities into 
humanizing events” (Haws, noted in Brubaker, 2013:119). Based on the Ubuntu 
concept, Desmond Tutu upheld reconciliation, that is, the restoration of the 
humanness of perpetrators and victims, as better than retributive justice in the revival 
of post-apartheid South Africa (Graybill, noted in Brubaker, 2013:119). 
As is apparent from the above literature, traditional African society had developed 
and was subsisting under well-defined indigenous governance and political systems 
before encountering influences from the western world. The philosophy of Ubuntu, 
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for instance, espouses the concept of servant leadership and equal support to the 
leader by the subjects. Of particular significance, the above literature highlights the 
concept of communal interdependence and mutual support by societal members 
through sharing, rather than personalising, resources. Similarly, the researcher 
argues that societal leaders in traditional Africa were obliged to share their 
endowment of leadership, in return for respect from the people. Accordingly, 
subsequent paragraphs in this study will explore the extent to which national 
personification in East Africa relates to the disruption of traditional African systems. 
The researcher hopes that new information on the subject will help national citizens 
and other stakeholders to conceptualise how to address the concept of 
personification. The study also hopes to improve governance by unveiling factors 
that influence and possibly impact on definitive leadership actions. Particularly, this 
section will attempt to address the first part of research question number two on how 
personified leadership style influences governance in East Africa. 
Brubaker (2013:97) posited that “Ubuntu is strongly rooted, structured in and 
associated with Southern Africa.” However, Nussbaum (2003) contended that 
“Ubuntu is an underlying social philosophy found in many African cultures.” In 
consonance, Kithaka wa Mberia (2015:113) shed some light on the origins of the 
term ‘Ubuntu’. “Using the cognates and employing the comparative method”, Kithaka 
wa Mberia reconstructed a proto-Bantu term for ‘humanness/humanity’ and argued 
that the original form existed right at the inception of Bantu languages in the area 
where current Cameroon borders the Benue-Congo area of south-eastern Nigeria. 
Kithaka wa Mberia observed that “‘bubuntu’ underwent phonological, morphological 
and semantic changes, eventually resulting in ‘ubuntu’ in isiZulu and isiKhosa, ‘unhu’ 
in Shona, ‘bubundu’ and ‘ubundu’ in Luhya, ‘utu’ in Kiswahili, ‘obuntu’ in Luganda 
and “ubuntu” in Kinyarwanda.” According to Kithaka wa Mberia (2015:114), “since 
there are differences in the historical changes through which ‘bubuntu’ has 
undergone in various Bantu languages, the cognates of ‘ubuntu’ may differ in shades 
of meaning and nuances while sharing the core meaning of ‘humanness/humanity’.” 
Correspondingly, Bibiliya Yera (noted in Brubaker, 2013:121) posited that in religious 
contexts, “Ubuntu denotes grace.” In non-religious contexts “Ubuntu means the 
quality of being kind and generous” (Niyomugabo, noted in Brubaker, 2013:121). 
“Despite these simple glosses, the philosophical and cultural connotations of Ubuntu 
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are also present and relevant within the Rwandan worldview (Broodryk, noted in 
Brubaker, 2013:103).” Broodryk maintained that, “when asked to explain the 
philosophical implications of Ubuntu, a group of Rwandese explained that Ubuntu is 
an act where the recipient of Ubuntu shows that he/she is as human as the giver and 
deserves the same quality of humanness as the giver.” Yet, according to Brubaker 
(2013:122), “although Rwandese hold up Ubuntu as a cardinal and aspirational 
virtue, experts regularly acknowledge that laudable acts expressing Ubuntu are 
infrequent.” 
I argue that the Ubuntu philosophy discussed above highlights our African 
humanness and humanity. The relevance of this philosophy to the theory of 
personification is that it characterises individuals as unique intellectual entities, 
capable of responding to emotional stimuli and demonstrating rational behaviours 
with or without external influence. This context is important since it clearly illustrates 
that traditional African society recognised that individuals were culpable for their 
actions. I argue that this philosophy acted as a check and balance on personal 
excesses and is a possible mitigating factor for personified inclination. I also noted 
that in religious contexts recognised Ubuntu as grace. I interpreted this to signify that 
religion also recognised that individuals demonstrated a certain degree of humanity. 
On the other hand, non-religious entities recognised the Ubuntu philosophy as 
connoting kindness and compassion. Essentially, all the different elements 
discussed above recognised the intrinsic factor in Ubuntu that moderates individual 
human behaviour towards others in a society. Based on the latter, I infer that good 
practices in specific African cultures like Ubuntu had the potential of checking 
personified leadership.  
Still on the subject of Ubuntu, Winston and Ryan (2008:217) argued that “in Kenya, 
the concept of Ubuntu is analogous to Harambee. Ubuntu has similarities to 
Patterson’s (2003) definition of servant leadership in that it focuses on the well-being 
of the follower while seeing the [institution’s] interests as secondary, thus creating a 
community of followers within the organization” (Winston & Ryan, 2008:217). 
Similarly, Jolley (2011:15) asserted that “an Ubuntu practice in Kenyan villages 
includes the African tradition of child nurturing by the whole village.” Thus, Jolley 
(2011:2) maintained that “Ubuntu seeps into society, to gain a foothold and assist 
individuals, families, and communities, leaders, and managers to increase respect 
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and dignity in communities.” On the other hand, Koshal (2005:1, 3) “studied the 
acceptability of Patterson’s (2003) theory of servant leadership in Kenya in order to 
gain perspectives from African cross-cultural settings to broaden our comprehension 
of the model.” In particular, Koshal focused on the applicability of ‘Patterson’s 
construct of service’. Based on the concept of Harambee, a Kenyan culture of pulling 
together as a community, Koshal (2005:15) suggested that Kenyan leaders are more 
likely to accept and apply Patterson’s service construct. In Koshal’s (2005:1, 8) 
analysis, respondents consider that the servant leadership concept of service 
comprises six factors: “role modelling; sacrificing for others; meeting others’ needs 
and developing them; primary function of service; recognition and reward of 
employees; humility and respect for employees; and involving employees in 
decision-making.” Correspondingly, Leys (noted in Chesire, Mutiso & Chege, 
2015:247) posited that “the Harambee philosophy of self-help development as a key 
feature of development planning aimed at meeting the needs and expectations of the 
indigenous populations.” Leys maintained that The Harambee movement … “was 
responsible for the mobilization of large sums of capital for a wide variety of basic 
needs. Similarly, the initiative aimed at social inclusion and integration of populations 
in development processes.”  
From the above, I noted the recurring concept of humanness and reciprocity under 
Ubuntu. In the case of Kenya, I noted that society had understood that “leadership is 
a relationship between leaders and followers.” Thus, the spirit of reciprocity in 
traditional Africa, especially in sharing resources, historically empowered both the 
leader and followers in respectable measures. The researcher therefore argues that 
the concept of Ubuntu, and its equivalent Harambee, potentially moulded effective 
‘servant leaders’ out of African society, who by inference became good governors of 
society. These leaders then took charge over the processes of arbitration, nurturing, 
well-being, decision-making and spiritual growth of traditional society. Mangaliso 
(noted in Mangena, 2011:108) corroborates the latter point in his assertion that 
“Ubuntu forms the core of most traditional African cultures as it embraces the spirit of 
caring and community, harmony and hospitality, respect and responsiveness.” I 
argue that there was little or no room for personification of systems, since society 
shared all resources symbiotically and reciprocally. Traditional African society also 
posed no conflict of roles in leadership and governance structures. This is because 
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every societal member knew their role, particularly within the context of Koshal’s six 
factors of servant leadership, discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
In line with the above, I argue that the immediate post-independence government in 
Kenya showed tendencies towards personification, rather than Harambee. Booth, 
Cooksey, Golooba-Mutebi and Kanyinga (2014:13) affirmed this in the assertion that 
“when Kenya became independent in 1963, it assumed a model of government 
comprising multiparty elections and a bicameral legislature based on Westminster 
principles.” Booth et al. maintained that “initially, two major political parties were 
formed along ethno-regional lines: Kenyan Alliance of National Unity (KANU) 
represented numerically large Kikuyu and Luo communities, while Kenya African 
Democratic Union (KADU) represented numerically smaller groups. KANU won the 
independence elections and formed the first government with Jomo Kenyatta, a 
Kikuyu as President and Oginga Odinga the Vice President. A few years into 
independence, the KANU government dismantled federal institutions as well as 
multiparty politics” (Booth et al., 2014:31) and “started promoting the ideology of 
‘African Socialism’” (Leys, noted in Chesire et al., 2015:248). On this note, I argue 
that the dismantling of federal institutions with strong ethno-cultural foundations 
diminished the concept of social inclusions and humanistic concern. Instead, national 
leaders promoted untested ‘African socialism’ in an attempt to disrupt the human 
relationships that elevate the importance of humanness and shared community. I 
posit that this contemptible move disrupted the normal trajectory of Kenya’s social, 
cultural and political transition, paving the way for the rise of personified governance.  
In a study of the political economy of Kenya, Booth et al. (2014:13) articulated “a 
clear inference to Kenya’s transition to a personified system. They contended that 
the ruling party [under Jomo Kenyatta] manipulated the political system in a way that 
compelled the opposition, KADU, to wind up in the ‘national interest’.” Similarly, 
Andreassen and Crawford (2013:55) argued that “KANU, under the leadership of 
Kenyatta started repressing the opposition and his regime became increasingly 
authoritarian.” Likewise, Ghai and McAuslan (1970:159) asserted that “Kenyatta’s 
authoritarian style, characterized by patronage, favouritism, tribalism and/or 
nepotism drew criticism and dissent, and set a bad example followed by his 
successors. He had the constitution radically amended to expand his powers, 
consolidating executive power.” Therefore, I point out that, having deviated from 
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Africa’s consensus-based systems like Ubuntu, the transition to authoritarian 
governance was inevitable. I discussed in the preceding paragraphs how Ubuntu 
philosophy posed a formidable check and balance on individual excesses. In this 
respect, Mengisteab (2006:3) particularly “cites well-known examples of consensus 
based decision making as the council of elders (kiama) of the Kikuyu in Kenya, as 
well as the Teso and Lango of Uganda.” Thus, Mengisteab (2006:8) maintained that 
“the new elite, which increasingly grew self-serving and autocratic, also could not 
tolerate the existence of contending points of [traditional] power. Accordingly, the 
leaders subverted prevailing traditional systems in preference for manipulating 
citizens using personified governance systems.” To this end, I agree with Lituchy, 
Punnett and Puplampu (2013:251) that “reverting to an Afro-centric view of 
leadership requires a reconnection with African indigenous knowledge like Ubuntu 
that endorse factors such as supportiveness, relationships and extended networks.” 
Further to the above, I argue that the impact of Kenyatta’s governance style 
reverberated in Kenya, and continues to do so even after his demise. This is 
indicative of how deep-rooted personified systems can become. Illustratively, 
Andreassen and Crawford (2013:55) argued “that from 1978 to 2002 during the era 
of President Daniel arap Moi [who succeeded Jomo Kenyatta], political repression 
and control of the judiciary continued to plague Kenya.” I contend that that arap Moi’s 
regime was a blend of Jomo Kenyatta’s and Moi’s own version of state 
personification. Both regimes subverted the servanthood of the traditional African 
leadership that had epitomised pre-colonial Kenya. For instance, Veney and Zeleza 
(2013:6) argued that “under Moi, the contradictions of authoritarian-dependent 
capitalist development became more evident and explosive; and Kenya became a 
one-party state with centralized power around the President.” Veney and Zeleza 
maintained that “KANU became a powerful weapon to discipline members of the 
political class, and a dreaded mechanism of patron-client dispensations of 
resources.” Khamisi (noted in Andreassen & Crawford, 2013:56) accentuated the 
latter in his explanation that “many features of Kenyan politics over the last 50 years 
such as confrontational ethno-politics, corruption and political bribery, have not 
changed.” Conversely, Andreassen and Crawford (2013:55) argued that “in the 
1990’s Kenya moved from a one-party authoritarian state to a formal democracy 
[albeit] with a stagnant economy.” However, Andreassen and Crawford contended 
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that “significant constraints on new democratic forces characterized the decade, with 
dramatic state instigated violence in the electoral cycles of 1992, 1997 and 2008.”  
As illustrated from the above literature, I argue that Kenyatta’s personified leadership 
was contrary to Patterson’s theory of servant leadership, and the Harambee spirit. 
Manda (2009:1) illustrated this point eloquently in the assertion that most post-
independence leaders manifested the eclipse of Ubuntu, indicated by the leader 
becoming the main centre of every reference, thus losing the essence of Ubuntu that 
focuses on community building. In affirmation, the researcher postulates that the 
above literature illustrates how personification has distorted the mandate of public 
institutions and the very moral fabric of Kenyan society, thereby relegating its 
nationals to the status of acquiesced citizens. In particular, the advent of colonialism 
introduced models of governance that were embryonic for African society. Kenyatta’s 
attempt to introduce socialism with an African dimension came with governance 
dynamics that were more egocentric than egalitarian. Within the foregoing context, 
Mangena (2011:109) asserted that “in the West, community exists to serve the 
interests of the individual while in sub-Saharan Africa the individual exists to serve 
the community. Thus, Ubuntu operates in this spirit.” Mangena maintained that “in 
Africa, people influence the direction their leader should take when it comes to 
governance issues and leadership is about serving the people.” This study argues 
that by resorting to egocentrism, Kenya’s immediate post-independence leaders 
succumbed to the trappings of personified rule, which inevitably resulted in 
acquiesced citizens. 
Regarding Rwanda, this section will mainly focus on the incumbent President, Paul 
Kagame, whose enigmatic reign provides paradoxical correlation between good 
governance and good leadership. To this end, the researcher highlights a highly 
saturated quote from Parolini (2014) to set the tone for this segment.  
Parolini (2014) posited that … “Rwanda has a perfect example of servant-
leadership from the king’s court. The king’s servant was the second most 
powerful man in the country; part manservant, prime minister, head of 
protocol, his mouthpiece, his best friend because he spent twenty four hours 
with the king. The servant was from a low-caste but was more feared and 
respected than royals, he controlled access to the king, and he dealt with 
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matters of state and had a network of spies around the country. His word was 
the word of the king, a slight glance from him could get you killed, but he 
walked in absolute humility. He knew the real power he had but never showed 
it, that even added to his power, everyone in the room was scared of him but 
he acted coy and subservient to them. That is the key to servant-leadership, it 
is not weak leadership, it is strong leadership, [an individual] has to soften 
their appearance to be more approachable.” 
The researcher agrees with Parolini’s assertion that humility and subservience do 
not necessarily mean the powerlessness of a leader. Contrary to the quandary of 
egocentrism that defines personified leadership, adaptability is a critical ingredient 
for servant leadership. Parolini’s befitting quote played out in contemporary 
Rwanda’s history in 1994. After successfully overthrowing the Rwandan government 
in 1994, Kagame assumed the role of Vice President, having been the “tactician 
behind”, and after 1990, the commander of, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (The 
New York Times, July 20th, 1994). Although he deputised for President Pasteur 
Bizimungu, real power appeared to rest with Kagame (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
2016). Correspondingly, Oloka-Onyango (2004:32) posited that “in the aftermath of 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the title new breed was generically applied to the 
leadership of the RPF, but more specifically to Paul Kagame – the elusive power 
behind the throne who in 2000 revealed his true colours and assumed full leadership 
of the country.” Drawing on the inferences by the two authors cited above, I argue 
that Kagame portrayed the unequivocal mastery of the principles of servant 
leadership espoused by his regal ancestors in the court of Rwanda’s kings. 
Onyango-Oloka (2004:32) even referred to the then Rwanda’s Presidency as the 
“throne”, alluding to its contextually regal nature. Accordingly, “as a servant leader, 
Kagame the true power behind the Presidency and military remained the dominant 
force in the maintenance of civil order and the administration of justice, as well as 
ensuring the security of the country’s borders” (Waugh, 2004:121). 
From Waugh’s (2004) argument, I note a definite likening of Kagame’s leadership 
style to ‘servant leadership.’ The foregoing statement postulates that Kagame was 
cognisant of the need to project himself as a servant leader in order to delude his 
constituents for a while. In line with the researcher’s argument on Kagame’s servant 
leadership posture, Brubaker (2013:122-3) demonstrated “a strong correlation 
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between servant leadership behaviours and perceived leader effectiveness in 
Rwanda.” By showing that servant leadership behaviours are consistent with the 
African philosophy of Ubuntu on leader effectiveness, Brubaker has shown that the 
“interconnectedness of self within society and the extension of humanness within 
shared community” help to account for the relevance and acceptability of servant 
leadership within Rwanda.” I contend that Brubaker’s argument dovetails well with 
Parolini’s views. The argument highlights the point that humility acts as a check on 
the egos of national leaders, and puts community strength and success ahead of 
selfish personal desires. On this note, this study argues that the essential quality that 
amplifies the intrinsic humanity of a leader invites trust, respect and honour to the 
persona. This is the humanistic concern for others that the philosophy of Ubuntu 
demonstrates – the interconnectedness of the ‘self’ within society.  
In contrast, Rwanda exhibits a peculiarity, where scholars are associating 
patrimonialism with positive national development. Booth et al. (noted in Cubitt, 
2014:5) posited that “developmental patrimonialism embraces local norms and 
practices rather than fighting against them, as exemplified by contemporary 
Rwanda.” In this case, Khan (noted in Cubitt, 2014:5) asserted that “developmental 
patrimonialism has yielded a situation where politically generated opportunities for 
profit are institutionalized and centralized, and where economic rents are deployed 
efficiently with a view to longer-term development.” In corroboration of the foregoing, 
Booth et al. (2014:76) argued that “Rwanda is undoubtedly an outlier in the East 
African region. Although burdened with the least developed economy in terms of 
income levels and economic structure, the country is benefiting from political 
arrangements that set it apart.” Booth et al. (2014:x) maintained that policymaking in 
Rwanda, for instance, does not suffer from the acute, politically driven coordination 
problems besetting other East African countries like Kenya and Tanzania. While 
observers point to President Kagame’s personal dominance and leadership style, 
Booth et al. (2014:85) reasoned that the explanation is more institutional than 
otherwise. Nonetheless Booth et al. (2014:85) concurred that “Kagame has 
successfully presided over the construction of a national political settlement that 
provides a favourable context for the design and implementation of national 
development efforts.” 
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In analysing the above discussion, I contend that experts associate Kagame’s 
leadership style with patrimonialism and dominance. Apparently, this signifies 
Kagame’s transition from emulating the principles of servant leadership, as formerly 
championed by Rwanda’s kings, to espousing personified leadership. In 
corroboration, Reese (2014) expounded on “the writings and ideological construct 
embodied by Machiavelli in the 16th Century that are exemplified in the leadership of 
Paul Kagame, the current President of Rwanda.” Reese maintained that “as a 
modern day Machiavellian Prince, Kagame has inspired Rwandans with love, fear, 
and a unique paternalism.” Reese positively noted that “Kagame’s enigmatic and 
Machiavellian leadership style has helped propel Rwanda into a fledgling success 
story amidst the difficult political climate of Africa.” On this note, I posit that the 
character attributes currently associated with Kagame’s leadership and by extension, 
governance style, are more related with personified leadership than servant 
leadership. Equally, patrimonialism, dominance, fear and paternalism are descriptors 
of an authoritarian and totalitarian leadership style that is more inward than citizen 
oriented. I assert that these are the enunciating elements of personified leadership.  
In line with the above arguments, Uddhammar (2013:419) examined “views 
expressed by Western leaders and academics about autocratic leaders, including 
President Kagame.” Uddhammar (2013:403) contended that “indeed the West 
portray Kagame as ‘enlightened’, however, they excuse his democratic deficit mostly 
on the grounds that he delivers on other developmental goals.” Conversely, the 
researcher argues that there is growing infrequency and rarity in reciprocity of 
humanness by President Kagame. To this end, Gisselquist (2012a) argued that 
“Rwanda [under President Kagame] provides an illustration of some of the 
challenges faced by experts in defining good governance.” Gisselquist maintained 
that “Rwanda has made clear progress in terms of economic growth, public sector 
management and regulatory reform since the end of genocide in 1994.” The Human 
Rights Watch (2011) averred that this “trend continued through 2010, but there were 
numerous violations of civil and political rights, and the government failed to fulfil its 
professed commitment to democracy”. Should we consider Rwanda well governed 
because of its economic progress, or poorly governed because of its democratic 
deficits? “The Department for International Development (DFID) – the largest 
bilateral donor in Rwanda, for instance, has effectively argued the former. Human 
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Rights Watch, among others, sharply criticized DFID policy in 2011, effectively 
asserting the latter” (Gisselquist, 2012a).  
According to Reese (2014), “experts romanticize and criticize Paul Kagame’s role as 
a head of state in equal measure.” Reese maintained that “the critics charged that 
beyond the paved roads and clean sidewalks, Kagame has embraced a dictatorial 
flair that has blemished his remarkable achievements.” On the other hand, Reese 
points out that “Kagame’s supporters point to Rwanda’s rapid economic growth 
under Kagame’s policies. Kagame has enjoyed a great deal of success towards the 
objectives that he has laid out for Rwanda, but it will always carry the stigma of being 
at the cost of political freedom.” Analogously, Swart, van Wyk and Botha (2014:667) 
contended that “experts describe President Kagame as a ‘benevolent dictator’ who 
belongs to a group of ‘hybrid leadership’ in Africa.” To this end, I argue that 
Kagame’s leadership style has ultimately defined his national governance style. 
Similarly, I posit that because of his deviation to personified tendencies, Kagame’s 
governance style has failed to espouse the principles of Ubuntu that I discussed in 
preceding paragraphs. In terms of striving for policy objectivity, the researcher 
agrees that “the quality of development policy-making in Rwanda needs to be less 
associated with Kagame’s personality” (Booth et al., 2014:11). However, I note that 
the process of policymaking deeply enmeshes with systems in Rwanda’s national 
institutions. From the above arguments, this study infers that the fact that experts 
increasingly associate Rwanda’s social, economic and political successes with 
Kagame’s leadership is indicative of personification. 
As highlighted above, the empirical segment on the subject of personification poses 
certain critical questions, as did the theoretical segment. For instance, to what extent 
does personified leadership in nations that practice Ubuntu curtail or precipitate good 
governance? Equally, Manda (2009:4) asked that “if we understand that Ubuntu 
offers a great foundation in the African culture or way of life, why then does a society 
or a nation such as Rwanda, knowing Ubuntu allow genocide to occur?” Similarly, 
Manda (2009:4) posed another related question, “why are several tribal clashes and 
civil wars happening in the land where supposedly Ubuntu understanding is rooted?” 
To these questions, the researcher responds that leadership is about how an 
individual leader and their subjects view the world. An individual’s worldview 
comprises personal accountability, ethics, personal calling and integrity. Accordingly, 
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I argue that in Rwanda, for instance, leaders who digress from the principles of 
Ubuntu should be held accountable for governance outcomes during their terms in 
office. This is because the inherent choice to espouse Ubuntu or not is a subjective 
leadership choice, as is the decision to personify a system. 
Furthermore, the empirical account of genocide in Rwanda confirms the researcher’s 
views that several individuals, acting in tandem, could induce a leader to enter into 
personification. Conversely, the concept of Ubuntu, a fundamental doctrine of 
traditional African morals and ethics, emphasises collective identity as opposed to 
the Western emphasis on individual identity (Van Dyk, 2016:256). The New World 
Encyclopaedia (2016) asserted that “individual behaviour and interaction in the 
context of various social roles are key concepts associated with Ubuntu. Accordingly, 
Ubuntu is essential to traditional African jurisprudence and governance. Thus, a 
person with Ubuntu knows their place in the universe and is consequently able to 
interact civilly with other individuals.” I postulate that adherence to the above African 
values is sufficient to avert ethnic tensions in Rwanda. In addition, the researcher 
posited that the respectful, interactive aspects of Ubuntu that have helped traditional 
African society to live in harmony are still important for a nation like Rwanda. For 
instance, “one aspect of Ubuntu is that at all times, the individual effectively 
represents the people from among whom he or she comes, and therefore tries to 
behave according to the highest standards and exhibit the virtues upheld by his or 
her society” (New World Encyclopaedia 2016). Similarly, Katz (noted in Van Dyk, 
2016:240) posited that the African traditional worldview emphasized the ‘self-
embedded in the community’, which establishes conditions where “what is good for 
one is good for all, and the whole is greater than the sum of parts.” 
I observe that, “while in the past Africans seem to have universally embraced Ubuntu 
as a way of life, this has eroded with the passage of time; hence, there is a call to 
revive the Ubuntu way of living” (Jansen; Kamwangamalu; Nyaumwe & Mkabela, 
noted in Van Dyk, 2016:228). Accordingly, Masango (noted in Van Dyk, 2016:228) 
believed that “such a call will assist in building [African] nation(s) to its original way of 
living and of respecting one another and thus counteract the current social ills of 
violence and abuse.” Hence, I argue that the dissolution of personified leadership in 
East Africa is possible when national leaders espouse traditional African principles of 
servant leadership, particularly Ubuntu. Perhaps East African leaders could also 
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borrow from the well-defined Christian perspective of servant leadership. As seen in 
Isaiah 41:8; 42:1, the Bible articulately amplifies the concept of servant leadership 
“based on an individual assuming the role of a servant to both God and others” 
(Farling, n.d.:2, noted in Cerff, 2004:7). Likewise, in the book of Matthew 20:28, we 
read that Jesus – a central figure in Christianity – declared in reference to Himself, 
“the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life a 
ransom for many.” On this note, Snodgrass (noted in Cerff, 2004:7) argued that 
“Christians understand their role of being servants ‘on account of’ Jesus. Snodgrass 
maintained that individuals ‘do not become servant leaders by choice or desire’.” 
Conversely, Snodgrass argued that “servanthood is the result of an individual’s 
personal relationship with Christ, as the character and purposes of Christ become 
pre-eminent in an individual’s life.” From the above discussion, I note that Christianity 
illustrates a clear example of ‘service above self.’ Intrinsic convictions in the heart of 
an individual drive these selfless acts of charity and goodwill. I therefore assert that 
Christian perspectives of servant leadership can positively influence the leadership 
behaviours in the theory of personification. 
The Christian perspective also resonates well with the norms of servant leadership 
and ultimately Ubuntu. For instance, “the Kenyan concept of Harambee, which 
embodies and reflects the strong ancient value of mutual assistance, joint effort, 
mutual social responsibility and community self-reliance, has continued to play a 
cardinal role in the development of Kenya” (Bailey; Chieni, Mbithi & Rasmusson; 
Shikuku; Wilson, as noted by Koshal, 2005:6). Of critical significance on the subject, 
Koshal (2005) “links the concept of Harambee to the practice of servant leadership in 
Kenya.” Hence, I posit that the connection between Harambee and servant 
leadership is important since it diminishes the egocentricity inherent in personified 
leadership. In corroboration, Koshal (noted in Winston & Ryan, 2008:218) pointed 
out that “the notion of service in ‘Patterson’s (2003) model of servant leadership’ is 
like the Harambee philosophy that draws guidance from the principle of ‘collective 
good rather than individual gain’ as it puts others’ welfare and interest [above the 
leaders own].” This study agrees with Winston and Ryan’s (2008:217) assertion “that 
Ubuntu has similarities to Patterson’s (2003) definition of servant leadership since it 
focuses on the well-being of the follower, while regarding [personal] interests as 
secondary.” Accordingly, I submit that, in order to mitigate the impact of 
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personification in Kenya, the national leaders could adopt philosophical and 
humanitarian values fostered by African traditions. Thus, the leaders observing 
Ubuntu would express qualities that Teffo (noted in Van Dyk, 2016:230) suggested, 
including “kindness, good character, generosity, hard work, discipline, honour, 
respect and harmonious living” [as opposed to personified inclinations].  
Regarding Rwanda, I contend that the country has made remarkable socio-economic 
and political gains in the post-genocide era since 1994. I argue that Rwanda’s 
national leaders could better consolidate these gains if they were to espouse 
unpretentious servant leadership and Ubuntu values. Although earlier in his 
Presidency, the incumbent leader, Paul Kagame, practised the principles of servant 
leadership in the traditions of his ancestors, he became completely transformed with 
the passage of time. The researcher notes that previous national leaders in Rwanda 
followed the same pattern of personified leadership. In an ethnically charged nation 
like Rwanda, the researcher argues that the time-tested values of servant leadership 
that sustained Rwanda’s regal system until its abolishment would be a more viable 
governance alternative. This study notes that the challenge with the current 
leadership structure, which heavily gravitates towards personified rule, is that it is 
exclusionary and precipitates discord rather than unity. Thus, as an alternative to the 
personified rule in Rwanda, I draw on Brubaker’s (2013) argument that shows 
“interconnectedness of self within society and the extension of humanness within 
shared community” can help to account for the relevance and acceptability of servant 
leadership in Rwanda. “The holistic and multi-dimensional approach to servant 
leadership that includes the rational, emotional, ethical, and spiritual sides of both 
leaders and followers” (Sendjaya & Cooper, noted in Mutia & Muthamia, 2016:130), 
provided a justifiable basis for virtuous leadership in Rwanda. The latter is significant 
for this study, especially in corroborating the point that true leadership is not a matter 
of mere style, but is fundamentally an act of character. For example, I argue that a 
true leader does not detract from impartiality, as administered by the country’s’ 
sovereign justice system in order to advance good governance. Since justice is a 
critical aspect of national governance, in subsequent paragraphs I examine how 
Ubuntu philosophy promotes judicial processes. 
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According to Hinton (2015:392,397), Ubuntu – a traditional humanistic philosophy, 
and Gacaca, an indigenous Rwandese restorative justice process are 
interconnected. Hinton (2015:395) maintained that “there are variant assertions over 
the role of Gacaca in promoting healing and post-conflict reconstruction. 
Endogenous methods like Gacaca courts in Rwanda represent a model of alternative 
or restorative justice, which are both cathartic and conciliatory. The Gacaca was 
reincarnated for both pragmatic and ideological reasons. From a practical standpoint, 
Rwanda’s formal courts faced a backlog of cases, while huge caseloads swallowed 
the International Tribunal on Rwanda. It was quite clear that the Rwandan formal 
legal system and the international criminal tribunal were not going to be able to deal 
with all these cases of genocide. The Gacaca was, therefore, a mechanism to 
decongest the country’s prisons by speeding up trials at the community level. From 
an ideological viewpoint, Gacaca emphasises the Rwandan government’s need to 
promote culturally relevant approaches to reconciliation.  
I observe from the above arguments that Gacaca courts are a clear illustration that 
indigenous African forms of restorative and transitional justice are actually still 
applicable in this era. It is also interesting to note that Rwanda opted for the 
traditional justice system as an alternative to decrease the backlog of cases. I also 
point out that this justice system was instrumental in expediting the process of 
reinstating freedoms to incarcerated suspects. In many respects, Gacaca courts, a 
variant of Ubuntu, possible checks and balances to personified governance since it 
premises on cultural systems that are familiar to the citizens. 
In shedding more light on the model, Karbo and Mutusi (2008:5) assert that Gacaca 
is a Kinyarwanda concept which literary means “justice on the grass”. They maintain 
that “Gacaca courts are a traditional Rwandese phenomenon, where people sit on 
the grass to settle their disputes in the presence of community members. Historically, 
Rwanda used Gacaca courts to settle issues such as land, property, marital and 
other interpersonal disputes. Gacaca hearings are traditionally held outdoors and the 
system is based on voluntary confessions and apologies by wrongdoers.” 
Correspondingly, Werchick (noted in Karbo & Mutusi, 2008:5) argues that “in its pre-
colonial form, Gacaca was used to moderate disputes concerning land use rights, 
cattle ownership, marriage, inheritance rights and petty theft, among others. 
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Traditionally, members of the community known as the inyangamugayo translated as 
‘persons of exemplary conduct’ – who were renowned for courage, honour, justice 
and truth run the Gacaca courts. The inyangamugayo were special, and assumed 
this role based on their high moral and ethical standards. In traditional Rwanda, after 
the dispute had been resolved, the parties would conduct a ritual or ceremony 
reflecting the symbolic and practical importance of the process. Gacaca sessions 
often ended with the involved parties sharing drinks and a meal as a gesture of 
reconciliation. Serious offences would result in [authorities] ostracising the offender 
from the community.” 
I posit that the above literature highlights the potential of Gacaca for the assurance 
of stability in traditional communities. The model also protected the rights of 
members across various domains from interpersonal differences through to property 
disputes. I believe the stringent threat of ostracizing also ensured observance of the 
law within the communities. With respect to the latter, it is no wonder that Hinton 
(2015:395) posited that  “the Rwandan government passed a law creating Gacaca 
courts to prosecute crimes committed between October 1990 and December 1994.” 
Hinton argued that “the government determined that it was critical to eradicate the 
culture of impunity in Rwanda, and to deter the possibility of genocide. There was a 
need for justice, reconciliation, and nation building in the post-genocide era.” In 
consonance with the latter, Issifu (noted in Arthur, Issifu & Marfo, 2015:64) 
contended that, African nations have applied local conflict resolution mechanisms in 
managing and resolving ethnic, religious, chieftaincy and resource based conflicts. 
According to him, war-victimised countries including Rwanda have all used local 
conflict resolution methods like Gacaca to resolve conflicts to ensure sustainable 
peace after years of warfare. I argue that Issifu’s assertion lends credence to my 
position that Gacaca courts provided robust conflict resolution mechanisms in 
traditional African society. The fact that an ethnically fragile country like Rwanda 
legalised Gacaca demonstrates that the nation still finds reassurance in this model to 
deter and mitigate conflict. 
In this context, Arthur et al., (2015:63) contend that violent conflicts have been the 
major critical issues in the global politics. As Sadowski (noted in Arthur et al., 
2015:63) puts it, “many of violent conflicts occurring along the political and ethnic 
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lines are common phenomena in sub-Saharan Africa.” Sadowski (noted in Arthur et 
al., 2015:64) maintains that “in the past four decades, there have been numerous 
instances of violent conflicts with roots in ethnicity, politics and governance, territory 
or boundary as witnessed in several African countries - the worst being the genocide 
involving Hutus against Tutsis in Rwanda. In his view, in most parts of the conflict 
torn countries in the Africa continent, these conflicts tend to have negative 
repercussions on women, children and socio- economic activities of the state.” 
Correspondingly, Mugumbate and Nyanguru (2013:96) asserted that in managing 
community conflicts, the application of African traditional jurisprudence, leadership 
and governance is usually helpful and Ubuntu espouses these values. Likewise, in a 
study, Brubaker (noted in Ngunjiri 2016:226) found servant leadership and Ubuntu 
leadership behaviours to be highly related to perceived effectiveness of leaders in 
Rwanda. However, his audience reported not often observing Ubuntu leadership 
behaviours among their leaders. 
In the above literature, Mugumbate and Nyanguru correlate the concept of African 
traditional jurisprudence, leadership and governance. This correlation is relevant for 
this study since it focuses on the themes that influence that evolution or subsistence 
of personified reign. In this context, it is noteworthy that Brubaker introduces the 
concept of servant leadership, a factor discussed in section 4.1, but this time comes 
with a connection to Ubuntu. By inference, I argue that Ubuntu philosophy is a critical 
ingredient in shaping a leaders governance style. On the contrary, leaders who do 
not esteem the Ubuntu philosophy will gravitate towards personification as I have 
already discussed severally in this study. However, I argue that if a country has 
strong independent institutions, such systems can check the excesses or tendencies 
towards personification. Karsten and Illa (2005:10) corroborated my argument in 
their assertion that “the contribution of the Ubuntu concept to the resolution of 
organizational and institutional problems now integrates countries from across Africa, 
for example Rwanda and Kenya in East Africa.” This strengthens my postulation that 
the Ubuntu model is effective at both leadership and institutional levels. 
In rationalising Ubuntu as an African governance model, Ezeanya-Esiobu (2017:9) 
argued that “post-independent Rwanda continued with the governance system it 
inherited from the colonial masters. She maintained that succeeding administrations 
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in Rwanda invested more in the provision of social services, working together with 
international development partners and a budding civil society and private sector. 
Ezeanya-Esiobu points out that Rwanda’s Ubuntu philosophy, shared by much of the 
Bantu occupied region of Sub-Saharan Africa, calls for the protection of the weak 
and vulnerable by the stronger members of the society.” From the above argument, I 
noted that Ubuntu actually cascades from leadership and institutional levels through 
to vulnerable members of society. On this point, I contend that Ubuntu is a 
comprehensive African governance tool that is contextually applicable to 
contemporary leadership and governance dynamics. 
In order to buttress my argument, I draw on Kanakulya (2015:236) who echoed my 
view in asserting that “the application of the principle of Ubuntu to governance in the 
East African region would help harmonise divergent views. He maintained that the 
foundation on which Ubuntu builds a society is that we are all humans who deserve 
respect and a chance as members of society.” Kanakulya (2015:279) maintained 
that, “Ubuntu as a principle captures and represents the three common approaches 
by African thinkers to resolving the African development challenges, namely: re-
dignification, unification and re-construction. In re-dignification terms, ubuntu brings 
back the dignity of the native African as one who can also contribute to the 
governance and development of the region using a philosophy that they are well 
versed with. In terms of unification, Ubuntu has potential of unifying varying views 
within East Africa because it arises from shared spiritual and moral aspirations of the 
people of the region. In re-constructive terms, Ubuntu contributes to re-
conceptualizing and re-framing of the processes and the institutions of the region.” 
In conclusion, in this section I established that the concept of servant leadership 
reveals that outward manifestation of leadership actions emanate from within an 
individual. In addition to focusing on the leader, the Ubuntu philosophy also asserts 
that leadership ‘power belongs to the people.’ These observations are critical in this 
study because they highlight that leadership actions and follower reactions operate 
in tandem. It is significant to note that both actions stem from intrinsic characters of 
individuals. This is important in this study because the theory of personification holds 
individuals culpable for their actions. In this respect, Ubuntu provides a sense of self-
identity and self-respect that enables individuals to act in a positive manner by 
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drawing on the humanistic values. I also noted that servant leaders develop people, 
and support their communities to prosper as opposed to egocentric accumulation of 
wealth associated with personified regimes. Essentially, the Ubuntu philosophy 
highlights our African humanness and humanity by characterizing individuals as 
unique intellectual entities, capable of responding to emotional and external stimuli. 
More importantly, the Ubuntu philosophy has safety provisions that moderate 
individual human behaviour towards others in a society. Although Ubuntu takes 
many dimensions in different African societies, the subjects of the philosophy do not 
compromise its core principles. For instance, Kenyan society domesticated Ubuntu 
principles by rebranding it as the “Harambee” philosophy. This motivating factor 
enabled Kenyan leaders to take charge over key decision-making processes and 
spiritual growth of society. However, the study noted that Kenya’s attempt at 
introducing ‘African socialism’ to replace humanistic principles bungled, as it only 
disrupted the ordinary trajectory of Kenya’s social, cultural and political transition, 
paving the way for the proliferation of personified governance.  
In the case of Rwanda, this study noted that the country provided a perfect example 
of traditional servant-leadership from the king’s court. The king appointed a servant 
who was from a low-caste but eventually became more feared and respected than 
other royals. This servant controlled access to the king, and dealt with administrative 
matters of the state. Rwanda witnessed a contemporary version of servant 
leadership in 1994 when the current regime assumed power. After the 1994 war, 
Kagame, the power behind the RPF, took on the role of Vice President to a Hutu – in 
effect, emulating the tenets of servant leadership. As it is with all leaders with 
personified inclinations, Kagame’s pretence did not last long. He quickly elbowed his 
way to the top where he has been the President for over 20 years now. However, 
Rwanda’s brand of personified leadership poses a paradox in this study. Experts 
unanimously agree that Kagame has successfully created an enabling environment 
for national development. He has leveraged the Ubuntu philosophy successfully to 
strengthen Rwanda’s judicial process. Yet Rwanda is trudging under a defacto-
personified regime. Essentially, Kagame’s actions point squarely that leadership 
actions determine governance and development trajectories. Thus, good leadership 
actions result in positive development outcomes. Kagame’s actions run contrary to 
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the Ubuntu philosophy that requires the individual to effectively represent his people, 
and to behave according to the highest standards upheld by their society. 
Finally, this study drew inspiration from the Christian interpretation of servant 
leadership that depicts leadership as a selfless act of charity and goodwill. This 
interpretation provides a substantive check on personified excesses. In this context, I 
argue that Ubuntu philosophy of African governance can potentially shape 
contemporary governance styles and development outcomes. On the contrary, 
contemporary leaders who do not esteem the Ubuntu philosophy will inevitably 
gravitate towards personification. On this note, I point out that the next section will 
examine contemporary dimensions of personified governance in East Africa. This will 
allow the holistic comprehension pertaining to how a leader’s behavioural inclination 
relates to their actual effectiveness. 
4.3 Contemporary dimensions on personified governance in East Africa 
In this segment, I undertake an empirical analysis on how a leader’s behavioural 
inclination relates to their actual effectiveness. This entails a detailed review of 
extent to which personified leadership affects governance and development. 
Accordingly, this section will focus on two countries, Kenya and Rwanda that are the 
subjects of empirical case studies to illustrate the thesis and principles of personified 
governance in East Africa. Specifically, the rationale for selecting Kenya is that it 
provides the most typical basis to explore and understand causal qualitative 
leadership mechanisms that are not obviously apparent in other East African 
countries, as covered in this thesis. Also of significance, “Kenya is a regional 
economic power and thus overall performance of [other countries] in the region 
largely depends on what happens in Kenya” (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). On the other 
hand, the study on Rwanda will provide rich, deep contextual data to help the reader 
understand qualitative empirical phenomena pertaining to personified leadership in a 
manner that can be generalised to other East African countries. Of particular 
importance, the BBC (2015) posited that “Rwanda, a small landlocked country is 
trying to recover from the ethnic strife that culminated in government-sponsored 
genocide in the mid-1990s.” The BBC maintained that “today, Rwanda is striving to 
rebuild its economy with The World Bank praising Rwanda's recent ‘remarkable 
development successes’, which it says have helped reduce poverty and inequality.” 
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Overall, I contend that the empirical case studies of Kenya and Rwanda allows this 
thesis to test the hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework of this study. 
The Republic of Kenya, “after years of [unsuccessful] post-independence approach 
to Local Governance embraced a strong centralized governance structure to resolve 
regional development challenges (Khaunya, Wawire & Chepng’eno, 2015:27).” 
Having failed in this endeavour, Kenya adopted a devolution system of decentralised 
development. Khaunya et al. (2015:28) maintained that there are “various evidences 
of governance challenges in Kenya that include bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of 
accountability and transparency, unequal distribution of national resources and 
minimal community participation in local development, amongst others.” Mwenzwa 
(noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246) argued that “specifically, since 
independence, the challenge regarding governance of development in Kenya has led 
to poor economic performance and hence negative consequences in the country.” In 
particular, “centralized planning excluded grassroots leaders and local communities 
from participating in decision-making and implementation of development projects” 
(Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246). Misati and Ontita (noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 
2014:246) posited that “consequently, beneficiaries have for the most part been 
passive as opposed to active partners in development, which has given rise to 
heightened dependency.” Misati and Ontita maintained that “as a result of the above, 
community-initiated development has been hard to come by and whenever this 
happened, projects have largely evolved into shadows of their true potential or 
stalled altogether.” 
From the above contemporary discourse, I argue that we still note reference to the 
deliberate centralisation of governance by Kenya’s post-independence leaders. 
Successive Kenyan leaders have done this, with a total disregard of the cultural and 
traditional institutions that formerly fostered a mutually appreciative relationship 
between the leader and the subjects. The result, as Booth et al. (2014:ix) assert, is 
that “Kenyan politics [still] revolves around the inclusion or exclusion from power of 
the five or so major ethnic blocs.” Booth et al. maintained that, “furthermore, Kenya’s 
ethnic structure has never had an appropriate (i.e. federal) constitution capable of 
accommodating such diversity and harnessing it to collective objectives.” To this 
end, I argue that successive past leaders in Kenya entrenched personification into 
the institutional framework to the extent that helpless citizens acquiesced in the 
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status quo. As is the case with personified systems, leaders clamp down decisively 
on any real or perceived threats to their power. Furthermore, as hypothesised by the 
researcher in Chapter One, personified leaders also use devious inducements to 
reward loyalists. In the case of Kenya, Booth et al. (2014:13) “pointed out that in 
order to consolidate political power, the ruling party from the early period enticed the 
opposition with material interests – land. This enabled Kenyatta’s government to 
begin centralization of power with limited opposition.” 
As this thesis asserts, the centralisation of power by national leaders is symptomatic 
of personified tendencies that exclude the masses to the benefit of a unique leader. 
Frequently, the centralisation of power also blurs the lines between governance 
institutions. “In Kenya’s case, the intermingling of political and economic power has 
always been intense, but has taken different forms under the Presidencies of Jomo 
Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and now Uhuru Kenyatta. Institutions that 
provide some checks on interests have been weak, and their strengthening under 
the 2010 constitution has produced uneven results. Changes that influence the 
governance of growth will therefore come primarily from the executive” (Booth et al., 
2014:viii). To place this argument in context, “Jomo Kenyatta, the founding President 
of Kenya, passed away in August 1978 after fourteen years as head of state (Adar & 
Munyae, 2001:1).” During Kenyatta's Presidency, a small Kikuyu elite dominated the 
political realm, the so-called Kiambu Mafia, from Kenyatta's home district. Adar and 
Munyae (2001:1) maintained that “this group undermined Kenyatta's nationalist and 
populist background, alienating other ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming 
Kikuyus.” According to Adar and Munyae (2001:1), “although Moi, the then Vice 
President was loyal to Kenyatta, the latter's inner circle never accepted him.”  
“Under Moi, patronage and loyalty to the President became mandatory for one's 
political survival. Similarly, [the system] denied persons perceived to be against the 
President and KANU policies the right to contest electoral seats” (Adar & Munyae, 
2001:3). “The military coup attempt [in] 1982 only accelerated the process of Moi’s 
control of the state and solidified Moi’s authoritarian rule” (Andreassen, noted in Adar 
& Munyae, 2001:4). Likewise, Adar and Munyae (2001:4) asserted that “In 1986 and 
1988, respectively, parliament enacted successive Acts imposing limitations on the 
independence of the judiciary, with far-reaching human rights violations.” An 
example of the latter is that “a former British expatriate judge in Kenya, Mr. Eugene 
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Cotran, openly stated that in cases in which the President has direct interest, the 
government applied pressure on the expatriate judges to make rulings in favour of 
the state” (Africa Watch, noted in Adar & Munyae, 2001:5). The President’s control 
over the parliament and the judiciary meant that he could easily manipulate the 
functions of the two branches of government. Both Parliament and the Judiciary 
ceased to have the constitutional rights to check the excesses of the executive. 
Thus, “there were no ‘checks and balances’ on Moi's personal authority” (Adar & 
Munyae, 2001:4). In 1986, posited Adar and Munyae (2001:4), “President Moi 
controlled parliament through [sham] elections where the ‘queue’ voting system 
replaced the secret ballot system.” To this end, Adar (noted in Adar & Munyae, 
2001:4) argued that “this system encouraged electoral rigging and judicious 
resolutions of electoral disputes were not possible.”  
According to this researcher, Kenya’s governance under President Moi exhibited the 
full trappings of a personified system. In addition, President Kenyatta, who had 
preceded Moi, set the foundation for personification by frustrating cultural and 
traditional ‘checks and balances’ in preference for egocentric governance. Likewise, 
Adar and Munyae (2001:1) argued that “President Moi opted to exploit tribalism” to 
his benefit. I posit that the latter flourished at the expense of the time-tested cultural 
and traditional systems inherent in Kenya, for instance, Ubuntu. From the foregoing 
observation, I contend that it is apparent that governance systems in Kenya under 
President Kenyatta, his successor – Moi, and to an extent Moi’s successor – Kibaki, 
were deficient in accommodating societal value systems that espouse tolerance, 
cooperation and conciliation. I contend that once a national governance system lacks 
such social value systems, then it is apparent that systematic personified leadership 
is probably creeping in. this is because such leadership thrives well in ethical and 
moral voids, as I shall discuss below. 
I now turn to Rwanda as a case study that synchronously provides a contrast with 
Kenya in terms of the dire turmoil it has weathered and a similarity in terms of rapid 
national development and relatively stable socio-economic and political dynamics.  I 
begin with a background from the 1980’s that will form my baseline analysis of 
Rwanda’s contemporary period, the subject matter of this section. This is because I 
have elaborately covered Rwanda’s historical contexts in other sections of this study.  
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According Sellström (1996:62), Rwanda had reached its economic limits towards the 
mid-80s. Experts partly attribute the latter to the dramatic fall in international coffee 
prices down by 75 percent between 1986 and 1992. This fall was significant since 
Rwanda a small but densely populated mainly rural and monoculture country wholly 
depended on external developments. To this end, [the World Bank] compelled 
Rwanda to adopt structural adjustment programmes in 1990. Politically, 
developments in Rwanda were influenced by the consequences of the fall of the 
Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. Since then, international aid to Rwanda has 
increasingly been linked to democratization, good governance and respect for 
human rights. I argue that the above stipulation is very significant in this study since 
the three terms alluded to entwine intricately with concepts in the theory of 
personification. In the subsequent narrative, I explain why this triad was important. 
Sellström (1996:41) maintained that “the internal conditions in Rwanda at the time 
were developing into conflict.” In this context, Sellström argued that since the 
beginning of the 1990s, Habyarimana - the then President of Rwanda, was facing 
strong internal and external political and military pressure for liberalization. As we 
had seen earlier, Sellström posited that “the pressure rotated around transition to a 
multiparty system, more respect for human rights, good governance and there was a 
new addition – fair settlement of the refugees. Such reforms, according to Sellström, 
could only lead to a reduction of the power and privileges enjoyed by the supporters 
of the one-party system, the army, local and national administrations, public 
enterprises etc. One could therefore expect a strong opposition from those groups to 
the restructuring process.” I observe that indeed such tensions ensued upwelling into 
a national crisis. 
The BBC News Service chronicled that the long simmering ethnic tensions in 
Rwanda culminated into the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane in April 1994 
where he was killed. The latter provoked the Hutu militia and elements of the 
Rwandan military to begin the systematic massacre of Tutsi ethnicities prompting the 
RPF to launch a major offensive to halt the massacre (BBC 2018). Sellström 
(1996:53) contended that once the RPF had launched its offensive in on [8 February] 
1994, it progressed rapidly. After only a short time, the RPF overran the major 
military base at Byumba, allowing for the re-supply of arms and ammunition. 
Subsequently, the RPF made an important advance when they occupied the 
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international airport at Kigali and the nearby Kanombe base in May, while they 
captured Kigali in July (Sellström, 1996:53). When the RPF declared the war to be 
over, it announced a cease-fire and formed a new government headed by Pasteur 
Bizimungu, as President and Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister both Hutu. 
Real power, however, rested in the hands of the Tutsi commander of RPF, General 
Paul Kagame who became Vice President and Minister of Defence (Sellström, 
1996:53). Therefore, I highlight that the above chronology of events clearly illustrates 
the intense power dynamics in Rwanda. The pressure on the then regime to improve 
its democratization, good governance and respect for human rights clearly 
highlighted a challenge with the governance of the nation. The latter becomes critical 
when we take into consideration the earlier economic crises driven by international 
dynamics. Operating in tandem, a simultaneous governance and economic 
challenge are precursors for the personification of national systems. At this stage, it 
takes a complete leadership reorientation to extricate a nation from plunging fully into 
personified dispensation as we note in subsequent discussions.  
According to McDoom (2011:2), sixteen years following the culmination of its civil 
war in genocide, Rwanda was described as a country that had successfully exited 
from violence. The country has not experienced serious internal insecurity since the 
events of 1994 and a minor insurgency in 1997 to 1998. Yet a note of caution, 
McDoom maintained, must be sounded since Rwanda’s apparent stability depends 
in large part on the government’s main ruling party, the RPF, which won Rwanda’s 
civil war and ended the genocide, and in particular increasingly on its present 
leadership under President Paul Kagame. McDoom’s caution is very enlightening 
considering that only a few years before Kagame’s forces toppled a leader with 
personified inclination. Now early on in his reign, Kagame was already showing an 
inclination to encourage dependency on his leadership, the clear onset of 
personification. Notwithstanding the latter, Behuria and Goodfellow (2017:2) posit 
that in the two decades after 1994, the RPF government achieved growth rates of 
over 6 percent every year (with the exception of 2003 and 2013). Behuria and 
Goodfellow (2017:2) maintained that his led to praise of diverse groups, ranging from 
international financial institutions (Tumwebaze; Lagarde, noted in Behuria & 
Goodfellow, 2017:2) to mainstream (Collier, noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2) 
and heterodox scholars (Kelsall; Booth et al., noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 
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2017:2). Conventional perspectives on the drivers of economic growth in Rwanda 
vary, but there are three identifiable narratives, all of which tend to oversimplify the 
drivers of growth by placing disproportionate emphasis on one particular feature of 
Rwanda’s development trajectory. Behuria and Goodfellow argued that “the first 
account focuses on Rwanda’s espousal of market reforms, supported by foreign aid, 
as key to its success. A second narrative focuses on the centrality of ‘second-
generation reforms’—i.e. issues such as improved education indicators, social 
protection, and women’s empowerment—as key to the growth success (Lagarde, 
noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2). A third narrative takes a heterodox 
perspective, attributing the country’s success largely to the use of party and military 
owned enterprises to intervene in strategic and long-term ways in the economy” 
(Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, noted in Behuria & Goodfellow, 2017:2). 
Correspondingly, McDoom (2011:2) argues that “following the genocide, Rwanda’s 
new government created a remarkable vision for the re-making of the country. The 
economy was the centrepiece of this vision and the regime has made impressive 
strides to re-build and to re-structure it to meet an ambitious developmental goal. 
The ‘Vision 2020’ sets out the Rwanda’s strategy to transition from a low-income, 
agricultural-based economy to a lower middle-income, more knowledge-based 
economy by the year 2020.” McDoom noted that there is certainly the political will to 
achieve this dream. He argued that “the country’s President, Paul Kagame, appears 
genuinely committed to transforming Rwanda’s economy. He has for example taken 
firm action against corruption, liberalized sectors such as telecoms and banking, 
lowered taxes to attract foreign investment, stabilized inflation, enhanced Rwanda’s 
trade within the region, and reformed land rights.” In the same spirit, Rayarikar 
(2017:2) argued that Rwanda’s new post-genocide government managed to 
completely turnaround the destruction, and loss of human life and capital. Rayarikar 
maintains that “after ending the genocide, the RPF, under Paul Kagame’s 
leadership, undertook a massive effort to rebuild infrastructure, kick start the 
economy, improve socio-economic conditions, and re-develop social cohesion within 
the troubled nation. This period of rapid development continues to this day with the 
same intensity. Rwanda has seen great improvements on indicators, and has 
sustained a GDP growth rate averaging around eight percent annually.” In 
affirmation, Porter (noted in Mann & Berry, 2015:120), claims: “[Rwanda represents] 
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a very rich story about management and leadership and strategy and 
communication.” Rayarikar (2017:3) sums it up in arguing that “considering all of this, 
there seems to be reason enough for Rwanda to be hailed as a model for 
development. Kagame and the RPF engaged in recreating the structures of the state 
that were destroyed. By ending the genocide and securing Rwanda, the RPF 
government ensured their monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The state was 
strengthened and civil society was allowed to grow, albeit with some restrictions.” I 
posit that positive Rwanda’s national transformation as discussed above directly 
relates to individual leadership action channelled through various institutions. I note 
that deliberate leadership actions channelled through independent systems, register 
a comparable positive development like in the case of Rwanda’s economy.  
In line with the above, Mann and Nzayisenga (noted in Mann & Berry, 2015:131) 
contended that “today the strength and seriousness of the Rwandan state is 
reflected in the institutions and agencies spearheading its economic development. 
The Government of Rwanda (GoR) has launched progressive policies and its 
Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). The government 
has created the Rwandan Development Board (RDB), a “pilot agency” modelled on 
Singapore’s Economic Development Board, and the Private Sector Federation, a 
“peak association” that develops the capacity of the private sector. Mann and 
Nzayisenga maintain that “the government uses ‘imihigo’” – a pre-colonial cultural 
practice where an individual sets targets or goals to be achieved within a specific 
period (Rwanda Governance Board 2017), to enforce mandatory ‘results oriented 
performance’ contracts. A plethora of other institutions have been established to 
promote investment, regulate utilities and promote infrastructural development and 
capacity” (Mann & Nzayisenga, noted in Mann & Berry, 2015:131). Analogously, 
MCDoom (2011:2) observed that “underlying these impressive pro-growth policies, 
which have been met with approval by Rwanda’s donors, is the government’s belief 
that economic prosperity is a cornerstone of social stability and it has pinned much 
on this assumption Rwanda’s leadership does recognize that this ambitious 
economic transition remains potentially vulnerable. Yet this dependence on the ruling 
party and increasingly on its leadership raises the question of what would happen in 
their absence.” McDoom raises a pertinent question on the over-centralisation of 
power and institutional functions around Kagagme’s leadership. This study has 
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pointed out that such egoistic tendencies signify the occurrence of personification of 
state systems. I validate this argument in subsequent observations by other authors. 
According to Rayarikar (2017:3), “Kagame has placed himself at the centre of this 
economic miracle.” Rayarikar (2017:16) maintained that “President Paul Kagame 
plays a similar role in being at the centre of the Rwandan state. He argued that 
although Rwanda’s first president after the genocide was another senior RPF leader, 
Pasteur Bizimungu, Kagame was the one with whom all the power was actually 
concentrated. Bizimungu resigned in the year 2000 over dissatisfaction with the way 
in which Kagame stifled dissent. Power became centralised in Kigali and a new 
constitution was adopted in 2003 to address many of the shortcomings of previous 
constitutions of the postcolonial period.” Mitchell (noted in Mann & Berry 2015:5) 
adds that “[at the time] the apolitical approach to Rwandan development partly 
reflected the limited space for political discussions in Rwanda.” To Mitchell, these 
neoliberal currents affected development by constraining spaces where ‘economics’ 
can work. The fact that Rwanda’s economic progress increasingly depended on the 
leadership of Paul Kagame (McDoom 2011:17), portended the onset of all-out 
personification under his regime. 
According to Reyntjens (2018:520), “at the presidential poll of August 2003, 
President Kagame was elected with 95.05 percent of the vote after a campaign 
marred by arrests, “disappearances”, and intimidation. As all parties represented in 
parliament either joined the RPF list or supported Kagame during the presidential 
election, all the directly elected MPs were part of one political platform. A European 
Union observer mission arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that, after the 
elections, “political pluralism is more limited than during the transition period.”” 
Reyntjens maintains that “in reality, the polls returned Rwanda to de facto single 
party rule, and all subsequent elections were deeply flawed. At the end of 2015, a 
constitutional amendment allowed Kagame to run for a third seven-year term in 2017 
(he was elected with almost 99 percent of the vote) and for two five-year terms 
thereafter. As he had effectively been in power since 1994, he could thus potentially 
lead the country for forty years.” To Reyntjens (2018:521), “Rwanda is clearly a 
strong case of hegemonic authoritarianism, where under the guise of seemingly 
regular elections in a multi-party context the polls do not perform any meaningful 
function other than consolidating a dictatorship.” Reyntjens provided the strongest 
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argument describing Kagame’s reign as “authoritarian and dictatorial.” Building on 
the latter, I argue that this study has traced the systematic transformation of 
Rwanda’s post-genocide regime from a benevolent ruler to a personified state 
centralised around the persona of President Kagame. The constraining of political 
and economic spaces marked the crescendo of democratic tolerance and the 
transition to personified reign, yet I find this situation paradoxical. The puzzle is that 
Rwanda is exhibiting personified tendencies and yet the economy is still registering 
significant economic progress and overall national development. As stated 
elsewhere in this study, this paradox is worth exploring further to understand how a 
personified regime can still register successes with national development.  
There several possible ways in which Kagame could be sustaining this paradoxical 
development in Rwanda. One probable way in which Kagame is able to develop a 
cult of personality around him and the RPF leadership is through the indoctrination of 
specific groups of people around the nation in targeted camps, known as the 
ingando solidarity camps. These camps are mandatory for all students who have just 
graduated from high school, and for older Rwandans who have been accused of 
associating with groups that criticise the government or for those who were involved 
with the genocide (Rayarikar 2017:18). I find Rayarikar’s argument pertinent 
because the theory of personification postulates that the process of personifying 
national institutions entails a systematic indoctrination of national organs to the 
extent that they start reflecting the essential character of the leader. Indoctrination is 
a methodical process of politicizing the masses to absolute acquiescence. Rayarikar 
(2017:35) also argued that “Rwanda’s image of embracing capitalism is not clean 
either. Rwanda is far from having anything resembling a free market, despite what 
the World Bank or the Rwandan government strongly assert from time to time. 
Rayarikar’s concern here is that the market is used to drastically expand the RPF’s 
control over Rwanda and its economy. Additionally, business groups that are backed 
by the government get preferential contracts to execute projects that play a role in 
the Rwandan development story.” Rayarikar (2017:56) maintains that “instead of 
being publicly owned entities, these companies have close ties with the RPF and by 
giving contracts to these companies the leadership of the RPF essentially pays itself 
and their associates. The RPF not only exerts almost complete control over the 
Rwandan economy, its actions also amount to corruption and nepotism.” Mann and 
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Berry (2015:139) argue that “the latter runs contrary to the assertion by GoR that 
“economic development as a first step towards security, peace and individual liberty.” 
In the above analysis, we now get a vivid picture of the internal workings of a 
personified system. It is apparent the adherents who are faithful to the personified 
leader also begin indulging in acts that prop up the regime like practicing corruption 
and nepotism, acts that lead to crude accumulation of wealth with the sole objective 
of controlling the economy.  
Correspondingly, Mann and Berry (2015:124) argued that “government firms 
dominate the domestic market and spearhead the much-needed economic 
development in a country with a weak private sector but also contribute to a rapid 
accumulation of wealth among politically connected elite.” For instance, a group 
Kagame’s closest confidants were majority shareholders in TriStar Company (the 
predecessor to Crystal Ventures), which was awarded all road building contracts 
financed by the UNDP and the European Union after the genocide (Prunier, 2009: 
195, cited in Mann & Berry, 2015:124). The growing power of these ‘party-statals’ is 
the result of a privatisation process that has been marked by allegations of non-
competitive tendering and inadequate competition policies (Gökgür, 2012a) (noted in 
Mann & Berry 2015:124). 
However, in another governance and development paradox, Mann and Berry 
(2015:121) quoting Booth and Golooba-Mutebi showed that “there is a 
developmental logic to Rwanda’s form of patrimonialism. This is because the state 
sponsored companies fulfil industrial policy-making and venture capital roles on 
behalf of the state. At the same time, there is a political logic here, as it allows the 
GoR to disperse military power through the allocation of lucrative professional 
opportunities. Awarding positions in the private sector eases transitions out of the 
armed services and ensures loyalty to the RPF”. To Mann and Berry (2015:138), 
economic development is a political process in which powerful groups make 
decisions to change the rules of the game. I observe that whereas Kagame is using 
state enterprises to wring loyalty from his close allies; he is also using the same 
conduit to advance national development. This kind or dispensation poses a 
question that this thesis set out to address: “what happens to the excluded citizens 
who now have no voice in national discourses?” We get a partial indication to the 
foregoing question in Goodfellow’s assertion. 
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According to Goodfellow (2014:7), “Rwanda’s traditionally rural society has been 
undergoing a seismic shift since 1994. The various waves of refugee return in the 
wake of the genocide, alongside a more general shift in favour of city life spurred in 
part by the anonymity it offers, gave urbanisation a decisive push. Indeed, between 
1995 and 2000, Rwanda’s urban growth rate soared to an average of 18 percent 
annually, a figure almost unprecedented in global history since at least 1950.  Here I 
observe that economic factors have precipitated massive rural urban migration that I 
can attribute to personified policies that result in uneven distribution of wealth. In 
other words, Rwanda’s acquiesced citizens have no option other than to trudge to 
urban centres to scavenge on trickle-downs from the politically favoured elites. 
Furthermore, Goodfellow (2014:17) contended that “formal institutional frameworks 
have in many respects been mapped onto existing structures of power and existing 
informal norms deriving from Rwanda’s long history of hierarchy and centralised 
governance. There is also systematic effort to shape informal norms and rules into 
formal ones, as for example reflected in the formalization of activities such as 
Rwanda’s community work day – umuganda, and the institution of imihigo 
performance contracts.” I argue that the formalization of institutional frameworks has 
its advantage, undoubtedly. However, the formalization of the traditional cultural 
systems cited above can have dire consequences on the erosion of cultural identity. 
This will inevitably interfere with the normal development of society, leading to 
disorientation and further acquiescence of the citizenry. This perspective is well 
illustrated in the argument below. Dawson argued that “the governance of change in 
Rwanda has consisted of centrally-designed and strongly-enforced ‘development’ 
policies (Dawson, 2018:12), which have imposed a transformation and placed 
considerable demands on their subjects (Gaynor, noted in Dawson 2018:12). 
Dawson (2018:11) maintained that “the Rwandan political system shows little sign of 
transformation to more inclusive governance. With the aim to transform Rwandans 
into ‘marketised’, modern individuals, many restrictions have been placed on their 
own valued practices (for subsistence, social, cultural and economic purposes).  
In explicit detail, Dawson (2018:11) highlighted how GoR excluded the majority of 
Batwa both from their traditional forest dwellings and livelihoods on one hand, and 
on from the economic diversification and market integration promoted for other rural 
inhabitants. Although some Batwa appeared supportive of the Government’s 
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modernization policies, many more perceive this to be a crucial time for both their 
culture and ability to meet basic needs. In light of the foregoing, Dawson (2018:12) 
argued that the removal of ethnic identities in Rwanda represented a democratic 
paradox as promotion of equality has precluded recognition and representation of 
their specific needs required to achieve meaningful poverty alleviation. Dawson 
maintains that the recognition of the Batwa’s indigenous status or the historical 
injustices surrounding their dispossession and detachment from ancestral lands and 
traditional practices is not on the horizon through either national politics or 
international sustainable development governance. I argue that the above example 
clearly shows the impact of disenfranchising a vulnerable population under the 
pretext of formalizing institutional frameworks. Such interruptions in the rural social 
fabric are key factors that provoke massive migration to urban areas. 
In consonance with the above, Traniello (2008:30) argued that “in Rwanda’s case, 
the state represented the prize. In the case of ethnic rivalries, a critical predictor of 
severe ethnic conflicts is the ownership of the state or specifically the relationship 
between the ethnic group and the state. When the group that owns the state controls 
the land, the resources and the distribution, the state becomes the prize. The 
question surrounding institutions engineered with power-sharing concepts is whether 
they can actually encourage groups to accommodate each other, or will there always 
be a zero-sum game?” Traniello (2008:38) maintains that “Rwanda represents the 
worst case scenario that played into almost every criticism of the concept. The 
power-sharing settlement, the Arusha Accords, failed to mitigate violence because it 
lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership, a shared 
destiny and the will to accommodate.” Traniello’s argument refocuses our attention 
to the commitment of leaders to advancing inclusive national discourses. That said, 
Kagame’s brand of personified leadership that constrains governance on the one 
hand but promotes perceptible development on the other hand needs further scrutiny 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In conclusion, this section provided an empirical demonstration of the deliberate 
centralisation of governance by both Rwanda’s and Kenya’s post-independence 
leaders. In both countries, once the leaders started practicing personified 
governance, they implemented policies that totally disregarded the African cultural 
traditional institutions that formerly fostered a mutually appreciative relationship 
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between the leader and the subjects. The erosion of cultural identities let to utter 
disorientation of the citizen’s further entrenching ‘acquiescence.’ I also observed that 
in both countries, whereas parliament and the judiciary have the constitutional rights 
to check the excesses of the executive, they became subsumed in the vortex of 
personified governance. Thus, both countries demonstrated limited or no ‘checks 
and balances’ on their respective leaders’ personal authority. I contend that once a 
national governance system lacks such social value systems, then it is apparent that 
systematic personified leadership has probably crept in.  
Lastly, Rwanda’s case study highlights that personification transitions through a 
series of distinctive events that take different dimensions depending on the context. 
This notion actually validates the theory of personification. For instance, Rwanda 
went through an economic crisis that the then leader managed poorly, and this 
quickly culminated into the need for the regime to improve its democratization, good 
governance and respect for human rights. Essentially, the economic crisis directly 
correlated with the failure of governance in the country. I established that under such 
situations, it takes a complete leadership reorientation to extricate a nation from 
plunging fully into decadent personified dispensation. Immediately after the 
genocide, Rwanda actually seemed to demonstrate a complete leadership re-
orientation. However, currently the Rwandese leader has posed a paradox on how 
personified governance can actually advance positive national development. This 
grey area needs future exploration. In an attempt to shed more light on this paradox, 
the next section will examine personified leadership governance in East Africa. 
4.4 Personified leadership and governance in East Africa 
This section seeks to examine the intricacies and dynamics of personified leadership 
and governance in East Africa that have become apparent since the dawn of 
independence. Using case studies from Kenya and Rwanda, the researcher 
interrogates the role of national leaders in nurturing or retarding development. The 
researcher rationalises that the primary responsibility of a country’s leadership is the 
creation of enabling environments that are conducive for national development. 
Obasola (noted in Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012:142) underscored the point that “It is 
instructive to note that no nation has achieved meaningful development socially, 
politically or economically without the input of or effective leadership.” Thus, “in 
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contemporary discourse, the concept of leadership and governance has attracted a 
wider spread interest as they serves as the pivot on which social, political and 
economic structures rest” (Afegbua & Adejuwon, 2012:142). Accordingly, I chose 
Kenya as the subject for a case study because the country has maintained 
remarkable stability and development, despite encountering significant changes in its 
political system and a myriad of regional crises on its flanks. On the other hand, I 
chose Rwanda as a case study subject because it has made significant strides in the 
area of governance and development. The country has also endeavoured to 
revolutionise the concept of leadership across the board. 
According to Mutula, Muna and Koma (2013:263), “following Independence in 1963, 
Jomo Kenyatta, the first President of the Republic of Kenya, concentrated on 
amassing political power under the control of the central government.” Mutula et al. 
(2013:270) maintained that “during his regime, Kenyatta grew very hostile to those 
who arrayed criticism against his governance policies. Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta 
in 1978, continued this legacy by tightening the control of Kenyan public life in all 
spheres, including politics, administration, economy and management of public 
finance with little, if any, accountability.” “In 1995, Kenyan citizens lost their jobs if 
they gave as little as press coverage through the state media to any person who was 
out of favour with the then government of Daniel arap Moi (Maathai, 1995).” This 
occurred even when the subject that person was dealing with was essential to 
Kenya’s national development agenda. President Moi became increasingly 
authoritarian in 1982 after a failed coup attempt (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). 
Moi championed the “Nyayo philosophy,” which means “following the leader” and 
was, as he claimed, a distinctive African tradition of visionary leadership under a 
strong centralised state (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). “Consequently, this 
central control was evident in the imbalance in regional development” (Mutula et al., 
2013:263). “Economically, Kenya suffered under his Presidency, mainly due to 
mismanagement” (New World Encyclopaedia, 2013). In the same respect, Mutula et 
al. (2013:263) argued that “the abuse of power and inefficiency of Presidents 
Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki left Kenya susceptible to poor social, political and 
economic development.” “These leaders rewarded political loyalty while exercising 
social and economic marginalization or exclusion of those who showed resistance” 
(Amutabi, noted in Mutula et al., 2013:265). 
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Drawing lessons from the above literature, I contend that the centralisation of power, 
coupled with egocentric actions of the respective presidents, is indicative of their 
personification of leadership. From the narratives, it is apparent that the presidents 
manipulated power and resources for personal gain, at the expense of the Kenyan 
citizenry. Illustratively, “although Moi practiced a distinctive African style of 
leadership, he used his leadership style as an excuse for despotic, corrupt, 
autocratic rule that did nothing to raise the living standards of the majority of 
Kenyans and even denied human rights and civil liberty” (New World Encyclopaedia, 
2013). Particularly, Mwenzwa and Misati (2014:246) asserted that “centralized 
planning excluded grassroots leaders and local communities from decision-making 
and implementation of planned development projects. Consequently, beneficiaries 
have for the most part been passive as opposed to active partners in development 
which has given rise to heightened dependency.” Accordingly, with respect to the 
second question of this thesis, this study notes that the personified leadership styles 
of the past presidents in Kenya adversely influenced governance and development 
policies. The researcher argues that the intrinsic personae of the leaders precipitated 
the poor accountability, maladministration and deprivation meted out upon Kenyan 
citizens by the regimes. The common denominator among all the past leaders 
practising personification in Kenya is egocentric hunger for power and wealth.  
To resolve the above anomalies, Gatimu and Wagacha (2015) contended that “the 
Kenyan constitution of 2010 proposed to revolutionize the way in which the country's 
political leadership interacts and functions by devolving power to county 
governments.” In this respect, Kivuva (noted in Mutula et al., 2013:266) argued that 
“the executive office in Kenya has been constitutionally redesigned to make it more 
accountable to other arms of government, thus ensuring that functional separation of 
power exists.” Analogously, Khaunya et al. (2015:27) posited that “under the 
devolution of power in the new constitution, county Governments in Kenya have 
indeed made significant progress in involvement of stakeholders on development at 
County level.” Khaunya et al. maintained that “Kenya engages various stakeholders 
in decision-making thus enhancing acceptance of various development initiatives at 
County Governments, which minimizes resistance from beneficiaries.” Similarly, 
Khaunya et al. contended that “Kenya has a more accountable political system in 
place with ‘checks and balances’ at all levels of the political divide.” 
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However, “the post-2010 political leadership has been unable to adapt to the 
devolved system of governance, which calls for transparency and accountability 
Instead, leaders continue to engage in a way that is combative and confrontational, 
punctuated with negative political posturing” (Gatimu & Wagacha, 2015). Khaunya et 
al. (2015:27) “established that the Counties faced a myriad of challenges. Key 
among these is the apparent lack of political goodwill from the National Government 
to fully devolve certain functions.” Similarly, Gatimu and Wagacha (2015) argued that 
“this continued form of abrasive political engagement shows that the country's 
leadership has been neither dynamic nor innovative enough to measure up to the 
new political systems.” Likewise, the Kenyan leadership has not been able to unite 
the nation to rally around important issues like deliberation over national policies and 
strategies. For instance, “the governance style of the current political leadership has 
severely restricted accountability” (Khaunya et al., 2015:28) and “entrenched 
impunity within the public sector” (Gatimu & Wagacha, 2015). Therefore, “the 
inability or unwillingness of the political leadership to become dynamic and 
innovative, and adapt to new institutional mechanisms, threatens to erode the 
principles of good governance in Kenya” (Gatimu & Wagacha, 2015). [As a result of 
the reluctance to transform exhibited by the leadership], “there is a strong perception 
among the Kenyan public that the National government simply cannot be trusted to 
redistribute resources equitably” (Khaunya et al., 2015:35). 
From the above narrative, the researcher points out the enduring spill-over effect of 
personification on societal structures. The notion that leaders elected under the new 
2010 Kenyan Constitution are still facing challenges with persuasive transitioning to 
transparency and accountability signifies the indelible imprint of personification. The 
researcher argues that it takes a while to unravel and realign personified institutional 
systems that have rotated around the leader for a while. In the case of Kenya, the 
citizens have become acquiesced to such an extent that the achievement of good 
governance which the new constitution champions may face poor prospects, for 
now. As hypothesised by this study, citizens who have been influenced extensively 
by personified regimes over the years have metamorphosed to espouse the 
philosophy. Accordingly, Mwenzwa (noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:246) posited 
that “since independence, the governance of development in Kenya has faced 
numerous challenges leading to poor economic performance and hence negative 
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consequences on the country.” In particular, “centralized planning resulted in 
grassroots leaders and local communities to play an insignificant role in decision-
making and implementation of development projects” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 
2014:246).  
Turning to Rwanda, Professor Twagilimana (2016) argued that “following the 1994 
genocide [that pitted the Hutu ethnic group] against the Tutsi ethnic group, Rwanda 
became a physical, moral and spiritual wasteland doomed in the eyes of many, to be 
a failed state. After 100 days of a killing frenzy that took the lives of more than one 
million people, destroyed the social fabric of society and stripped the country of 
resources, the nation looked destitute and in ultimate crisis mode.” Kigabo (2010:6) 
contended that “the war had destroyed the entire system ranging from the economy 
through security, justice [framework] and infrastructure.” Positively, Twagilimana 
(2016) noted that “Rwanda has now risen from the ashes to be a reference in 
successful and exemplary post-conflict recovery in various domains, including 
economic development, reconciliation, good governance, women’s empowerment 
and gender equality, good business environment, and more.” Twagilimana 
maintained that “even though [others] would probably point to a system rather than 
to the effort of one individual to justify Rwanda’s achievements, many people have 
argued and indeed documented facts that Rwanda’s rebirth was spearheaded by the 
strong leadership, resolute political will, and an unwavering sense of purpose, 
urgency and resilience of one person: President Paul Kagame.” In consonance with 
the later view, Kigabo (2010:17) posited that “Rwanda’s impressive achievements 
over the past [21] years are attributable to good leadership committed to finding 
durable solutions for Rwandan’s people despite important challenges.” 
With respect to the above, I argue that the fact that Professor Twagilimana (2016) 
attributed Rwanda’s success to President Kagame, rather than an efficient system 
as mooted by Kagame, is strong circumstantial evidence of the systematised 
personification of Rwanda. In other words, even the highest echelons of academia 
cannot separate President Kagame’s inferred leadership skills from the country’s 
successful development. I concur that it takes great leaders to achieve success in 
view of the pace and scale of Rwanda. However, I agree, as Kagame himself 
asserted, that leaders work through systems and institutions to achieve overall 
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national objectives. I maintain that national systems become even more effective 
with the incumbent leader’s espousal of citizen-driven governance. Accordingly, I 
contend that realists like Kigabo (2010) look at the leadership factor more broadly 
rather than simply tying it to one person. Kigabo’s reasoning motivates the 
participation of other collaborators instead of exalting a unique leader, which may 
possibly advance personification of national leadership by the President. 
A scholarly article by Wilber (2011) posited that “Rwanda is the first country where 
women constitute more than half of the political leadership.” Wilber asserted that this 
achievement was not an accident. Rwanda prioritised women, introducing structures 
and processes to advance them at all levels of leadership. For instance, in 2008, 
Rwandans elected women to 56 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
making Rwanda the first nation to break the halfway mark in a lower house of 
parliament, and placing it eleven percentage points above second-place Sweden, as 
of December 2010. Wilber maintained that Rwanda intentionally advanced women in 
political leadership, designing innovative mechanisms and drawing on established 
best practices. However, Wilber emphasises that “it is important to acknowledge the 
pivotal role of President Kagame in ensuring this success.” His direct support is 
essential [to champion support for women]. Political arguments aside, [Kagame] 
continues to advocate for female leadership. A research study done in December 
2009 by the Institute for Inclusive Security in Rwanda found that [Kagame] was the 
singular force most cited by Rwandans [as the personality behind] women’s 
advances. Similarly, Randell and McCloskey (2014:108) posited that “Rwanda is 
widely known for its global lead in the representation of women among decision-
makers and in Parliament: the only country with a substantial 64 percent of women in 
its Chamber of Deputies.” 
The researcher argues that the compelling espousal of gender-sensitive policies by 
Rwanda, particularly to empower women despite the radical and cultural challenges, 
signifies strong leadership. I argue that by exercising authoritarian leadership over 
Rwandese institutions and political processes, President Kagame has managed to 
ensure the empowerment of women. Emancipated women play a crucial role in 
national development, especially in a country like Rwanda that is steadily recovering 
from a degenerate past. Involving women in leadership roles gives them confidence 
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to address issues that affect their livelihoods. Randell and McCloskey (2014:107) 
corroborated the researcher’s line of reasoning in their assertion that “gender 
equality and women’s empowerment are critical components of any program for 
sustainable development and poverty reduction. In Rwanda, where agriculture is the 
backbone of the domestic economy, women are much more likely than men to work 
in agricultural occupations are, and are more likely to depend on their farm work for 
income.” In addition, this study argues that Rwanda’s phenomenal economic growth 
and development success exemplifies the paradox with personified leadership. 
According to Coakley, Raschke, Twiss, Ovalle and Samaras (2013:57), “[President] 
Kagame’s extraordinary leadership is behind much of the energy and optimism in 
Rwanda.” Coakley et al. (2013:57) maintained that “unlike many African leaders, 
Kagame’s leadership is an example of disciplined focus with zero tolerance for 
corruption and a mixture of social engineering and innovative social 
entrepreneurship. Kagame has developed a vision 2020 to transform Rwanda into a 
modern and self-sufficient economy. The vision among other critical factors 
emphasizes community-based development.” To Coakley et al. (2013:57), “the 
combined development confirms a new future for Rwanda.” 
Still on the subject of leadership and development in Rwanda, Kigabo (2010:6) 
posited that “the fundamental causes of this decade of quick development are most 
likely the following: charismatic leadership, rich and positive ideology, strict political 
will, and lessons from the genocide and Rwandan history.” I argue that a leadership 
is charismatic when it works to serve the general interest, rather than egoistic and 
selfish interests. Such leadership is always committed to finding durable solutions to 
community problems. I find Kigabo’s definition of charismatic leadership particularly 
pertinent to this study. Kigabo argued that “such a leader should serve the general 
interest of the population rather than egoistic and selfish interests” – attributes that 
this study associates with personified leadership. On this note, Kigabo (2010:7) 
contended that “since taking over power, Rwanda Patriotic Front leaders (RPF) [the 
political wing of Rwanda Patriotic Army] have worked to re-establish social harmony 
and promote sustainable economic development. For these purposes, the RPF has 
created mechanisms, institutions, principles and practices to serve the country 
efficiently. The results include the reestablishment of security, economic and social 
reconstruction and promotion of the private sector and civil society.” Kigabo (2010:8) 
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maintained that “the government of Rwanda has also invested much in good 
governance, an important administrative reform based on decentralization.”  
Again, we see an allusion that systems and institutions contribute to national 
development in Rwanda, arguably, under the able leadership of the President. In the 
foregoing example, I note an empirical paradox that personified institutions can 
actually advance national development. The key to this paradox is the leadership 
action. I therefore argue that under personified systems, a leader can build strong 
institutions that depend on the leader. I also observe the concept of good 
governance being directly linked to Rwanda’s phenomenal development and efficient 
administration. The latter accentuates this study’s theory of change that good 
leadership results in good governance and development. Yet again, I observe the 
paradox that personified leadership can actually engender good governance. By 
deduction, the researcher argues that ‘good governance’ in Rwanda is attributable to 
President Kagame’s good leadership skills. This duality in President Kagame makes 
for an ethical paradox that demonstrates how leaders can intentionally abuse or use 
their power beneficially to foster national development. 
4.5 Leadership and national development in East Africa 
In this section, I set the tone of my discussion on the subject of ‘leadership and 
national development’ by drawing inspiration from the study by Gray and McPherson 
on the subject. Gray and McPherson (2001:712) believed that the quality of 
leadership and its evolution (or non-evolution) has a major impact on policy change 
and hence, growth and development. Gray and McPherson (2001:731) maintained 
that “visionary leadership by an individual with political power or by a small group to 
whom the leader delegates power is critical to institutional development as well as to 
adopting and sustaining policies that will accelerate an African country’s economic 
growth.” Similarly, Mkapa (2010:20) argued that “discourse on African development 
increasingly focuses on capacity for leadership and governance, as well as its role to 
engender economic growth, promote development, and ensure poverty reduction.” 
I agree with the above argument to the extent that it aligns with the theory of 
personification in highlighting that individuals or their designees are responsible for 
advancing national development. It is also interesting to note that Gray and 
208 
 
McPherson link institutional development and economic growth directly to leadership 
actions. Despite the importance of this subject, my online research indicates that 
there is no composite literature that bridges the phrase ‘leadership’ and ‘national 
development in East Africa’ to produce a holistic picture on the subject. Accordingly, 
this section will therefore discuss and analyse the subject of leadership and national 
development in East Africa, with Kenya and Rwanda serving as case studies. 
Ultimately, this section will help us to understand the evolution of personified 
leadership in East Africa and its impact on national development. 
The concept of leadership in the East Africa region has traversed a spectrum from 
modest political dispensations, punctuated by fragile democracy, through to extreme 
situations being deposed by violent military interventions. According to Fouéré, 
Maupeu and Nolan (2015:7), “many leaders across East Africa, most of whom are 
former guerrillas, gained power following armed insurgencies.” Fouéré et al. (2015) 
maintained that their modes of government often rely on a dominant-party paradigm; 
the party creates a veritable party-State that prevents democratic culture from 
emerging. They also argue that the long history of military élites draws attention to 
decisive political figures, since this has led to similar governance forms across 
greater East Africa. Nevertheless, according to Fouéré et al. (2015), “these are not 
traditional authoritarian regimes; they adapt more readily to international constraints 
that require democratisation and neoliberalism. They have also proven more 
effective in their quest for legitimacy, drawing upon development projects, security, 
or even representativeness.”  
In East Africa, military interventions have so far spared Kenya and Tanzania. For this 
reason, the economic base, infrastructure and social fabric in these countries are 
relatively intact. Focusing on our case study, Kenya, we need to delve deep into its 
past to understand the genesis of its leadership with respect to the country’s national 
development. Gray and McPherson (2001:713) contended that “earlier [in her 
history], Kenya showed potential as a star of African development. The quality of its 
leadership has much to do with its continuing failure to realize that potential.” 
According to Booth et al. (2014:viii), “the intermingling of political and economic 
power in Kenya has always been intense, but has taken different forms under the 
Presidencies of Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and now Uhuru 
Kenyatta.” Booth et al. (2014) maintained that “the intermingling of business and 
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politics is not a recent phenomenon in Kenya. It has historical antecedents that reach 
back to the colonial period.” At the same time, Booth et al. argued that “cronyism has 
transitioned through various distinct phases since independence and continues to 
evolve.” 
Within the above context, Gray and McPherson (2001:713) posited that “in 1966 
Kenya’s founding father, Kenyatta, made Moi his Vice President, largely to restrain 
the ambitions of more prominent candidates. The national assembly had the 
constitutional obligation to ratify the succession of Moi or designate another 
President within 90 days of Kenyatta’s death. The assembly chose not to rock the 
boat.” Gray and McPherson maintained that “President Kenyatta also tacitly 
encouraged a chain of events that imposed two burdens on Kenya’s economy. First, 
it was under Kenyatta that corruption became a macroeconomic phenomenon. 
Second, Kenyatta initiated a pattern of state involvement in economic affairs that 
resulted in a plethora of inefficient state enterprises.” Similarly, Gray and McPherson 
argued that “oriented toward import substitution, these enterprises continue to 
burden Kenya with an inefficient industrial structure, which impedes its entry into 
export markets.” Likewise, Gray and McPherson posited that “Kenyatta largely saw 
his role as that of a traditional chief, maintaining political stability, distributing benefits 
to the population within the resource constraints as defined by his finance ministry 
without stirring parliamentary and popular criticism.” I argue that Gray and 
McPherson present an interesting observation that Kenyatta had [but did not use his] 
political influence to implement the policies needed to raise Kenya’s economic 
growth rate. This action opens room for speculation on Kenyatta’s probable objective 
at the time. However, considering his personified inclinations, one cannot rule out a 
well-calculated scheme for advancing egocentric rather than egalitarian policies. 
The discourse in the above chapter accentuates the hypothesis mooted by the 
theory of personification, as discussed further below. Meredith (cited in Mkapa, 
2010:40) noted that “as founding fathers, the first generation of nationalist leaders—
Kenyatta [and other contemporaries]—all enjoyed great prestige and high honour. 
They were seen to personify the States they led and swiftly took advantage to 
consolidate their control. On this note, I argue that in characteristic personified style, 
President Kenyatta anointed Moi as his successor, thus denying other more able 
candidates the opportunity for democratic elections.” In identifying another 
210 
 
personified characteristic, I argue that Kenyatta allowed the proliferation of 
corruption, largely as a reward to incentivise his network of loyalists. The 
consequence of Kenyatta’s actions had a direct impact on national policies that 
shaped the trajectory of national development. For instance, “during Moi’s era, 
Kenya registered zero average per capita economic growth rate in the years 1991–
1997” (Gray & McPherson, 2001:714). Despite such overall national stagnation, the 
subjects loyal to the incumbent leader in personified dispensations seem to thrive as 
highlighted below. 
According to Nzau (2010:105), “the ambitions of leaders and ethnic loyalties centred 
on these leaders, largely conditions the leadership of political parties in Kenya.” 
Nzau maintained that “many of the parties rely on a handful of patrons, usually also 
their leaders/founders, for the finances needed for maintaining their activities; they 
increasingly became susceptible to attempts at building cults of personality and 
internal structures of patronage.” Likewise, Nzau contended that “Party leadership in 
Kenya is poorly institutionalised, grossly tribal and corrupt. Thus, to these political 
leaders, elections are no more than exercises to rubber-stamp illegitimacy, and poor 
governance.” Nzau believed that “this type of leadership has stifled national 
development in the country since independence. Accordingly, fifty years after 
independence, Kenya continues to suffer chronically from immense poverty, 
corruption, dependency on foreign aid and lack of a national sense of direction.”  
Equally, the post-independence adoption of a Unitary Constitution affected Kenya’s 
national development. Maxon (noted in Nzau, 2010:100) argued that “there seemed 
to be a move right from independence to introduce a strongly centralized governance 
structure.” In Maxon’s view, “two important aspects characterized the Kenyatta 
regime as far as development planning was concerned.” Maxon points out that “first, 
is that it supported – at least in principle – the ideas of African socialism; and second 
it was guided by highly centralized development planning which took a top-bottom 
approach that adopted what would be termed state capitalism; some kind of 
socialism with capitalist tendencies.” Kinyanjui and Misaro echo Nzau’s arguments 
discussed above. According to Kinyanjui and Misaro (2013:183), “while Kenya’s 
highly centralised political system has resulted in the widespread social-economic 
marginalization of rural areas, very little attention has been focused on analysing the 
relationship between socioeconomic marginalization and popular participation in 
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management of constituency development funds (CDF) geared towards rural poverty 
alleviation.” Accordingly, Kinyanjui and Misaro corroborated Maxon’s assertion cited 
above, that the over-centralisation of government structures has posed challenges to 
the realisation of the intended benefits of decentralisation to rural people in Kenya. 
I posit that the adoption of a unitary constitution was a means used by the incumbent 
leader to perpetuate a personified regime. Like other discussions on the subject that 
I covered in preceding sections, Nzau rightly pointed out that the net effect of the 
personified constitution affected Kenya’s national development. Similarly, I argue 
that the centralisation of power grants the leader outright control and influence over 
national development outcomes. I argue that the top-bottom approach to 
development planning, which was a choice instrument of Kenya’s personified 
regime, was exclusionary as it cut out other grassroots citizens from participating in 
national discourses. However, the top-down approach seems to have been remedied 
when Kenya adopted a decentralisation governance structure. According to 
Kinyanjui and Misaro (2013:186), the government moved swiftly to avert the regional 
imbalances caused by political marginalisation that was playing a central role in tax 
collection and distribution to the remote rural areas, which are vested with the 
mandate of prioritising their own development goals. This has indeed reduced the 
disparities of the top-down approach to development, thus giving the rural 
communities more autonomy in handling their needs. Although the central 
government still plays a key role in overall nationwide development, the rural people 
now have a stake. 
I argue that whereas the central government certainly has a key role to play in the 
development of the country, the extent of its involvement in decentralised structures 
is critical. Under personified governance, the undemocratic concentration of power in 
the hands of the leader negates the involvement of the masses in economic 
development, and thus curtails efficiency, accountability, and transparency in 
resource allocations for economic development, resulting in dire social inequality. In 
a study conducted in rural Kenya, Essendi, Madise and Matthews (2014:72) 
corroborated my point of view covered above in their assertion that “national 
development could better be achieved once individual, household and community 
development needs are met.” They maintained that “having improved leadership and 
other systems at national level was important but not sufficient unless people’s 
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livelihoods at household and community level are met.” According to Essendi et al., 
“an empowered populace would best participate in governance and leadership, a 
situation that would be difficult to achieve in the absence of improved capabilities for 
the populace.” I appreciate the argument by Essendi et al. that draws critical 
attention to the importance of synchronising leadership and community 
empowerment in national governance. However, as stated below, I highlight how a 
personified inclination is a singular factor that can pose a huge deterrence to national 
development. 
According to Brodén (2015:15), “until the late 1970s, Kenya was at a wave of 
economic progress thanks to exports and aid, although cracks against Kenyatta’s 
leadership started to appear. Kenyatta’s approach became increasingly autocratic as 
his politics became capitalistic and pro-Western, although African socialists wanted 
to nationalize property. Kenyatta and the family were very wealthy and the Kikuyu 
elite, particularly the Kiambu Mafia had taken advantage of the reform that 
redistributed land.” Although the then leadership purported to be following socialist 
ideals, Leys (noted in Nzau, 2010:101) asserted that “in reality there was nothing 
socialist about Kenya’s development and its leadership at independence.” Okondo 
(noted in Nzau, 2010:102) posited that “in terms of institutional development, the 
performance of these institutions as far as socio-economic development in Kenya is 
concerned left a lot to be desired. This is because their performance was dismal and 
wrought with nepotism and grand corruption; especially in agriculture, transport and 
communication, commerce and industry that are crucial for the socio-economic 
development of the country.” Nzau (2010:102) argued that “this state of affairs 
enhanced the role of the Civil Service particularly the Provincial Administration and 
other forms of state coercive apparatus as instruments of regime control rather than 
national development.”  
In the above discussions, Nzau argued that the autocracy, nepotism and corruption 
perpetrated by Kenya’s leaders were squarely to blame for the poor national 
development. The facts that Nzau cites as root causes of underdevelopment are 
factors that I have argued are characteristic of personified regimes. In other words, I 
posit that the leader first concentrates power around themselves, appoints loyalists 
to shore up the regime, and indulges in acts of corruption to reward cronies. Kagema 
(2018:5) echoes Nzau’s position in his assertion that a small elite in Kenya controls 
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power, leading to poverty and class struggles among the majority of the population. 
Once in a position of leadership, [entitlement] becomes a right with little regard being 
given to the responsibilities of office. He maintained that no sustainable development 
could be attained where only a few selfish leaders control the national economy, 
while the majority of the citizens are languishing in poverty (Kagema, 2018:8). In 
citing the example of Kenya, Kagema (2018:9) argued that the majority of the 
leaders are selfish, self-centred, greedy, and only concerned with themselves, to the 
detriment of the impoverished masses. No sustainable development can be attained 
when a nation has such leaders. 
Minja (2011:1) “lamented that the failure of Kenyan political leaders and executives 
to provide moral leadership has disappointed citizens. This action that has rendered 
national goals unmet, has affected political and economic development.” Minja 
maintained that “If Kenya is to develop both politically and economically and to 
achieve Vision 2030, leadership must transform to start acting ethically.” According 
to Minja, “the debate in Kenyan situation is whether the country actually has moral 
leaders who can be depended on to provide ethical leadership and if they exist, are 
they afraid or just reluctant to provide that leadership especially in the public sector.” 
The focus on leadership ethics in Kenya touches on the heart of personified 
governance. I find inspiration in the fact that Minja implored leaders to act ethically; 
however, under personified dispensations, a complete behavioural change might be 
able to realign and transform the leader’s perception of how to interact with the 
country’s subjects. Like Minja, Kagema (2018:1) argued that the “installation of 
competent, empathetic, equitable, and forward-thinking leaders will successfully 
guide the sustainable development of emerging African economies like Kenya.” The 
fact that Kagema pointed at leadership as the crux of development aligns well with 
the thinking of this thesis. However, I underscore the point that all the virtues of the 
ideal leader that Kagema cited are secondary outcomes of the leader’s cognitive 
development trajectory. In the next paragraph, I turn to Rwanda, a country with 
strong leadership credentials, to understand the dynamics between leadership and 
national development. 
The Hutu uprising, also known as the ‘Rwandan Revolution’ is particularly significant 
in fostering the understanding of leadership and development in Rwanda. First, 
however, we need to understand the genesis of the social dynamics in Rwanda. 
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According to Mayersen (2012:3), “the German colonial authorities utilised a system 
of indirect rule, which effectively reinforced the pre-existing complex and highly 
organised Tutsi monarchical system (the mwamiship), and the power of the Tutsi 
aristocracy. When Belgium assumed control of Rwanda, it too implemented a system 
of indirect rule, utilising the indigenous Tutsi elite to implement a range of policies. 
Over time, the model of indirect rule was substantially modified to meet Belgian 
economic and developmental goals.” The primary interest for this study is in the role 
of ‘external forces in shaping power dynamics in Rwanda, and ultimately its 
leadership’. In an ethnically charged locus like Rwanda, by allying with the Tutsi, the 
colonialists empowered one ethnic group against the other. I argue that in this 
regard, the highly organised monarchical Tutsi advanced in national leadership 
acumen faster than the Hutu did. The fact that colonialists used the Tutsi to advance 
their development goals further cemented their dominion in the prevailing power 
play. As I discuss in subsequent paragraphs, this situation provides fertile ground for 
breeding personified inclinations. 
In 1926, the Belgians introduced a system of ethnic identity cards, differentiating 
Hutus from Tutsis. Mamdani (noted in Chirwa, 2015:109) referred to this as “the 
origin of the racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi.” Chirwa (2015:110) posited that “the 
polarization between the two groups escalated, and in 1957, Hutu formed the 
PARMEHUTU (Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus) while Rwanda was still 
under Belgian rule. The PARMEHUTU, founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology, had 
the desire to reclaim Rwanda for the Hutu people.” According to Mayersen (2012:8), 
“inter-ethnic tensions in Rwanda were high throughout 1959.” Consequently, 
Atterbury (noted in Mayersen, 2012:8) contended that “the sudden death of the 
Rwandan monarch in July and the appointment of his replacement in controversial 
circumstances contributed to an atmosphere akin to a ‘simmering cauldron’.” 
Atterbury maintained that “by November the same year, it only took a spark to ignite 
the Rwandan revolution. Impulsively, Rwanda rapidly plummeted into violence in 
which the Hutu burning of Tutsi huts spread rapidly.” Chirwa (2015:110) posited that 
“the ‘wind of destruction’ occurred, wherein the PARMEHUTU rebelled against the 
Tutsi elites by massacring many Tutsi. As a result, up to 150,000 Tutsis fled to 
Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC.” In response, “the Tutsi reaction was swift, 
organised and politically impelled” (United Nations; Lemarchand; Lemarchand, as 
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noted by Mayersen, 2012:8). I note from the foregoing that the undemocratic brutal 
preservation of individual or communal hegemony has personified connotations. As 
discussed in the conceptual segment of this study, we shall see in subsequent 
paragraphs that his dispensation is untenable.  
Newbury (noted in Chirwa, 2015:110) pointed out that “[the 1960s] was a time of 
discrimination for both Tutsis inside Rwanda and in exile. In 1960, Hutus won the 
municipal elections that the Belgians organized, and after a 1961 coup in Gitarama, 
they declared Rwanda a republic and abolished the monarchy. PARMEHUTU 
leader, Gregoire Kayibanda, became the first President of Rwanda in 1962, when 
Belgians granted official independence and national elections were held.” 
“Unfortunately, oppression and violence against Tutsis continued, and the refugee 
crisis worsened (Chirwa, 2015:110).” From the above discussions, I highlight the 
point that the Belgians did not properly conceptualise the fragile relationship between 
the Hutu and Tutsi. As a result, they triggered the outward manifestation of the 
intrinsic inclination of the two ethnicities. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, 
unrestrained resorting to ethnic differentiation, as in the case of Rwanda, frequently 
plays into the realm of personified politics. Thus, ethnicity simply unites several 
individuals with personified inclinations. The result is the emergence of a leader with 
a personified agenda, premised on ethnic foundations. I argue that instead of 
unifying the country, PARMEHUTU leader with personified inclinations, Gregoire 
Kayibanda, escalated repression against the Tutsi.  
A 1973 coup against Kayibanda brought another Hutu, General Juvénal 
Habyarimana, to power (Chirwa, 2015:111). “Just like the PARMEHUTU, Juvénal 
Habyarimana’s leadership also stressed the dominance of Hutus in the social, 
political, and economic spheres of Rwanda” (Rayarikar, 2017:11). “From 1990 
onward, under the leadership of a small clique surrounding Habyarimana and his 
wife known as the akazu (literally, the small house), various dynamics fostered the 
radicalization of prejudice. First, the FPR threat was extended to all Tutsi” (Uvin, 
1999:260). However, an economic downturn during Habyarimana’s reign almost 
brought Rwanda to a complete societal collapse. Chirwa (2015:111) contended that 
the resulting economic hardships caused increased competition for scarce resources 
between the Hutu and Tutsi. Instead of acknowledging the government’s role in the 
economic deterioration, it blamed the Tutsis for the country’s social and economic 
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woes (Kamola, noted in Chirwa, 2015:116). The situation quickly degenerated into 
an all-out ethnic war, where the Hutu attempted to exterminate the Tutsi through 
genocide. This elicited the need for Tutsi to save themselves from extinction. I 
underscore the point that the personified dispensation exhibited by the leadership 
and a cross section of the population precipitated anarchy. 
Mann and Berry (2016:1) argued that “twenty years after its horrific genocide, 
Rwanda has become a model for economic development. The Government of 
Rwanda’s (GoR) guiding policy, “Vision 2020,” contains ambitious social and 
economic targets that aim to make Rwanda a middle-income country by 2020, 
increasing incomes to $900 and life expectancies to 55 years.” According to 
Reyntjens (2015:19), “President Paul Kagame and the ruling Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) have restored order and presided over a period of impressive 
modernization and economic development since 1994.” Reyntjens maintained that 
“from 2003, Rwanda’s annual economic-growth rate has been a robust 7 to 8 
percent, and the country has made major progress in health and education. Among 
African countries, Rwanda has been a top achiever of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals, and has moved up the ranks on the World Bank’s Doing 
Business index.” The Rwanda National Human Development Report (2014:48) 
acknowledges that “these achievements have been underpinned by a strong and 
committed leadership, which has mobilized citizens and created a sense of unique 
identity, as well as confidence and collective responsibility which has catalysed the 
implementation of home-grown solutions.” Rayarikar (2017:2) argued that “it is 
evident that this development took place under the aegis of Kagame’s leadership. It 
would very likely not have happened under someone else leadership.” 
Underlying all the apparent progress, Mann and Berry (2016:4) argued that the GoR 
is attempting to use the development of markets as a way to deepen power. Mann 
and Berry maintained that, through the construction of a common coordinative 
system of control and communication (conceived of as markets), the GoR aims to 
create an infrastructure of power that is decentralised and embedded into everyday 
life. To Mann and Berry, such transformation extends beyond a prioritisation of 
growth and encompasses the articulation of ideologies, the provision of social 
spending, and the reordering of the social and physical layout. Accordingly, Mitchell 
(noted in Mann & Berry, 2016:5) argued that the apolitical approach to Rwandan 
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development partly reflects the limited space for political discussions in Rwanda, but 
also reflects broader neoliberal currents in development, depicting markets as 
apolitical spaces where ‘economics’ can work. To cultivate this national work ethic, 
the GoR deploys political and civic re-education and indoctrination camps 
traditionally called ingando, (and more recently, itorero camps – a type of traditional 
cultural school) designed to make Rwandans more receptive to development, 
modernisation, and reconciliation (Mann & Berry, 2016:30). 
The rationale behind the “corrupt payments” is to make recipients feel like they have 
a stake in the developmental vision. These fraudulent costs place further fiscal 
pressure on the GoR to prioritise development. Whether or not these programmes 
will succeed is debatable, as high rates of population growth mean that more people 
live in poverty than ever before (Mann & Berry, 2016:26). In Rwanda, models like 
ingando could help stabilise the political environment for growth. However, its 
resemblance to a surveillance system could have longer-term negative impacts on 
the country’s political development, in the absence of media scrutiny and public 
oversight. Rwanda, like other African countries, has made it mandatory for citizens to 
register their communication devices with the government (Mann & Berry, 2016:28). 
As in the case of Rwanda, economic development is a political process in which 
powerful groups make decisions to change the rules of the game. They will only do 
so when they believe it is in their interests, and when they feel they can control the 
process of accumulation (Mann & Berry, 2016:33). 
Reyntjens (2015:21) argued that “today, there are two radically opposing views of 
Rwanda.” Reyntjens maintained that “one view hails Rwanda’s visionary leadership, 
economic progress, market-oriented policies, empowerment of women, and reforms 
in education, health, and agriculture. The other view condemns Rwanda’s autocratic 
rule, human-rights abuses, persecution of the Hutu majority, and growing inequality 
and rural poverty.” The DFID’s Operational Plan 2011–2015 (noted in Reyntjens, 
2015:30) did note “constraints on rights and freedoms” in Rwanda and a growing 
“concern that power is too highly centralized, with unpredictable consequences for 
long term political stability, economic development and human rights.” Conversely, 
Reyntjens (2015:31) posited that “the argument that political repression is necessary 
for development is empirically unsustainable. The Kagame regime’s policies are 
reminiscent of colonial days, when politics was obscured by a focus on technocratic 
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improvements in infrastructure, health, and education. Similarly, the RPF regime 
runs Rwanda like a corporation and seems to believe that its citizens are not political 
beings. In the end, this is a risky strategy.” 
The leadership justifies this use of force by arguing that it must protect the country 
against various security threats. At the same time, its government has been criticised 
for its authoritarian tactics and use of violence (Mann & Berry, 2016:16). “Some have 
argued that a degree of authoritarianism is necessary in Rwanda, because the 
country is still politically fragile and because socioeconomic progress can reduce 
political demands and tensions” (Reyntjens, 2015:31). However, the Rwanda 
National Human Development Report (2014:16) argued that “institutionalizing 
inclusive growth and human wellbeing will ensure that pro-poor development is 
guaranteed to extend beyond the current government’s term.” The report maintained 
that “the latter is vital, considering that much of the country’s participatory and 
inclusive development initiatives have been inspired by – and very often driven by – 
the current head of State, President Paul Kagame. Equally, the Umushyikirano [a 
forum for national dialogue], Girinka [cultural practice where a cow is presented to 
another as a sign of respect and gratitude] and Agaciro [self-dignity and self-respect] 
initiatives have ridden on Kagame’s personal stewardship and may be difficult to 
sustain without his direct leadership unless these initiatives are fully institutionalized 
within government.” 
“It is important to recall that Rwanda had been a highly centralized State since the 
precolonial period. Successive regimes had disenfranchised and conditioned citizens 
to become highly fearful of, and dependent on, rulers at all levels. The few people in 
leadership positions believed, behaved and worked as rulers not leaders, working for 
the interests of higher levels of government, often at the expense of citizens” 
(Rwanda National Human Development Report, 2014:52). “President Paul Kagame 
plays a similar role in being at the centre of the Rwandan State. His leadership in the 
civil war against the previous regime in Rwanda, and his party’s role in ending the 
1994 Genocide automatically put him at the helm of the devastated nation” 
(Rayarikar, 2017:16). Similar to what Mann and Berry have stated (as noted in 
preceding paragraphs), Rayarikar (2017:18) contended that “one of the ways in 
which Kagame is able to develop a cult of personality around himself and the RPF 
leadership is through the indoctrination of specific groups of people around the 
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nation in targeted camps, known as the ingando solidarity camps. Two key phrases 
associated with personified leadership that come into play in the above paragraph 
are ‘centralized state’ and ‘cult of personality’.” I argue that both terminologies 
subsist together as one: the personality is a precursor to the centralisation of power. 
However, like all personified systems, the systematic indoctrination of the masses 
serves to entrench the essential character of the leader in the nation’s societal fabric 
and institutions. The foregoing is clarified in the subsequent paragraphs.  
Ayittey (2017:98) posited that “although Article 34 of Rwanda’s constitution stipulates 
‘freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by 
the state,’ Pres. Paul Kagame brooks no dissent; critics are labelled as enemies and 
targeted for assassination.” According to Ayittey, in 2013, Patrick Karegeya was 
brutally strangled to death in Johannesburg. His killer or killers remain at large. 
Ayittey maintained that another target at that time was Kagame’s former army chief, 
General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, who has been the target of a series of attacks 
and murder plots, which – according to the South African Government and other 
sources – were orchestrated by agents of the Rwandan Government. Furthermore, 
Ayittey posited that the democratic experiment in Rwanda has been farcical. Since 
1994, Kagame has won two presidential elections (in 2003 and 2010) with more than 
90 percent of the vote. On August 25, 2003, Rwanda held sham elections in which 
President Paul Kagame won 95 percent of the vote. His main challenger, Faustin 
Twagiramungu, a former Prime Minister, secured only 3 percent of the vote. 
Twagiramungu’s opposition party, Democratic Republican Movement, was banned. 
Similarly, the government-run media vilified Twagiramungu; his supporters were 
harassed, intimidated and jailed. Ayittey contended that this farce was repeated in 
2010 when Victoire Ingabire returned to Rwanda, after six years in exile, to form the 
Unified Democratic Forces (UDF), a coalition of opposition parties. She was 
immediately arrested and charged with terrorism and endangering the security of the 
state. She was sentenced to an eight-year jail term. Four high-profile dissidents, who 
formed the Rwanda National Congress in 2010, suffered a similar fate. 
Furthermore, Rayarikar (2017:4) argued that “urban development in Rwanda is not 
without its problems: its showcase capital Kigali displays characteristics of 
authoritarian planning, while other cities are vastly underfunded and 
underdeveloped. Besides, Kigali serves as an urban spectacle while distracting 
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attention from the vastly poorer parts of Rwanda.” Rayarikar maintained that 
“essentially, close associates of the RPF own some large business groups that 
operate in Rwanda. Since RPF is the ruling party, this blurs the line between the 
government and the private sector.” According to Rayarikar, “the rise of Paul 
Kagame and his power because of economic growth, along with the merging of the 
state with private enterprise, and support for war outside its borders hints towards 
Rwanda’s government gradually morphing into a fully authoritarian regime.” In 
echoing the above, Clapham (2012:13) argued that “Rwanda is a prominent example 
of a former liberator that sought to reinvent themselves as a ‘developmental state’.” 
To Clapham, “Rwanda is following Asian models in which a strong State committed 
to rapid economic development provides public order, infrastructure and other basic 
services, [and] seeks to establish conditions propitious for private sector investment.” 
Clapham maintained that “this has the great advantage, from the movement’s point 
of view of continuing to guarantee the central role of the movement itself; while at the 
same time (if the strategy  is successful) helps to meet popular demands for 
employment and public welfare.” According to Clapham, “this strategy may also 
provide continuing opportunities for State or party owned businesses, or for ‘crony 
capitalists’ associated with the regime, and delay the point at which challenges to the 
government’s continued tenure becomes acute.” 
In the above discussions, we note that experts are associating Rwanda’s 
development planning with ‘authoritarianism,’ a characteristic that is surrogate to 
personification. Furthermore, and effectively accentuating the hypothesis in this 
study, Rayarikar points out that the lines between Kagame’s government and other 
institutions are blurred. This goes a long way in demonstrating that with time, 
institutions in personified dispensations inevitably assume the essential character of 
the leader. Clapham seals my argument by highlighting deep patterns of personified 
governance in his assertion that Rwanda’s development model  guarantees the 
central role of the movement as it does for “ … ‘crony capitalists’ associated with the 
regime.” Contextually, the latter statement highlights the point that the uncanny 
forces of personification are pervading Rwanda. 
However, not all is lost in Rwanda. Warfield and Sentongo (2011:84) posited that 
“despite dilemmas of justice and democracy, transformative leadership in Rwanda 
continues to evolve at both state and grassroots levels through processes based on 
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indigenous knowledge and practices like gacaca and ingando to achieve the greater 
good of reconciliation.” In exemplifying Rwanda, Warfield and Sentongo (2011:86) 
maintained that “community capacity building through grassroots leadership is a 
necessary and sufficient ingredient for the development and sustenance of African 
democracy.” To do so, Warfield and Sentongo argued that “transformational 
leadership, as is Kagame is effecting, must exist at various levels of the state in 
order to mobilise community consciousness.” Equally, Warfield and Sentongo assert 
that “a number of transformations and reforms involving community, civil society and 
national level stakeholders and other actors in Rwanda reflect a dominant utilitarian 
approach to leadership and progress in the country.” “While there are claims of 
increasing authoritarianism on the part of government, the leadership in Rwanda can 
be perceived as progressively developmental, moving steadily (albeit with a few hic-
ups) on a path to sustainable long-term development” (Hayman, noted in Warfield & 
Sentongo, 2011:91). 
In conclusion, the above paragraph points out the paradox with personified 
governance that has cropped up in other segments of this thesis. The fact is that, 
under certain conditions that require more investigation, personified governance may 
advance a degree of national development. I surmise that this factor has led donors, 
development partners and even acquiesced citizens to continue supporting 
personified regimes, even where it is associated with atrocious scandals. The 
dilemma that all stakeholders face is whether to drop a personified leader who is 
registering achievements in national development, or elect an untested leader. The 
fact that the personification of state systems is progressive, and usually culminates 
in extreme conditions for the masses, complicates the situation further. Perhaps 
another salvaging factor in the above discussions is the fact that traditional African 
governance systems like gacaca and ingando are resilient. As in Rwanda, this fact 
gives a window of hope to citizens who are subject to personified governance, in that 
home-grown solutions might provide the way to go forward. This concluding line sets 
that stage for the next section, where I shall examine literature on the extent of 
citizen involvement in, and influence of, national governance in East Africa. 
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4.6 Citizen involvement in national governance in East Africa 
In the previous section, I examined conceptual abstracts on the theory of 
personification that relate to empirical literature on leadership and national 
development in East Africa. In this section, I will attempt to answer the research 
question, “How can East African citizens influence national governance and 
development policies under personified leaders?” This section will integrate the 
literature from preceding sections with the researcher’s own postulations regarding 
probable citizen actions under personified leadership. Accordingly, this section 
begins with an overview of the context and background of citizen participation in 
national governance and development policies in East Africa. The chapter concludes 
with an assortment of strategies that citizens could apply to overcome personified 
leadership in East Africa. For case studies, the researcher selected Kenya and 
Rwanda, countries that reflect a broad variety of historical, cultural and social 
contexts.  
This section will draw on perspectives from the countries cited above to enable the 
reader to gain an understanding of how citizen participation translates into national 
gains through effective, citizen-driven governance, and how citizens might have 
acquiesced because of suppression by leaders. According to King; Feltey and Susel; 
Putnam; and Arnstein (as noted by Irvin & Stansbury, 2004:55), “arguments for 
enhanced citizen participation often rest on the merits of the process and the belief 
that it is better to have an engaged rather passive citizenry.” Likewise, Irvin and 
Stansbury (2004:55) posited that “with citizen participation, formulated policies might 
more realistically reflect citizen preferences. This is because the public might 
become sympathetic evaluators of the tough decisions that government 
administrators make.” Thus, Irvin and Stansbury maintained that “the improved 
support from the public might create a less divisive [and peaceable] populace to 
govern and regulate [national issues].” Irvin and Stansbury’s postulation augurs well 
for this study’s assumption that citizen-led governance, rather than personified 
governance, would more probably result in sustainable national policies. The 
discussions in subsequent paragraphs will explore and analyse available literature 
on the subject to validate the researcher’s assumptions. 
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The literature covered so far highlights the complexities associated with the subject 
of personified leadership. This is because, to contextualise the essence of 
personified inclination, one needs to trace the progression of childhood to adulthood 
influences on a subject leader exhibiting such qualities. As the researcher has 
discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the subject of personification becomes even 
more complex where more than one person in leadership positions exhibits such 
qualities. To complicate issues further, the unpredictability of human personality 
makes it even harder to anticipate potential actions that are associated with 
personified leadership. While experts might deduce accurate data outcomes of 
leadership policy actions, the researcher posits that personified leadership is 
invariably measured with error. This is because some leaders who exhibit 
personified tendencies essentially deny having any such predisposition, while others 
actually flaunt it to their benefit, to subjugate any perceived or real threats. Similarly, 
leaders, being human, can feign character traits to suit audiences. Because of the 
likelihood of encountering systematic data errors in plotting a personified leadership 
trajectory, this researcher’s description of citizens’ influences on national governance 
and development policies under personified leaders will be premised on models that 
measure unobserved variables by using ‘known’ variables. 
Consequently, this study contends that, in order for citizens to have an effect on 
national governance and development policies under personified leaders, they must 
credibly and accurately understand the ‘influencers’ of the incumbent leader. By 
understanding behaviour, one can predict, direct, change and control the actions of 
individuals or a group. This may require long-drawn, longitudinal studies of the 
leader, which may be too complex for the average citizen to undertake. Thankfully, 
the body of literature presents useful models that might help predict aspects of 
childhood development and their possible outcomes at adulthood. The researcher 
will draw on such literature to outline how citizens can effectively influence national 
governance and development policies under personified regimes. This study 
theorises that citizen participation in national governance and development policies 
may ensure greater transparency, ownership and accountability. 
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 Participation of citizens under personified national governance  
In this section, I examine the participation of citizens under personified national 
governance in East Africa, drawing on distinct case studies of Kenya and Rwanda. 
For ease of reference, the researcher will discuss each country categorically and 
then conclude the section with a cross-regional comparative analysis. The 
researcher will discuss the countries in no specific order, and will particularly try to 
ensure logical flow and congruence of the subsequent paragraphs. 
According to Kanyinga (2014:98), “until the early 2000s, Kenya’s space for political 
participation was severely constrained and so was citizen participation in policy-
making.” Kanyinga maintained that “the executive, and especially the President, as 
well as powerful bureaucrats, influenced and decided policy without consultation. 
The greater majority of the population was excluded from the policy process. A 
systematic emasculation of Parliament, the judiciary, civil society and the media 
during the one-party regime, constrained the space for civic engagement.” Similarly, 
Njagi (2015:7, 15) contended that “four years after the promulgation of the Kenyan 
constitution, the covenant seemed elusive, suffocated by tokenistic participation 
strategies, disrespect for the rule of law and open tensions between the national 
Government and the county Governments.” Njagi maintained that “citizens on the 
other hand, were unable to seize the opportunities availed to them through the 
constitution to influence public policy making processes. Notable civic voices argued 
that the space for citizens’ engagement was gradually shrinking.” As discussed in 
this thesis, I explained how Kenya is a typical example of a country grappling with 
long-drawn effects of personification.  
As corroborated above by Njagi and Kanyinga, I argue that personified systems 
frequently prevent the participation of citizens in determining national policies. Of 
particular interest in the above literature, is the fact that citizens are excluded from 
participating in making national policies that typically affect them. The researcher 
argues that even the perceived sanctity and supremacy of a national constitution is 
no restraint to a leader with personified inclinations, as was the case in Kenya, cited 
above. Likewise, I argue that the exclusionist strategy practised by personified 
regimes renders polices unresponsive and irrelevant to citizens’ needs. The 
researcher maintains that engaging citizens directly in national policy processes 
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would enable incumbent governments to gain support, build consensus, identify 
acceptable solutions, and ensure operability. Interestingly, in the case of Kenya, the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (noted by Kanyinga, 2014:3) “had warned 
that Kenya was so deeply divided along ethnic lines that if the government did not 
address some of the reasons causing divisions, conflict would occur. The APRM 
maintained that the violence indeed occurred because of the failure to respond to 
long-standing governance issues. It continued to threaten the consolidation of 
democracy and it constrained political participation.” Thus, according to this thesis, 
the latter highlights the volatility associated with excluding citizens from determining 
national issues that affects them. 
“In terms of law making by Parliament and County Assemblies, Kenya’s 2010 
Constitution is a clear departure from the 1963 Constitution that exclusively vested 
law making in peoples’ representatives” (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:438). “In contrast, 
the particular need to open the political space to competitive politics after several 
decades of domination by the one-party regime informed the struggle for political 
liberalization from the late 1980s. These struggles placed primacy on people’s 
participation in decision-making, because the government and the ruling party often 
imposed decisions that promoted parochial and individual political interests rather 
than the public good” (Kanyinga, 2014:6). Similarly, Khaunya et al. (2015:27) argued 
that “the post-independence approach of Local Governments in Kenya embraced a 
strong centralized governance structure contrary to its initial objective meant to 
resolve the regional development challenges that apparently failed.” Khaunya et al. 
maintained that “the challenges in Kenya [were increasingly] associated with 
bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of accountability and transparency, unequal 
distribution of national resources and minimal community participation in local 
development, amongst others.” Consequently, “under the 2010 Constitution of 
Kenya, direct participation of the people in law-making and political governance 
[became] a cardinal democratic ideal that surmounts decades of usurpation of the 
role of Parliament by the Executive that used the legislature to enforce 
authoritarianism in the country” (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:438). The same constitution 
strongly emphasizes the need for public participation in governmental decision-
making processes (Constitution of Kenya 2010). Likewise, Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) echoes the spirit of the Kenyan Constitution. 
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The Declaration provides that “everyone has the right to take part in the government 
of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.” 
At a localised level, participatory development in Kenya, as in many other countries, 
began with, and was for a long time confined to, community development projects 
(Wakwabubi & Shiverenje, noted in Omolo, 2011:9). Kenya attempted to 
institutionalise decentralised planning and implementation of its programmes as 
early as the 1960s through Sessional Papers. The most elaborate was the District 
Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) Strategy, which became operational in 1983. 
However, the Strategy emphasised the involvement of central government field 
workers in planning and implementation of programmes. This, as Chitere and Ireri 
(cited in Omolo, 2011:9) noted, “is contrary to the conception of the participatory 
approach. Ideally in participation, development workers such as civil servants only 
facilitate the process by assisting communities to identify and solve their own 
problems.” Omolo (2011:10) argued that “in order to enhance participation as 
[Kenya] implements devolution at county level, there is need for clear mechanisms 
for engagement and articulation of community interests. However, failure or apathy 
of the middle class and local elite to engage in development processes challenge 
community participation in implementation processes” (Omolo, 2011:17). 
However, I contend that, literally, citizen participation in Kenya’s national governance 
has not occurred as expected. Indeed, any transformation of Kenya’s post-
independence structures has more or less been for the self-interest of the incumbent 
political elite, and therefore, of little or no benefit to the common man. As such, 
“Kenyan [leaders] have never structured the state in the interest of the masses and 
public good” (Gakuru, Mwenzwa & Bikuri, noted in Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:247). 
“Instead, the leaders use the state as a tool for coercion, enforcement and 
maintenance of the oppressive regime of the politico-economic elite, whose interests 
never coincide with those of the common man” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:247). 
According to Mukuna and Mbao (2014:443), the Commission for the Implementation 
of the Constitution (CIC) enumerates examples of “blatant violation of the 
Constitution.” For instance, national leaders unconstitutionally enacted the 
Contingencies Fund and County Emergency Funds Act, 2011, and the National 
Government Loans Guarantee Act, 2011, without the involvement of the CIC. 
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Similarly, the Kenyan Government introduced amendments of Bills approved by 
Parliament, for instance the important Commission on Revenue Allocation Bill, 2011, 
thus circumventing CIC scrutiny, and worsened by the Executive’s ignorance of CIC 
advisories in this regard. Mukuna and Mbao (2014:443) maintained that “other key 
violations of the Constitution included the grave sin of disregarding the participation 
of the people in law making – a complete refusal of Parliament and the Executive of 
High Court order to stop the passage into law of the Government Loans Guarantee 
and the Contingencies Fund and County Emergency Bills for being unconstitutional. 
To add to the long list of Bills passed by Parliament in utter violation of the 
requirement for the participation of the people are changes to the Political Parties 
Act, 2011. In June 2012, without public participation, Members of Parliament passed 
crucial amendments to the Act to permit floor crossing without losing their seats in 
Parliament. The later transpired despite calls by the chairperson of the CIC and 
some MPS that the Bill was unconstitutional” (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:443). 
The situation becomes more disturbing when allegations of corruption among 
committee members are made by none other than the Deputy Minority Leader of the 
National Assembly [indicating the advent of personification, corruption, manipulation, 
etc.] (Mukuna & Mbao, 2014:443). For example, “Counties face a myriad of 
challenges that stand in the way of the realized achievements. These challenges 
include lack of political goodwill, inadequate funding, ‘devolved’ corruption, nepotism, 
inability to absorb some devolved functions, mistrust among stakeholders, different 
implementers of devolution with varied cultures and approaches, devolved 
bureaucracy, a bloated workforce with duplication of duties and internal political 
supremacy wars” (Khaunya et al., 2015:35). Similarly, Kanyinga (2014:xii) argued 
that “the most important challenges facing Kenya’s democratic consolidation include 
ethnicity and identity politics, the [poor] electoral system, and the dominance of the 
executive.” Kanyinga noted that “ethnicity is a symptom of the structure and use of 
political power.” Specifically, Kanyinga cites “the interplay of ethnicity and the 
competition for executive power as critical factors that have constrained public 
participation and the democratic transition in general.” 
From the foregoing discussion, I argue that the executive and legislative arms of the 
Government in Kenya have, at one point in time, excluded citizens from participating 
in national governance. Despite the promulgation of a comprehensive constitution in 
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2010, there is a strong indication that national leaders still violate the sanctity of the 
constitution, basically, for egoistic reasons. The deliberate circumvention of 
regulatory institutions by national leaders points to occurrence of personified 
dispensation. As has occurred in Kenya, the exclusion of citizens from participating 
in national governance has a ‘price’ – mass uprisings, anarchy and popular revolts, 
as was the case in 2007. In Kenya’s case, the vice of personification has permeated 
the institution of law making, which is a factor that grossly hinders unprejudiced 
redress of any legal issues associated with citizen participation and, ultimately, 
governance. Accordingly, the exclusion of the people from participating in national 
discourses has escalated vices like corruption, nepotism, and manipulation, which 
are the bastions of personified regimes. 
Turning to Rwanda, decentralisation has been a key policy of the Government of 
Rwanda (GoR) since the year 2000, with the objective to promote good governance, 
service delivery, and national development. By developing and implementing the 
decentralisation policy, the GoR is not only doing what is right, but also doing what 
was prompted by popular demand by the Rwandan population (National 
Decentralization Policy 2012). According to the Minister of Local Government, 
“decentralization helped Rwanda democratize leadership and create platforms for 
nurturing leaders, mostly women and youth, who had hitherto been excluded from 
their governance” (National Decentralization Policy 2012:6). Similarly, the National 
Human Development Report (2014), highlights the point that “decentralization has 
facilitated the transformation of Rwandese from a passive population disconnected 
from governance, characterized by a high level of dependency on government, and 
powerlessness, to a more engaged and active citizenry.” The report asserts that “not 
only do the citizens elect their own leaders; they are also holding them accountable. 
This is because they are now more about the role of government and their own 
responsibility and potential.” 
However, Interayamahanga (2011:13) differed with the above rosy picture painted by 
national institutions. He argued that “Rwanda citizens have cited low participation in 
policy/law formulation and decision-making, formulation of Local government 
programs and evaluation of government projects.” However, Hogg (2009:45) posited 
that “the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) much-touted moves towards 
democratic and decentralized governance exist on a nominal level, many reports 
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confirm the ‘disappearances’ of those who have attempted political or ideological 
moves outside of central governmental control.” Likewise, “most external observers 
note that the Rwandan government’s claims of successfully moving the nation 
forward along the path towards democratic governance are based on Huntington’s 
‘transition paradigm’ of ‘democratization’” (Huntington, noted in Hogg, 2009:45). The 
‘transition paradigm’ “assumes that a nation undergoing political transition will 
proceed towards democratic governance when democratic rule, freedom, good 
governance, and the rule of law are able to trump authoritarianism, oppression, 
human rights abuses and corruption” (Reyntjens; Burnet, as noted in Hogg, 
2009:46). Further to the above, Hogg (2009:46) argued that “in light of the RPF’s 
oppressive practices, inter alia human rights abuses and quieting of political dissent, 
the current authoritarian nature of the regime hardly falls within the parameters of 
democratic governance.” 
Additionally, I argue that the two dominant ethnic groups in Rwanda also play a 
critical role in determining the participation of citizens under personified rule. 
Adejumobi (2001:91) illustrated the latter in his well-articulated assertion that 
“Rwanda under both the Kayibanda (1962-1973) and Habyarimana regimes (1973-
1994) mirrored its colonial ancestry. The State enforced exclusive group rights and 
privileges and provided the institutional context and legitimacy for the discrimination 
and domination of one group by another.” Adejumobi maintained that “the State did 
not define citizenship on an individual or common national basis, but from a group 
dimension.” Equally, Adejumobi contended that “the ethnic identity card policy, which 
the colonial state instituted, was retained. A perverse policy of ‘quota democracy’ or 
‘majoritarian rule’ was enforced by the State, which reserved 80 percent of all public 
goods to the Hutus. This policy was the other side of the colonial one that 
emphasized the rule or governance by the ‘superior specie’ or ‘qualitative rule’. Thus, 
group identity and social stratification were fused into the State system.” 
For a country like Rwanda with strong ethnic disparities, I argue that the issues 
pertaining to power sharing are rather complex. This is because power sharing 
involves a delicate tripartite relationship between two disparate ethnic groups and a 
governing leader. According to Rothschild and Roeder (noted in Traniello, 2008:32), 
“power-sharing institutions frequently empower the leaders of ethnic groups with the 
means to challenge the power-sharing agreement.” This notion specifically suggests 
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that power sharing can strengthen ethnic conflict. Thus, Spears (noted in Traniello, 
2008:34) contended, given that, most African conflicts are internal, such as in 
Rwanda, “power-sharing must be about reconciliation between enemies.” To Spears 
(noted in Traniello, 2008:34), this is an attractive option because it offers a logical 
approach to conflict management in terms of political and economic power. Of 
particular significance to this segment is the fact that scholars argue that power 
sharing requires elite political leaders to drive the model (Traniello, 2008:35). 
However, Traniello (2008:38) argued that “Rwanda represents the worst-case 
scenario of power sharing since the Arusha Accords (1993) designed to avert the 
1994 genocide, [and] failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary 
factors as an able and committed leadership.” 
Many experts now believe that Rwanda is currently better governed under the 
incumbent leader, which the researcher argues, makes power sharing a possibility. A 
case in point is the Mo Ibrahim Index report on Africa Governance (IIAG) (noted in 
Mutesi, 2014). The latter specifically alludes to Rwanda as having recorded the ‘best 
progress’ since the year 2000, making it the ‘most successful’ among all the post-
conflict countries. However, as posited in the preceding paragraphs, Rwanda has 
had cyclical challenges with leadership that ultimately affect or even mitigate citizen 
participation in governance. I argue that the leadership challenges may be perennial, 
since personification can become entrenched in national systems. On this subject, 
Spears (noted in Traniello, 2008:38) recognises that “African politics must be seen 
from the self-interested perspective of elites; because even though they find power 
sharing attractive, their primary concern remains what strategies best meet their 
interests and their security needs.” Spears maintained that “ostensibly, the self-
interested perspective of national elite’s signifies personified tendencies that feasibly 
exclude citizens from rightfully participating in governance.” In essence, I posit that if 
a leader is not willing to share power with other citizens for egoistic reasons, then 
equitable governance in that jurisdiction will fail.  
 Acquiescence of citizens to personified governance 
To understand the existence of acquiescence in Kenya, I will review the process of 
the country’s national formation that stretches far back in time and across societal 
dimensions. One such dimension pertained to the rationalisation of citizenship to 
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guarantee the rights of immigrant populations in Kenya. From the dawn of 
independence, the different ethnic groups have quarrelled about access to land and 
state resources. Archer (2009:53) maintained that some scholars argue that ethnic 
identities and the history of ethnic antagonism that characterises Kenyan society are 
key factors in understanding the current political situation. Jeffrey Steeves (noted in 
Archer, 2009:53), for instance, stated when writing about Kenya that “the individual 
in Africa is defined by one’s ethnic community and thus one’s loyalty and actions are 
framed within an ethnic identity.” I argue that it is even more significant that 
acquiescence in Kenya is directly linked to the subject of ‘interests’, which in this 
study is a core factor in personified governance. I also note that in order to mitigate 
recurrences of acquiescence, and while amending the 1963 Kenyan constitution, 
legislators endeavoured to exchange the executive-centred Constitution in 
preference for one focused on participation by the people. In reviewing Kenya’s 
constitution, Ojwang (2001) contended that “Kenya’s Constitution should carry the 
most basic principles of law that relate to a nation’s main political arrangements. 
Such political situations include governance patterns, as well as the public power 
schemes that the people have accepted, or acquiesced in, or been subjected to.” In 
addition, Ojwang (2001) argued that “acquiescence poses no political problem since 
there is no major quarrel with the power dispensations.” On the other hand, Ojwang’s 
main concern was that people should not be “subjected to an unpopular public power 
dispensation”.  
However, I argue that the subjection of the citizenry to unpopular power 
dispensations is a precursor to acquiescence. Furthermore, as mentioned above and 
elsewhere in this study, Kenya has a long history of personified governance that 
started from the country’s independence in 1963. Because of domination and 
suppression by successive personified regimes, the older generation is now more 
acquiesced than the youth is to unpopular power dispensations. In a study that 
Afrobarometer conducted in 18 sub-Saharan countries, Chikwanha and 
Masunungure (2007) posed a critical question: “Will the youth occupy the frontlines 
in defence of democracy, while the elderly acquiesce more willingly to the 
authoritarian impulses of leaders?” Afrobarometer’s findings on Kenya were not 
surprising. Chikwanha and Masunungure (2007:8) established that in Kenya, there 
was a negligible variance regarding perceptions on authoritarian rule between youth 
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and the elderly. In essence, Afrobarometer (noted in Chikwanha & Masunungure, 
2007:8) highlights the point that a political generational gap is not apparent in Kenya 
“since neither the young nor their elders express a preference for a nondemocratic 
order.” Despite the latter, “young people in Kenya are especially distrustful of the 
Presidency” (Chikwanha & Masunungure, 2007:15), and I argue that the Presidency 
is apparently the epicentre of personified governance. To the researcher, this finding 
confirms the assumption that long periods of subjection to personified rule will 
ultimately diffuse from the elders to the youth. Chikwanha and Masunungure 
(2007:9) corroborate this notion in the assertion that “the elders have a personal 
history of experience with authoritarian rule against which to judge the performance 
of the [incumbent] regime. Conversely, the youth may only hear or read about 
authoritarianism and therefore have no experiential benchmark for evaluating the 
present regime against the past. The fact that Kenyan youth are now apathetic to 
one party rule, military rule and one-man rule” to me indicates a systemic process of 
acquiescence to personified governance. It is not surprising then, that the subject of 
acquiescence featured prominently in the constitutional reform article discussed 
above, which professor Ojwang (2001) authored.  
In discussing corruption as being one of the indicators of bad governance and 
human rights abuse in Kenya, Gathii highlights another dimension of acquiescence 
in the country. According to Gathii (2009:152), “corruption thrived in Kenya, 
especially following the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and tenets of good 
governance during the one-party era in the 1980s.” Gathii maintained that “corruption 
has been traced and linked to the Presidency.” Thus, Gathii posited that “there has 
been a convergence in High Court cases as well as the statements of highly placed 
government officials that has tended to acquiesce to high-level corruption. One of the 
consequences of this acquiescence to high-level corruption cases has been a culture 
of impunity” (Gathii, 2009:170). Similarly, Gathii (2009:177) posited that “since 
Kenyan courts have acquiesced to these arguments in leading cases, this has 
greatly hampered the prosecution of corrupt officials, especially those associated 
with high-level corruption.” Regarding the above assertions, I contend that when the 
judicial system of a country acquiesces to the personified interests of the national 
leader and their cronies, the “unconnected” citizens are bound to suffer injustices. 
This is evident in Kenya, where Gathii argued that “corruption has undermined 
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respect for human rights within the country. The latter degenerated to the extent that 
State cannot meet its obligations to respect, fulfil and protect the human rights of its 
citizens” (Gathii, 2009:197). 
The above literature review has highlighted how the political, judicial and legislative 
arms of government under personified regimes can conspire to foster the 
acquiescence of the masses to the status quo. The study has also linked 
acquiescence to personified governance in the infancy of regime entrenchment, 
culminating in fully fledged helplessness when there is no change. Even more 
significant is the fact that inter-generational conduits can transmit acquiescence 
through from the elders to the youth, precariously obscuring the possibility of 
systemic change. The above insights underscore how personified governance can 
permeate and transform the guiding social fabric of society, thus rendering citizens 
distrustfully dependent on the selfish interest of callous leaders. 
Turning to Rwanda, as in the case of Kenya, we see a correlation between the 
acquiescence of its citizens and authoritarian rule. According to Blair and Stevenson 
(2015:43), the struggle for the justifications to rule, as well as for popular support (or 
least acquiesce), in Rwanda provided an instructive case in point. Remembrance of 
the genocide is the main justification of the regime’s (Tutsi ethnic) minority rule. Blair 
and Stevenson maintained that by stabilising a specific memory of the genocide 
event that brought them to power, the Rwanda Patriotic Front is attempting to 
stabilise its own ideological foundation through a salvific discourse about the 
necessity for continued authoritarian governance for the salvation of Rwanda (Blair & 
Stevenson, 2015:28). The above assertion corroborates the theoretical framework of 
this thesis that citizens, as in the case of Rwanda, can actually promote the 
personification of the leadership and, ultimately, the acquiescence of other ethnicities 
to their preferred leader. As discussed earlier in this section, ethnicities in Kenya, as 
in Rwanda, tussled for superiority and dominance at the dawn of independence in a 
battle won by the African majority. This contest, as in the case of Rwanda, resulted 
in the acquiescence of Kenyan Asians to the egocentric demands of so-called 
African nationalists. 
Rwanda presents an even more intriguing dimension of acquiescence. “Journalistic 
accounts stress Rwanda’s ‘entrenched culture of obedience’ when accounting for the 
234 
 
swiftness with which Hutus killed their Tutsi victims” (Lacey, noted in Paluck & 
Green, 2009:2). The researcher reckons that this rationalises the above paragraph 
that highlights how Rwanda’s incumbent Tutsi leaders are methodically 
indoctrinating acquiescence to vanquished ethnicities, while systematically 
personifying the state. A scholarly history of the genocide likewise described the 
Rwandan citizen’s mind-set: “when the highest authorities in that state told you to do 
something, you did it, even if it included killing” (Prunier, noted in Paluck & Green, 
2009:2). Accordingly, Berkely (2001) asserted that the broad participation of tens of 
thousands of ordinary Hutus in the genocide was undoubtedly a function of 
Rwanda’s notorious culture of obedience. As in Kenya’s case, Rwanda’s culture of 
blind obedience to authority – a variant of systematised acquiescence – has deep 
roots in the country’s colonial legacy. “Studies show Rwandans’ deference to 
authority is traceable to institutional arrangements imposed by Belgian colonial 
rulers, who refashioned the intricate monarchical system characterized by competing 
patterns of local allegiance into a more centralized, oppressive, and ethnically 
homogenous system of governance” (Lemarchand; Newbury, as noted by Paluck & 
Green, 2009:5).  
The researcher argues that the colonial enforcement of allegiance to a centralised 
oppressive governance structure starkly illustrates the genesis of systematised 
acquiescence. It is instructive therefore; that the current manifestation of Rwanda’s 
culturally rooted acquiescence has its deep roots in colonial political governance. 
Until the 1950s, a highly authoritarian and centralised administrative structure 
characterised Belgian colonial rule [in Rwanda] (Gellar, Morris & Kayigema, 
2001:48). In essence, Rwanda inherited native authority systems from the 
colonialists (Mazrui & Wondji, 1999:450), who [tactlessly tried to] turn traditional 
leaders into civil servants and democratise [monarchies] (Mazrui & Wondji, 
1999:209). The fact that absolutism was infused into Rwanda’s governance system 
from the advent of independence explains why successive governments have 
inclined towards personified governance. Consequently, Clark (2014) contended that 
“… beneath the cunning veneer of Kigali’s litter-free streets lies a government with 
near-absolute control over its citizens, who live in a state of perpetual and silent 
fear.” Caplan (1994) offered further evidence of the systematic personification of 
Rwanda’s governance. According to Caplan (1994:24), “there was a small, almost 
235 
 
exclusively Hutu intellectual elite, including academics at the country's only 
university, on whom the government could count for active support or, at the least, 
acquiescent silence.” 
Again, we note the occurrence of state-inspired acquiescence forced upon a 
powerless ethnicity by the ruling government. The latter contravenes Kaseya and 
Kihonge’s (2016) definition of self-government that states “… democratic self-
government means that citizens are actively involved in their own governance; they 
do not just passively accept the dictums of others or acquiesce to the demands of 
others.” The researcher argues that successive regimes in Rwanda have personified 
governance to the extent of undemocratically rewarding political cronies or perceived 
supporters at the expense of other citizens. Without any feasible options, the hapless 
citizens acquiesce to incumbents in an effort to preserve themselves. Gellar et al. 
(2001:48) posited that, “over time, a longstanding tradition of popular acquiescence 
to direction and control by an authoritarian central government” has emerged in 
Rwanda. However, as I contend, the tolerance of citizens subjected to personified 
governance always culminates in dissension, the subject of the next section. 
 Citizen dissension to personified governance 
This section will focus on Kenya and Rwanda as case studies to aid discussions on 
the extent of citizen resilience to personified governance in East Africa. Furthermore, 
the case studies will link this section to preceding chapters. Likewise, the level of 
citizen participation in matters of governance in both countries is rather intense, 
owing to several factors such as divisive ethnic politics. Moreover, Kenya has made 
its way through strong autocratic dispensations and politics of exclusion perpetrated 
by intolerant leaders (Njogu, 2014:3) to become the most advanced economy in the 
region. Moreover, the Kenyan political scene has been relatively stable since 
Kenya’s independence in 1963. On the other hand, Rwanda is arguably the fastest-
transforming country in the region, given its tumultuous past. As one of the world’s 
fastest-growing economies, Rwanda has experienced powerful national 
reconstruction and reconciliation. The country’s annual GDP growth averaged eight 
percent between 2001 and 2015 (World Bank, 2014), and the country has posted 
high economic growth, coupled with strong progress in reducing poverty and 
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inequality (Chuhan-Pole, 2014:166). In order to ensure comparability, the researcher 
will generalise the case studies to the entire East African region.  
The section will also re-state research question 1.2 (iii) to highlight how citizens in 
East Africa cope with the vestiges of personified governance, as well as ascertain 
what measures citizens take, if any, to obtain policy responses that ameliorate the 
callous consequences of personified governance. Drawing on empirical literature 
interposed with theoretical abstracts, I will discuss several strategies that citizens 
employ to subsist under personified governance, ranging from acquiescence to overt 
active reaction against the status quo. To set the context, I draw on Wolf’s assertion 
that an enduring lesson from East Africa is that local communities are not passive 
victims in the face of state failure. Their resilience and capacity to respond varies 
from country to country (Wolf, 2012:8).  
Kanyinga (2014:8) posited that, after Kenya’s independence in 1963, there were 
several political parties, the main ones being the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KANU’s membership 
included some of the large ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo, while KADU 
[comprised] the numerically smaller ethnic communities, many of whom feared 
domination by large groups. However, the first government after independence 
dismantled this set-up and consequently KADU – the main opposition – joined KANU 
to form one governing party [under President Jomo Kenyatta]. The government also 
introduced a series of constitutional amendments that centralised power in the 
Presidency (Okoth-Okombo, Kwaka, Muluka & Sungura-Nyabuto, 2011). These 
changes significantly constrained democratic participation [leading to dissension] 
(Kanyinga, 2014:8). The Presidency evolved as the most important institution 
because, without checks on accountability, the President could use public resources 
to reward followers and to punish dissenters (Kanyinga, 2014:13). The Kenyatta 
regime became intolerant and suppressed dissent through detention without trial. 
The regime of President Moi, who assumed office after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, 
inherited and escalated the appetite to concentrate power in the executive. [The 
regime made] constitutional amendments to constrain dissent and suppress 
viewpoints that differed from those of the government and the ruling elites in KANU 
(Kanyinga, 2014:21). Essentially, [the Kenyan] government was generally 
237 
 
responsible for making and implementing key decisions and would do so without 
accommodating dissent or criticism (Kanyinga, 2014:35). 
From the above literature, the researcher infers that the centralisation of power 
around the Presidency triggered the onset of dissent to undemocratic governance in 
Kenya. In essence, the President and his cronies attempted to suppress the 
inalienable rights of citizens to participate in their own governance. This study posits 
that personified political manoeuvres that exclude sections of the citizenry on 
discriminatory grounds are bound to result in dissent, as in the case of Kenya. In an 
attempt to ‘legitimise’ personified governance, the incumbent government brazenly 
invoked the powers of the constitution, and as we will see in subsequent paragraphs, 
the judiciary. All these machinations failed to clamp down on the intrinsic trigger 
sequestered within marginalised citizens to voice their dissension to oppression. 
According to Okoth-Okombo et al. (2011:141), from the mid-1960s up to early 1990s, 
dissenting views in Kenya were [summarily] suppressed. Moreover, the umbrella 
body of trade unions, the biggest national women’s movement for rights and other 
pressure groups and associations soon became part of the ruling and only political 
party, KANU. The President and the ruling clique monopolized political, social and 
economic activities in the country under the guise of “development”, arguing that all 
other people with differing opinions were anti-development. The reality was that the 
ruling class aimed to control all aspects of life and have hegemony over the 
population for purposes of safeguarding accumulation of wealth by a few. Okoth-
Okombo et al. (2011) maintained that 2002 was by far the worst year for Kenya. The 
economy grew at a meagre 0.4 percent. During this period, the government could 
not collect enough revenue to enable it effectively provide key social services. 
Okoth-Okombo et al. (2011:148) blamed Kenya’s then woes on poor leadership by 
the Moi regime; an irresponsible and directionless leadership characterised by 
corruption, tribalism, impunity, despotism and disregard for the rule of law. Okoth-
Okombo et al. (2011) posited that this was also the period when dissenting voices 
were brutally silenced, resulting in widespread fear amongst the citizens. Upon 
ascending to the Presidency, Moi moved swiftly to consolidate political and economic 
power with the clarion call of “Fuata Nyayo”, which loosely translates into “toe my 
line or perish.” Within four years of the advent of this administration, KANU made it 
very clear that the President, the party and the government were one institution that 
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would not tolerate dissent (Okoth-Okombo et al., 2011:192). Political crackdowns on 
the perceived dissidents led to the establishment of torture chambers, extra-judicial 
executions, and detentions without trial. The ultimate impact of the autocracy and 
bad governance was the near collapse of the economy, debilitating poverty, 
unemployment, the collapse of the health system, insecurity, and a myriad of social 
problems (Okoth-Okombo et al., 2011:154). 
Again, we note from the above narrative that Kenya deepened its centralisation of 
state power around the President and his clique. The Presidency systematically 
personified state institutions, and in the process established repressive units to 
muzzle any dissent. However, frantic state efforts to sustain the dictatorship at the 
expense of the citizenry ended up with disastrous results as the economy came to a 
near collapse. At that moment, volatile conditions set the stage for dissension as 
citizens struggled to express their disapproval of the status quo. As is the case with 
absolute personified regimes, any perceived deviation in political ideology by the 
Kenyan citizens was met with brute force by the state, to the extent of extermination. 
Subsequently, [leaders] reduced citizens to bystanders since the state, in the words 
of Kanyinga (2014:35), [was] “… responsible for making and implementing key 
decisions without accommodating dissent or criticism.” 
On this note, Omolo (2011:14) argued that “one of the shortfalls of Kenyan 
leadership is failure to receive criticism positively.” Thus, most citizens at the 
grassroots level are wary of holding their leaders accountable, lest they be 
victimised. Omolo (2011:20) maintained that “there is need to create a culture of 
social responsibility particularly amongst the middle class who are socialized against 
dissent.” I note that Omolo raised an interesting point about the indifference of the 
middle class to undemocratic governance. In corroboration of the latter point, 
Cheeseman (2014:6) asserted that “the Kenyan middle class has rarely acted with 
one voice. From the 1930s onwards, a sizeable section of the middle class has sided 
with authoritarian rule.” In consonance, Wasserman (noted in Cheeseman, 2014:6) 
posited that “in the 1950s and 1960s, the colonial government successfully used 
land programmes and access to credit to establish a loyal middle class in an attempt 
to insulate the regime from the Mau Mau uprising and radical nationalism.” 
Furthermore, Branch and Cheeseman (noted in Cheeseman, 2014:6) contended that 
“in the late colonial/early post-colonial years, this group grew in numbers as 
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President Jomo Kenyatta, who favoured political and economic stability and feared 
rapid change, repeated the trick.”  
Even more intriguing, civil society in Kenya also exhibits double standards when it 
comes to dealing with undemocratic governance. They engage with the state in a 
myriad of networks, only accusing the state when they are losing grip and joining it 
when they have the opportunity (Murunga & Mutunga, 2000:11). Of further 
significance, Butler (2013:21) argued that [in some cases, even] the judiciary in 
Kenya works for the state to repress dissent. On a positive note, Butler (2013:3) 
contended that “when Kenyan politicians adopted the democratic principle of 
multiparty elections in 1992, they entered a new political world where accountability, 
a key characteristic of a functioning democracy, was expected of leaders.” In 
corroboration of the problem statement highlighted by the researcher, Brown 
(2013:726) argued that “over and over again, donors deterred measures that could 
have resulted in more comprehensive democratisation after Kenya legalized 
opposition parties.” Brown maintained that the donors did this by deliberately by 
endorsing inequitable elections (including suppressing evidence of their illegitimacy) 
and subverting domestic efforts to secure far-reaching reforms. Likewise, Brown 
posited that, “faced with popular mobilisation against a regime, donors’ primary 
concern appear to be the avoidance of any path that could lead to a breakdown of 
the political and economic order, even if this meant legitimising and prolonging the 
regime’s authoritarian rule.” 
In discussing the preceding paragraphs, I agree with the thinking of Cheeseman 
(2014) and of Murunga and Mutunga (2000) that the reason for the acquiescence of 
the middle class and civil society to authoritarian rule is more pecuniary than 
ideological. This is true with personified governments that frequently use ‘rewards’ to 
foster loyalty. With a muzzled middle class and inert civil society, and until an 
irresistible critical mass halts personified regimes, their leaders can impose their 
egoistic interests over helpless citizens. As discussed earlier, Kenyan citizens got 
this break in 2010, with the promulgation of the new constitution. However, the most 
intriguing discussion covered in the preceding paragraphs revolves around the 
“indifference” of international and local organisations, and most baffling, of the 
judiciary, when citizens need their support the most. I posit that although democracy 
is not a human right, it provides the best defence of human rights for individuals. 
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Therefore, when institutions that should champion international best practices shun 
their roles, national citizens have no options other than to chart another path to 
freedom. One route might be to identify strong leaders. Brown (2001:736) argued 
that “because [there is a] lack of clear alternatives to incumbent leaders across the 
board, for example in the case of Moi, this holds back [remedial] donor actions.”  
I argue that Brown highlights perhaps the most constraining force that frustrates 
citizen dissension to personified governance – the responsibility of leadership. As 
stated by Brown, “the senior opposition activists happened to perceive each other 
more as rivals than partners did.” Brown maintained that “opposition leaders often 
spent more time undermining each other than focusing on their nemesis – KANU. 
The extremely high stakes led to an atmosphere of distrust among them. Every 
candidate desired the Presidency – where power is highly concentrated.” According 
to Brown (2001:729), “none would agree to the post of Vice President or the 
enticement with an unsecure Ministerial appointment that the incumbent President 
could rescind at any time. No opposition leader wanted to subordinate their career to 
another’s, even if the likely outcome was KANU’s re-election.” Moreover, Brown 
posited that “the use of a tribal discourse to secure candidates’ ethnic power base 
transformed rivalries from personal to ethnic dimensions, this also rendered it almost 
impossible to gain support among other ethnic groups.” 
I posit that the above paragraph highlights a number of challenges that citizens’ face 
while trying to resist or oust personified reign. The paragraph brings to the fore the 
way in which leadership plays an important role in motivating, mobilising, and 
coordinating the masses. In the absence of the coordination of the masses, citizen 
action against the incumbent personified leader would be limited or mitigated. We 
also note that selfish interests can derail leaders from the path of uniting people to 
address a common cause. The manifestation of personified inclination in opposition 
leaders hypothetically indicates that once the opposition leaders assume power, 
there is a strong possibility of their personifying the state as their predecessors did. 
Furthermore, there is the issue of ethnic divisions that also limit the ability of citizens 
to unite against personification. Thus, a fragmented citizenry will not sustain the 
momentum to confront any personified regime. However, in the case of Rwanda that 
I will discuss next, this path to emancipation can assume complex dimensions. 
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The discussion on citizen dissent to personified governance in Rwanda is rather 
complex, as it entails its colonial and socio-cultural heritage. The researcher will 
explore the latter, and then tie both historical dimensions to personified governance 
and its correlation to fomenting citizen dissent. We begin by reviewing the historical 
events that led to the infamous genocide in 1994.  
Manchester (2010) considered that “Belgian colonial rulers may have had a hand in 
the 1994 genocide.” Manchester maintained that “the ethnic implications of the 
Belgian colonizing practices were distinctly marginalizing. When the Belgians took 
over the Rwanda-Urundi territory in 1918, three predominant groups consisting of the 
Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa made up the region. Among them, there were shared religious 
beliefs, a common culture as well as a shared language, Kinyarwanda. Governing 
these three groups, Belgian colonizers made conscious choices concerning 
‘phenotypic’ and financial characteristics that would instil deeply rooted ethnic 
marginalization for generations to come. Belgians started appointing members of the 
Tutsi minority to positions of influence to rule over the rest. Over time, the 
colonialism propaganda suppressed voices of dissent and created a world culture 
that accepts ‘the white man’s rule’. As a result, racial elitism ensued, with Tutsis 
adopting a sense of superiority and legitimized authority over their fellow citizens, 
who grew severely resentful when government deliberately neglected them.”  
Building on the latter, this study notes that resentment and dissent always go hand in 
hand. As is evident in the case of Rwanda, marginalisation of a section of citizens 
pushed them to the end of their tether. I argue that the latter kindled dissent among 
the citizenry. I also note that colonial oppression catalysed dissent, which the 
authorities summarily suppressed.  
Additionally, Manchester (2010) argued that “just before the region gained 
independence in 1962, the Hutus in Rwanda began a series of attacks against the 
Tutsi-led Belgian government killing thousands of Tutsis and sending 130,000 more 
into exile. As a result, Rwanda maintained a largely Hutu-dominated population 
strengthened by the abandoned plantations and cattle from the Tutsis who had fled 
seeking asylum.” Manchester maintained that “Rwanda soon became a one-party 
dictatorship when Habyarimana, a Hutu, overthrew the Belgian-appointed leader. 
Under his regime, he continued the practices of ethnic discrimination developed by 
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the Belgians, only in turn favouring the Hutus [over the Tutsi]. In April 6, 1994, 
dissidents shot down a plane carrying Habyarimana on his return from Dar es 
Salaam. This resulted in the systematic murder of the Tutsi by Hutu extremists. 
Eventually the Rwanda Patriotic Front managed to defeat the Hutu militias and 
created a new government” (Manchester, 2010). The above narrative is analogous to 
Kenya’s governance history, to the extent that colonial masters influenced the 
subsequent courses of national personification. “Whereas Kenya was at the brink of 
genocide in 2008” (Kniss, 2010:2), Rwanda was not very fortunate in 1994. In both 
instances, we see the deliberate systemisation of personified governance inherited 
from the colonialists, always ending in dire consequences.  
According to Reyntjens (2011:8), “after the RPF seized power in July 1994, it 
established a ‘Government of National Unity’ purportedly in line with the 1993 Arusha 
peace accord. Initially a number of politicians, civil servants, judges and military from 
the old regime either remained in the country or returned from abroad, and indicated 
their willingness to cooperate with the RPF. During the first months of 2000, the 
President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament were forced to resign, 
and the latter two went into exile. This shows how little space there were for real or 
suspected dissenting views).” I observe that an individual or a group of people in 
power was/were intolerant of dissension to their unpopular actions, to the extent of 
deposing a legitimate government. We get a clue on this powerful entity in Bekken’s 
assertion. According to Bekken (2011), “Kagame's structural approach to silencing 
dissent is so effective that it renders the use physical violence unnecessary. For a 
people who survived [their predecessors’] legacy, the constant haunt by the fear of 
persecution may be worse than actual violence.” Bekken (2011) maintained that “one 
of the most insidious yet effective weapons against dissent has been the misuse of 
laws known as genocide ideology and divisionism.” However, Rwanda’s situation is 
unique. While [Rwanda] has been stable for more than two decades, social tensions 
persist (Hintjens; Hilker, noted in Smith, 2015:54). To Smith, the government has 
promoted peace and reconciliation through tradition-inspired peace building 
institutions and its invention of a specific version of history. Nonetheless, as with 
other scholars, Smith (2015:54) notes that suppression of dissent has made it 
difficult for its citizens to debate, discuss and reconcile.  
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From the above narrative, I note that Smith (2015) and Reyntjens (2011) both agree 
that the incumbent Rwandese government is intolerant of, and even suppresses, 
dissent. I also note that the controlling power behind Rwanda’s government rests 
with the Presidency. Put differently, I argue that the President has the prerogative to 
create space for dissenting political minorities and assure a level ground for political 
competition. In Rwanda, there are sayings such as “umwera uturutse I bukuru bucya 
wakwiriye hose,” which means “whatever comes from the highest leadership will 
expand all over (even if it is bad)”; and “Irivuze umwami ntirikuka”, literally “what is 
said by the king can’t be contradicted,” which can be understood to mean that 
nobody should publicly oppose the leader (Balch, Verweij & Kamani, 2013:39). This 
study argues that the leaders in Rwanda have perpetually taken advantage of these 
cultural weaknesses to subdue citizens, resulting in distrust for the system. 
Underneath the surface, citizen dissension to oppressive governance is brewing. For 
instance, Thomson (2011:440) argued that “daily acts of resistance illustrate that 
peasant Rwandans do not believe in the policy of national unity and reconciliation, 
that is, their perceived compliance with its dictates is tactical rather than sincere.” 
Thomson (2011:455) maintained that “the marginal socio-political position of peasant 
Rwandans identifies the nodes of resistance where the State enacts oppressive 
power in their daily lives. Thus, even with coercive compliance and minimal 
opportunities for dissent; individuals continue to express their politics through acts of 
resistance.” 
The above literature highlights how Rwanda’s citizens have developed complex 
mechanisms to express their dissension to oppressive policies. In their bid to subsist 
in Rwanda and express themselves, “Rwandese citizens practice three specific 
types of everyday resistance: staying on the side-lines; irreverent compliance; and 
withdrawn muteness” (Thomson, 2011:440). However, external stimulus can 
catalyse these ‘passive’ expressions of dissent and transform them to outright 
dissension. Paluck and Green (2009) studied the impacts of a radio programme in 
Rwanda. The study “revealed that modest interventions that legitimize expressions 
of dissent can increase citizens’ repertoire of available actions, and enable 
individuals to challenge norms of deference.” Paluck and Green maintained that the 
radio programme “discouraged blind obedience and reliance on direction from 
authorities and instead promoted independent thought and collective action in 
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problem solving. After one year, although the radio program had registered little 
impact on limited beliefs and attitudes, it had a substantial impact on listeners' 
willingness to express dissent and the ways they resolved communal problems.” 
While Paluck and Green (2009) primarily focus on social and cultural legitimisation, 
Zhang (2012:15) posited that “information about public participation can potentially 
enable people to figure out ways to take action, in spite of socio-political constraints.” 
I argue that from the above literature, it is apparent that external influences play a 
critical role in shaping the thinking of individuals. The Rwanda example highlights 
how a large segment of the citizenry was vulnerable to a well-orchestrated mass 
media rallying call to voice dissention to the incumbent authority and leadership. This 
underscores the theory of personification, which argues that leaders and whole 
communities are subject to well-targeted external influences. In combination with the 
childhood perception of the world, the latter act as a catalyst for personified 
inclinations in leaders. 
 Path to emancipation from personified governance 
As in preceding chapters, this section will focus on Kenya and Rwanda as case 
studies to highlight the ways in which citizens build momentum to emancipate 
themselves from the clutches of personified governance. “Compared with her 
neighbours, who are often besieged by civil unrest, Kenya has for long been a hub of 
socio-economic and political stability” (Mbondenyi, 2009:192). According to Klopp 
(2009:143), “Kenya has the largest and most dynamic economy in the region, key 
infrastructure and institutions, a vibrant press and civil society, political space and 
abundant human capital, creativity and entrepreneurship.” Klopp maintained that 
“these many resources can enable Kenya to achieve greater prosperity and freedom 
and become a genuine force for transformation in Africa in the 21st century.” 
Because authoritarian regimes [like Kenya and Rwanda] maintain the status quo just 
as easily as any democracy, it appears that the citizenry themselves need ways of 
pressuring the political and bureaucratic elite to develop (Minier, noted in Woons, 
2013). For this reason, I will focus on Kenya as a case study in this section to 
highlight how citizens emancipate themselves from predatory personified 
governance. I will also examine how the intrinsic desire to own and participate in 
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governance processes is a driving force for citizens’ emancipation to promote better 
governance. 
Akoth (noted in Mutula et al., 2013:284) argued that expectations that “Kenya’s new 
constitution would emancipate its citizens from years of authoritarian rule inspired 
the agitation for a new constitutional dispensation, mainly driven by dissident 
politicians, civil society organizations and religious groups. For instance, even 
though Moi had managed to contain emerging opposing voices, the 1982 coup came 
as a surprise to his authoritarian rule.” Akoth maintained that “this move underscores 
the attempt of the Kenyan governance system to move from an elite controlled top-
down to a bottom-up process where Kenyans participate in determining the growth 
and development of the country.” In the same manner, Gutierrez-Romero (noted in 
Hassid & Brass, 2015:9) posited that “perhaps the most implicative instance of 
Kenyan citizens asserting their authority came in the 2007 parliamentary elections 
that saw over 60 percent of Members of Parliament (MPs) seeking re-election 
removed from office.” Gutierrez-Romero maintained that “popular opinion at the time, 
as well as research conducted later, suggested that MPs lost their offices largely for 
being unresponsive to citizen demands, particularly with regard to mismanagement 
of Constituency Development Funds (CDF).” Similarly, Klopp (2009:152) asserted 
that “during the 1990s, MPs attacked each other [for selfish reasons] and in the 
process, revealed to Kenyans the ugly internal workings of the state.” Klopp 
maintained that “citizens in turn expressed their anger at their MPs by voting out 
many incumbents, including Ministers in large numbers.” 
From the above literature, it is apparent Kenyan citizens were using elections as a 
means to express their discontent with personified rule. “Some citizens therefore 
regard elections as an opportunity to vent their anger and frustration over poor 
governance (Mbondenyi, 2009:192).” Mbondenyi maintained that “on the other hand, 
some political elites in successive governments have regarded elections as an 
opportunity to settle scores with their opponents. Thus, although Kenya conducts its 
elections periodically, there has been no guarantee that they would be, and in most 
cases they have not been, free and fair.” The African Charter (noted in Mbondenyi, 
2009:185) asserted that in the process, citizens have been denied the enjoyment of 
many of their rights, including the right to participate in government, as guaranteed in 
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the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Yet, Mbondenyi (2009:184) 
argued that “Kenya’s legal system [which should offer a reprieve to its citizens] has 
been the government’s handmaiden for undemocratic tendencies such as ethnic 
polarization and electoral malpractices. Indeed, we could best understand the 
widespread violence experienced in Kenya during every election year as long-
standing grievances and failures of governance that run deeper than electoral 
politics.” 
It is also notable that Kenyan citizens have used the media to extricate themselves 
from the entrapment of personified governance. According to Ogenga (2010:155), “in 
Kenya, the power of politicians, emanating especially, from a colonial institution, the 
media is often threatened, censored and gagged in the name of national interest or 
state security or even cultural values. In such a situation then, the citizens/audiences 
find alternative arenas such as the internet to debate contentious issues of public 
interest.” Ogenga maintained that “by engaging into citizen journalism through 
internet blogging, Kenyan citizens are fighting back through the very same tool that 
Government censored.” Mbeke (2008) posited that “the above scenario explains why 
the Kenyan government was once reluctant to support the development of 
community media and broadcast in vernacular languages because of its fear of 
empowering citizens in a way that would challenge its hold on power and demand 
good governance.” This lack of support denied Kenyans a crucial media resource 
required in an ideal democracy (Ogenga, 2010:157). 
In extreme cases, citizens emancipate themselves through outright violence against 
personified rule. According to Muhula (noted in Sjögren, Murung’a & Okello, 
2014:82), “the jolting effect of the Kenyan post-election violence of 2008 stemmed 
directly from the nature of the existing constitution, which promoted a ‘winner takes 
all’ mentality and supported the unequal distribution of the national wealth.” In 
consonance, Sjögren et al. (2014:82) posited that “the violence was thus a result of 
disenchantment with the immediate electoral cheating overlain by deep discontent 
about marginalization, brutalization, and exclusion by the state and the narrow band 
of elites capturing it. The violence reflected the extent to which citizens had lost 
confidence in the incumbent state elites and in the regime’s ability to represent and 
mediate between popular interests, allocate resources fairly, and act as the guardian 
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of a representative republic. The only way to restore this confidence would be 
through constitutional reforms.” 
I argue that Rwanda’s societal struggle for self-emancipation is as old as its struggle 
for political independence is. According to Simmons (1996:394), “during 1959–61, 
Rwandan society went adrift and a social and political revolution took place.” 
Simmons maintained that “the process of political emancipation of the majority 
Bahutu led to the abolishment of the Batutsi monarchy. However, this emancipation 
was ethnical rather than nationalistic since it served mainly the interests of the 
majority Hutu ethnicity.” “It’s driving force, Kayibanda, who in 1962 became 
Rwanda’s first post-independence President, desired a ‘social revolution’ in Rwanda 
to emancipate the majority Hutu community from its menial status to Tutsis by any 
means necessary (Mthembu-Salter, 2002:6).” Mthembu maintained that “even 
Rwanda’s Catholic hierarchy radically changed its stance from enthusiastic advocate 
of Tutsi supremacy to champion of Kayibanda and the cause of Hutu emancipation.” 
According to the researcher, the pursuit of citizen emancipation along ethnic lines 
earlier in Rwanda’s independence set a bad precedent for successive efforts at 
unified national liberation actions to dislodge personified reign. However, quite 
commendably, the incumbent regime is making slow but progressive attempts to 
bridge the ethnic divide. Thus, Hartley (2015:54) argued that “while the attenuation of 
radicalized ethnic differences is essential for a society transitioning from Rwanda’s 
past, the Rwandan government has chosen to perpetrate a ‘no difference’ version of 
history rather than adopt a more nuanced perspective on ethnic diversity.” I argue 
that being a member of an ethnicity can mean gaining access to, or outright 
exclusion from, the enjoyment of national resources. Whereas the zeal for self-
emancipation can be a uniting force for national movements, in the case of Rwanda, 
it became a fracturing force due to its egocentricity. 
The fact that Rwandan society induced self-emancipation along ethnic lines earlier in 
its quest for independence explains the subsequent perpetuation of ‘mass-driven’ 
personified governance in the nation state. In the case of Rwanda, it is interesting 
that Tutsi advocated for immediate independence and an end to ‘racial’ division 
(Kiwuwa, 2012:77). On the same note, Mamdani (noted in Kiwuwa, 2012:77) argued 
that some Hutu elites and masses were not in favour of immediate independence, 
and worried about the readiness of society to undergo such radical transformations 
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amidst existing social and political disparities (Kiwuwa, 2012:77). Instead, the Hutu 
argued that social and political re-equilibrium had to be in place in order to achieve 
such fundamental transformation. Not only did they believe in the liberating nature of 
democratic practice from their social and political bondage, but also sought to 
advance the principle of Hutu emancipation within a democratic framework (Kiwuwa, 
2012:77). Here we note that even in extreme political and social positions, moderate 
voices with logical reasoning are bound to emerge, as in the case of the Hutu. The 
researcher maintains that these moderate voices frequently coalesce with like minds 
to stabilise political situations, as did moderate Hutu during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda. On the other hand, such moderate voices can also be an impediment to 
opportune drives for social or political emancipation. Instead of being catalytic, they 
can easily dampen high spirits of revolutionaries who want to change the status quo. 
With respect to Rwanda’s woes, Kayumba (2008) approached the struggle for social 
and political emancipation from a different perspective. According to Kayumba 
(2008), in general, the attitudes of Rwandans are both negative and positive towards 
their 1962 independence, and these are due to their ethnic antagonism. The Hutu 
view themselves now as not free, while the Tutsi rejoice. Meanwhile, before 1994, 
the reverse was true for the Hutus. Therefore, the other understands independence 
as an ethnic emancipation from domination. We note that the Hutu and Tutsi were 
brought under the control of one state by force; it did not happen naturally. Hutu feel 
that they have lost their independence, just as the Tutsi feel they have regained their 
independence, in the sense that they too can also now participate in political, social 
and economic activities, which the Hutu regime had denied them (Kayumba, 2008). 
It is revealing that Kayumba referred to the divergence between Hutu and Tutsi in 
Rwanda as ‘ethnic antagonism.’ Bonacich (1972) argued that “economic competition 
is the primary cause of ethnic antagonism. Within this framework, antagonism 
encompasses all levels of intergroup conflict, including ideologies and beliefs, 
behaviours and institutions. Bonacich’s argument accentuates the researcher’s 
argument that a competitive spirit with a selfish twist triggered an ethnically biased 
struggle for emancipation in Rwanda. The result is that ethnically driven 
personification of state systems permeated Rwanda’s societal and institutional fabric. 
The above argument rationalises why Wallis and Green (2008) argued that 
“Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame raised the stakes by endorsing outright military 
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intervention when ‘institutions lost control’.” I note that Kagame’s desperate 
endorsement of military intervention to restrain national institutions is twofold: on one 
hand, it works well to regulate a nation like Rwanda where ethnicity plays a key role 
in governance. Conversely, the reliance on military might to govern national 
institutions may point to suppressive tendencies associated with personified reign. 
Accordingly, Rwanda’s societal systems may in the short run not be able to take 
advantage of national unification to emancipate themselves from personified 
governance. Moreover, the current Tutsi dominance cited by Kayumba (2008) is still 
precarious, considering the long-drawn history of animosity between the Hutu and 
Tutsi ethnicities. Given that, “the first serious political challenge to the Tutsi oligarchy 
came in 1957 when in anticipation for another visit from the United Nations, a group 
of Hutu published a manifesto that demanded emancipation and rule by the majority” 
(Melvern, 2000:13). The latter signifies a highly fractured society, with over 60 years 
of rivalry. Melvern (2000:13) pointed out that “it is even more daunting that the 
manifesto was an effective appeal for Hutu solidarity, a rallying point for a revolution 
presumably against the Tutsi.”  
The researcher argues that when Rwanda failed to rally under a unified front to fight 
endemic personification, the minority Tutsi had to seek solace in personal 
redemption. “Poor economic and political prospects confronted the Tutsi youngsters” 
(Campioni & Noack, 2012:266). These Tutsi had very limited options other than to 
self-emancipate, at whatever cost. Campioni and Noack (2012) maintained that “as 
civil war broke out and Obote’s proxies attacked Rwandan refugees, young Tutsi 
joined Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA), which offered an 
attractive avenue for personal emancipation as well as an appealing.” As this study 
noted earlier, I note again that ethnic antagonism is such a retrograding force that it 
inhibits national unity efforts to fight personified regimes. In Rwanda’s case, I draw 
attention to an emerging cyclical pattern. From the 1950s through to the 1980s, the 
Hutu ethnicity led a so-called revolution to emancipate themselves from a Tutsi 
oligarchy. In the 1990s, we saw retribution when the Tutsi allied with foreign powers 
to re-invigorate their drive to wrest power from their ‘antagonists’ – the Hutu. I argue 
the fact that the incumbent President, Paul Kagame, preferred a military option to 
rein in institutions is rooted in the successes that the Tutsi youngsters had registered 
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against Obote when they allied with NRA. This gave them a personified impetus to 
rout the Hutu. 
With respect to the arguments propounded in this section, this study has highlighted 
the point that societal emancipation from personified governance can primarily come 
about by means of a revolution to rehabilitate the social conditions of alienated, 
affected citizens. As the researcher highlights in the discussion on both Kenya and 
Rwanda, fragmented ethnic politics constitute a major deterrent to the formation of a 
unified front to fight the suffering meted out by personified regimes upon their 
citizens. Similarly, there must be synchronised unity on three fronts to achieve 
national-level citizen emancipation. The individual needs to align with societal 
ideologies. The society, in turn, should have a unified political agenda, and only then 
will a nation have a unified drive for national emancipation. 
4.7 Citizen involvement in national development in East Africa 
The objective of national emancipation, discussed in the previous section, is to free 
citizens to allow them to participate in social, political and economic issues that affect 
them. Accordingly, this section will attempt to address question three of this thesis, 
which reads, “How can East African citizens influence national governance and 
development policies under personified leaders.” Therefore, the researcher will split 
this section into two themes. The first part will draw on empirical literature on East 
Africa to highlight the extent of citizen participation in national development under 
personified regimes, while the second part will focus on citizen participation in 
national governance. The section will close with a conclusion that rationalises the 
issue of whether East African citizens actually influence national governance and 
development, or whether the reverse is true.  
 Egalitarian citizen participation in national development 
The EAC outlines a key fundamental policy framework to guide development in the 
region. The aims of the initiatives are “To promote investment in the region through 
the EAC Development Strategy, set out the priority programs for the region focusing 
on macroeconomic cooperation; trade liberalization and development; cooperation in 
infrastructure; the development of human resources, sciences and technology; and 
cooperation in legal and judicial as well as political affairs” (East African Community, 
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2017). Also listed together with the EAC policy are unique strategies that each 
member country is pursuing to achieve national development. Of the five East 
African countries listed, only Kenya mentions “equitable social development.” On the 
other hand, Kenya and Rwanda, in their strategies mention, “people centred” and 
“mobilize the people”, respectively, as critical components of their development 
strategies. The researcher argues that the inclusion or omission of the word “people” 
from a country’s strategies indicates the extent of consideration for participatory 
approaches in national development. It is even more damning to discover that the 
word “participate” only appears at the end of the narrative, in reference to private-
sector participation in the economy.  
A cursory review of the Summary Report on Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 
for the Eastern Africa sub-region, authored by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), does not do any better than the EAC national 
development policies discussed above do. In fact, this report does not mention the 
word ‘citizen’ even once, and again, the report mentions ‘participate’ once in relation 
to private-sector engagement. Therefore, I argue that the so-called policy experts 
concerned with fostering development in the East African region relegate the 
significance of citizen participation. Lwaitama, Kasombo and Mkumbo (2013:20) 
accentuated my argument by asserting “… their review of three election manifestos 
political parties use to mobilize the electorate in order to induce their support for 
electoral victory reveals that there were no grand plans in the manifestos on the 
modalities of enhancing citizens’ participation in the EAC integration agenda.” 
According to this researcher, this revelation serves to highlight the deep egocentricity 
practised by leaders in the region. The scale of this egotism also explains the extent 
of personified governance in the region. Thus, for citizens to participate meaningfully 
in any development, there is need for legally backed, mass-driven counter measures 
to be taken by citizens to overthrow undemocratic systems. 
With respect to social movements that are citizen based and driven, the community-
wide civil society think-tank, launched with the support of the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung 
(FES) in October 2011, thinks differently about citizen participation in East Africa. 
According to Lwaitama et al. (2013), with fast-changing demographics, especially in 
the EAC region where the challenges of the youth population growth are becoming 
devastatingly worrisome, a new form of political expression, which now underlies the 
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numerous blogs such as ‘Jamii Forum’ and, ‘Vijana Forum’ is taking shape and 
becoming a force in civic engagement. Recently, Twaweza, an NGO, launched a 
project titled ‘Ni Sisi’ (It is us) to promote the idea that citizens can forge change 
through their own actions, rather than depend on external agencies, be they 
governments, donors, politicians or, in this particular respect, the EAC. Social 
movements that are citizen based, centred and driven are the critical agents and 
catalysts of any form of transformation (Lwaitama et al., 2013:9). 
With the above introduction in mind, the subsequent sections of this study will dig 
deeper into available literature to understand the context of citizen participation in the 
East African region. Again, for consistency, this section will use Kenya and Rwanda 
as case studies to understand the extent to which East African citizens actually 
influence national governance and development. 
 Citizen influence in national development: Does it really matter? 
In order to rationalise this section, I draw inspiration from a World Bank article on 
citizen participation (noted in Mansuri & Rao, 2013). In the aforementioned article, 
the World Bank posited that “the current wave of interest in participation began as a 
reaction to the highly centralized development strategies of the 1970s and 1980s, 
which created the widespread perception among activists and nongovernmental 
organizations that ‘top-down’ development aid was deeply disconnected from the 
needs of the poor, the marginalized, and the excluded. Underlying this shift was the 
belief that giving the poor a greater say in decisions that affected their lives by 
involving them in at least some aspects of project design and implementation, would 
result in a closer connection between development aid and its intended 
beneficiaries.” 
Equally, in a recent State of East Africa Report (2016), the Society for International 
Development (SID) highlighted the state of inequality in East Africa and sought to 
explore what future inequality might have in East Africa. The Report (SID, 2016) 
surmised: “two powerful driving forces are shaping the future of inclusiveness and 
equity in East Africa. One is the inclusiveness of growth – a measure of how much 
the poorest East Africans are participating in generating economic growth.” 
According to SID the report, “the second driving force is the degree of equity, which 
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describes how the benefits of economic growth are shared among the region’s 
citizens, and particularly the share of income and wealth that accrues to the poorest 
East Africans. GDP figures, with a regional annual average increase of 6 percent 
since 2011 tell the story of an economic expansion that has taken place in East 
Africa in the last few years alongside significant structural changes and greater 
sophistication in the countries’ economies.” The SID report maintained that “this 
GDP growth has generated optimism and greater confidence that the region is going 
places. Are all citizens of East Africa perceiving or feeling the benefits of these stellar 
GDP growth figures registered in the region? In spite of the growth, the economic 
boom has not generated the jobs or prosperity that East Africans expected. The 
levels of poverty, hunger and malnutrition in these countries remain staggeringly 
high.” 
Noticeably, although the above literature recognises some level of economic growth 
in East Africa, it still questions the extent of citizen participation in this regard. 
Accordingly, within the context of personified governance, this section will attempt to 
ascertain the extent to which citizens actually influence or even participate in national 
development in East Africa. To aid the discussion, the researcher will use Kenya and 
Rwanda as case studies to understand the extent to which East African citizens 
actually influence national development. The first part will discuss literature on Kenya 
and then subsequently close with discussion on Rwanda. 
With respect to engaging in development, “rural Kenyans report that the information 
that is available on policy, government programs and services is difficult to obtain 
and interpret” (Kariuki & Mbwisa, 2014:569). There is, therefore, “a desire to learn 
about and access information about government programs and services that is 
understandable, concise and timely” (Omolo, noted in Kariuki & Mbwisa, 2014:569). 
Before citizens can express their opinions, and participate in the public decision-
making process, they need information about the subject at hand (World Bank 2004). 
Although rural citizens feel that there is a lack of access to information about 
government programs and services, there is a desire to learn about, and access 
information on government programs and services that is understandable, concise 
and timely (Dukeshire & Thurlow, noted in Kariuki & Mbwisa, 2014:569). However, 
Kenya’s National Constitution (Revised Edition 2010) supports access to information 
by all citizens, which is a key ingredient to effective and active citizen participation. 
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The Constitution, for instance, directs Kenya’s national and county legislative bodies 
to conduct their work in an open and transparent manner. In addition to information 
gathered from the official business of the legislatures and public finances, Article 35 
of the Constitution stipulates that citizens have the right to access all information 
held by the State and public officials. Public servants must also share information 
with citizens. Article 232 (1) (f) states that the values and principles of public service 
include “transparency and provision to the public of timely and accurate information.” 
I point out that Kenya’s legal framework provides an enabling environment for citizen 
participation in national development. Since leaders with personified inclinations 
have usurped citizen liberties to participate, certain pragmatic individuals have had to 
circumnavigate personified structures to articulate their influences.  
Chesire et al. (2015:248) corroborated the researcher’s view outlined above in their 
assertion that “community development has largely been through the participation of 
self-help groups outside the formal system of governance. Therefore, the Harambee 
movement was the first attempt by the government to involve local communities in 
community development by ensuring that the communities pulled their resources 
together for their own development.” To this end, Maxon (noted in Nzau, 2010:100) 
posited that “two important aspects characterized President Jomo Kenyatta’s regime 
as far as development planning was concerned. First, it supported, at least in 
principle, the ideas of African socialism; and second it was guided by highly 
centralized development planning which took a top-bottom approach that adopted 
what would be termed state capitalism; some kind of socialism with capitalist 
tendencies.” Similarly, “the Kenya Vision 2030 is the most recent development 
blueprint in the country whose overall objective is to achieve a middle-income nation 
status, which would not only be globally competitive and prosperous, but also accord 
high quality of life to her citizens. The Kenya Vision 2030 is a long-term development 
plan for the country, a result of multi-stakeholder engagement and participation 
starting in October 2006” (Mwenzwa & Misati, 2014:248). 
However, Leys (1994, noted in Chesire et al., 2015:248) observed that “the strategy 
[to involve communities in development] did not fully succeed since it was hijacked 
by vested interests.” Mbithi (noted in Chesire et al., 2015:248) concurs with Leys 
(1994) and points out that “the Harambee movement did not succeed because the 
very autonomous nature of the movement led to manipulation by politicians for 
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private political ends and the oversubscription to the movement by the poorest and 
the most needy rural citizens”. I observe from the above literature that while sitting 
governments made seemingly credible attempts to pursue participatory 
development, personified interests overwhelmed these well thought-out processes. 
This demonstrates clearly how personified governance can literally subjugate 
democratic interests for the sake of few, if not one, individuals with personified 
inclinations. Nonetheless, the inclusion of citizens in participatory development and 
leadership always pays positive dividends, if done in a transparent and democratic 
manner, as will be discussed in the case study of Rwanda in subsequent 
paragraphs.  
Rwanda adopted the Decentralisation Policy, with a focus on reconciliation and 
empowering citizens with the knowledge and confidence to participate in leadership, 
hold leaders and service providers accountable, and bridge the gap between the 
leaders and the led. This form of citizen education and confidence building 
generated impressive results by the end of Phase One in 2003. Citizens had learnt 
democratic values by electing their own leaders; however, they could not hold their 
leaders accountable, as the culture of fearing leaders still prevailed. Moreover, local 
leaders were also not used to being accountable to citizens (Rwanda National 
Human Development Report, 2014:74). Drawing on the above, I argue that with 
good leadership strategies, a country can transform the behaviours of its citizens to 
espouse democratic ideals. This approach mitigates the proliferation of personified 
governance, since democratic values are entrenched in national systems. As is 
evident above, it also takes a selfless and egalitarian leader to ensure that the nation 
pursues inclusive citizen participation. However, when egocentric inclinations are 
imbued in leaders, as discussed below, national systems begin degenerating rapidly, 
if excesses are unchecked. 
Rwanda is a country that has faced conflicts that seemed to be perpetual, and the 
situation was further aggravated by the “highly centralized governance systems and 
practices” (Kauzya, noted in Ndahiriwe, 2011:2). The citizens were largely excluded 
from participating in the affairs of their country, either by exclusionary politics or 
through violent conflicts. As a result, many remained stateless as refugees in 
neighbouring countries (Ndahiriwe, 2011:2). As a way of correcting the above 
scenario, the Rwanda Government decided in 2002 to decentralize governance by 
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giving authority to elected local authorities, hence giving the citizens a greater say, 
and ensuring that they have considerable input in the affairs of their country, through 
the policy of decentralization (Ndahiriwe, 2011:3). The policy of decentralization in 
Rwanda gets its legal authority from the 1992 Arusha Peace Accord, between the 
Government of Rwanda and the then rebel army, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). 
The accord emphasizes the fact that every Rwandese must participate in the 
development of Rwanda (Kauzya, noted in Ndahiriwe, 2011:3), as a way of sharing 
power, including citizens in the state building process, and avoiding violent conflicts 
(Ndahiriwe, 2011:3).  
Similarly, Rwanda became indebted after coffee prices plunged on the world market. 
President Habyarimana had to negotiate with the World Bank and IMF to implement 
the first Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). As a result of having the IMF’s 
‘stamp of approval,’ Rwanda received both increasing amounts of international aid 
and private bank loans. Unfortunately, the global economic climate and the SAP 
implementation measures brought Rwanda to the brink of societal collapse and 
created an atmosphere conducive to genocide. Foreign loans during this time were 
also contingent on Habyarimana pursuing ‘western-oriented’ development objectives 
(i.e., industrialization and urbanization), at the expense of rural areas. Therefore, 
rural discontent and feelings of relative deprivation grew (Chirwa, 2015:115). 
To endear citizens to government initiatives, “the Rwandese President Paul Kagame 
even runs a public participation program called citizen outreach tours that often 
intertwine with interactive sessions with the area opinion leaders” (Kimeli, Wawire, 
Manyibe, Teresia & Nafukho, 2014:319). Accordingly, Kigabo (2010:96) noted that 
“decentralization is currently giving the power to the people and enabling them to 
execute their will for self-development.” With respect to the promotion of self-
development, the researcher argues that this approach brings to the fore the role of 
the individual, rather than holistic society, in aspects of national development. Thus, 
while decentralisation in Rwanda empowers people, it also stimulates people to 
compare themselves with others, and emphasise interpersonal qualities and 
attributes. The researcher posits that the above aspect ominously evolves into 
personified tendencies that threaten egalitarian development. Accordingly, the 
Rwandese fraternity had to conceive a well-balanced rational approach to link the 
‘self’ and decentralisation. Kigabo (2010:96) highlighted such an approach in his 
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assertion that, to reinforce decentralisation and self-development, the Rwandese had 
to establish the traditional ubudehe problem-solving process. 
Kigabo (2010:96) asserted that “ubudehe is a unique policy of promoting citizens’ 
collective action in partnership with a government committed to decentralization. It is 
a policy designed to increase the level of institutional problem-solving capacity at the 
local level by citizens and local governments.” Kigabo maintained that “it has 
succeeded in putting into operation the principles of citizens’ participation through 
local collective action.” Accordingly, “in order to improve the delivery of local 
development projects, ubudehe concept has enabled the Rwandan government to 
decentralize the planning and implementation process” (Public Governance 
International (PGI), 2015). The PGI report posited that by framing the program 
around the traditional Rwandan concept of “ubudehe” – which entails working 
together to address common problems – the government and its partners have 
engaged citizens at the local level to address their own development issues. The 
PGI report maintained that “established in 2001, ubudehe is a program that 
emphasizes a community-level approach that empowers citizens to play a lead role 
in alleviating poverty in their own villages. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide, the new government faced major challenges in rebuilding the country. 
Extreme levels of poverty, widespread destruction of infrastructure and property, and 
high degrees of social fragmentation and distrust of government acted to reduce its 
capacity to govern effectively.”  
According to PGI, given these challenges, the government recognised the need for 
an innovative, bottom-up approach that engaged citizens who were best positioned 
to lead development at the lowest administrative level: the village, or cell. 
Furthermore, Uvin (noted in Chirwa, 2015:106) highlighted the point that “some 
experts have gone so far as to argue that, over time, ill-conceived development and 
social strategies contributed to an environment more conducive to the occurrence of 
genocide.” The PGI (2015) contended that “currently, experts estimate that the 
ubudehe has directly benefited at least 20 percent of the population. Importantly, the 
program has coincided with advances in poverty reduction; according to one survey-
based study, 95 percent of respondents have seen their incomes improve. Similarly, 
96 percent reported that they were now less poor than before the program’s 
implementation.”  
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“Given the lack of natural resources of Rwanda, the current leadership has adopted 
more investment in science and technology and in human development so that 
Rwanda can be competitive and benefit from regional integration, with a goal of 
transforming Rwanda into a knowledge-based economy” (Kigabo, 2010:94). Abbot 
(2015:7) posited that “Rwanda has put frameworks in place for all layers of society to 
contribute to the development process through civic engagement using mechanisms 
of dialogue and consensus. The aim has been to recreate a sense of national 
identity and loyalty through an emphasis on one language, one culture, one history 
and one people.” Likewise, Abbot maintained that “Rwanda has one of the most 
effective governments in Africa. These positive comments about Rwanda clearly 
show that the country has a strong potential to democratize and even subvert 
personified reign.” 
The policy on remittances from the Diaspora is one of Rwanda’s most innovative 
recognitions of the importance of citizens in development. According to Rubyutsa, 
(2012:121), “the Government of Rwanda, having realized the importance of the 
Rwandan Diaspora in the national development, strongly believes that the Rwandan 
Diaspora is an important constituent, which, if well harnessed, can contribute to the 
socio-economic development of the country” (The Rwanda Diaspora Policy, noted in 
Rubyutsa, 2012:121). It is in this regard that the Government of Rwanda initiated a 
Diaspora Policy in 2009 to mobilize and integrate Rwandese in the Diaspora into 
national development discourses (Rubyutsa, 2012:121). Moreover, at 64 percent, 
Rwanda leads the world in the representation of women among decision-makers and 
in Parliament; it is the only country with a majority of women in its Chamber of 
Deputies (Randell & McCloskey, 2014:107). The Government of Rwanda has been a 
world leader in its commitment to gender equality, achieved through legal reforms 
that guarantee women a representative voice in public policy, a commitment to 
increasing the enrolment of girls in primary and secondary schools, and institutional 
reforms that ensure accountability for gender sensitive policies (Randell & 
McCloskey, 2014:107). Randell and McCloskey (2014:118) maintained that Rwanda 
has shown strong leadership in removing barriers to women’s participation and 
inclusion, and is likely to enjoy the results for years to come. 
Despite the national commitment to gender equality, many of these strategic 
interventions have had limited effect, to date (Randell & McCloskey, 2014:114). 
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Moreover, women’s effective participation in programmes targeting economic 
development, particularly in the agricultural sector, has lagged. Women continue to 
face challenges caused by poor skills and lack of effective organisations, limited 
access to improvements like seeds and fertilisers to support greater productivity on 
small farms, soil degradation, weak coordination of agricultural actors, and 
insufficient collaboration between farmers, researchers and extension workers 
(Randell & McCloskey, 2014:107). Randell and McCloskey (2014:107, 110) argued 
that although the government has policies and strategies in place to promote the role 
of women in economic development, and specifically in agriculture, they have had 
little impact as yet where the vast majority of women work. Burnet argued that the 
high political representation of women in parliament has not translated into legislative 
gains for women; women parliamentarians toe the party line, rarely mobilise around 
‘women’s issues’, and in some cases vote for legislation that reduces legal protection 
for women or eliminates women-friendly policies (Abbot 2015:4). Furthermore, there 
is increasing concern that Rwanda’s heavily centralised power has unpredictable 
consequences for long-term political stability, economic development and human 
rights (Abbot 2015:8). 
Of further significance, a post-conflict country such as Rwanda cannot deal with 
economic growth separately from conflict resolution and building peace and security. 
Peace is a precondition for security, stability, and development. The leadership of 
Rwanda understands that it needs political stability to attract domestic and foreign 
investors, and it needs peace to implement development plans and growth (Kigabo, 
2010:87). Thus, this researcher argues that in order to attract investors, leaders 
might easily feign a degree of enthusiasm for citizen participation. Accordingly, 
Marobe (2015:134) argued that political leaders in Rwanda have to respect good 
governance principles, such as rule of law, and participatory, transparent and 
constitutional ruling. He maintained that government here has to be close to its 
people by involving citizens in the development and implementation of policies and 
programmes that affect them in their localities (Wama, noted in Marobe, 2015:135). 
Of critical significance, Zorbas (2004:38) posited that, if, as Peter Uvin argued, 
poverty, inequality, exclusion and prejudice – cumulatively ‘Structural Violence’ – fed 
into the dynamics of genocide, it followed that ‘national unity and reconciliation’ have 
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as a necessary foundation – the notions of economic development, equality, 
participation, tolerance, human rights and the rule of law. 
 Acquiesced citizens and personified development 
Having rationalised in Subsection 4.6.2 that citizens in both Kenya and Rwanda 
acquiesce to personified governance, in this section I will explore the interaction 
between acquiesced citizens and personified development. Kirscht and Dillehay 
(2015:25) argued that the interaction between acquiescence and authoritarianism is 
complex. On this note, the researcher posits that since personification is a variant of 
acquiescence, by inference the interaction between acquiesced citizens and 
personification is potentially complex affair. However, the literature review of Kenya 
and Rwanda in subsequent paragraphs will provide evidence-based narratives on 
the subject. In previous sections of this thesis, we noted the conceptual patterns of 
acquiescence that are impulsiveness, susceptibility to stimuli, and accepting (Couch 
& Keniston; & Smith, noted in Kirscht & Dillehay, 2015:25). I will study various 
indicators of acquiescence to personified governance to give an indication of its 
impact on society, and to give cues to experts who are interested in finding 
sustainable solutions to personified state domination. To understand the extent of 
acquiescence, I will contextualise literature at both the individual level and communal 
level.  
According to Mutula et al. (2013:263), corruption in Kenya has notoriously revolved 
around the Presidency and those who demonstrated loyalty to the ruling elite. 
Consequently, this central control was evident in the imbalance in regional 
development. The abuse of power and the inefficiency of the three presidencies of 
Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki left Kenya victim to poor social, political and economic 
development. They maintained that the high levels of corruption are attributable to 
authoritarian regimes enriching themselves with public resources, resulting in 
corruption with grave effects on social and economic developments (Mutula et al., 
2013:267). Kenya emerged out of colonialism in 1963 after a prolonged liberation 
struggle, with a political economy marked by the existence of an authoritarian state, 
uneven regional development, deep social cleavages, and an intolerant political 
culture sustained by deep historical memories of grievance and injustice. Of further 
import, constrained development proliferated under the auspices of Kenya’s new 
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constitution [2010], which was expected to address the power disparities that had 
hampered the country’s social and economic development since independence 
(Mutula et al., 2013:275).  
This researcher argues that Kenya’s authoritarian regimes intensified the inequalities 
of wealth and power within the state. As observed earlier in Section 4.1 of this thesis, 
such authoritarian rule with personified connotations fractured the Kenyan society, 
ultimately hampering economic development. Another debilitating factor is the high 
corruption associated with Kenya’s personified regimes as cited above. It is apparent 
from the literature that intolerant political culture served to entrench practices for 
perpetuating systemic corruption that is detrimental to national development. The 
entrenchment of corruption in Kenya accentuates this study’s argument in Chapter 
Four that something has gone wrong with the governance system. Transparency 
International could not have stated it more candidly as they did in the rationale of 
their mission statement. According to Transparency International (2017), corruption 
is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. Transparency 
International maintained that corruption undermines good government, 
fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms 
the private sector, and particularly hurts the poor. I aver that the foregoing statement 
buttresses the arguments by Mutula et al. (2013) in the previous paragraph that 
record the grave effects that corruption has had on Kenya’s social and economic 
development. 
Similarly, it is apparent from the above literature that authoritarianism, a surrogate of 
personification, actually has an intricate and multifarious correlation with national 
development. Although successive Kenyan regimes have been associated with 
personified governance, the country has posted progressive successes in 
decreasing poverty, promoting social development, and maintaining political and 
economic stability. Kenya’s record of relative political stability and its lack of dramatic 
ideological shifts over the same period have done much to cement its economic 
dominance in the region (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). In fact, the researcher argues that 
Kenya is the most advanced economy in the East African region. Within the EAC, 
the Kenyan economy is the anchor. According to Kimenyi and Kibe (2014), what 
happens in Kenya largely determines the overall performance of the EAC region. 
They maintained that Kenya’s economy is the largest in the region and is much more 
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dynamic than those of other EAC member countries are. The country’s economy is 
better linked to the other economies in terms of investment flows and trade. This is 
attributable to its more advanced human capital base, its more diversified economy, 
and its role as a leader in the information communication revolution in the region. 
The latter strengthens Kenya’s economy, creating salutary benefits for the other 
member countries (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). 
By the time of President Jomo Kenyatta’s death in 1978, a national bourgeoisie had 
emerged, although its hegemony was limited by the deepening crises of 
development and democracy (Veney & Zeleza, 2013:6). Internationalisation 
accompanied the nationalisation of the Kenyan economy. Thus, the dynamics of 
internal uneven development and integration into the world capitalist system had 
deepened. The researcher notes that the paradox of economic development 
achieved under autocracies, rather than in some democracies, intrigues experts. The 
fact that Kenya recorded phenomenal growth under the personified autocratic reigns 
of Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki is equally perplexing. For instance, Burgess, Jedwab, 
Miguel and Morjaria (2015:1840) posited that during the years of autocracy [in 
Kenya] –  from late 1969 to late 1992 – the districts that were “co-ethnic” with the 
President, meaning they shared his ethnicity, received three times more investment 
in road-building projects than their population share would deserve. Moreover, the 
length of the roads built in those districts was more than five times their predicted 
share. However, remarkably, those imbalances almost completely disappeared 
during the two periods of democracy – 1963 to 1969 and 1993 to 2011 (Burgess et 
al., 2015:1840). 
With respect to development under the undemocratic regime, Laura Seay (2016) 
presents a fascinating analysis in “The Washington Post” (WP). According to the 
Seay (2016), regardless of how undemocratic and human rights-violating his 
behaviour might be, Kagame’s defenders tend to focus on the substantial economic 
and development gains Rwanda has made under his leadership over the last 15 
years. Seay maintained that the country’s official development statistics are 
impressive, as highlighted by poverty rates that dropped from 56.7 percent in 2005 to 
44.9 percent in 2010. Primary school enrolment has skyrocketed, and life 
expectancy is steadily growing (Seay, 2016). As in the case of Kenya, the 
progressive development achieved under undemocratic governance poses a 
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paradox. Furthermore, Seay argued that the highly touted improvements in 
development outcomes are unevenly distributed, with people in urban areas having 
far greater access to improved services and opportunities, while those opportunities 
are often much harder to access (or are absent) in rural spaces. This assertion is 
closely analogous to the literature that cites uneven regional development under 
Kenya’s personified regimes. Seay’s (2016) contention that “… one excuse 
Kagame’s supporters often give for continuing to back his rule is that in the post-
genocide context, a strong hand is necessary to guide the country out of conflict and 
into prosperity” is even more compelling. 
The researcher notes that there is a clear pattern of acquiescence of citizens to 
personified governance that is identified in the literature on Kenya and Rwanda. The 
most enigmatic finding is that some citizens perceive strong-handed dictators as 
being the country’s solution to development. Even more puzzling is the level of 
development associated with Rwanda, albeit under controversial governance 
indulgence. According to Friedman (2012:255), in the years since the genocide, 
[Rwanda] has been stable and growing economically at an impressive rate. In 
addition, the government has set out an ambitious set of goals called “Vision 2020” 
that aims to move the state into international middle-income range by the year 2020. 
The country aims to accomplish this mainly through education and the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy. We can only describe the success of this program and 
of Rwanda over the past decade as incredible (Friedman, 2012:255). Friedman 
(2012:256) maintained that the extraordinary emergence of Rwanda has centred 
predominantly on one man, President Paul Kagame. However, we should bear in 
mind that this study has extensively highlighted arguments questioning Kagame’s 
democratic credentials. Friedman echoes the foregoing assertion in his argument 
that while Mr. Kagame’s vision for the future of Rwanda includes its transition into a 
middle-income nation, it does not include the transition to a liberal democracy. [This 
contrasts with] many of Rwanda’s close neighbours and other similarly situated 
developing nations [that] suffer from tremendous corruption, siphoning off much 
needed funds (Friedman, 2012:256). On the contrary, Rwanda has engaged in an 
aggressive anti-corruption effort that has seen a large amount of success. This fact 
has also led to a boom in private foreign direct investment, fuelled in large part due 
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to personal relationships courted and developed by Kagame between himself and 
prominent international business leaders (Friedman, 2012:256). 
The above literature review highlights an intriguing perspective concerning Rwanda’s 
citizens and the international community regarding the country’s development. It is 
apparent that stakeholders seem to acquiesce to President Kagame’s undemocratic 
methods of governance, for as long as it yields the development outcomes in the 
magnitude that Rwanda is registering. Drawing on examples elsewhere, we see that 
even superpowers like China espouse a variant of development akin to Rwanda. 
Once considered an awkward, unsustainable blend of authoritarian politics and 
capitalist economics, [communist] China's growth ‘model’ has shown impressive 
resilience in recent years (Kurlantzick, 2013). In 2008 and 2009, the global economic 
crisis decimated the economies of nearly every leading democracy, while China 
surfed through the downturn virtually unscathed. China’s economy grew by nearly 9 
percent in 2009, while [so called capitalist and democratic societies like] Japan’s 
shrunk by over 5 percent, and the American economy contracted by 2.6 percent 
(Kurlantzick, 2013). The researcher argues that this development paradox is perhaps 
one of the most critical factors that engender citizen acquiescence in such 
personified regimes like Rwanda. The fact that an oppressive regime registers 
significant development milestones presents a daunting psychological enigma. 
According to Shkolnikov (2004:1), a number of developing countries in other parts of 
the world show the same popular attitudes, as citizens support regimes where 
leaders hold strong authority. Shkolnikov (2004:1) maintained that many countries 
are considering anew the view that a strong leader – a benevolent dictator – can 
lead countries to political stability and economic prosperity. Citizens in new 
democracies came to realise the unlikelihood of a constructive dialogue with public 
officials. Thus, the main fruit of democracy, participation in public policy, was 
unattainable (Shkolnikov, 2004:3). 
Therefore, in light of the manifest personification in Rwanda, why then do sections of 
Rwandese and the international community espouse Kagame’s contentious path to 
development? Friedman (2012:257) partially answers this question in his argument 
that, while the Rwandan government is decidedly authoritarian, its development of 
infrastructure, education, and health sectors, along with the creation of a niche as a 
regional telecommunications hub, has created economic growth out of the ashes of 
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genocide. For example, Rwanda’s Human Development Index (HDI) score, which 
includes health and education indicators in addition to economic growth, rose from 
0.238 points in 1990 to 0.506 points in 2013. Optimistically, Seymour (noted in 
Matfess, 2015:184) famously hypothesised that economic growth increases the odds 
of authoritarian governments giving way to democracies. Perhaps this optimism for 
an elusive democracy is what keeps Rwandese citizens endeared to the incumbent 
personified system. [Nevertheless up to now], economic growth in Rwanda has not 
strengthened democratic forces in the country. Rather, economic policies in Rwanda 
directly affiliate with the political regime and are a part of larger state intervention in 
the social sphere (Matfess, 2015:185). 
This study contends that even humanitarian aid donors seem to be perpetuating 
personified development in some countries like Rwanda. Over the past decade, 
donors increasingly abandoned their earlier commitment to democratic governance 
in recipient countries in favour of, once again, more technocratic approaches to 
development that sits well with the authoritarian policies (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 
2016:16). Hagmann and Reyntjens (2016:1) posited that in 2013, one-party regimes 
that did not allow for democratic participation and criminalised political dissent, ruled 
four of the ten most important aid recipients in Africa, namely Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Uganda and Rwanda. Again, we note that against all odds and conventional wisdom, 
Rwanda managed to attract the funding from donors to finance its development 
projects. For the citizens in Rwanda, this would look like an endorsement of 
Kagame’s personified development policies by the international community. This 
study, therefore argues that, faced with such titanic odds, the citizens do not have 
much choice other than to acquiesce to the incumbent regime. This becomes even 
more astonishing when we learn in Hagmann and Reyntjens (2016:5) that Rwanda 
managed to convince donors that governance was ‘technocratic’ and 
‘developmental’, and thus unrelated to politics and rights, which silenced their 
internal and external critics, and led to more aid being given as the country became 
more dictatorial, over time. 
In conclusion, this chapter has linked governance and development under 
personified regimes. The chapter has also brought to the fore paradoxes associated 
with citizen acquiescence to personified governance where such regimes are 
registering successes with development. Even more astonishing is the fact that 
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members of the international community, who present as champions of democracy, 
have actually ignored atrocious personification to fund undemocratic governments. In 
a bid to answer how citizens could influence national development under personified 
governance, this study has highlighted the point that complexities associated with 
personified governance transcend the capacity of disempowered citizens. 
Accordingly, East African citizens and the humanitarian international communities 
can only apply catalytic actions that would establish inclusive regimes in order to 
realise citizen participation in the development agenda. 
4.8 Conclusion of Chapter Four 
As a recap, in this section, I answered the research question “How does personified 
leadership influence governance and development policies in East Africa?” In this 
respect, I focused on empirical concepts in the theory of personification, drawn from 
literature and my own observation. I also analysed traditional African concepts of 
with respect to personified rule in East Africa. Chapter Four ended with an analysis 
of leadership actions with respect to placing national governance and development 
interests ahead of leaders’ own self-interests. 
In this section, I discussed how personified leadership correlates with the ‘servant 
leader’ model and leadership in the African culture of Ubuntu. I noted that within the 
context of this study, the ‘servant leader’ model is the opposite of personified 
leadership in that it builds trust around the leader, develops the ‘led’ by using power 
entrusted to the leader, and accommodates the opinions of others positively. 
Conversely, the egocentrism associated with personified leadership centres power 
on the national leader, thus denying citizens their inalienable rights. Thus, traditional 
African society had developed and was previously subsisting under well-defined 
indigenous governance and political systems. The philosophy of Ubuntu, for 
instance, espouses the concept of servant leadership and equal support to the 
leader by the subjects. In Kenya, the Harambee movement – a variant of Ubuntu – 
was responsible for the mobilisation of large sums of capital for a wide variety of 
basic needs, thereby fostering social inclusion and integration of populations in 
development processes. In these models of leadership, we note that society had 
understood that leadership is a relationship between leaders and followers. Thus, the 
spirit of reciprocity in traditional Africa, especially in sharing resources, empowered 
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both the leader and followers in respectable measures. Accordingly, there was thus 
little or no room for personification of systems, since society shared all resources 
symbiotically and reciprocally. The most exceptional finding is that Christians 
understand their role of being servants “on account of” Jesus. Individuals “do not 
become servant leaders by choice or desire”; however, servanthood is the result of 
an individual’s personal relationship with Christ, as the character and purposes of 
Christ become pre-eminent in an individual’s life. 
The advent of independence dismantled federal institutions with strong ethno-cultural 
foundations, thus diminishing social inclusions and humanistic concern. This study 
posits that this devious move shocked the erstwhile social, cultural and political 
transition, paving the way for the proliferation of personified governance. Most post-
independence leaders subverted prevailing traditional systems in preference for 
manipulating citizens using personified governance systems. These leaders 
manifested the eclipse of Ubuntu, indicated by the leader becoming the main centre 
of every reference, thus losing the essence of Ubuntu that focuses on community 
building. I argue that the latter illustrates how personification has distorted the 
mandate of public institutions and the very moral fabric of society, relegating its 
nationals to the status of acquiesced citizens. In particular, the advent of colonialism 
introduced models of governance that were embryonic for African society. 
Conversely, saw strong examples from traditional Rwanda, highlighting the point that 
humility keeps the egos of leaders in check, and places community strength and 
success ahead of selfish personal desires. Based on the latter, I argue that an 
essential quality will amplify the intrinsic humanity of a leader and invite trust, and 
imbue respect and honour for the persona. This quality is the humanistic concern for 
others that the philosophy of Ubuntu demonstrates – the interconnectedness of the 
‘self’ within society. 
The empirical literature reviewed in this study confirmed that that several individuals, 
acting in tandem, can tempt a leader into a pursuit of personification. On the 
contrary, respectful interactive aspects of Ubuntu that have helped traditional African 
society to live in harmony are still important for nations. For instance, one aspect of 
Ubuntu is that, at all times, the individual effectively represents the people from 
among whom he or she comes, and therefore the individual tries to behave 
according to the highest standards and to exhibit the virtues upheld by his or her 
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society. Similarly, African traditional worldview emphasises the ‘self – embedded in 
the community.’  
I then carried out a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between a 
leader’s behavioural inclination and actual leader effectiveness. We note that an 
attempt by leaders to entrench personification in the institutional framework yields 
helpless citizens who are acquiesced in the status quo. As is the case with 
personified systems, leaders decisively clamp down on any real or perceived threats 
to their power. This section highlighted the point that incumbent leaders entice their 
targets with material inducements in order to centralise power, with limited 
opposition. We also noted that the centralisation of power by national leaders is 
symptomatic of personified tendencies that exclude the masses to the benefit of a 
unique leader. In the end, I established that personified leadership styles by past 
Presidents, as in Kenya, adversely influenced governance and development policies. 
We also saw the enduring spill over effects of personification on societal structures, 
and the related challenges associated with trying to unravel and realign personified 
institutional systems that have long been designed to depend on the leader. To this 
end, this study demonstrated that citizens who have been influenced extensively by 
personified regimes over the years have metamorphosed to espouse the philosophy. 
However, strong leadership, resolute political will, and an unwavering sense of 
purpose, urgency and resilience, as in the case of President Paul Kagame, will 
spearhead isolated transformations. While I concur that it takes great leaders to 
achieve success according to the pace and scale of Rwanda, leaders still need to 
work with and through systems and institutions to achieve overall national objectives. 
Most significantly, I validated the view that, as in the case of Rwanda, the concept of 
“good governance” directly correlates to a nation’s development and efficient 
administration. The latter accentuates this study’s theory of change, to the effect that 
good leadership results in good governance and development.  
In this segment, I answered the research question “how can East African citizens 
influence national governance and development policies under personified leaders?” 
This chapter integrated the literature from preceding sections with the researcher’s 
own postulation of the probable citizen actions that arise under personified 
leadership. I established that, in order for citizens to have an effect on national 
governance and development policies under personified leaders, they must credibly 
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and accurately understand the ‘influencers’ of the incumbent leader. By 
understanding behaviour, one can predict, direct, change and control the actions of 
individuals or a group. The challenge is that even the perceived sanctity and 
supremacy of a national constitution poses no restraint to a leader with personified 
inclinations, as was the case in Kenya. Likewise, I argue that the exclusionist 
strategy practised by personified regimes renders polices unresponsive and 
irrelevant to citizens’ needs. Similarly, I established that the relationship between 
ethnicity and executive power influences the extent of public participation in national 
discourses, and in democratic transition in general. In some instances like in Kenya, 
I contend that the vice of personification has permeated the institution of law making, 
a factor that grossly hinders the unprejudiced redress of any legal issues associated 
with citizen participation and, ultimately, governance. Accordingly, the exclusion of 
the people from participating in national discourses has escalated vices such as 
corruption, nepotism, and manipulation that are bastions of personified regimes. 
I established that in the case of Rwanda, decentralisation has facilitated the 
transformation of Rwandese from a passive population, disconnected from 
governance and characterised by a high level of dependency on government and 
powerlessness, into a more engaged and active citizenry. However, the two 
dominant ethnic groups in Rwanda play a critical role in determining the participation 
of citizens under personified rule. Thus, the state system fuses with group identity 
and social stratification. I argue that for a country like Rwanda with strong ethnic 
disparities, issues pertaining to power sharing are rather complex. This is because 
power sharing involves a delicate tripartite relationship between two disparate ethnic 
groups and a governing leader. Nonetheless, if a leader is not willing to share power 
with other citizens for egoistic reasons, then equitable governance in that jurisdiction 
will fail. The result of despondency under any regime is usually acquiescence of 
citizens to personified governance. Furthermore, the acquiescence of a country’s 
judicial system to the personified interests of the national leader and their cronies 
infringes on the national freedom to participate in governance and development. This 
undermines the respect for human rights, to the extent that the State cannot meet its 
obligations to respect, fulfil and protect the rights of its citizens. 
Accordingly, this study has linked acquiescence to personified governance in the 
infancy of regime entrenchment, culminating in fully-fledged helplessness when 
270 
 
there is no change. Even more significant is the fact that elders can transmit inter-
generational acquiescence to youth, precariously obscuring the possibility of 
systemic change. The above insights underscore how personified governance can 
permeate and transform the guiding social fabric of society, rendering citizens 
distrustfully dependent on the selfish interests of callous leaders. I also illustrated the 
fact that colonial enforcement of allegiance to a centralised oppressive governance 
structure starkly fomented the genesis of systematised acquiescence. In current 
dispensations, I highlighted the occurrence of state-inspired acquiescence imposed 
upon a powerless ethnicity, as in the case of Rwanda. However, I established that 
the tolerance of citizens subjected to personified governance always culminates in 
dissension. I drew on Verga’s (2013) perspectives to highlight how citizens have 
developed strategies in difficult times to adapt to, and to learn from, transformations 
and to find sustainable alternatives to ensure a functioning community. In East 
Africa, the resilience and capacity of citizens to respond to state oppression varies 
from country to country. I illustrated the point that personified political manoeuvres 
that exclude sections of the citizenry on discriminatory grounds are bound to result in 
dissent, as in the case of Kenya. Thus, no extent of political machinations can clamp 
down on the intrinsic trigger sequestered within marginalised citizens to voice their 
dissension to oppression. I discussed the paradox that civil societies sometimes 
exhibit double standards in dealing with undemocratic governance. This is true with 
personified governments that frequently use ‘rewards’ to muzzle the middle class 
and disable civil society. Even where compliance is coercive and the opportunities 
for dissent are minimal, individuals continue to express their politics through their 
acts of resistance. 
I also ascertained that citizens use an array of tools, from peaceful dialogue to 
outright violence, to emancipate themselves from personified governance. In Kenya, 
citizens used the media to extricate themselves from the entrapment of personified 
governance. However, in extreme cases, citizens emancipate themselves through 
outright violence against personified rule. The jolting effect of the Kenyan post-
election violence of 2008 was a result of disenchantment with the immediate 
electoral cheating, overlain by deep discontent with the marginalisation, brutalisation, 
and exclusion enforced by the state. Whereas the zeal for self-emancipation can be 
a uniting force for national movements, in the case of Rwanda, it became a fracturing 
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force due to egocentricity associated with being a member of an ethnicity. The type 
of ethnicity can mean access to, or outright exclusion from, the enjoyment of national 
resources. On the other hand, moderate voices can also pose an impediment to 
opportune drives for social or political emancipation. Instead of being catalytic, they 
can easily dampen the high spirits of revolutionaries who want to change the status 
quo. As was the case in Rwanda, the failure to ally under a unified front to fight 
endemic personification usually results in societal degeneration. To this end, I posit 
that fragmented ethnic politics comprise a major deterrent to forming a unified front 
to fight the suffering meted out by personified regimes upon their citizens. 
Accordingly, there must be synchronised unity on three fronts to achieve national-
level citizen emancipation. The individual needs to align with societal ideologies. The 
society, in turn, should have a unified political agenda, and only then will a nation 
have a unified drive for national emancipation. 
Finally, I explored the interaction between acquiesced citizens and personified 
development. To appreciate the extent of acquiescence, I contextualised the 
literature at both the individual level and communal levels. I start my argument by 
pointing out that, as in the case of Kenya, authoritarian regimes usually intensify 
inequalities of wealth and power within the state. I then demonstrated that 
authoritarianism, a surrogate of personification, actually has an intricate and 
multifarious correlation with national development. However, the paradox of 
economic development being achieved under undemocratic governance and 
autocracies, rather than in some democracies, intrigues experts. Even more 
enigmatic is the fact that some citizens perceive strong-handed dictators as being 
the country’s solution to achieving development. To this end, I highlighted how 
stakeholders seem to acquiesce under undemocratic governance, for as long as 
these yield development outcomes, for example, in Rwanda currently. The foregoing 
highlights the fact that an oppressive regime registers significant development 
milestones presents a daunting psychological enigma. Similarly, humanitarian aid 
donors seem to be perpetuating personified development, as indicated by their 
abandonment of the earlier required commitment to democratic governance in 
recipient countries. Now, they prefer technocratic approaches to development that 
aligns well with authoritarian policies (Hagmann & Reyntjens, 2016:16). 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The subject of this study, personified national development and governance, has 
mesmerised humankind for a long time. The fact that there are examples of 
incumbent national leaders that strongly correlate with development and governance 
lent credence to the significance of this study. This is because personified leaders 
have successively influenced development and governance trajectories, albeit 
sometimes with mixed results, some of which were avoidable. The study is even 
more significant for East Africa where there is pertinent concern about the objectivity 
of policymaking processes in the region. Instead of championing inclusive national 
participation, some leaders govern East African countries using retrograde 
ideologies, indicative of restrictive executive interests. Underlying these interests is 
usually a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty leaders impose on 
hapless masses. The egocentric system allows incumbent leaders to squander 
public resources to prop up their restrictive governance systems, with dire 
consequences for inclusive development. Accordingly, the study unravelled the 
fundamentals of personified policies and suggests a platform for leaders, citizens 
and other relevant stakeholders to seek common solutions for sustainable 
governance and development. 
In trying to unravel the intricacies of personification, this thesis delved deep into 
inherent factors that elicit personified tendencies in national leaders. The supporting 
literature review took me through an adventurous journey of human exploration and 
transformation, traversing disciplines like spirituality, biology, philosophy, 
psychology, religion, politics, economics and ecology. Due to the copious amount of 
literature at hand, I had to rely on advanced computer technology, as well as manual 
analysis, to arrive at answers from an epistemological perspective, while ensuring 
that my approach to the problem aligned well with the study’s research questions. 
The scope and depth of my research yielded significant insights into the subject of 
personified governance and development in East Africa. These findings will have 
major implications for defining the interactions between citizens and their leaders. 
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5.2 Restatement of the purpose 
The objective of my study was to understand how personified governance correlates 
with development in the East African region. More specifically, this research sought 
to comprehend how national leaders, who play a critical role in shaping governance 
and development, metamorphose progressively to assume personified inclinations. 
Because personified leadership is defined by rather complex relationships, this 
thesis also sought to understand the role that citizens played in abetting or deterring 
personified reign. The researcher hoped that the outcome of the research would 
enable national and international stakeholders to better contextualise personified 
leadership within the context of national governance and development. Ultimately, 
this research aims to equip experts and other interested parties with tools to identify 
leaders with personified inclinations, and eventually develop appropriate solutions to 
respond to personified actions. 
5.3 Summary of main points  
The overriding purpose of this study was to undertake a literature review in order to 
understand the genesis of personified leadership, how such leadership influences 
national governance and development policies in East Africa, and whether such 
leadership styles consider citizen participation in national discourses. The study also 
sought to develop best-practice criteria for citizen-driven development policies that 
transcend personified governance in East Africa. 
My theoretical findings established that the degree of animistic thinking in a child, 
coupled with external influences on the cognitive development of the same 
individual, right from their childhood through adolescence to adulthood, has a direct 
bearing on the leadership style of the subject individual. However, in some cases, 
external influences on a subject leader, even in adolescence, such as parental 
actions, socio-economic status, peer pressure, ethnicity, and political affiliations, also 
played a critical role in shaping an individual’s leadership inclination. Of equal 
significance, I found that an individual who is born and raised in a particular national 
culture, and who lives most of their life in a nation state in which they are a citizen, 
assume a “nationalised personality structure” fundamental to a subject state-society. 
This conceptual construct clearly links an individual personality structure to the 
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progression (or lack of progression) of political and socio-economic factors in a 
nation state. This study highlights the point that the connection of a personified 
leader to state systems inevitably infuses the leader’s influences into such 
institutions, to the extent that the state starts projecting the essential character of the 
leader. Since states do not operate in a vacuum, a personified national system often 
permeates into the realms of the “international balance of power.” 
One of the themes to emerge from my analysis is that personified inclinations in 
national leaders can be traced to specific “triggers” in their upbringing that elicit and 
catalyse predominant egocentric outlook and actions. This study found that when 
unchecked, leaders with personified inclinations plunge into a delusionary state 
where they cannot differentiate their persona from the state institutions that they 
lead. The common thread in a personified reign is that it produces two cadres of 
nationals: acquiesced citizens, whom personified systems pummel into submission 
using the sheer power of state resources, and a small band of supporters who prop 
up and benefit from the regime. Citizens, as in the case of Rwanda, can actually 
promote the personification of the leadership, and ultimately the forced acquiescence 
of other ethnicities to their preferred leader. 
The findings suggest that self-perpetuity and egocentrism is a strong motivational 
factor for personified national leadership in East Africa. In this respect, all leaders 
who gravitate towards personified tendencies first begin by subverting national 
constitutions and simultaneously undermining democratic ideals. On the other hand, 
undercurrents of resilience motivate oppressed citizens to explore avenues for 
wresting power back from personified regimes. It is this resilience that culminates in 
mass mobilisation actions that peak in regime change, and the cycle continues. 
I also found that personified leadership was a major perceived influence on the 
quality of national governance and development. In this respect, my analysis 
traversed from traditional to contemporary models of governance, and examined the 
latter’s correlation with development. This study established that personified 
leadership is a deviation from Africa’s consensus-based systems like Ubuntu. 
Accordingly, reverting to an Afro-centric view of leadership requires a reconnection 
with African indigenous knowledge that endorses factors such as supportiveness, 
relationships and extended networks. In Afrocentric models, people influence the 
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direction that their leader should take when it comes to governance issues, and 
leadership is about serving the people. Regarding the foregoing, this study 
established that “servant leadership” correlates ideally with the Ubuntu philosophy. 
The servant leader fosters “interconnectedness of self within society and the 
extension of humanness within shared community”, as happened in the case of 
Rwanda. However, the above findings also yielded certain paradoxes in leadership 
styles. 
For instance, Rwanda under Kagame exhibits a peculiarity with developmental 
patrimonialism, where politically generated opportunities for profit are 
institutionalised and centralised, and where economic rents are deployed efficiently 
with a view to longer-term development. In Rwanda, Kagame has drawn on the 
Ubudehe as a unique policy for promoting citizens’ collective action in partnership 
with a government committed to decentralisation. Ubudehe emphasises a 
community-level approach that empowers citizens to play a lead role in alleviating 
poverty in their own villages. This particular model of governance highlighted the fact 
that a blend of good tenets from traditional and contemporary governance can 
potentially deliver development results in a given polity. In a departure from 
contentious servant leadership models, I found that the Christian perspective offers a 
more practical ideological, philosophical, theological and religious solution. 
According to the teachings in the Bible, individuals “do not become servant leaders 
by choice or desire”; however, servanthood is the result of an individual’s personal 
relationship with Christ, as the character and purposes of Christ become pre-eminent 
in an individual’s life. The Bible teaches that, as an individual becomes obedient to 
the covenants associated with God, one’s nature is changed, as virtue is added to 
faith, followed by knowledge (or testimony), temperance (or self-discipline), patience, 
godliness, brotherly kindness, and charity (2 Pet. 1:5–8). This perspective removes 
complete reliance on intrinsic or external influences on a leader’s character, and 
draws on the divine essence of Christ to guide the leader. 
With respect to citizens’ participation in national governance and development, this 
study found that it is better to have an engaged, rather than a passive, citizenry. 
Accordingly, with citizen participation, formulated policies might more realistically 
reflect citizen preferences. The researcher argues that engaging citizens directly in 
national policy processes would enable incumbent governments to gain support, 
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build consensus, identify acceptable solutions, and ensure operability. However, as 
in the case of Kenya in 2007, the exclusion of citizens from participating in national 
governance has a ‘price’ – mass uprising, anarchy and popular revolts. In some 
instances, in response to undemocratic regimes as in Rwanda, citizens practise 
three specific types of everyday resistance: staying on the side-lines; irreverent 
compliance; and withdrawn muteness. In cases where there is limited functionality of 
the constitution, for example in the 2007 Kenyan parliamentary elections, citizens 
assert their authority by massively voting out the cronies of personified regimes. 
Similarly, despite threatening, censorship and gagging, Kenyan citizens have also 
used the media to express their discontent with personified governance.  
5.4 Relationship with previous research 
The outcomes of my literature study align well with findings from previous research 
to the extent that it identifies the fact that cognitive development has an impact on 
individual perception of the self and the world at large. Research on human 
development is a relatively recent endeavour. Elder (noted in Berk, 2007:5) asserted 
that studies of children did not begin until the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Investigations into adult development, aging, and change over the course 
of life emerged only in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, speculations about how 
people grow and change have existed for centuries (Berk, 2007:5). Many of these 
studies characterise individual development from childhood to adulthood as a 
smooth continuous process, while others posit that individuals develop more 
discretely in a series of ‘stable’ stages. However, whether growth is linear or 
staggered, the theory of personified leadership focuses more on how the intrinsic 
changes within an individual shape their perceptions of their surroundings. This 
breakthrough approach to analysing an individual’s transition to adulthood can 
consistently point out factors that potentially shape a leader’s governance style. My 
findings also largely align with existing theoretical, philosophical and empirical 
constructs that relate governance and development. The emphasis of this study is 
that the mode of governance adopted by any leader determines development 
outcomes. Similarly, by focusing on leadership action, this study answers one of the 
main concepts from earlier work, highlighting how experts struggle with 
characterising “good governance” in relation to societal development. 
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However, my conclusions run counter to the conventional, widely expressed views 
posited by several theories of leadership, most of which are extensively covered in 
Chapter Two of this thesis. On the contrary, by combining childhood animism, 
cognitive development, and external influence on the individual, I was able to 
formulate a new “theory of personification.” Unlike other similar studies, my approach 
to leadership analysis is unique because it considers the full continuum of a leader’s 
evolution, from childhood to maturity, and correlates this with subsequent leadership 
actions. Of equal significance, I established that consistent egocentric actions 
implemented under leaders practising personified reign breeds a sizeable class of 
“acquiesced citizens.” To the best of my knowledge, no previous research has 
identified this class of subjugated citizens. This highlights the point that scholars, 
researchers, and experts have overtly focused on tertiary issues like leadership, 
while paying little attention to primary factors like citizens who are subject to the 
leaders. I argue that understanding the subject of acquiescence is a critical step to 
inspiring or mobilising masses to counter personified reign. 
My findings are (to some extent) at odds with the sparse literature that makes 
inferences regarding personalised politics in which individual expressive personal 
action dislodges collective actions. In this respect, the personalisation of politics 
largely assumes that people are mobilised around a “common identity”. Some 
authors assert that examples of personalised politics have long existed, of course, in 
the form of populist uprisings or emotional bonds with charismatic leaders (Bennett, 
2012:22). With respect to institutions, Rahat and Shaefer (noted in Mazzoleni, 
Barnhurst, Ikeda, Wessler & Maia, 2015:945) posited that institutional 
personalisation refers to the “adoption of rules, mechanisms, and institutions that put 
more emphasis on the individual politician and less on groups and parties.” They 
maintained that “more power is granted to leaders in case of centralized 
personalization, and to individual politicians generally in the case of decentralized 
personalization.” “[Experts] have identified several factors as key drivers of 
personalization. Some of them are the pervasiveness of the media in the political 
process, the intensified economic orientation, and the modernization of society and 
changes in the political system (Holtz-Bacha, Langer & Merkle, 2014:154).” Holtz-
Bacha et al. (2014:154) maintained that “modernization, in its sociological sense, has 
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led to a weakening of the traditional social ties that used to determine an individual’s 
path through life.” 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that experts on the subject of 
personalisation concentrate more on the external factors that drive individuals, 
groups or institutions. Similarly, proponents of the personalisation concept suggest 
that people confer power upon a leader in “centralized personalization.” The latter 
falls short in considering the intrinsic factors that catalyse egoistic inclinations in 
leaders, as the theory of personification depicts. This divergence highlights how the 
concept of personalisation omits critical factors that shape a leader’s social, political, 
economic and cultural orientation. This accentuates my submission that this thesis 
will contribute significantly to the understanding of leadership as it relates to 
governance and development. 
5.5 Possible explanations for the findings 
Theoretical and empirical studies on governance emphasise mainly two distinctive 
themes. There are those who view governance as being concerned with the rules of 
conducting public affairs, on the one hand, and those, on the other hand, who see it 
as steering or controlling public affairs (Hydén & Court, 2002:7). Some analysts treat 
governance as being reflected in human intention and action, whereas others view 
governance as an ongoing phenomenon that is hard to pin down, but which bears on 
how results are achieved (Hydén & Court, 2002:7). 
I argue that researchers have paid limited attention to the fundamental role of the 
national leader in shaping the governance trajectory. In particular, it is not clear how 
citizens can overcome the personified inclinations of any given leader in order to 
enjoy democratic reign. The latter is complicated by the fact that to-date, there is no 
clear methodology, if any, for predicting personified tendencies in aspiring or 
incumbent leaders. In this study, I contend that this deficiency is what led to the birth 
of the terminology “good governance”, a term that shows that the word ‘governance’ 
needs to be qualified by a suffix. In the absence of concrete agreement on the 
definition of key terminologies that characterise national policies, experts are bound 
to interpret leadership actions differently. This singular factor, especially on the 
blurred definition of ‘governance’, heavily influenced my line of thought in this thesis. 
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The other thematic area I covered in this study is the subject of ‘development’. This 
term also has its unique definitional challenges. Like its counterpart – governance – 
the term ‘development’ that is heavily used by experts globally also has its own 
unique definitional challenges. For this reason, experts add the suffix ‘sustainable’ to 
buttress the word ‘development’. Tacconi and Tisdell (1993:411) accentuate my 
point in their assertion that, from its inception more than 20 years ago, the concept of 
‘sustainable development’ has undergone substantial changes. Originally, it was 
used to indicate the need for a pattern of economic development compatible with the 
physical limits set by the natural environment. However, the concept has recently 
been used in a broader sense to indicate the need for a balanced and sustainable 
development of the ecological, political, social and economic systems. In this 
respect, I argue that the term ‘development’ has assumed several dimensions, 
ranging from connoting a process, condition or a given state of existence. However, 
during the course of this study, I found very limited reference or no literature at all 
that links the cognitive growth of a leader to the subsequent personified actions that 
affect national development. This gap in the literature offered me the liberty to 
interpret the relationship between leaders and development in a manner that favours 
the theory of personification. Had there been substantive studies, the outcome of this 
thesis would have perhaps been different.  
The above two scenarios are methodologically challenging for many reasons. It goes 
a long way to show that the highly complex behaviours which are often of interest, 
for instance personified leadership, are difficult to measure, and sophisticated state-
of-the-art statistical procedures often are required. It is made even more daunting by 
the fact that political actors are difficult to engage with as research participants. This 
makes it difficult to link an individual leader’s persona to their actions, say in 
governance or development outcomes. A leader’s political behaviour is only one 
aspect of his or her total behaviour as a social being. The scanty literature on these 
subjects, which was mainly comprised of secondary information, highlights the 
complexity of conducting research on leaders. For instance, scholars of political 
behaviour find it relatively easy to identify the bases of power or the scope of power 
(Lasswell & Kaplan, noted in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
2008), but power relationships are extraordinarily difficult to identify and even more 
difficult to measure (Dahl, noted in International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
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Sciences, 2008). Thus, we can significantly improve the outcome of research on 
personified leadership by applying methodological sophistication, which largely 
draws on primary research.  
Moreover, part of the maze of literature that I had to triangulate to understand the 
concept of leadership personality traversed through culture, biology, economics, 
politics and sociology. Throughout my navigation, I encountered challenges in trying 
to link leadership actions with the responses of their subjects. Even more complex 
was my attempt to pinpoint the catalytic momentum that would galvanise citizen 
actions against personified regimes. In order to define the relationships, I had to 
combine theoretical and empirical literature to find a middle ground. However, even 
the dearth of literature I reviewed still came short of predicting mass actions against 
personified regimes. This is partly because the prediction of such actions entails the 
understanding of individual motivation – a gigantic task given the numbers entailed. 
Again, this gap in the literature gave me the liberty to interpret the study information 
in a manner that advances the theory of personification. 
The above-cited possible explanations for the findings also, to an extent, highlight 
the limitations that I encountered during conducting this study. Accordingly, the next 
section delves deeper into the scope of this study to shed more light on the 
limitations of the study, taking into account sources of potential bias or imprecision.  
5.6 Study limitations 
I should stress that my study has been primarily concerned with the impact of 
personified leadership action on national governance and development. In order not 
to be rigidly prescriptive, the definition of ‘personified’ was limited to the context of 
governance and development in this research. More specifically, this study did not 
focus on the cumulative contribution of other persons to the success or failure of 
subject national leaders. This is a significant limitation because we know that leaders 
do not act in a vacuum. However, the latter does not in any way diminish the findings 
in this study. To the contrary, I argue that each leader is solely responsible for their 
actions, and as this thesis highlights, several leaders deliberately pursue personified 
actions with the sole objective of furthering their individual interests. Likewise, a 
longitudinal study of the research the problem, for example leadership evolution and 
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transformation, was too complex and required much more time. Thankfully, the body 
of literature presented useful paradigms that furnished this study with a plausible 
conceptual model of leadership development and its potential impacts on 
governance and development. 
Additionally, I only studied in detail issues pertaining to the role of national leaders in 
the EAC, and the options available to citizens to respond to personified actions. In 
this respect, this study only covered five out of the 22 East African countries. I 
particularly zeroed in on the geographically extensive countries of the EAC namely: 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi because they have a rich ethnic 
diversity – most of whom share a common heritage and socio-economic conditions. 
These countries also generally face a relatively high leadership turnover largely due 
to the similar political dispensations in the region. All the above factors conspire to 
complicate the study. I deliberately applied a case study methodology that focused 
on two countries, Kenya and Rwanda, whose characteristics I reckoned were 
generalizable to the other three cohorts. In this instance, the case study 
methodology enabled me to investigate and explore the available literature more 
thoroughly and deeply to gain new insights regarding personified governance and 
development in the EAC. My primary concern here was not in targeting samples for 
proportionality. However, the largest limitation I faced in the above respect pertained 
to the difficulty in generalising conclusions by studying only one country. I therefore 
had to focus on two countries, as already described above. The methodology was 
also prone to possible biases in data collection. To this end, I relied on non-
probability judgement to draw study samples from the population of interest. 
Accordingly, the people whom I surveyed did not truly comprise a random sample, 
which is also a limitation. I quickly noted that this method is not suitable for samples 
where the size of both the universe and the sample is considerably large. In other 
words, it was not easy for this study to achieve a plausible level of significance due 
to the small size of the sample.  
The lack of data or paucity of reliable data led me to limit the scope of my analysis 
and the size of my sample. In particular, my reliance on third party reporting, 
punctuated by restrictive atmospheres in some countries, limited accurate data 
compilation on values, power relations and individual actions of leaders. The secrecy 
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surrounding leaders and citizen behaviours exacerbated the latter difficulty, 
rendering some research outcomes attributional or proximal. I also faced strong 
limitations in accessing data on the internet, since most peer-reviewed journal 
articles are only accessible at a fee or on purchase. I therefore spent much time 
navigating the web, trying to build up literature from fragments of publications, and 
largely, from freely accessible databases and online libraries. 
With respect to the research methodology, I extensively consulted readily accessible 
published material that might have understated or exaggerated the effect of 
personified leadership. In terms of depth of material, I only managed to access some 
limited volumes of unpublished material. Similarly, the overtly subjective sampling 
procedure applied in the study decreased the representativeness of the sampled 
material relative to the geographic area of coverage. In this regard, the statistical 
significance of my findings may vary when compared to wide-ranging dissertations 
and other unpublished research. Accordingly, I was concerned about the selection 
bias arising out of the highly subjective meta-analytical approach. However, I used 
computer software that corrected or balanced my conclusions arising out of my 
methodological approach. I therefore believe that the outcomes of my systematic 
research is replicable, rational and independent, ultimately leading to the 
construction of viable new knowledge. 
5.7 Implications of my findings 
My study offers suggestive evidence that whereas personified leadership is a factual 
phenomenon, the accessible literature is vague on how personification affects 
governance and development policy. In this respect, the challenge posed in Chapter 
One of this study is clear: despite the institutionalisation of several national 
development policies and so-called governance pillars, there is limited citizen 
participation in national discourses. This is largely because of restrictive executive 
interests that are driven by a deep-seated desire for self-entrenchment that crafty 
leaders impose on hapless masses. This egocentrism allows incumbent leaders to 
misuse public resources to the advantage of incumbents and loyalists. 
Consequently, mismanagement pervades society, weakening it severely, resulting in 
the national institutions assuming the personified attributes of incumbent leaders. 
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In Chapter Two, this study linked the theory of personification to various traditional, 
classical, philosophical and contemporary theories of leadership. This was significant 
in grounding personified leadership within the existing literature. This analytical 
adventure enabled me to coin a new definition of the term ‘personification’ that will 
now hopefully find usability in the annals of literature. One significant finding in this 
chapter is that mental states, moods and attitudes precipitate specific behavioural 
responses in personalities that ultimately characterise the personalities of individual 
national leaders. The implication of the latter is that behavioural analysts could 
potentially decipher the personality traits that drive national governance and 
development policies. Of equal significance in this chapter is the finding that culture 
and socialisation patterns also shape a national leader’s disposition. This points to 
the fact that external factors shape a leader’s perception of the world. The theoretical 
implication is that we can now trace leadership actions to specific intrinsic or external 
stimuli and influences in a leader’s cognitive development. 
In Chapter Three, I draw on philosophical, traditional and empirical concepts on 
leadership to guide my discussions on how personified leadership relates with 
governance and development. One key finding, with significant implications, is that 
social empowerment constitutes a threat to the interests of personified systems. This 
is because under personified dispositions, self-interested powerful national leaders 
usually use their positions to constrain, rather than empower, the masses. The latter 
is not helped by the blurred definition of the term ‘good governance’. The varied 
interpretations of good governance render it challenging to measure, and then use 
such measures to inform national policy processes. In addition, autocratic leaders 
exploit disparities in the definitions of good governance to rationalise their actions. 
The lack of conceptual clarity when it comes to ‘good governance’ poses a problem 
for the practical outcomes that development institutions and the like are trying to 
achieve. This significantly limits the ability to measure the causal relationship 
between governance and development outcomes. Accordingly, this study offers a 
solution to the effect that the concept of governance, whether good or bad, can 
actually be evaluated from the perspective of a leader. This breakthrough removes 
the ambiguity that has hitherto delinked governance actions from development 
outcomes.  
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In Chapter Four, I focused on the interplay of traditional concepts of African 
leadership with personified governance and development, as exemplified in 
contemporary models of leadership. The objective of this section was to identify a 
suite of strategies, if any, that citizens could apply to overcome personified 
leadership in East Africa. From the outset, this chapter pointed out that the spirit of 
reciprocity in traditional Africa, especially in sharing resources, traditionally 
empowered both the leader and followers in respectable measures. Thus, the 
exclusion of citizens from sharing the “national cake” has a ‘price’ – mass uprising, 
anarchy and popular revolts, as was the case in Kenya in 2007. In countries like 
Rwanda, strong ethnic disparities render issues pertaining to power sharing rather 
complex. This is because power sharing involves a delicate tripartite relationship 
between two disparate ethnic groups and a governing leader. In this instance, 
Rwanda failed the litmus test when the power-sharing Arusha Accord (1993), which 
was designed to avert the 1994 genocide, failed to mitigate violence because it 
lacked such necessary factors as an able and committed leadership. The lessons 
learnt in this regard is that, with better governance as is the case in Rwanda now, 
power sharing becomes a real possibility. On the other hand, Chapter Four 
highlighted the challenges of dealing with acquiesced citizens. For instance, the 
deep-rooted phenomenon of acquiescence in Kenya’s socio-political fabric has far-
reaching influences, going into institutional systems such as the judiciary. Once the 
sanctity of the judiciary is compromised, the “unconnected” citizens are bound to 
suffer injustices, to the benefit of the personified interests of the national leader and 
their cronies. This is evident in Kenya, where corruption has undermined respect for 
human rights within the country because of personified governance. 
As a response to combat acquiescence in personified systems, citizens have 
developed strategies to adapt to and learn from transformations, and to find 
sustainable alternatives to ensure a functioning community. Citizen resilience in 
times of crises highlights the enduring lessons from East Africa that local 
communities are not passive victims in the face of state failure. In extreme cases, 
citizens emancipate themselves through outright violence against personified rule. 
An example of the foregoing is the jolting effect of the Kenyan post-election violence 
of 2008, which stemmed directly from the nature of the existing constitution, which 
promoted a ‘winner takes all’ mentality and supported the unequal distribution of the 
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national wealth. Conversely, moderate voices can present an impediment to 
opportune drives for social or political emancipation, or even to resilience to bad 
governance. Instead of being catalytic, moderate citizens can easily dampen the 
high spirits of revolutionaries who want to change the status quo. This may lead to 
national discord, as was the case in Rwanda in 1993 where citizens failed to ally 
under a unified front to fight endemic personification, resulting in the minority Tutsi 
seeking solace in personal redemption, at whatever cost. Now there is a clear 
paradox emerging in Rwanda, where some citizens perceive strong-handed dictators 
as being the country’s solution to development. Even more puzzling is the level of 
rapid development associated with Rwanda’s current regime. This goes a long way 
to demonstrate that some citizens can put up with acquiesce to undemocratic 
methods of governance, as long as these yield development outcomes in the 
magnitude that Rwanda is registering. 
 Theoretical Implication 
Whereas many persons have exhaustively studied the subject of personality in 
psychology, no explicit attempt has been made to link the formative behavioural 
stimuli in children to personified disposition in adult individuals subsisting in a defined 
socio-cultural system. Therefore, one significant contribution of this study to the body 
of literature is in tracing the root cause of an individual’s inclination to insinuate their 
personae into national systems and institutions, solely for their personal or sectarian 
gain. This study will enable the scientific analysis of the attitude-behavioural 
correlational construct, with respect to self-interest or egoistic tendencies. 
Moreover, this study will also enable theorists to model possible singular or collective 
human actions in a given polity, based on the cognitive development and ecological 
influences of the leader in question. This study offers conceptual clarifications to 
theoretical ambiguities related to the underlying “problem” of singular or collective 
action, specifically on how to model social dilemma situations in the fields of 
governance and development that other theoretical predictions have not explained. 
Ultimately, the study will provide a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis of 
individual leadership impact on national governance and development policies. 
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This study has revealed that personification, as a behavioural paradigm, assumes 
two fundamentally incongruent dimensions. On the one hand, individuals exhibiting 
personified tendencies may demonstrate benevolent attributes, as in the case of 
Julius Nyerere, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania. Conversely, 
individuals exhibiting personified tendencies may demonstrate a malevolent 
disposition, as in the case of Jean Baptiste Bagaza, former President of Burundi. 
Accordingly, this thesis underscores the need for greater transparency in behavioural 
studies, which currently might be inhibiting the use of behavioural insights to 
understand the complex concept of leadership. Thus, the use of behavioural insights 
to understand the concept of leadership will potentially induce an explicit shift in the 
modus operandi of national governance, a factor that will ultimately stimulate 
national development.  
In light of the above, an area that requires further research is the occurrence of 
personified tendencies in socio-cultural groupings, as in the case of the Tutsi and 
Hutu ethnicities that straddle the nations of Rwanda and Burundi. These ethnicities 
show a manifestation of personal behavioural inclinations that are sequestered in 
unique individuals who are motivated by a collective affinity to personify an entire 
national polity for their own sectarian benefit. Further research needs to be 
conducted on the impact of acquiescence on determining the courses of action 
available to citizens who are faced with personified governance and development. 
 Policy implication 
Several attempts have been made to achieve sustainable governance and 
development in East Africa, without much success. Experts have adduced many 
explanations to rationalise endemic corruption, politically inspired murders, 
exclusions, deliberate marginalisation of citizens, and so forth. However, most 
accounts have fallen short due to the lack of credible evidence to validate the 
assertions. Accordingly, this study endeavoured to unravel the implications for public 
policy of the underlying factors that determine how leaders make governance and 
development decisions. 
In this study, I have highlighted how personification restrains a given nation from 
reaching its full potential. My theory shows that, in addition to hampering national 
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development, personification permeates and cripples different levels of society. With 
an acquiesced citizenry unable to overcome personified systems, policy makers are 
faced with a challenge of how to develop sustainable and inclusive policies. A key 
implication in our context is that policy makers should understand how to navigate 
the policy cycle in personified countries, as in the case of East African nations. As 
this study highlights, the inclusion of citizens in national discourses through robust 
power-sharing arrangements, as in the case of Rwanda, is ideal for achieving 
sustainable national governance and development.  
Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, this study explained the genesis of 
personified inclination, which ultimately concentrates power in the hands of individual 
leaders and their cronies. The rise of egocentrism, where powerful individuals 
impose their logic on those without any means or political backing to counter 
leadership excesses, is socio-economically debilitating. The net impact of the 
concentration of power is that certain segments of society are rendered ineffective, 
and thus economically unproductive. Therefore, countries that face personified 
governance need to pursue robust institutional reforms to disintegrate personified 
systems in order to achieve sustainable development across the board. The 
plausible policy implication is that there is unlikely to be significant progress in the 
incorporation of sustainability into national economic and development policymaking 
in the absence of a clearer understanding of personified leadership. 
Finally, this study provides a basis for leaders, citizens and other relevant 
stakeholders to find common solutions that will advance sustainable development 
policy and governance strategies. As with the case of the well-documented subject 
of criminal profiling, I provide a basis for conceptualising a leadership style and 
possible policy actions associated with the subject individual. It provides decision-
makers with an opportunity for including plurality from a scientific and development 
point of view, which has positive consequences in advancing institutional, societal 
and strategic political, economic and social resilience across the nation. 
5.8 Recommendations 
Without further research being conducted into the cognitive development of 
individuals who become national leaders, it will not be possible to decipher the direct 
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impact of those leaders on national governance and development. It is therefore 
most relevant to investigate scientifically how the holistic development of an 
individual from childhood to adulthood affects the individual’s perception of life, to the 
extent of manifesting personified inclinations. In light of the above, I make the 
recommendations set out below.  
 Governance and development policy 
This study has compellingly illustrated that any national development effort in East 
Africa, which does not factor in the effects of personified governance, is bound to 
falter, right from the start. The study highlighted the point that the relationship 
between governance and development is more than correlational, it is causal: good 
governance makes development possible (Grindle, 2007:4). Most importantly, good 
governance itself depends on the integrity of the national leader. Where the leader 
has personified inclinations, these pose a danger of perverting the governance 
trajectory. Equally, the dynamics presented by citizens who acquiesce to, or even 
support, personified systems complicate the intricate link between governance and 
development. Yet, citizens comprise the ideal grouping to overcome any personified 
regime. Accordingly, I recommend the advancement of a model that capitalises on a 
shared national agenda to catalyse citizen-driven counter-action against personified 
governance and development. This will require equally strong direction to be given 
by effective, visionary leaders who can sustain the momentum to dislodge a 
personified regime, using non-violent, but compelling, national agenda. 
To complement the above, East African regional governments should build strong 
judiciaries that act as the custodians of constitutionalism that is required to achieve 
sustainable development. The recent nullification of the 2017 presidential elections in 
Kenya accentuates the above recommendation. It was the first example in Africa in 
which a court nullified the re-election of an incumbent. Mr. David Maraga, the court’s 
chief justice, declared the result “invalid, null and void” after ruling for the opposition, 
which had argued that the vote had been electronically manipulated to assure a 
victory for President Uhuru Kenyatta (Kimiko de Freytas, 2017, writing in The New 
York Times). The New York Times maintained that the ruling also offered a potent 
display of judicial independence on a continent where courts often come under 
intense pressure from political leaders. In corroboration of the latter, contemporary 
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scholarship highlights the fact that the issue of whether a government has the means 
to bend the judiciary to its will depends not only on its appointment power, but also 
on variables such as the ability of the political branches to agree among themselves 
on how to deter or reverse interference with the judiciary. A hamstrung political actor 
poses little threat to a defiant judiciary (Ferejohn & Weingast; Spiller & Gely; Epstein 
& Knight, noted in Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009:347). 
Courts, like constitutions, may provide a focal point around which citizens can 
collaborate to protect their rights (Weingast, noted in Helmke & Rosenbluth, 
2009:348). In dictatorships and in unstable democracies, where a culture of 
democratic norms may not exist, an independent judiciary committed to rights 
protection may provide an important substitute. Yet, [in dictatorships and in unstable 
democracies] judicial independence is likely to be the most fragile. Thus, although 
there may be situations in which authoritarian leaders use laws to govern, which we 
might term “rule by law” (or “rule of will”), in no case is “rule of law,” which entails 
non-arbitrariness, fully achieved (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009:348). I argue that the 
above observation highlights that impartial judiciaries can check personified regimes 
by bolstering the efforts of citizens to advance democracy. Therefore, I recommend 
that the establishment of a strong judicial system to complement the advancement of 
the model that capitalises on a shared national agenda to catalyse citizen-driven 
counter-action. Whether or not courts seem impotent in the face of personified 
regimes, stakeholders may nevertheless consult court records to search for ways to 
seek redress, long after the demise of the dictatorship.  
 Researchers 
This thesis relied explicitly on a literature review to unravel the occurrence of 
personified reign in East Africa. During the course of the study, I found indications 
that personification possibly runs beyond national leadership. Accordingly, experts 
need to conduct a more detailed scientific study to understand how personification 
has permeated through different strata of society. This study surmises that years of 
cyclical personified rule across the region have yielded a societal generation that 
perceives personified tendencies as being “routine.” Accordingly, further research on 
the subject would help us to understand whether a major paradigm shift has 
occurred in socio-political behaviours in the region, resulting in a bias towards 
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personified reign. Confirmation of the latter would enable experts to formulate 
behavioural change interventions needed to salvage an acquiesced community from 
plunging irredeemably into accepting personified predispositions.  
Furthermore, due to challenges cited in the limitation section above, this study did 
not exhaustively capture behavioural information on incumbent national leaders so 
as to unvaryingly identify their genesis to personified reign. I recommend that experts 
should conduct further methodological work on how to analyse robustly the cognitive 
development of leaders. This would enhance better scientific prediction of leaders’ 
inclinations to personified reign earlier in their careers. Stakeholders would also be 
able to predict accurately the possible personification predisposition of individuals 
who offer themselves for election to leadership offices. 
5.9 Generalisation of the study beyond East Africa  
Taking into consideration the critical implications of personified reign for governance 
and development, I suggest the scientific replication of this thesis beyond East Africa 
to determine whether my findings are generalizable within different contexts, 
populations and locations in Africa. This is important because the types of 
development challenges facing the East Africa region, such as high rates of maternal 
and child mortality, cyclical poverty and inequality, corruption and weak institutions, 
are similar to the challenges other countries in Africa are facing. Accordingly, a 
scientific replication would help to determine whether the same study would generate 
a different outcome under different social, economic, political and cultural conditions. 
The outcome would be particularly useful for informing social sciences, such as 
sociology, psychology, and economics. Ultimately, I envisage that the scientific 
replication would empirically support the results of my thesis, by clarifying my 
observations and extending their overall generalisability. 
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